

ART AND REPRESENTATION

contributions to contemporary
AESTHETICS

edited by

ANANTA CH. SUKLA

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In the sacred memory of my late parents,

JAYAKRUSHNA SUKLA

and

PABITRA KUMARI DEBI

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A.C.S.

Introduction

ANANTA CH. SUKLA

I

Representation is basically an ocular concept that explains the dualistic nature of human experience. It refers to the relation between two items in our experience—the internal and the external, the mind and the world. The oldest form of this concept is the Greek *mimesis* and its cognate terms used by Plato for explaining the nature of the physical world in terms of a dualistic relation between abstract concepts and material phenomena—the intelligible “Ideas” (in the Platonic sense) and the sensible objects as the impressions/reflections/imitations of these Ideas that are *sui generis*. Although the fundamental question as to the independence of *phaeomenon* of *Eidos* remained unanswered in Plato, the mimetic structure of Plato’s metaphysical understanding continued through the centuries until it acquired a transformation in the epistemology of the seventeenth-century philosophers who substituted the word *mimesis* with *representation* to explain the nature of human knowledge. The word in its Latin origin *repraesentare* meant “to make present or manifest or to present again” confining the referent almost exclusively to inanimate objects that are literally brought into someone’s presence—to present/embody/manifest an abstract idea/thought through/in a concrete object or even sometimes to substitute one object for another. In the Middle Ages the word meant mostly a mystical embodiment “applied to the Christian community in its most incorporeal aspects”—the religious leaders representing (embodying) Christ and the Apostles. When the medieval jurists considered a community as a person, that is, *representing* a person (*persona repraesentata*), representation was associated with “fiction”/artificiality: not a real *person* but a person by representation only. The Latin *persona*, the present associate of representation “signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage, and sometimes more particularly, that part of it, which distinguishes the face, as a mask or vizard . . . he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name.”¹

Late in the fourteenth century, along with its Latin signification such as "to bring oneself or another into the presence of someone," "to symbolize or embody," it also brought a significant addition "to bring before the mind." In the fifteenth century there were other significant additions to the signification of representation, that is, image, likeness/picture and production or staging of plays. Subsequently in the late sixteenth century the word "representer" was used to mean "one who engages in the activity of painting, producing a play and creating representations." In addition to inanimate objects, "representation" also referred to human beings themselves functioning as the image, embodiment, or symbol of something standing for something absent. Finally by the mid-seventeenth century, the word gave way to its use for the parliamentarians referring to their substituted presence for the people whom they stand for insofar as acting for them.

Hanna Pitkin in her exhaustive study of political representation categorizes the phenomenon into three basic groups: *formalistic*, *standing for*, and *acting for*. She observes that political representation, according to the definition of Thomas Hobbes, is a formalistic one that takes place in the case of human beings only when a group of men formally *authorize* a man or men to act for them, these representatives being subsequently accountable for their actions. Secondly, the *standing for* representation is accomplished by both human beings and inanimate objects that is again of two types: first, *descriptive*, "the making present of something absent by resemblance or reflection, as in a mirror or in art"; and second, *symbolic*, in which "no resemblance or reflection is required, and its connection to what is represented is of a different kind. Each of these representations by standing for brings with it a corresponding notion of activity, the *making* of a descriptive representation or the *creation* of a symbol." The third kind is an activity: "not a making of representations or symbols, but an *acting for* others, and not just the formalistic trappings that surround action, but the substance of the activity itself."²

This brief survey of the etymology of "representation" makes one aware of the fact that the concept started accumulating its critical strength from fourteenth-century English vocabulary and attained full-fledged conceptual status in seventeenth-century epistemology and political theories. Thomas Hobbes' notion of representation in politics was rather a part of his concept of representation, which he formulated by associating two Latin terms *repraesentare* and *persona* and used to understand human behavior as a whole. Hobbes observed that man's social function is basically *representational*—as a *person* he always puts on a mask of someone else: "so that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate is to act, or represent *himself*, or *another*."³ A man in ordinary life and a stage-actor are both primarily performers, and they perform for others. A man is not simply a human being; he is a son, a father, a husband, an in-law and so on. While performing as a man, he also performs for or personates or represents some other or himself. In other words, every act is an act of representation.

The emerging concept of representation, therefore, suggests an inherent dualism between the *represented* and the *representation* itself; and taking into consideration the significations of the term developed in the fourteenth and fif-

teenth centuries such as “to bring before the mind,” “pictures,” and “theatrical acting,” there is now no difficulty in associating the concept with the Greek *mimesis* and its family terms derived from the root *mimelazo*, although obviously the concept in its Latin origin was unknown to the Greeks. It is now a great advantage for the seventeenth-century British empiricists to use both the term and the concept for explaining the contents of the human mind invented by Descartes whose cognitions, even if they are self-reflections, can be fairly termed as “representations” if put into Hobbes’ formulation of the concept. It is all too clear that the Platonic *mimesis* and the empiricists’ mental representations, that is, sensory impressions of the external world on the *tabula rasa* of the mind, are of the same category—*descriptive representations*—with the difference that Plato’s is of an ontological type whereas that of the empiricists is psychological. The whole of the phenomenal world is for Plato an area of “representations” insofar as the world is a matter-mirror on which the ideas are represented variously. But for the empiricists the mirror-analogy shifts from the external world to the inner space of the mind. Platonic matter-representations are concrete objects, but the empiricist mind-representations are only sensory impressions. “Nothing can ever be present to the mind,” said David Hume, “but an image or perception.”⁴ Unlike Aristotle, who understood knowledge as an identity of the mind with the objects known, John Locke thought that things other than the mind itself are not present to the understanding. It is necessary that something else as a *representation* of the thing it considers should be present to it, and this representation constitutes knowledge only when it accurately represents the represented, that is, the external world of sense.

There is a second difference: Plato’s *representations* are unreal, illusory, the only truth being the represented Ideas, whereas the empiricists’ *representations* are real only if they accurately represent the represented. For Plato, knowledge is the experience of the represented; for the empiricists, knowledge is an assemblage of accurate representations.

When the empiricists accepted the mutual independence of the mind and the world—the inner blank space of the mind-mirror and the outer space of material objects and events—and understood all representations (the most basic elements of knowledge otherwise called “simple/original ideas”) as sensory impressions of the external world, Immanuel Kant invented two distinct kinds of representations (*Vorstellungen*)—sensitive (intuitive, material) and intellectual (intelligible, formal, conceptual): “. . . things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as *they appear*, while things which are intellectual are representations of things as *they are*.”⁵ The sensory representations as such are discrete without a form or structure; and “an internal principle in the mind” is necessary for bringing them into some representational whole. Sensory representations are mere sense impressions or appearances of the external world, and, as such, they can constitute a cognition only when they are structured by mental principles. Kant criticized both Leibniz and Locke: “Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as Locke . . . sensualized all concepts of the understanding.”⁶ Kant suggested a synthesis of the sensory representations.

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of cognition: sensitive and symbolic.⁷ The object of "sensitive cognition" is the external world of phenomenon, and the cognition itself is named empirical experience. The constituents of "symbolic cognition" are representations of a different order that belong to *pure understanding* such as moral concepts and metaphysical concepts like possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, and the like. They are abstracted from the laws inherent in the mind and, as such, never enter into any sensory representations as parts; nor are they even abstracted from such representations. This symbolic cognition is the cognition of the noumenon, and the constituent representations are the intellectual representations of things *as they are*. "Divine intuition," Kant writes, "however, which is the principle, of objects and not something governed by a principle, since it is independent, is an archetype and for that reason perfectly intellectual."⁸ Kant further states that whereas the sensory representations are *passive* insofar as they are *given* to the mind, intellectual representations are creative.⁹

To put it otherwise, Kant's conceptual representations are of a special privileged class of representations that are found within the mirror-mind, and are not the outcomes like the mirror images of the world outside. But what it is that they represent? If they are "independent" (of any represented) then they are *not* representations in the sense in which the sensory impressions are representations. If so then the mind either ceases to function as a mirror or has two sides, one facing outward and the other facing inward. In fact, a mirror has been a traditional analogy for any kind of reflection not necessarily reflecting the external nature always. Kant's conceptual representations or "archetypes" are (different from Cartesian innate ideas) self-evident and self-sufficient intellectual stuff that are self-presented. Representation in this sense signifies a nondual concept of self-presentation where the represented is the representation, that is, the concepts make themselves present in their original eternal forms (thus sharing the significance of the Latin original *repraesentare*). These creative "divine intuitions" are spiritual entities that can be better called *presences* rather than *representations* to avoid any confusion; and, in the post-Kantian philosophical tradition, they form the basis of cognate concepts such as "symbol" (Cassirer), "essence" (Husserl), and "logical form" (Russell).

II

Another wing of knowledge manipulated the concept of Representation in its search for the nature of linguistic signs or the function of language in general, and abandoning altogether the epistemological tradition, it drew upon the symbolic category of stand-for representation to explain the relation between signifier and signified, both of which constitute the linguistic system of a culture. Instead of studying language historically, searching for a single source of several sister languages by virtue of demonstrating their grammatical affinities, this new system proposed to study each language in its isolated cultural context analyzing the structure of its actual spoken form. Nevertheless this approach had an overall estimation of the linguistic system in general that language is a representa-

tional system of signification where the two constituents—signifier and signified—stand in relation of representation and represented: The signifier is an acoustic image or representation of the signified. In other words, the signifier stands for the signified, and this standing for is purely conventional or arbitrary insofar as the signifier bears no descriptive signs of the signified. The greatest contribution of Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of this system, is that he freed the linguistic system from both the ontological and the epistemological traditions. He announced that language, as signification, has nothing to do with the world of phenomena—neither with the matter-mirror nor with the mind-mirror. What the acoustic image represents or stands for is not any phenomenon of the world of nature; it is a concept only—not a concept in any Kantian sense of intellectual form:

The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it “material,” it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract.¹⁰

Linguistic “truth” is distinguished from epistemological “truth,” and “meaning” is not a correspondence between the word and the world, but an association between the signifier and the signified; and within the realm of signifiers, meaning is created not by any referential function but by a system of difference among the signifiers. Saussure intended to say that language reflects reality and/or human experience in a way different from that of perception: Language does not mirror the world it means.

Another great contribution of Saussure is evident in his consideration of language as a social institution rather than just a formal system—presenting language as the paradigm sign-system that “studies the life of signs within society,” a project that was carried to its full-fledged presentation by Charles Sanders Peirce, a senior American contemporary of Saussure. Peirce formulated a logic of signs as “representational decrees” aiming at offering a logical system of generative epistemology. He writes:

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea.¹¹

According to Peirce, semiotics is a representational system that involves four terms—representamen (representation/sign), object, interpretant, and ground. If O is a sign or representation, then it must represent something other than O itself—P, to the interpreter Q on some ground R, and the interpreter's understanding of the representation is determined by the triadic relationship: (1) relations of comparison based on the kind of representamen that can be a *quality* (*qualisign*) embodied or an *actual thing* or event (*sinsign*) acting singly and simply or a *law* (*lesisign*) or set of governing principles; (2) relations of performance based on the kind of *ground*, that is, actual entities functioning by virtue of their resemblance (*icon*) or by factual or causal connection (*index*) or by a set of rules or conventional association with the object; and (3) relations of thought based on the kind of *object* indicating the understood possibility of the object to the interpreter (*rheme/semé*) or conveying information about the object (*dicent/dicisign/rheme*) or the argument the object of which is not a single thing but a law. Combining these nine types, Peirce counts ten classes of representations, which again are multiplied into sixty-six varieties in their different modes of combination. Thus the operational mode of Peirce's sign system covers the whole area of epistemology—the analysis of the process of knowing itself and of how knowledge is possible. By incorporating the view of another significant Slavic semiotician, Roman Jakobson, that a sign has two aspects—"an immediately perceptible signans and an inferable, apprehensible signatum"¹²—one might observe that semiotics as a representational system ultimately results in a generative epistemology, that is, how to know things unknown from things already known. The interpreter who is acquainted with the techniques of multiplying the signs within a particular culture will be able to generate as many sets of signs as necessary from an initially given set of signs. Language is only one such set of signs, as Saussure states: "Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semilology"¹³ though the paradigm one. In the rise of Peirce, the representational nature of knowledge shifted from Plato's matter-mirror reflecting Ideas to include the empirical mind-mirror reflecting the external world in being transformed into the elements of formal logic: Both grammar and epistemology are now subjects of logic.

Peirce's epistemology may be put to a hard test, and its validity may be questioned; particularly when the basic given set is inevitably a perceptual one, it might be difficult to establish the "stand-for" relation among the perceptual data unless the perceptual experience is itself successfully interpreted in terms of a linguistic system of arbitrary stand-for relations. But, according to Peirce, the linguistic sign system is only a species of the semiotics genus. Semiotics as generative epistemology can function only in the area of one inferential and testimonial knowledge, not in the perceptual level. This is what is precisely stated by Jakobson as quoted earlier. The philosopher then comes back to the empirical starting point: Whether perception is a representational system involving any one or more of the ten classes of signs Peirce suggests; and even if this happens to be so, can the system get rid of the psychology of perception? In other words, can Peirce successfully demonstrate that perception is absolutely a logical process without any trace of

tive and symbolic categories of stand-for representation respectively. Denotation as an arbitrary designator is not at all a representation or symbol. On the other hand, a symbol is a designator that represents what it stands for. In this sense letters are sometimes natural and at others arbitrary designators. UN, for example, represents the name United Nations, but denotes the organization so named. Symbols as representations substitute the things they symbolize. Religious rites, therefore, are symbols or representations in the sense that they (represent or represent) enact an action or event or state of affairs. All the mimetic rituals in magic or religion that the anthropologists and historians of religion have discovered are symbols or representations in this sense. The “Seven-steps” (*saptapadī*) rite in Hindu marriage, where the bride and groom together move around the sacred fire on the altar, is an event that does not *denote* but symbolizes or represents the lifelong relationship (union) of wife and husband.

The mirror analogy, however, comes back to explain the representational function of language in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein deviates from both Peirce and Saussure in reinstating the Aristotelian theory of language in terms of the relation of the word and the world, but adding this time the pictorial view of language that mirrors the world of reality. Language is a tool that functions like a mirror. But unlike the Platonic matter-mirror and epistemological mind-mirror, Wittgenstein’s language-mirror or proposition-mirror reflects the logical form or structure of the world of facts. But most significantly, language does not represent reality as pictures do, that is, language is a picture only metaphorically because both picture and language represent the same principle, namely, the logical form of the world. But by no means is a linguistic representation as pictorial as a pictorial representation of the same fact. In other words, pictures and propositions are mirror/symbol/sign systems of different kinds that perform the same function—represent the common principle of logical form:

A picture is a fact. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.¹⁶

The significant point to be noted is that the representation of the logical structure in a picture or in a sentence implies no more than the identity of logical structure as displayed in the picture or sentence and the fact they correspond to. “We speak of a logical picture of reality,” explains Bertrand Russell, “when we wish to imply only so much resemblance as is essential to its being a picture in any sense, that is to say when we wish to imply no more than identity of logical form.”¹⁷ The logical picture of a fact, he says, is a *Gedanke*. A picture can correspond or not correspond with the fact and be accordingly true or false; but in both cases it shares the logical form with the fact. “In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be in

common between the sentence and the fact cannot, so he contends, be itself in turn *said* in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be *shown*, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure."¹⁸ According to Wittgenstein, a picture cannot depict its pictorial form, it displays it, and similarly, a proposition cannot mean its linguistic structure, it displays it.

Above all, Wittgenstein's primary concern for a "logically perfect language" that transcends the psychological (what actually occurs in our minds when we use language), epistemological (relation subsisting between thoughts and words or sentences) and linguistic (using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood) uses of language and aims at "logical classification of thoughts" is itself a concern for a transparent medium that would unravel (represent) the truth ("the existence and non-existence of states of affairs"). Philosophical discourse, according to Wittgenstein, is the representative or the best representational of all other discourses—historical, literary (fictitious), and scientific.

III

In his English version of Aristotle's *Poetics*, Ingram Bywater used both "imitation" and "representation" synonymously for the Greek word *mimesis*.¹⁹ But recent thinkers have rejected this synonymy: "I think," writes Jacques Derrida, "we must begin with the hypothesis that the word 'representation' translates no Greek word in any obvious way, leaving nothing aside, unless it is reinterpreted and re-inscribed deeply into history."²⁰ Martin Heidegger had observed earlier that the Greek world was not dominated by Representation: "Representation is to be sure an image, or an idea as an image in and for the subject, an affection of the subject in their form of a relationship to the object which is in it as a copy, a painting or a scene."²¹ Representation, in this sense, is a subject-object, a man-world relation that determines the way, the form in which humans experience the external world. In other words, Representation is basically an epistemological concept, whereas the Greek (Platonic) *mimesis* is a metaphysical category. Phenomenon is a *mimesis* of idea, and in turn art is a *mimesis* of phenomenon. It is this metaphysical hierarchy rather than any epistemological content/mode of process that occupies the Platonic reflections in structuring the concept of *mimesis*: "The Greek world did not have a relation to what-is as to a conceived image or a representation (*bild*). There what-is is presence; and this did not, at first, derive from the fact that man would look at what-is and have what we call a representation (*Vorstellung*) of it as the mode of perception of a subject."²² Nor did the Middle Ages have any idea of representation because in this epoch the being of what-is never consists in an object (*Gegenstand*) brought before a person, fixed, stopped, available for the human subject who would possess a representation of it. In the Middle Ages the subject-object relationship was rather explained in terms of belonging: "'To be something that is' means to belong to the created order." But it is only in the modern period, the Cartesian or post-Cartesian period that "that what-is should become what-is in representation (literally in the being-represented, *in der Vorgestelltheit*)"²³—what-is is deter-

mined as an object present before and for a subject in the form of representation or *Vorstellen*.

But this apparently simplistic distinction between imitation and representation, far from solving any critical crisis, has raised an enormous body of theoretical problems that have at once complicated and enriched the Western intellectual history of the last 300 years. This distinction has contributed significantly to the construction as well as unification and interrelation of different areas of human culture that explain the relations of humanity and the world, mind and body, knowledge and mind, and the legitimacy of humans' claim to knowledge—ultimately contributing to the human quest for the foundations of knowledge and to the discovery of the discipline of philosophy as the supreme foundation that underwrites claims to knowledge made by the other areas of culture such as science, morality, jurisprudence, art and religion. Richard Rorty writes:

Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims. It can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge, and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the mental processes or the activity of representation which makes knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretence of doing so).²⁴

The shift of the mirror analogy from the Platonic function of imitation in Nature and the arts to the modern function of the human mind in representing/reflecting the external world is utterly significant in defining and determining the value of mirroring in two different phases of the Western culture: If the mirror-*mimesis* deflates truth in the Greek world, the mirror-representation is the very content and the principles of constructing human knowledge in the modern world. The analogy shifts from the external world (or object) to the internal world (or subject). For the Greeks, the world mirrors (imitates) the Ideas (and the arts mirror the world), whereas for the moderns the mind mirrors (represents) the world. In both the cases, however, the analogy presupposes the presence of a given—either the Idea or the world—that necessarily precedes the function of mirroring as well as the result of this function. On this point at least *mimesis* and representation are synonymous because both of them are terms meaningful within adverbial structures of time and space, that is, they refer to a function that is possible only by presupposing the existence or occurrence of some other thing or function in some other place at some other time. A can be an imitation/representation of B if and only if B exists/occurs prior to A: "The relation of that," as Aristotle puts it, "which comes after to that which goes before"²⁵ is the relation that explains both imitation and representation. But, precisely, it is this before-after relation, the adverbial principle, that has been central to the formulation of knowledge in all the areas of human cultures that causes great irritation for pres-

ent-day philosophers. Therefore they condemn Representation (also imitation): "Today there is a great deal of thought against representation. In a more or less articulated or rigorous way this judgment is easily arrived at: representation is bad."²⁶

This attack on representation is basically an attack on the traditional way of thinking, that is, the other-worldly way of thinking originating in Plato and continuing to Kant through Christianity. In the search for the True World of Reality—the world of Idea, a permanent, eternal, unchangeable entity, a *Logos* that is to be cognized by human reason by way of concepts—this tradition has consistently undermined, subordinated the World of Appearance, the real world of senses in which people live and function as human beings. This attack begins with Friedrich Nietzsche and runs through Martin Heidegger, reaching its apex with the contemporary Euro-American philosophers such as Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Paul De Man, Harold Bloom, Hillis Miller, Rorty, and Hartman. Sounding this challenge, Nietzsche writes as early as 1886 in his "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," which he prefaced to the "New Edition" of his *The Birth of Tragedy*:

The existence of the world is *justified* only as an aesthetic phenomenon . . . an artistic meaning and cryptomeaning behind all events—a "god" if you please, but certainly only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god, who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory—one who creating worlds, frees himself from the *distress* of fullness and *overfullness* and from the *affliction* of the contradictions compressed in his soul. The world—at every moment the *attained* salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant and contradictory being who can find salvation only in *appearance*.²⁷

Challenging further the Platonic and Christian approaches to human life and its values in terms of "binary oppositions," Nietzsche further writes:

In truth nothing could be more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world . . . than the Christian teaching, which is and wants to be, *only* moral and which relegates art, *every* art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art. Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a *hostility to life*—a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, marked by, dressed up as, faith in "another" or "better" life.²⁸

Precisely, section 5 of Nietzsche's "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" contains the very seed of what is now called "postmodernism" or "poststructuralism" aiming at the annihilation of the binary oppositions: Idea-phenomenon, reality-appearance/representation, true-false, primary-secondary, subjective-objective, genuine-fake, original-derivative, unified-diverse, essential-accidental and so on.

This tradition of the "binary opposition" is severally called by the philosophers who want to destroy it: "Platonism," "Metaphysics," and "Ontotheology" by Heidegger, and "Metaphysics of presence" or "logocentrism" (and its cognate words phonocentrism, phallogocentrism) by Derrida. Richard Rorty, following the mirror metaphor central to Plato's metaphysics and aesthetics, chooses to label this metaphysical tradition continuing beyond Plato through the theorists of knowledge (the epistemologists—Descartes, Locke, Hume) rationalism of Kant, to the post-Kantians—the positivists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of language and linguists—the tradition that sought for the one to explain many, the single philosophical "foundation" to explain the diverse areas of culture, the single system (the law of causation in the philosophy of science) or paradigm (or the archetype) to explain the several natural occurrences, events, situations and characters—as the tradition of representation. The whole tradition of the past, almost 2,500 years, has been committed "to the construction of a permanent, neutral framework of inquiry," to the foundation that would explore the truth in all the areas of culture—to discover the mirror that would reflect the truth. But in all such ventures what is merely repeated is the same Platonic paradox—instead of finding the one to explain many, the mirror has been always reflecting the many, that is, the representations of reality and not the reality itself—discovering the truth that there is no one, only many, only representations without a reality. But instead of acknowledging this bare truth that reality is always many, the philosophers have been moving in the labyrinth of representations (the many) to find out the one reality, which is an illusion. While the mirror metaphor persists throughout the tradition, the only change that occurs is the one to the nature of the mirror-reflections, and to the role of the mirror played by different phenomena in different phases. In the Platonic metaphysics, phenomenon or matter is the mirror, a many-sided prism that reflects severally the one Idea; in the age of epistemology, mind is the mirror reflecting the manifold external world of nature; and in the linguistic era, language is the mirror representing the structure of the human mind. Throughout this tradition of mirror metaphor it is obviously the ocular aspect of human experience that has dominated the whole of Western culture. The Horatian dictum *Ut pictura poesis* was therefore inevitably the ruling principle of aesthetic theory that linked the Greeks with the theorists of knowledge, and although in the rise of romanticism in the dictum *Ut musica poesis* the acoustic model took over the ocular paradigm, the dominating plastic imagination was still haunting the ekphrastic sensibility of the romantic poets; and although the acoustic model prevailed over the ocular in the modernist linguistics that held the phonic entity as the basis of language, the structuralist theories were still dominated by the plastic perceptual framework in formulating their sign systems. The "signified" is understood basically on a visual pattern. Rorty writes:

It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our convictions. The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror containing various representations—some accurate, some not—

and capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself.²⁹

Rorty observes that the several recent schools in the history of Western philosophy followed the Cartesian and Kantian mirror metaphor in claiming the different functions for philosophy such as “conceptual analysis,” “phenomenological analysis,” “explication of meanings,” examination of “the logic of language,” and of “the structure of constituting activity of consciousness”; and it is the later Wittgenstein whose “post-positivistic” stance started deconstructing the mirror metaphor program that was supplemented by Heidegger’s historical awareness of the source of this metaphor that began in Plato and occupied the thinkers of the last three centuries.

Although in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche’s leadership in attacking the Platonic tradition of binary opposition is sufficiently evident, Heidegger accuses even Nietzsche of being a metaphysician himself who only inverted the Platonic opposition between Being and Becoming by making Becoming, in the form of the endless flow of power, primary: stamping Becoming with the character of Being—that is the *supreme will to power*. Instead Heidegger claims the leadership in saving the Western tradition from this hierarchical oppositions for himself. Curiously, Derrida is unwilling to credit this leadership to Heidegger, because Derrida is confident that he has located the signs of metaphysical or what he calls “onto-theological” tradition in Heidegger’s writings.

Derrida detects Heidegger’s metaphysical character in his mysterious notion of “Being” somewhat envisaged by the pre-Socratic philosophers and gradually forgotten over a score of centuries when the notion reached Nietzsche’s inverted Platonism. When Heidegger describes Nietzsche’s inverted Platonism as “forgetfulness of Being,” which amounts to a confusion of Being and beings—an assimilation of two simultaneous questions, “what is Being” and what is the most general characteristic of beings, that obscures “the ontological difference,” that is, the difference between Being and beings, Derrida thinks that even this Heideggerian ontological difference is a distinct mark of the metaphysical tradition, and therefore to avoid this tradition completely—an avoidance that he thinks he pioneers—he invents a set of terminology such as *differance*, *trace*, *archiecriture* as displacing Heidegger’s *Ereignis* and *Dichtung* and the like.³⁰ While rejecting Heidegger’s reverence for the ineffable, the silent and the enduring Derrida admires the features such as the elusive, the allusive, the proliferating and ever-self-recontextualizing that are illustrated in writing rather than in speech. In reversing the Platonic preference for the spoken word over the written word, Derrida thinks he has attained the desired end, that is, the annihilation of metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic hierarchies or binary oppositions. In Derrida’s thought, “representation” as any phenomenon considered on the mirror model, coming or occurring or produced after a preceding original—such as script as the representation of speech, language as the representation of thought or experience, knowledge as the mental representation of the external

world, art as the representation of reality (either Platonic Idea or the objects and events of the external world and a delegation political or otherwise as the representation of an authority or power)—is condemned.

IV

Condemnation of representation starting from Plato to Derrida is not single-tracked. Plato condemns representation interpreted in the sense of *mimesis*, that is, an inaccurate copy or replica of the truth or reality that is not only useless but also harmful for society because it misguides in confusing truth with falsehood. In the worst part of this confusion, *mimesis* encourages people for a preference of representation/*mimesis* to the truth/original/reality as in the case of appreciation of the arts. But in the modern—the Cartesian or post-Cartesian—era in the epoch of epistemology, representation as the mental reflection of the external world (which is the representation proper, foreign to the Greek vocabulary as Derrida observes) is not dangerous in any Platonic sense. Rather representation is the very source and content of our knowledge, the central concern of philosophy being only to judge the accuracy of these representations by means of empirical correspondence and to demark the borderlines of different areas of culture in accordance with the degrees of accuracy. In traditional philosophy, representation has played a very vital role, as in terms of the conditions of its accuracy attempts have been made to explicate notions of “rationality” and “objectivity.” Now, Derrida’s attack on representation is not so much on the term itself as on its concept in the epistemological tradition defined in terms of the correspondence between the mental and the nonmental, linguistic and the nonlinguistic worlds: “Language, every language, would be representative, a system of representatives, but the content represented, what is represented by this representation (a meaning, a thing, and so on) would be a presence and not representation.”³¹ Derrida’s view of language as a nonrepresentational, self-contained phenomenon, his slogan “There is nothing outside the text,” obviously corroborates the Heideggerian slogan that it is language that speaks not man:

Language is—language, speech. Language speaks.

x x x x x

Language speaks.

Man speaks in that he responds to language.³²

Both Heidegger and Derrida have no objection to use the term representation in the sense implicit in the function of language as suggested in the passage just quoted: self-representation, and not representation of something nonlinguistic, extraneous to language itself. Heidegger observes that the paradigm of this self-representative character of language is poetry: “Language itself is poetry in the essential sense.”³³ Accordingly, keeping this thesis in view, new interpretations of both *mimesis* and “representation” are offered by Heidegger as also endorsed by Derrida. Heidegger’s notion of representation as an act of “Self”-

representing evolves out of his interpretation of the Cartesian axiom *Cogito ergo sum*, which he presents in his essays on Nietzsche: "In important passages, Descartes substitutes for *cogitare* the word *percipere* (*per-capio*)—to take possession of a thing or to seize something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself by way of presenting-before-oneself, *representing*."³⁴ *Cogitare* is not merely thinking. It is always thinking in the sense of "thinking over": "presenting to oneself of what is presentable," a presentation to the "self" that is assured beyond all doubts. Thus every representing of anything is inherently a representation of a "myself." But this "self"-representation is not a mirror-reflection such that the self stands opposite to this representation, as even a chair or table stands opposite to the mirror reflection. *Ego* is the condition of this representation and as such emerges as the subject of representing. Consciousness of an object is inherently self-consciousness and, therefore, consciousness and subject being synonymous, the binary opposition between subject and object is destroyed as also the opposition between empiricism and rationalism appears meaningless. Inevitably, for Heidegger, the subjective factors such as imagination, emotion and aesthetic reception all are modes of representation:

Cogitare is representing in the fullest sense. . . . We must conjoin the thought the following essentials: the relation to what is represented, the self-presentation of what is represented, the arrival of the scene and involvement of the one representing with what is represented, indeed in and through the representing.³⁵

Derrida has reiterated the Heideggerian annihilation of the subject-object, internal-external, and reality-representation binary relation in the reinterpretation of "representation" with special reference to linguistic representation in several passages of his *Speech and Phenomena*:

In both expression and indicative communication the difference between reality and representation, between the veridical and the imaginary, and between simple presence and repetition has already begun to wear away. . . . The subject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking, and this is no accident. We can no more imagine effective speech without there being self-representation than we can imagine a representation of speech without there being effective speech. . . . Speech represents itself; it is its representation. Even better, speech is the representation of itself.³⁶

On the other side of the wing, Michel Foucault, a historian of philosophy and culture, in his search for *epistemes* or the modes of experience of the order of things in terms of which the history of Western culture may be divided into several epochs, discovers that there are three distinct periods: Renaissance (sixteenth century), Classical Age (mid-seventeenth to eighteenth centuries), and Modern Age (nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries), which are identified by three modes of experience—resemblance, representation, and organic structure, respectively. These modes are the principles by which knowledge is codified, that is, in terms of which things in the world are ordered or connected with one another. According to Foucault, knowledge is an ordering of things, and the

meanings of knowledge vary from time to time according to the principles of this ordering. Further, knowledge is a linguistic phenomenon, and because language is a system of signs, the principles of ordering things are virtually the modes of linguistic functions. Foucault says that language is a function, not being. Clearly enough, the three *epistemes* explain the different modes in which language functions in the three different epochs: (1) The Renaissance sign system is natural insofar as the signifier is believed to have a perceptual semblance with the signified; (2) the Classical sign system is representational in the sense that the signifier conventionally stands for the signified; and (3) in the Modern Age the signifier is connected with the signified by analogies between their structures. In the Renaissance, signs are parts of the world they signify; in the Classical Age, the signs are ontologically separated from the world of the signified, the system is one of identities and differences in their properties. Classical signs are mental ideas, not material things (maps).³⁷

Foucault discerns two essential features of the Classical representation: First, it signifies its subject by representing it transparently so that no function, no context, no determination other than what it represents is necessary. Secondly, the representing sign is a duplicate production in the sense that it refers to its own representative function. Pictorial signs such as maps and pictures by their very nature present themselves as signs of something else, that is, a map is necessarily a map of a region that it represents and as such it also represents its representativeness or, in other words, classical representation is a self-representation. The best example Foucault cites to explain the concept of classical representation is a picture of the studio of Velázquez painted by Velázquez himself entitled *Las Meninas* (1658) to which Foucault devotes the very first chapter of his book *The Order of Things*.

The picture gives a complete account of the studio of the artist—the artist himself, with brush in hand and facing a huge canvas; a dog; a dwarf; a visitor; a jester; painting lining the two walls; and a mirror on the backside reflecting the picture painted on the canvas by the artist—the picture of Philip IV of Spain and his wife Mariana. In fact, it is this picture within the whole picture that is the real subject of the picture. But, taken as a whole, it is a representation of the artist representing Philip IV and his wife. In other words, it is a self-representation, a self-portrait of Velázquez's work—the picture represents its representative character, and this explains the very nature of the classical representation:

Perhaps there exists, in this painting by Velázquez, the representation as it were, of Classical representation, and the definition of the space it opens up to us. And, indeed, representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being. But there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is simultaneously grouping together and spreading out before us, indicated compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation—of the person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very subject—which is the same—has been elided. And representation, freed finally from the relation that was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure form.³⁸

According to Foucault, *Las Meninas* is the representative of the seventeenth-century (Classical) notion of representation in the sense that it advocates for a representation without resemblance. The picture does not produce a resembling substitute for what it represents—the king, the central subject of the picture who is invisible. Successful representation is not a matter of real resemblance. The (invisible/physically absent) King's representation is not a symbol that serves as a substitute, because royal power cannot be substituted; it can be only manifested and embodied, displayed and exhibited along with its credentials and salient attributes. Foucault thus summarily rejects the picture-theory of representation and pleads for a self-reflexive notion of representation. Foucault further observes that this self-representative notion of representation explains the representative function of consciousness in Descartes's system of thought: Consciousness does not represent any external world opposite to or outside of it. The subject of this representation being nothing other than consciousness itself, Descartes's mental representations are not pictures of the material things of the external world, as it is commonly regarded, but are the representations of consciousness itself.

V

As it appears, philosophers from Descartes to Wittgenstein formulate two theories of representation—the picture-theory and the language-theory—which come under what Hanna Pitkin calls the *stand-for* representation. Pitkin's descriptive representation may be understood as the picture-theory representation or representation by resemblance, and her symbolic representation may be understood as the language-theory representation. Descartes proposed a picture-theory of representation in explaining the mental representations, and the linguists proposed a language-theory of representation in explaining the relation between the signifier and the signified. Wittgenstein applied the picture-theory of representation for explaining the linguistic function in his early writings, whereas in his later writings he views linguistic function as a symbolic stand-for representation. Precisely speaking, pictures and language have been paradigms of representation for the epistemologists and linguists/philosophers of language respectively. The mimetic critics from Plato to the eighteenth-century classicists followed the picture (mirror) paradigm of representation in explaining the relation between art and reality; the analytic philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century interpreted artistic representation in light of the symbolic representation in language. Representation by resemblance was totally abandoned. Along with linguists like Saussure and Peirce, philosophers of language such as Wittgenstein, Frege, and Kripke were followed by the art historians and philosophers of art. To count a few, Ernst Gombrich, Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, and Roger Scruton, who, notwithstanding significant differences in their approaches, broadly adopt the language-theory of pictorial representation.

Gombrich's thesis of pictorial representation is based on the Saussurian theory of linguistic conventionalism as well as on a relativist psychology of Gestaltan perception.³⁹ Similarly, Nelson Goodman's theory of pictorial repre-

sentation as a linguistic denotation is modeled on Peirce's concept of representation as based on a set of rules or conventional association with the object rather than on any iconic resemblance: Art is not an iconic sign, but a conventional sign. In Pitkin's language, Goodman's representation is not a descriptive but a symbolic stand-for.⁴⁰ Roger Scruton proposes a theory of pictorial representation that is analogous to representation in literature—both having a *sense*, not a *reference*. Recognizing a difference between “sense” and “reference” (drawing upon Frege), Scruton rejects the referential or denotational theory of representation (contra Goodman) in art. In some cases (as in religious practices) a picture may stand for/refer to/denote what is represented. But because this representation does not explain a fictional picture, it is inadequate for explaining any picture of an imaginary object: “Painting an imaginary object is like writing a story . . . a painting can have a place in the symbol scheme that is proper to being a man-picture without actually *denoting* a man. Its place in the scheme is fixed not by its reference but by its sense.”⁴¹ What is sensed in a picture or in a story is an “intentional object,” not any actual referent. On the other hand, Arthur C. Danto discerns two senses of representation from Nietzsche's discussion on the birth of tragedy—re-presentation and representation. In the Dionysusian ritual of ancient Greece, the god was believed literally to be present on the occasion. This self-presentation of the god where the represented and the representation are identified is re-presentation. To cite an example from the Hindu myth, Krishna was re-presenting himself in coupling with innumerable milkmaids simultaneously so that each maid was believing that Krishna was present only with her. The second sense of representation emerged when the ritual was replaced by an enactment of the ritual where someone (the tragic hero) appeared as representing the god. Danto thinks that this second one is the early stage of both religious and political representation, where the representation proxies the represented with a presupposition that both are separate from each other.⁴² Danto interprets this second sense of representation as a linguistic designation where in designating reality, language represents it. Both the forms of representation Danto discerns correspond obviously to the Latin concepts of *repraesentare* and *persona* respectively. But by comparing linguistic designation with political or religious deputation, he confuses Hobbes's formalistic representation with Pitkin's symbolic type of stand-for representation. In other words, Danto accepts language-theory of representation (designation) as the paradigm of all forms of representation in the different arts such as painting, drama and literature, as also of all the forms of religious, political, and bureaucratic representations, which are subsumed by Derrida under the single concept of “sending.” Danto of course adds a new point that artworks are not mere representations. An imitation theory of representation reduces the artwork to its content, whereas Danto's theory suggests that an artwork uses the way the nonartwork presents its content to make a point about how that content is presented. A representation is not an artwork simply by virtue of its mimetic qualities, but by virtue of the qualities conferred upon it by the art world. Danto's familiar example to justify his thesis is Duchamp's *Fountain*.

Although Aristotelian mimetic theory of representation and the picture-paradigm of all art-representation are rejected by these analytic and post-analytic philosophers, there is, nonetheless, a group of literary critics who model a theory of literary representation on Aristotle's probable-imitation. Erich Auerbach interprets that fictional particular represents actual universal: First, reality is transcribed in abstract categories in terms of a conceptual system of ideology and sociology, and the like, and then fictional particulars are matched with these postulated categories.⁴³ Ian Watt slightly twists this Auerbachian thesis: Fictional particulars are not derived from the actual prototypes. The fictional particulars, like historical data, somehow pre-exist their representation, and the writers, having a privileged access to them, report about them, describe them, share their knowledge with their readers. "A fiction writer is a historian of pre-existing fictional realms."⁴⁴

On the other hand, the ocular base of Aristotelian mimetic representation is lost in a powerful nonlanguage-theory of representation put up by the most influential French phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur. He virtually agrees with Derrida's interpretation of *mimesis* as "the movement of the *phusis*, a movement that is somehow natural (in the nonderivative sense of this word), through which the *phusis*, having no outside, no other, must be doubled in order to make its appearance, to appear (to itself) to produce (itself), to unveil (itself); in order to emerge from the crypt where it prefers itself; in order to shine in its *aletheia*."⁴⁵ Ricoeur focuses upon Aristotle's notion of *phusis* and its relation to *mimesis* as a form of making or *poeisis*. Art or *mimetic* making completes what is incomplete in Nature. And as Nature is not a fixed form, but a ceaseless process of becoming (*entelechia*), a movement or manifestation of the potential into the actual, so also art as mimetic representation is a ceaseless re-description of the world of action whereby new configurations in Nature are released. Mimetic representation is, thus, not a mirror-copy or illusion of any form, but an invention.

The language-theory of representation received a strong blow from Richard Bernheimer, who boldly asserted that "the current identification of representation with sign function is illegitimate."⁴⁶ The two functions—representation and signification—may share a common structure, may overlap each other, but the field of representation is wider than that of signification. The function of representation is most akin to "the much neglected and little known one of substitution."⁴⁷ Although substitution is distinct from and inferior to representation in its logical status, because the orders of being to which they belong are different, substitution is a natural function and representation is a mental one. Substitution is most intimately akin to representation in sharing with it "its semipermanence, the separation of being and function, and the prominence accorded to its referent, once the latter is in the position of replacing its referent."⁴⁸ By tracing the history of pictorial art from the pre-Aristotelian magical tradition to twentieth-century surrealism and abstract cubism, Bernheimer draws a conclusion that the rejection of representation by the theorists of abstract art and the abstract theoreticians of art in favor of a dignified symbolic revelation is due to a misunderstanding of representation as a simple replica or imitation of the external world. According to

Bernheimer, abstract art can very well be accommodated within the representational framework, provided that the complex structure of representation is properly understood. In pleading for a "symbolic revelation," what the abstract artist did is not any rejection of representation as such, but the rejection of an "indiscriminate imitation" of nineteenth-century realism. By breaking the living forms of the external world into geometric shapes, the abstract artist redirected his attention from the world of objective reality to the realm of subjective imagery.⁴⁹

There is yet another attempt by John Willats at liberating pictorial representation from linguistic conventionalism. Willats's approach to the subject is completely different from technological perspectives of humanity's perceptual experience and systems of drawing. He differs from the art historians (Gombrich) who view the historical and stylistic changes in pictorial representation as arbitrary or conventional. Instead, Willats, drawing upon the engineering representational systems, founds pictorial representation on an objective scientific ground. He demonstrates substantially that three drawing systems such as perspective, oblique projection and orthogonal projection belonging to a family of systems known as the projection systems along with three classes of denotation systems (silhouettes, line drawings and the optical denotation systems) determine the changes in styles and evolutions of pictorial representation in different ages and cultures.

Willats's study challenges the arbitrary or conventional theory of pictorial representation; but it does not cater to the need of the present-day philosophical inquiry as regards the relationship between the represented and the representation. Because Willats presupposes the existence of a presence (external world) before representation (pictorial art), the age-old dualism is upheld. Willats's major dealing is with the *how* questions rather than with the *why* questions: "Before we can say *why* pictures have changed, we must be able to say *how* they have changed."⁵⁰ His main aim is to show the different ways in which both artists and children represent the visible world. But the aim of the iconoclastic resolution of today's thinker is to "abolish the real world, grasping the world as little more than a text or sign-system." Geoffrey Hartman summarizes this current tendency for identification of the represented and the representation, the means and the end, and the seeing and the sought in the following lines:

Representation or perceptibility, even of ideas remains more important than those ideas. Should perceptibility itself be what is desired, then we understand why it marks the limit of desire and cannot be reduced further—to covert libido, idea or will. Seeing is sought, and not merely as a medium for something else. Even philosophy's insistence on clear and distinct ideas may express this "ineluctable modality" of the perceptible that makes what we call representation the inexcludable middle between phenomenal reality and mind, between thinking in images and thinking by means of texts against them.⁵¹

VI

The present volume is designed to offer a comprehensive view of representation in both its conceptual perspectives and application in understanding vari-

ous art forms such as painting, photography, literature, dance, music, theater, and film. An international team of contemporary thinkers have focused on the relevant aspects of this critical phenomenon from multidisciplinary and cross-cultural perspectives with a view to exploring its structural richness in both depth and dimension rather than attempting any universal or final resolution to the complexities it reflects.

The chapters of the present volume are arranged into two parts. The first part considers the conceptual issues of representation as meditated upon in several faculties of knowledge, and the second part applies different theories of representation in explaining and understanding the nature of different forms of art. John Llewelyn takes up the issue of representation in language. He starts with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and pursues the central question of the issue as reflected upon by the representative philosophers both preceding and following Wittgenstein—including the Greeks, medieval mystics, empiricists, rationalists, analysts, and postanalysts. Llewelyn's treatment, in both historical and analytical perspectives, offers a comprehensive account of the issue he addresses.

Despite the comments of Heidegger and Derrida, Robert A. Sharpe ascertains that the English word "representation" used in the context of art has taken some of the overtones of the Greek *mimesis*. An artistic representation, as an artifact, if not a substitute for, is somewhat closer to a presence than a nonartistic representation might be. Almost along the line of Auerbach, Sharpe is sure that art is a means of knowledge as we learn a universal actual (that we did not know earlier) from the fictional particular(s) of artistic representation along with obtaining some historical information as well. Following Wittgenstein, Sharpe observes that as the task of philosophy is not to provide us with new facts as much as to remind us what we might overlook, the information we get from art is, similarly, more a reminder than a new fact. An indirect moral education is also imparted by the narrative representational arts such as literature, theater, and film—enabling us to see how should we act. Visual arts do not impart moral wisdom as significantly as the former arts do. Sharpe also stresses the roll of interpretation in performing art like music. Performance of music is not a representation of the work, but a representation of the interpretation of the work by the performer. Therefore different performers represent the same musical work differently according to their different interpretations of the work (the original composition).

F. R. Ankersmit analyzes political and historical representation in the light of two major theories of pictorial representation—resemblance theory and substitution theory. Representation in both politics and history is, according to him, more a conceptual than a practical need; and as in the case of the arts there is an aesthetic gap between the represented (reality) and the representation (art), so also in history and politics the representation must necessarily be different from the representation of historical and political realities.

Ivan Strenski discusses the role and nature of representation in sacrificial rites. Earlier, in his *Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century History* (1987), he applied a critical attitude that in theorizing the myths of exotic societies for their cross-cultural implications the theorizer, through an intellectual coloniza-

tion, represents the political, moral and religious ideologies of his own. Similarly, in the chapter presented here (chapter 4) he argues that theorization of sacrificial rites is essentially ideological representation. A theory of representation that Strenski suggests here is very much akin to *re-presentation*—a critical attitude that determines the presentation (or interpretation) of a group of data that was not so presented earlier. This kind of representation is highly charged with value commitments. If the theory is a mirror, then what is represented (or reflected) here is the very attitude of the theorizer.

By applying the modal realism of David Lewis, Ruth Ronen observes that the impossible cannot be excluded from representation unless one specifies the constraints impossible objects impose when given to the game of representation. It is not the contradiction as a logical relationship, but concrete interpretation of contradictions that may play a crucial role in representation.

Horace L. Fairlamb unravels a host of ideas, a variety of alternative views that gather under a single umbrella named "postmodernism" with their monoprogram to destroy the representational model of knowledge that presupposes metaphysical essences and epistemological certainties. Fairlamb does not simply survey the critical events of postmodernism with regard to its concern for representation; he also seeks for a remedy for the postmodernist critical skepticism in the "negative dialectics" of Theodor Adorno. Closer to Aristotle's notion of "probable imitation" or Auerbach's "actual universal," Adorno's notion of representation is a kind of "modeling of nature" that can be more or less accurate. Like scientific models, aesthetic *mimesis*, in order that it may be useful, need not mirror nature but only represent a "type" of situation and a "type" of solution to be meaningful.

In the part two, Dieter Peetz categorizes the major views of pictorial representation that developed since Ernst Gombrich's *Art and Illusion* into five theories: (1) Conventional theory, (2) Intentional theory, (3) "Realist" theory, (4) Aspect theory, and (5) Projection theory. The philosophers considered under these theories are Richard Wollheim, Nelson Goodman, Roger Scruton, Ernst Gombrich, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, respectively. Out of this categorization, what Peetz explores is a critical point that all these theories miss—a distinction between ordinary pictorial representation without any aesthetic properties on the one hand and aesthetic representation on the other. This vital distinction, Peetz further notes, was taken into consideration by two philosophers only—Immanuel Kant and Harold Osborne.

In his search for a successful language-theory of pictorial representation, T. R. Quigley finds the causal theories of linguistic representation advanced by Dennis Stampe as a suitable model. He feels confident that he compensates for the failure of Jenefer Robinson in setting up necessary and sufficient conditions of pictorial representation, which she expected to do on the basis of Fregean and Kripkean theories of reference.

Donald Brook considers photography as a representational art like painting. He rejects the views of analytical philosophers (Goodman and Scruton) who interpret pictorial art on the model of linguistic representation and consider the ontology of the "represented object" as "intentional" and not "actual," as is the

status of semantic entities. Because the ontology of the object of photography is actual, not "intentional," photography ceases to be an artistic representation. But Brook advises to avoid the language theory of representation in understanding the ontology of the nonverbal represented object, because representational practices are prelinguistic, and language emerged from the failures of creatures in discriminating between representations and the represented subjects for which they could be substituted. Pictorial representation does not bother for the ontology of its represented objects. Brook states that both painting and photography are representations by virtue of resemblance, by virtue of failures in discriminating between the actual and the possible.

The rivalry of two theories of representation—the language-theory and the picture-theory—has caused a great deal of controversy regarding the representational character of literature: What and how does literature represent? The Saussurian and the post-Saussurian linguistic traditions detach language from a pre-existing reality external to the realm of language. Hence according to these traditions, literature does not represent any reality outside of its own linguistic realm. But Colin Lyas does not agree with this view. He advocates for a mimetic theory of representation along the Aristotelian lines of argument and considers the arguments of the structuralists and poststructuralists against the mimetic theory as ill conceived. Language structures may condition our view of the world; but from this fact it does not follow that the question of truth in literature is only a matter of self-coherence within the particular linguistic system. Literary truth cannot be absolutely independent of a referent outside the linguistic world.

Considering realistic painting as the paradigm of artistic representation, Stephen Davies examines the limitations of musical representation. Expressiveness can be equated with representation only in the cases where a musical work recounts or describes an event or presents actions and emotions of a character, as in opera and song, not elsewhere. A piece of "pure" or abstract music is not representational because it does not refer to anyone's "owning" or experiencing an emotion or performing an action. It is only under special conditions that music is representational: where there are differences between the music that serves as the medium of representation and the musical ideas that are the subject of representation. Music can represent aspects of music itself, provided that the subject and the medium of representation are distinguishable.

Milton Snoeyenbos argues that only some dances are representational, not all; and he discusses the nature and scope of representation in those representational dances. He also reflects upon the connections between the concepts of representation and expression in dance. Representation in dance is based on convention and resemblance, and an understanding of style is important in recognizing and articulating resemblances. Individuals, their actions and sequences of events, types and stereotypes are representable. In the case of fictional individuals such as Oedipus, the dancer's resemblance with this character is in a counterfactual context: Oedipus would look like the dancer if he existed as historically specified. Dance may also represent by a denotational reference or by representational symbolism when the represented object is symbolic of a quality or set of qualities.

Thomas Wartenberg, dealing with film representation examines the ontological issue of realism in film that depends upon the broader questions of photographic representation. Having discussed such relevant issues as “transparent realism” and “the logic of seeing,” Wartenberg concludes that film and other photographic media are not transparent ones to put the viewers in touch with the physical world in an unmediated fashion. Looking at film-images, according to him, is like watching smoke or looking at a thermometer. What the viewer sees in a film directly is not an object of the world, but a smokelike image, which allows him to see the world only in a mediated manner.

Ananta Ch. Sukla explores different notions of representation in Sanskrit critical texts of fourteen centuries—from the fourth century B.C. to the tenth century A.D. He observes that the theories of illusion, artificial reproduction, replica, imitation, and re-presentation as advocated by the Western critics of different periods—from the ancients to the moderns—were anticipated by the classical and medieval Sanskrit critics who debated over the issue with no less rigor than what their Western counterparts have been doing. Sukla’s cross-cultural approach to the issue illuminates the universality of the concept of representation in philosophy and criticism of the arts and suggests that the Sanskrit critics might relevantly contribute to understanding the phenomenon by clarifying certain intricacies that have troubled Western critics so far. Put in this cosmopolitan context, representation appears spectacular both in its critical grandeur and multifaceted dimension.

Charles Altieri understands Representation as a semiotic function of symbolic signification. He combines Pitkin’s stand-for and act-for representations in order to have a comprehensive grasp of the concept. Particularly, he thinks, both representation and representativeness (by which he means not a function of how signs project resemblance to states of affairs but a deputy inviting an audience to take it as something to be identified with by projecting a possible world) must be taken together into consideration for a proper understanding of the representational arts. He chooses the noniconic painting of Kasimir Malevich to explain and illustrate literary representation because this painting, in his view, possesses qualities of literalness and immediacy important for modernist aesthetics, more than any literary work. Altieri proposes to bridge modernism and postmodernism by understanding the modernist painting and literature as representational arts because, he thinks, his notion of representation avoids the collapse of epistemological force of art by denying iconic status to these art forms on the one hand and by subscribing to the postmodernist anti-foundationalism in denying any single relation of resemblance between the representation and its pre-existing represented object on the other.

NOTES

1. Quotation from Thomas Hobbes and Cicero: Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 24. For a survey of the etymology of representation, see Pitkin, pp. 241–52.

2. Pitkin, chaps. 3–6.
3. Hobbes quoted by Pitkin, p. 24.
4. David Hume, *Philosophical Works* (Boston and Edinburgh, 1854), vol. 4, p. 173.
5. Immanuel Kant, "On the Form and Principle of the Sensible and the Intelligible World," in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, trans. and ed. David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 384.
6. Quoted by Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 148.
7. Kant, pp. 386–89.
8. Kant, p. 389.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, reprinted in Robert E. Innis, ed., *Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 36.
11. Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935–1966), reprinted in Innis, p. 5.
12. Roman Jakobson, *Selected Writings*, 4 vols. (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), vol. II, p. 699.
13. Saussure in Innis, p. 35.
14. J. H. M. Beattie, *Other Cultures* (London, 1964), p. 69, quoted from John Skorupski, *Symbol and Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 120.
15. Skorupski, pp. 121–22.
16. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1961.
17. Introduction to *Tractatus* (by Bertrand Russell), p. xii.
18. *Ibid.*, p. x.
19. Bywater's translation of Aristotle's *Poetics* (London: Oxford University Press, reprinted 1962), p. 29.
20. Jacques Derrida, "Sending: On Representation," *Social Research* 49 (1982): 302.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
24. Rorty, p. 3.
25. Aristotle's *Poetics*, in *Great Books of the Western World* (the volume on Aristotle), ed. R. N. Hutchins (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 15–20.
26. Derrida, "Sending," p. 304.
27. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 22.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
29. Rorty, p. 12.
30. For an elaboration of these ideas, see Timothy Clark, *Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot: Sources of Derrida's Notion and Practice of Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), particularly chaps. 1 and 3.
31. Derrida, "Sending," p. 303.
32. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 191 and 210.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
34. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol. Four: Nihilism*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 104–5.

35. Ibid., p. 109.
36. Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. D. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 51 and 53.
37. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1973).
38. Ibid., p. 16.
39. Gombrich's ideas in *Art and Illusion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1969).
40. The thesis is developed by Nelson Goodman in his *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978).
41. Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 192.
42. Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 18ff.
43. Lubomir Dolezel, "Fictional Reference: Mimesis and Possible World," in *Toward a Theory of Comparative Literature*, ed. Mario J. Valdes (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 112.
44. Dolezel, p. 115.
45. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Jonson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 193. For Ricoeur's views, see Paul Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," *Annals of Scholarship* 2, no. 3 (1981).
46. Richard Bernheimer, *The Nature of Representation* (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 24.
47. Ibid., p. 25.
48. Ibid., p. 38.
49. Ibid., pp. 2-6.
50. John Willats, *Art and Representation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 1.
51. Geoffrey Hartman, "Representation Now," *Annals of Scholarship* 2, no. 3 (1981): 14.

PART ONE



Concepts
and
Faculties

Representation in Language

JOHN LLEWELYN

The first section of this chapter takes advantage of the opportunity offered by a few propositions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to pose some of the questions to be pursued throughout the succeeding sections in the context of what has been said by a selection of earlier and later philosophers about representation in language or, as we shall eventually find reason to write, "representation" in language.

PICTORIAL, PRESENTATIONAL, AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM

How can we represent how language represents? How language represents does not have to be represented in language, if by language we mean words used in sentences, as I am using them here now. It could be done, apparently, by a diagram, thus: $W \rightarrow T$. Or does this fail because we have to add that "W" represents a word, "T" represents a thing, and " \rightarrow " represents the relation of representation, so that the original question recurs? Should we conclude that an attempted pictorial representation of linguistic representation demands a linguistic representation of pictorial representation? Or should we conclude that linguistic representation defies representation? It might be said, and it has been said, that we should not oppose pictorial to linguistic representation, and that we should distinguish representation as saying from representation as showing. A famous advocate of this double proposal argues that linguistic representation is ultimately pictorial representation, provided the latter be understood as a projective relation between the concatenations of logically proper names that make up elementary propositional facts and the objects or things arranged in other facts or possible states of affairs—in a *Sachverhalt*, a *möglicher Sachverhalt*, a *Sachlage*, or a *mögliche Sachlage*, as Wittgenstein variously says, leaving open a perplexingly wide range of options. I shall resist the temptation to embark upon the detailed analysis of the *Tractatus* without which we cannot begin to determine more precisely what these options are. I shall do no more than note that evidence can be produced

from it and related works in support of more than one answer to the question whether Wittgenstein maintains in them that logically proper names are not all of the same logical form. Frege distinguishes saturated or complete terms from ones that are unsaturated or incomplete, a difference illustrated in common speech by that between "the star" and "shines." It would be possible for Wittgenstein to have this distinction marked in elementary propositions even though the names in them name only because of an interdependence.

Alternatively, it could be said that there is more than one way of being unsaturated. Two such are reflected in another Fregean distinction, that between reference and meaning or sense. According to proposition 3.203 of the *Tractatus*, "*Der Name bedeutet den Gegenstand. Den Gegenstand ist seine Bedeutung.*"¹ If we follow Pears and McGuinness in translating this by "a name means an object. The object is its meaning," one may complain that this fails to recognize the asymmetry of "meaning" and "mean."² As Wittgenstein will himself later say, the meaning of a name remains when the object or person meant by it is destroyed or dies.³ True, the asymmetry just mentioned is liable to be concealed by the phrase "what is meant," because this phrase can be used both of what a name means—"Edinburgh" means Edwin's town—and of what someone means by a name—the capital city of Scotland. Furthermore, in the second of these cases the name is the name of place, whereas in the first it is the name of a name. In the perspicuous language that according to the *Tractatus* must underlie all language, these ambiguities would not obtain. In particular the ambiguity of meaning as between reference and sense would be precluded by the fact that the unit of meaning is the elementary proposition where no name is divorced from its use (*Gebrauch*, 3.326, 6.211).

According to the Tractarian explanation of how elementary propositions represent states of affairs, the meaning of each name would appear to be assimilated to a referent. For, as we saw, proposition 3.203 has names naming objects, *Gegenstände*. However, we have also seen that names may not all function in the same way, and that the objects they stand for may not all be of the same form. Wittgenstein tells us little more about them than that there must exist simple objects. The apparent irrelevance to his purposes of the question of the ontological status of these objects, the question whether they belong to the physical, the psychological or some third realm, is one of the chief respects in which the theory of meaning advanced in the *Tractatus* differs from the earlier theories of linguistic representation to be no less rapidly surveyed in the following sections of this chapter before attention is turned to some of Wittgenstein's later remarks about linguistic representation. However, this section cannot be brought to a close without noting an ambiguity in the reference made in its opening paragraph to the linguistic representation of pictorial representation. It is an ambiguity already present in the Greek *logos*, hence one that will haunt the history of the thinking of what we are provisionally calling linguistic representation.

Some commentators maintain that the phrase "pictorial representation" conceals a distinction that in Wittgenstein's text is marked by the difference between *Form der Abbildung*, pictorial form or form of depiction, and *Form der Darstel-*

lung. Is the latter to be called the form of representation, as most commentators and translators do, or shall we call it the form of presentation, or does it make no difference which of these translations we choose? A decent treatment of this exegetical question is beyond the scope of this essay. It must suffice merely to register the philosophical issues that are at stake in the choice between translating *Darstellung* as presentation or as representation. According to 2.22, "What a picture (re)presents (*darstellt*), it (re)presents (*darstellt*) independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form." And the pictorial form of a picture is said in 2.15 to be the possibility of the structure of the picture, where the structure is the determinate way in which the elements of the picture are related to one another. But what about the relation between the logical picture—and all pictures are said at 2.182 to be logical ones—and what it pictures? It might seem that this question is addressed by the *Form der Darstellung* if that is understood as the form of representation, that is to say, if we equate *Darstellung* with *Vorstellung*. At 2.11 we are told that a picture *vorstellt* a situation in logical space, namely the holding or not holding of states of affairs. The same verb is used at 2.15 to say "That the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents (*vorstellt*) that things are related to one another in the same way."

I believe that a tidier way to distribute these terms, though one not always obviously supported by the text, is to understand *vorstellen* as representation and representation as requiring both pictorial form, *Form der Abbildung*, and presentational form, *Form der Darstellung*. Pictorial form is equivalent to logical form and is what is common to the picture and reality. Pictorial form is also the form of reality. It is the possibility of structure. But the sense of a picture, hence of a proposition, is its actual structure, and it is this that 2.221 says it presents (*darstellt*). The truth or falsity of a picture will depend on whether its sense corresponds with reality. Whether or not it does is contingent upon reality. But a further contingent factor is that of how the notation is to be interpreted—for example, whether an arrow is to be taken to point to the left or to the right, or what relation convention stipulates in order that "*a*" stands to "*b*" in a certain relation says that *aRb*' (3.1432). According to this choice or convention, the picture has one or another form of presentation, that is to say, form of presenting what it purports to be a picture of, and its correctness or truth or incorrectness or falsity will also depend upon this form of presentation. So whereas pictorial or logical form could be said to be an internal relation between the picturing and the pictured fact—as both facts they are both parts or aspects of reality—the form of presentation is externally related to the reality it enables the picture to represent truly or falsely. It may be presumed that this is why "a picture presents its subject from a position outside it" and that "its standpoint is its representational form (*Form der Darstellung*)" (2.173). It may also be surmised that this connects with the idea that in a book called *The World as I Found It* neither the author nor his will would be mentioned in it. In an important sense, "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631). Given the right Wittgenstein confers on himself to employ a disposable ladder to bridge the gap between words

and the world, it should be no surprise to find him using thought as a bridge between the discussion of pictures in general and propositional pictures in particular. The transition is effected via the claim that all pictures are logical ones and that only what is logical is thinkable. One cannot think illogically. One can only think that one can think illogically.

Thinking the sense of a proposition is now said to be the way the propositional sign or sentence (*Satzzeichen*) functions as a projection of a possible situation in the world (3.11–3.13). There is a rule of projection by which the possible situation can be derived from the propositional sign, just as there is one that enables the musician to derive the symphony from the score and the technician to produce a disc from which the symphony and once more the score can be reproduced. This brings us finally to the crucial questions whether this projective thinking (which is not however “thinking out” as Pears and McGuinness translate the *Denken* of 3.11) is what some philosophers call intentionality and, if so, whether this intentionality is to be understood as requiring or as not requiring the performance of a mental act of willing, intending, meaning (*meinen*) suchlike. Mercator’s projection is a method for reading a map, a method, one among many, by which the map may be interpreted as a representation (*Vorstellung*) of the world. And Wittgenstein calls thinking the meaning of a proposition a method of projection. Perhaps other methods would be available here too; though it is to be noted that he refers to *Die Projektionsmethode* with the definite article.

It must be noted also that one speaks *about* or *of* (*von*) objects with the aid of names that deputize for or represent (*vertreten*) objects (3.221). If this is not intentionality, what is? On the other hand, names are the elements of the propositional picture, and although by 2.151–2.1515 a picture is said to be tied to reality and to touch it only through the relation of a name to its object, the consequent attachment of the picture, hence the proposition, to reality is said to be nothing other than “the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.” It may seem that the “vertical” relation of aboutness vanishes into a “horizontal” relation shared by the picture-proposition and reality. But it needs to be remembered that the shared relation is one among elements in the picture-proposition that name objects in the possible state of affairs. Yet again, names have meaning only in the context of a proposition (3.3). So there is interdependence, coinstitution, between what we may call the semantic and the syntactic relations. The pragmatic dimension of Wittgenstein’s semiotics is introduced when the conjunction of the semantic-vertical and the syntactic-horizontal are brought under the term “use,” as when we are told: “We use (*benutzen*) the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation” (3.11) and the method of projection is thinking the propositional sense. The propositional sense is a thought of the form *that aRb*, and the thinking of it is thinking *that “a”* stands to *“b”* in a certain relation (3.1432). Thinking—that is inseparable from the intentionality of thinking-of. This is what Heidegger will call the ontological difference, the difference in sameness of beings and being, the difference between what is present and its presencing. But we shall find that this difference admits an intentionality that it

would be inaccurate to describe as purely projective or representative. And picturing is far from the whole truth of language.

OLD AND NEW WAYS OF IDEAS

Order may be conferred upon the following unchronologically ordered reminders of the history of thinking about linguistic representation if they are prefaced by the reminder that the word *Gegenstand* so frequently used in the *Tractatus* brings with it the notion of something that is over against, and that "object" and its Latin predecessor convey the idea of something that is cast in front and so stands in the way. Further complexity arises from the fact that when the Scholastics, followed by Descartes and others, speak of the objective reality of an idea as distinct from its formal reality, objective means throwing before, projective. The formal reality is that of an idea as a psychological entity or operation "taken materially," Descartes says, to some ears perversely, in the Preface added after the first edition of the *Meditations*, meaning by this taken in abstraction from what the Scholastics, followed by Brentano and Husserl, call its intentionality. In a reply to Caterus, Descartes cites from himself a statement that anticipates a point upon which Husserl will insist and upon the interpretation of which will turn what one thinks about representation in language: "The idea is the thing itself conceived or thought in so far as it is objectively in the understanding." The star as observed by the astronomer through the "objective" lens of his telescope is not in his mind or in his eye or in his mind's eye as it is in the sky. Only with respect to its formal (or "material") reality is the idea in the mind in the way that the star is in the sky. And as soon as our topic changes from that of the objective to the formal reality of the idea, there results a compensating change in the idea of the mind that it occupies. The mind and its contents now become the topic of scientific study as when the astronomer's own experience of seeing the star gives way to a third-personal treatment of that experience as a case to be investigated by the science of optics.

Of course the word "contents" that I have used repeats the ambiguity of "in." It encourages the thought that the occupation of the mind by ideas is like the occupation of space by the star, except that instead of occupying the dimensions of space and time, the idea occupies the temporal flow of consciousness. Like the star itself, the idea will still be a thing, but instead of being objectively observable in the modern sense of this adverb, it will be observable only by the subject whose idea it is. This is the move that appears to be made by "the way of ideas" followed by classical empiricism. It is to counter this move that Husserl, echoing the sentence of which Descartes reminds Caterus, insists that when he says consciousness has the structure of *noesis-noema* or *cogito-cogitatum*, although the *noema* is an *Objekt*, it is not an entity additional to the *Gegenstand*, to, for example, a spatio-temporal thing. It is nothing other than the thing itself in its appearing as the accusative of consciousness or as phenomenon.

The Husserlian *noema* is not a freestanding psychological content (*Inhalt*) associated with other such contents by contiguity, resemblance, or causality. And

if it can be called an idea, it cannot be called inert, as Berkeley calls ideas of corporeal things. The hyphen Husserl inserts between *noesis* and *noema* indicates not a gap but a connection, one that can never be removed. A *noema* is always animated (*beseelt*) by an act of *noesis*, and *noesis* is never without a *noema*. But at least in the early writings, for example in the *Logical Investigations*, where some of the work done by the terms *noesis* and *noema* is performed by the terms *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* (though without the specific forces these terms are given by Frege), Husserl argues that even where the topic is that of the meaning of linguistic signs, this animation need not in principle be the animation of the words of an empirical language.

Our interest here, however, is not in the question of the dependence of meaning on empirical linguistic expression,⁴ it is in the question of the converse dependency. At this point of our historical but unchronological tour of what philosophers have written about linguistic representation, having noted the mediaeval distinction between two ways of regarding ideas that is continued by Descartes, it is appropriate to ask how representation in language is construed by the philosopher who, while owing much to Descartes, is one of the founders of the so-called way of ideas.

John Locke follows at least two ways of ideas. One of these will be signposted in the following section. He sets out on the more well-trodden way when in the first paragraph of the first chapter of Book Three of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, writing "Of Words or Language in General," he distinguishes words understood as articulate sounds such as parrots may be trained to produce and words with what he counts as the further property that man can "make them stand as marks for the *Ideas* within his own Mind." Given this and many other statements to the same effect, it is not surprising that Locke should be held to subscribe not only to a representative theory of perception but to a representative theory of language. If on the representative theory of perception ideas are a screen between the mind and things in their real nature, the representative theory of language will simply add that these ideas get to be the meanings or conceptions denoted by words, and words will be general, signs of instances, if the "Internal Conceptions" they name are general ideas. "Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them." If to this be added mention of the distinction between writing and speech, it might seem that we have the seminal definition offered by Aristotle in *De Interpretatione* according to which "Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken." But Aristotle goes on to say: "As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (*homoiomata*)."⁵ Aristotle declines to develop these thoughts. His excuse for not doing so there, assuming that the excuse he gives there has not been misplaced from another part of the text, as some scholars suggest, is that these thoughts have been treated in the *De Anima*. In fact no development of them seems to be

given there either. So on the evidence provided by this definition of words, it is difficult to say whether the affections or impressions (*pathemata*) are what Locke would call general ideas. That they are does not follow from Aristotle's statement that they are the same for the whole of mankind. They could be particulars in the mind that resemble particulars in the minds of others. Their serving to enable communication could be explicable by an account like that usually attributed to Berkeley. On that account an affection, although particular, could function as an archetype. The particular's capacity to represent particular things would be assured, so this story goes, thanks to the resemblance that other affections have to the original. The as it were lateral resemblance between *pathemata* would be what enables them to function as likenesses "vertically" representing things. One difficulty with this account relates to the ambiguity of the word *homoiomata*. The lateral resemblance that is supposed to explain vertical representation itself supposes that one particular is a re-presentation of the other, even if it does not represent it. If everything resembles everything else in some respect over and above resembling it in virtue of happening to represent the same thing, and if everything therefore re-presents everything else in the sense of repeating it, what is and what is not a re-presentation that counts for the purposes of linguistic representation remains unexplained. It remains unexplained even if the metaphorical use of the distinction between the lateral and the vertical is dropped and the things, Aristotle's *Pragmata*, are analyzed phenomenally or subjectively as ordered clusters of *pathemata*. This would still not meet the difficulty that communication would depend on a pre-established harmony between the affections of one soul and those of another. There would remain what Locke calls the secrecy of the reference my thought makes to yours, a secrecy no more surmountable than that which he ascribes to the real nature of the substance or things (*Essay*, 3.2.4).

Let us set aside the problem posed by the thought that everything resembles everything else in some respect. And let us allow that if one thing resembles another, then it also re-presents it or re-presents the feature shared by itself and the other. Perhaps this does not amount to the one thing standing for the other. Perhaps we have at best a condition on the basis of which one thing may be made to stand for another, to signify or symbolize it—and a condition on the basis of which one thing, even when regarded as a token (and not just because a token is a different kind of thing from a type), represents itself. We are still without an account of how one thing may be made to stand for another.

The account of this making that Aristotle goes on to give in the *De Interpretatione* is centered on the significative function of words. So it raises the question whether anything is gained by having recourse to mental affections as intermediaries between words and the things they denote. Aristotle holds that the meaning of names or nouns (*onomata*) and nominalized verbs is due to convention. This cannot, however, be an unqualified endorsement of the position maintained in Plato's *Cratylus* by Hermogenes if the latter's view is that any correctness or incorrectness of naming is determined solely by custom or convention. Not if the correctness is determined also by the fact that the names tally with the

mental affections of which Aristotle says they are signs and that they are the same for the whole of mankind. And of course this question concerning the meaning of names is paralleled by the question of the identity of the names themselves considered in isolation from their meaning. Barbarians and Greeks speak different dialects, vary their own pronunciation and form their letters in more or less discernably different ways. Yet this does not prevent their using what at least members of their own respective communities would recognize across these variations as one and the same letter or word. Does this mean that there is a second affection common to the minds, a verbal impression that partners the semantic impression in virtue of which the word succeeds in naming the thing?

Further, in default of more than we have discovered so far to explain linguistic representation, and recalling Wittgenstein's statement in the *Tractatus* (3.1431) that the fact that tables and chairs are configured in a certain way can represent a state of affairs concerning other things, hence things like linguistic signs, there seems to be no reason why the thing could not serve as the name of a word and indeed of the intermediating mental affection, provided that between the latter and the thing a further intermediating mental affection be posited. Perhaps this is the wisdom concealed in the fact that the Hebrew *devar* can mean both word and thing or event, a fact that fits the Hasidic-Kabbalistic doctrine that the Torah existed before the creation as a jumble of letters to be ordered by the events of which they will tell; a fact mirrored in the fact that the Greek *stoicheion* can mean both letter and element, so the first element of a language, in Democritean atomism, and in Aristotle's comment in *De Generatione et Corruptione* (315b) in connection with Democritus that tragedy and comedy come from the same letters.⁶ When Philonous's protestation to Hylas in the Third Dialogue that he is not for making things into ideas but for making ideas into things is conjoined with Berkeley's teaching that things are signs in the language of God to be deciphered by human beings, these signs are at one and the same time linguistic and natural, depending upon whether they be regarded theologically or as the subject matter of physical science.

Berkeley guarantees to names a correctness founded in nature because nature is founded in God. Ultimately this correctness depends on the undecieving nature of God no less than does the reliability of the "lessons of nature" invoked in the Sixth Meditation by Descartes. The theological premise is not essential to the case that Cratylus presents, in opposition to the conventionalism of Hermogenes, for his claim that the correctness of names is based on their etymology. That case is not destroyed by saying with Aquinas: "The etymology of a name is one thing, and the meaning of the name another. For etymology is determined by that from which the name is taken to signify something, while the meaning of the terms is determined by that which it is used to signify" (*Summa Theologia* 11a, 11ae, 92, 1 and 2). Though this is indeed a most salutary reminder that what I mean by a word may not be what my great-great-grandfather—or Adam—meant by that word, it simply denies without argument what Cratylus asserts. Cratylus's assertion amounts to the contention that the determination of what a name signifies is dependent upon the determination of the thing it origi-

nally named. The origin as understood by Cratylus would have a logical and epistemological force, but this would be secondary to its sense as historical beginning. Socrates provisionally agrees with Cratylus's thesis, but only because he makes the historical sense of origin secondary to its logical and epistemological force. He imagines a legislator or wordsmith—a forerunner of Berkeley's signwriting God—who coins words in the light of the Forms or Ideas that, in the language of the altar, are partaken of or, in the language of the stage, are imitated by the things of the world to which our words refer. So although Socrates appears to be agreeing with Cratylus's view that the correctness of names has a foundation in *physis* and to that extent appears to be disagreeing with Hermogenes's view that this correctness is based on custom, rule or law, *nomos*, he is in fact putting forward a third account in which the opposition between *physis* and *nomos* is denied. To which we may be inclined to say that this is all well and good, but that both the Cratylic and the Socratic postulates seem superfluous to any explanation of how we manage to get words to represent things correctly. We manage to do that without needing to carry out either etymological research or philosophical dialectic. And the needlessness for this purpose of dialectic remains even if that dialectic does not generate the infinite regress of ideas of ideas between the *eidos* or *idea* as Form and *idea* or *eidos* as thought, a regress analogous to the one to which we saw Locke's new way of ideas appears to lead.

ANOTHER IDEA OF IDEA

If the old Platonic way of Ideas and the Cratylic way of etymology both lead to dead ends as ways to explain how words represent, the way is left open for consideration of Hermogenes's claim that the correctness of the application of words is a matter of customary use. Consideration of this may profitably begin with the reconsideration of Locke promised earlier, in particular of his statement to the Bishop of Worcester that "the New Way of ideas, and the old way of speaking intelligibly, was always and ever will be, the same thing,"⁷ "a new history of an old thing: for I think it will not be doubted that men always performed the actions of thinking, reasoning, believing and knowing, just after the same manner that they do now."⁸ Not unnaturally, some commentators see such remarks as an identification of ideas not with objects thought, as in the more representationalist reading of Locke, but with the thinking itself. It is noted by Aaron, from whom the phrase "the thinking itself" is taken, that this interpretation of ideas, as not objects of thought but as the operations of thinking, seems to be at variance with Locke's describing the ideas we have of these operations as ideas of reflection.⁹

Could Locke be saying that an idea is both the object thought and the thinking of it? He could say this if by reflective he means reflexive in the sense that there is self-consciousness without this consciousness having to be that of a subject posed over against itself at the same time as an object. Is this prereflective consciousness not what speaking and writing demand, though without demanding that one can never interrupt oneself with the observations that one had just said and/or thought such-and-such? Although statements cited from Locke in our

second section suggest that we observe objects that are internal to our own minds, an implication of private consultation is not compelled by the reference he makes to observations when he writes that "we make use of words both to record our own observations and to recount to others, and commonly also even to think upon things which we would consider again."¹⁰ One's own observations are not bound to be observations of what is one's own in such a way that others may not share in their ownership when one's observations are recounted to others. Furthermore, the very expressions idea and object of thought for "whatever it is the mind can be employed about in thinking" may mean quite simply the topic of one's thinking. A topic may be a question as to what is the case, how something is done, when something happened, and so on. Questioning implies the engagement of the understanding. And even where the topic is a physical object, its being a topic implies that it is also an object of thought. It is that for which a word "in its primary or immediate Signification" stands. Here "primary" is not of course equivalent to Locke's "simple," for ideas are also complex. Perhaps, adapting the Fregean way of distinguishing distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* mentioned earlier, it could be said that the primary or immediate signification is what the word means, as distinguished from the physical or other thing to which the word refers.¹¹ Locke licenses Stillingfleet to substitute for the term "ideas" the terms "notions" or conceptions or "apprehensions,"¹² notwithstanding his own special use of the first of these expressions for "mixed modes," notions depending on stipulative definition or convention—for example, perjury, sacrilege and murder. If one allows oneself to imagine, in the manner suggested earlier, that the Platonic Idea may exist or subsist without being thought by a human intellect, and if one subscribes to the principle that there is nothing *in intellectu* that was not first *in sensu*, one may be inclined to imagine that sensory ideas may exist or subsist independently of being sensed. This inclination is discouraged by the synonyms for that idea proposed to Stillingfleet. They are expressions of the common speech of "countrymen" less likely to mislead a philosopher or divine in this way than the word "idea" with its Platonic ancestors. However, it is precisely they and their Scholastic successors, substantial forms, that provoke Locke to make use of that word in order to bring it back down to earth and to its indissociability from the operations of *human* understanding, an indissociability that the equivalents offered to Stillingfleet wear more patently on their face.

If words in their primary and immediate significations stand for ideas or notions or conceptions or apprehensions, for what do words in their secondary or mediate significations stand? At least as regards words that are names of material substances, one possible answer is real essences, real essences understood, however, not scholastically but mechanistically according to the atomistic hypotheses of Gassendi and Boyle. Saying, as Locke does, that we cannot know the true constitution of material or spiritual substances but only their nominal essences (*Essay* 3.6.3–11) is another way of saying that the primary and immediate significations of words is based on agreement grounded in what we believe on the basis of experience. Hence, although Book Three, "Of Words," was not a

part of Locke's original plan for the *Essay*, the word "Understanding" that figures in his title refers not just to "the" understanding or mind, but to understanding as opposed to misunderstanding. It is to that extent part of the tradition to which the treatises on method of Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza belong and that culminates in Peirce's essay on how to make clear our ideas—or intelligible, as Locke says, picking up Stillingfleet's comment: "[B]ut now, it seems, nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas" (*Works* 4.430).

Among the conditions Locke prescribes for the intelligibility of words is that they be joined up in sentences according to the rules of grammar and that these sentences be joined in a coherent discourse. In the very last chapter of the *Essay*, after referring to practical science, *praktike*, as one of "the three great Provinces of the intellectual World" and to Things as the topic of natural philosophy, *phusike*, defined sufficiently generally to include spirits and their constitutions and operations, he says that since Things other than the mind itself are not present to the understanding, it is "necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and there are *Ideas*." So ideas are here included in addition to words within the subject matter of the science of signs he calls *semiotike*. This is not as strange as it may seem, for in the final sentences of the work, words are once again called "articulate sounds," and it will be recollected that the first sentences of its third book make it clear that articulate sounds do not for Locke include what they mean. An articulate sound when made by a parrot can be taken as a sign of something, but only if it expresses a notion, conception, or apprehension is it a linguistic sign or representation.

FORMS OF LIFE

Locke's requirement for the intelligibility of words that they be linked with other words in sentences that are linked with other sentences in discourse anticipates Frege's statement that names make sense only in the context of a sentence or proposition, a statement that, as previously noted, Wittgenstein endorses in the *Tractatus* (3.3). In the *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*), this thesis broadens out into the claim that a word has meaning only in a form of life. This broadening is a broadening also of the Tractarian notions of pictorial, presentational and representational form. It not only extends the conception of picture by reminding philosophers of the variety of things that may be meant by description (*PI* 24). It extends beyond the pictorial and descriptive conception of language, reminding us of all the nonrepresentational activities in which words are used (*PI* 23), reminding us that the subject matter of *semiotike* is at the same time the subject matter of *praktike*, as semioticians after Locke recognized when they distinguished semantics, syntactics and pragmatics as the parts of semiotics that are concerned respectively with the relation of signs to meaning and truth, their relation to each other and their relation to those by whom they are used.

It is because Heidegger too questions the pan-representationalist conception of language that he takes exception to the assumption a reading of Dilthey might reinforce, that the study of language would be at its widest and deepest when its

topic becomes *Weltanschauungen*, worldviews. Compare Wittgenstein's self-interrogation "Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?" (*PI* 122) where the inverted commas may be tantamount to a *sotto voce* "perish the thought," for although the question is asked about the surveyable representation of our uses of words that philosophy should aim to produce by discovering and inventing intermediate cases, the representation the *Philosophical Investigations* comes up with brings out that words are used to perform many functions other than representing or presenting views. If we continue to say that languages embody, express or represent different views or theories of the world, let us understand that these views (*theoria*) are embodied, expressed or represented in practices and that at its widest and deepest what semiotics is concerned with extends beyond an either-or of theory-practice to a theoretico-practical both-and.

Wittgenstein may have been aware of the irony that this extension is already underway in the passage from Augustine cited at the beginning of the *Investigations* as an exemplar of the representationalist doctrine of language the appropriateness of which for language quite generally is questioned throughout much of the rest of the book. Augustine writes:

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved toward something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of the other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.

"In this picture of language," Wittgenstein writes, "we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands." Language is not limited to such a system of communication as that which Augustine describes. In saying that a language that fits Augustine's description is a system, it may not be Wittgenstein's intention to concede that in Augustine's model the verticality of the *nomen-nominatum* model of meaning is supplemented by a horizontal relation among names. But might not this latter dimension be implied in Augustine's assertion "as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified"? Could not the phrase *verba in variis sentiis locis suis posita* be an acknowledgment that "Fido"-Fido nominalism or nomenclatism of the sort favored also by Hobbes is conditioned by a system of sentence-frames such that each name succeeds in naming its object only through its being substitutable for names that occupy places in various other sentences and not substitutable for others? So that, as Saussure writes, the positive power of a name, its function as a label imposed upon a thing, is constituted by the differences among its phonological, syntactic and semantic "others": "In language there are only differences *without positive*

terms" in so far as we consider the phonic or graphic type or signifier in isolation from the signified meaning.¹³ Only when these mutually implicated aspects of a sign are taken together do we have positive terms and oppositions or distinctions between them. The positive meaning of signs understood in their signifying-signified totality will still be dependent on the positive meaning of other signs thus understood, as, to employ the now familiar analogy employed by Saussure and Wittgenstein and others, do the positive powers of the pieces in chess.

The infant Augustine's grasp of identity through difference subserves the expression of his own desires. His desires or wants (*voluntates*) are prescriptive of what he wants to say, what he means, whether what he refers to or names or intends (*meint*), or what he wants to enunciate or say about what he refers to or names (*veut dire*).¹⁴ (Compare the grammar of *meinen* and *vouloir dire* [PI 657]).¹⁴ The infant is more likely to express (*enuntiabam*) his desires by evincing them in the verbal and body language to which Augustine refers than by reporting or describing them. It is clear from what Augustine says that if there is description, it is description for a particular use (PI 291), in this case, for example, to get someone to satisfy the child's hunger or thirst. His mastery of language at this stage between infancy and boyhood is the mastery of a fairly primitive form of life. But it is learned by the intimation of more-mature people. This is why there is no room here for the objection that how the child learns the language is a matter of psychological genesis and therefore cannot be a logical norm for the analysis of the meaning of the terms he uses. See the citation from Aquinas in the earlier section "Old and New Ways of Ideas." The genesis is genea-logical. Norms are imbibed like the child imbibes its mother's milk. They are imbibed with it. In the first place the norms are the norms of a rudimentary form of life, a way of getting what one wants, in this case milk, which happens to be also what one needs. When the child wants to suck but no breast or bottle is ready to hand and to mouth, it feels that there is something radically wrong with its world and expresses that feeling in what it would be premature to call words until it has reached the stage described in the sentences reproduced from Augustine. Even at that stage, when the bottle does not appear or the milk is not flowing freely and the child's world as a totality of facilities ready to hand or to mouth is detotalized through being interrupted by unreadiness to hand or to mouth, it may stretch credulity to suppose that now for the first time its world becomes a totality of facts or of things and materials present at hand representable by names and true or false descriptions.

Heidegger's analysis of the experience of confronting a broken hammer assumes a setting like that of a carpenter's or cobbler's workshop in which the question can arise how and with what the hammer can be mended or replaced. All the child at the level of Augustine's analysis can do is express his loss in whatever words are at his disposal at that early stage of language acquisition, in the hope that in doing so he will acquire the nutritive goods of which he feels himself deprived. If he cannot suck at least upon his dummy, he will suck so to speak upon words. And indeed in due course he may experience a hunger for them and come to relish and value them for themselves in babble or in a more

elaborately artful musico-literary form. His desires for bodily comfort, still met by the succulent succor of oral and aural words, through being catered for in the linguistic medium he shares with his elders, enable him to enter more deeply into the stormy society of human life, as Augustine goes on to say, and give him access to the more complex culturo-linguistic practices that in turn generate more and more complex desires, values and ideals.

These values may include those of a scientific or philosophical representation of the world or philosophy. Now linguistic representationalism, as we began to see earlier in the section "Another Idea of Idea" and are about to see confirmed now, is not confined to the kind that has words standing initially for private psychological experiences, the subjective idea-list kind that, as we saw at the beginning of our discussion of Locke, many of his remarks seem to imply. Other remarks made by Locke imply a realism of a direct empirical kind that would enable him apparently to agree with Heidegger that in an assertion there is a pointing-out that "has in view the entity itself and not, let us say, a mere 'representation' (*Vorstellung*) of it—neither something, 'merely represented' nor the psychological condition in which the person who makes the assertion 'represents' it" (*Sein und Zeit* 154).¹⁵ To cite but one of many statements to this effect made by Locke: "Thus, the idea of the sun, what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the sun" (*Essay* 2.23.6). But the natural philosophy for which Locke's philosophy of the understanding is intended to clear a path maintains that the sensible qualities in a physical thing are also in the mind. They require the involvement of mentality, not only because the lightness and warmth of the sun are, as Locke writes, "perceptions in me" (*Essay* 2.8.24), which seems to entail that the qualities of the sun are in two places at once, but because the place where the properties belong is intelligible and describable only through the idea of a conditional if-then. If the so-called secondary qualities of things are to be understood as consequences of hypothesized events or states among the atomic constituents of the world, then power or potentiality is part of the bright and warm world we inhabit. Although Locke's way of ideas is often seen as one that fuels the picture of the world as a picturable totality of things or facts represented by simple, compound and complex ideas in turn representable by propositions and names, among ideas required to give the full picture are ones whose complexity can be expressed only in hypothetical statements that are not reducible to categoricals. Now it is true that these hypotheticals state causal connections. It is also true that these may arguably be analyzed as regular conjunctions in the manner of Hume. But what according to Hume is natural belief is indeed natural, and if it is an illusion, it is a transcendental illusion in the sense that it cannot be eradicated. For it remains at the root of all eradication if one's original way of inhabiting a world is not as a presenter of things present at hand but as a seeker of solutions and a performer of tasks set by oneself or/and by a world that is an environment: an *Umwelt* that is an *Um-*

zu Welt, a world of which the meaning (*Sinn*) is its being an oriented whole (*Verweisungsganzheit*). In this totality it is the ready or unready to hand by which one is always already surrounded, before one is surrounded by a totality of representable objects or facts. In the real world understood as the lived world (understood as maybe even Locke is beginning to understand it in some of his remarks on the phenomenology of power; for if a great part of our complex ideas of things are of their powers [*Essay* 2.23.8], a great part of those powers are within the powers of those who live in the world), the idea of correlation *as a rule* is dependent upon correlation *according to a rule* followed in pursuing an end, whether that of meeting a more or less simple bodily need or of explaining how the natural world works. For although the regularity of the conjunction of two kinds of event may not be a causal regularity, their being events implies a contextual *Umwelt* in the description of which counter-factually conditional truths cannot be assumed, an assumption that need not exclude the possibility that some events are uncaused.

Even the objects that are the subject matter of a science are functions of the science's objective. Whether that objective be a technological application or knowledge for its own sake, the involvement in pursuing the objective is concealed by statements predicating properties of objects. The objectivity of the science itself is predicated upon the scientists' participation in the projectivity of a program of research that, like the less articulate project of the child to satisfy its humbler desires (and the scientist too must eat and drink in order to be able to carry on with his or her research), has the structure of what Heidegger calls a *Verweisungsganzheit*, a functional, operative totality defined by reference to its point. An object is defined by an objective, even and especially where the objective is at least partly defined by the steps taken to achieve it, as in playing a game, which may be a language-game, and more generally in living a form of life. This telic structure, whether or not it depends on the innate forms of representation postulated by a Chomskian analysis of mastery of a *langue*,¹⁶ is the deep structure of language in use, of *parole*. There is no screening (riddling, concealing, revealing) grammatical structure, however deep, the output of which is not itself screened by the acquired structures of rhetoric. As ethics is a part of politics, so grammar is a part of rhetoric. But rhetorical structures are unrepresentable if by representation is meant the naming of objects or the picturing of states of affairs. Involvement in a concern is a way of being rather than seeing, though it has its own mode of discernment that in *Being and Time* is called *Sicht*, sight, as in *Umsicht*, circumspection, *Vorsicht*, precaution, and indeed *Rucksicht*, consideration or solicitude such as one might show when one mends one's neighbors' shoes but refrains from doing so at night lest the hammering keep them awake (SZ §31).

The structure of the means-end involvements with feeding bottles and hammers is not the same as that of the constataion of a relationship between a cause and an effect. But it is very like the structure of involvement with the instrumentality of words. In both cases the mastery of skills is required. In both cases a mastery of tools presupposes the mastery of what is not a tool but an organ. In the case of hammering, the organ to be trained is the hand. In the case of speak-

ing and suckling, the organ is the lips, the palate, the tongue (*la langue*) or, as Augustine says more generally, *edomito in eis signis ore*, his mouth had to be trained or accustomed to form these words.

As Heidegger says, the usual course is for words to accrue to meanings, significations or references such as inform one's engagement in a task, rather than for meaning to be supplied to words as things present at hand (SZ 161). Nor for the most part and in the first place do words as sounds supplied with meanings normally get supplied to, for instance, sounds. If, as Philonous in Berkeley's First Dialogue maintains, the proper and proximate data of the sense of hearing are sounds rather than a vehicle in the street, it is the latter, the red juggernaut emitting pungent fumes from its exhaust that is heard by the person, and it is this that originally gets named. "What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle" (SZ 163). What gets given a name is what there is a point in naming. The point in naming something a coach or a car is given by the convenience of getting from one place to another more quickly or more comfortably than one can on one's own two feet. The point of calling what one has heard a sound is less clear, because it is a conceptual truth that the accusative of hearing is sound, and a conceptual truth of such simplicity seems not to need to be put into words. However, it is difficult to imagine how musicians would manage without names to distinguish sounds of different pitch. And the point for dogs of having different names for different smells might seem evident, if we decided that dogs do have names for things, a decision that will itself turn on what point there would be in saying that they do.

WORLD PICTURES

Is *this* a "*Weltanschauung*"? Is *this* a conceptual scheme? Is the idea presented in *Philosophical Investigations* that nominal, referential, and predicative representation presupposes a nonrepresentational point just one among other conceivable points of view or perspectives on language? And can the same be said of the closely related if not identical idea defended in *Being and Time* according to which the apophantic "as" of assertion or "judgment"—for example, the assertion "This hammer is too heavy"—is a graft upon a hermeneutic "as"—for example, the experience of this hammer as too heavy expressed not by putting this finding into words but just by putting the hammer down and picking up one that is less heavy? Heidegger does claim to be giving an analysis of *Dasein* or human being as such, though he stresses that the starting point of that *existenzial* analysis is the concrete *existenziell* situation of inquiry in which he and his presumed reader are involved, the circumstance of philosophical questioning to which an ancient tradition says wonder gives rise. Wittgenstein describes imagined conceptual schemes in order to show that ones different from those with which we are familiar would be intelligible if certain very general facts of nature were imagined different (PI 230). Indeed, would not imagining the latter natural differences already be imagining the former conceptual ones? Such imaginings are designed to lead us away from a philosophical conception that attributes a piston

rod rigidity to conceptual necessity. Apparently absolute freestanding necessity is conditioned by historically relative circumstances. This holds for the necessity of Wittgenstein's own assumption that the so-called purely logical connections have their roots in social practices. So-called pure logic is always already applied. Pure logic is unemployed logic, so that the famed vacuity of the formal relations that mathematical logic represents in its truth-tables is the vacation of language, language on holiday (*PI* 38). Logical meaning or emptiness of meaning, it could be said, is the offspring of rhetorical use. What that use is can be shown only by describing actual or imaginary cases, as Wittgenstein does in his later writings. So what I have just called an assumption is not an assumption at all, for it is supported by the album of cases that those late writings construct. To expect him, independently of the cases within which we know our way about, to speculate whether it is parochial to say that representation lives on what is unrepresentable, is to expect him to join ranks with the philosophers whose errands he puts down to their desire to philosophize in a vacuum.

The remarks on the alleged crystalline purity and hardness of the logical "must" made in *Philosophical Investigations* are paralleled in *Being and Time* by a criticism of the notion of universal validity (*Geltung*) and bindingness revived by Lotze (*SZ* 155), but going back at least to the *Organon* of Aristotle in which *logos* came into the philosophical ken of the Greeks primarily as assertion, and assertion is regarded as the primary locus of truth. It is important to observe that this is a statement about philosophy. Otherwise one will find it puzzling that, especially in his work after *Being and Time*, Heidegger can explore the Greek thinking of *logos*—for example, the poetic thinking of *logos* in Heraclitus—for clues as to how today there could be a beginning of a kind of thinking other than that for which Aristotelian logic and its modern successors provide the norms.

Where in order to expose philosophical pretensions Wittgenstein describes forms of life that make no explicit philosophical pretensions, Heidegger describes epochs in the history of philosophical thinking of being. Most relevant to our purposes is Heidegger's claim that it is only in modern philosophy that thinking is identified with representation.

In an essay entitled "The Age of the World Picture" Heidegger says that the word and the concept of representation (*Vorstellen*) is worn out (*abgenutzt*).¹⁷ In order to grasp fully the modern essence of representedness, he says, we must trace the original power of naming that the word has lost. How far back must one go? To the beginning of the modern age or beyond? Is there an essence of representedness that is not modern, a representedness that does not have as its centre subjectivity as understood by Descartes and Locke? If the essence of modern representativeness can be expressed, as Heidegger expresses it, by saying that it makes man the measure of all things, has he not conceded that it is the same ancient essence that Protagoras expressed? By no means. For what is asserted in the sophistic thesis attributed to Protagoras at *Theaetetus* 152 is, in Plato's words, that "any given thing 'is to me as it appears to me, and to you such as it appears to you,' you and I being men." But the sophist is speaking from the same basis of *sophia* as Heraclitus and Parmenides, namely the basis of presencing and truth

as unconcealment. The measure of things is how human being accommodates itself to being. On the Cartesian account of the I that thinks, man requires things to accommodate themselves to him. Greek man's belonging within a horizon of unconcealment (*a-letheia*) lets that which is absent and that which is present be, allowing concealment (*lethe*) to be if there is to be clearing (*Lichtung*). Cartesian man presumes to decide for himself what will be represented in the light of his understanding. Descartes does not deny that the human comprehension of God is limited, but our conception of God's nature is according to him certain enough to enable man to have clear and distinct ideas of the natural world. The modesty of the Greek's relationship to the cosmos is expressed as the modesty with which he regards his relationship to the gods, as when Protagoras says "I am surely not in a position to have in sight anything regarding the gods, neither that they are nor that they are not, nor how they are in their visible aspect."¹⁸

This citation raises another question about how the Greeks see the world and how it is represented by the Cartesian. For the phrase "visible aspect" translates the Greek word *idea*. How can this not be a progenitor of Descartes's Latin *idea*? How can this not be a progenitor of Descartes's Latin *idea* and hence already the seed of modern representation? Heidegger tells us that it is both. The aspect or view for which Plato's word is *eidos* "is the presupposition, destined far in advance and long ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world's having to become a picture."¹⁹ This does not, however, mean that it is already a world picture or representation. For the aspect or view of a thing for the Greeks is more the thing's looking to man, with the full ambiguity of the word "looking" (*anschauen*), than its being the subject of and subjected to man's look.²⁰ It is not the *Weltanschauung* first named by Kant in 1790 in section 26 of the Third Critique. Man's worldview is not a passive registration, but active world-viewing, viewing of which the world is object as world picture and man views himself as the *subjectum* capturing the world in the concepts it imposes upon it, the centre and scene of the world.

In the essay "Science and Reflection," published 16 years after "The Age of the World Picture," a reference to the scene or stage is implicit in the reference again made to what Plato names *eidos*, here connected with *theorein*, hence with theater and theory. Without taking back what he said in the earlier essay about *eidos* having the sense of man being looked to, Heidegger stresses here that *theorein* is to look at something with close attention or heed. So, again, it is by no means mere passivity. On the contrary—or higher than contrariety—it is for the Greeks the highest form of doing.²¹ So it must be distinguished from the entrapment implied by the viewing (*Betrachtung*) of modern scientific theorizing. Greek *episteme* is not science. Greek *logos*, as gathering, *legein*, is not language that represents. Epistemology—*epistemologie*, the philosophy of science—is a modern invention, despite its ancient Greek name.

Yet modern idea, theory, and language as representation are, Heidegger allows, haunted by *eidos*, *theorein*, and *logos*. And again and again he describes how the senses of these and other terms employed in the modern age of the world picture are transformations of the senses of the Greek via the Latin *Idea*, *contemplari*, meaning to divide and inspect, and so on.

LANGUAGE AND THE VERY IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

Heidegger's etymological meditations, not to be mistaken for lexicographical antiquarianism, could make a big difference to how we see the area of the debate about representation in language that treats of what the title of a seminal essay by Donald Davidson calls "the very idea of a Conceptual Scheme."²² The idea in question is most familiar in the special version known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, one statement of which runs as follows:

Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly, between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages . . . we cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees.²³

Whorf goes on to say that this control thesis, as we may call it, holds not only for languages like Greek, Hebrew, English, Hopi, Chinese, and others, but for sublanguages of which he cites as an example the language of Western scientific thought. Would not this be paradigmatic of a conceptual scheme, and would we not have to exclude as illustrations of the control thesis at least ancient Greek if, as Heidegger says, the Greeks in a unique way thought out of their language—that is, received from it their human existence²⁴—and if the description he gives of that outlined earlier is faithful to it? For that description is worlds apart from the description he gives of a language like the language of modern science, of which it could be said that it expresses or imposes a conceptual scheme. The very idea of a conceptual scheme, the very idea of a concept, a *Begriff*, and the very idea of an idea in its Cartesian and Lockean sense of a representation, belong to the age and language of the worldview that pictures the world as a world picture, something taken like a camera takes a snapshot.²⁵ Hence, if one accepts what Heidegger says about the world as representation and about languages in this age of representation, one must also accept that any discussion of the incommensurability of two or more languages that impose different conceptual schemes is limited to languages that belong to this modern age. The age of representation, *Vor-stellung*, is the age of world picture, and the age of world picture is the age of *Ge-stell*, of setting securely within a frame, of setup, one could even say of frame-up, for a conceptual scheme is a conspiratorial scheming in which man inquisitions nature and himself, puts them both to the test.

I have argued elsewhere that the control thesis and the incommensurability thesis that follows from it are either vacuously true or untestable.²⁶ The demand for testability is very much a child of its time, the age of modern science in which things are put to the test, the age of the principle of verification and falsification.

Because that principle does not pass its own test, and because it is to misconceive its status to require that it should, perhaps the control thesis and the incommensurability thesis too are not damned by their untestability. "Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education," as Aristotle observes in *Metaphysics* (1006a), and as we shall have further occasion to remind ourselves later.

It is not clear that any interlingual breakdown of communication that is alleged to be consequential upon differences of conceptual scheme can be put down either to an in-principle explicable verbal misunderstanding or idiosyncrasy or to difference of belief. For if there can be belief only where there can be doubt, it is odd to say either that there is a difference of conceptual frame or that there is a difference of belief in some of those circumstances that would fit the circumstances Wittgenstein may have in mind when he speaks of how sometimes we are not able to find our feet with people—*nicht in sie finden*, literally, not able to find ourselves in them, not able to understand them. This may be because we have not mastered their language:

The Chinese concept of *yu/wu* excludes all senses of English "being" except the existential, but overlaps English "having." Thinking in terms of Being, we start from an object which on the one hand *is*, *exists*, on the other hand *has* properties. Thinking in terms of *yu*, we start from an environment which we may or may not determine as "the world," which has, within which there is, the object; arriving at the object we find that it has, that within it there are, form and colour.

... An English learner of Chinese takes a little time to rid himself of the impression that there is something missing from such a sentence as (MAN) NATURE GOOD "Human nature (is) good." If I say "The rose red" or "He in Paris," have I not left out the relationship between the rose and the colour, the man and the place—a relationship which is exactly defined by the splendidly unambiguous word "is"? No, for "the red rose" and "the man in Paris" are no more ambiguous than "the rose which is red" and "the man who is in Paris." But these phrases do not pretend to be sentences. "The rose red" needs a verb, not to show how redness is related to the rose, but to assert the redness; for it is a rule of English that there is no sentence without a verb.²⁷

Or we may feel people alien to us because, although we have mastered their language, we are at sea with their traditions (*PI* 223). The traditions or customs are part of the activity, the form of life of which speaking a language forms a part (*PI* 23). Hence if talk of conceptual schemes limits the discussion of their alleged incommensurability to the age of representation as strictly defined by Heidegger, in order to extend the scope of the discussion of this problem to take in historically earlier ages or ages that although historically contemporary do not belong to the *Zeit des Weltbildes*—may be precisely because their *Zeit*, their temporality, is different, as Whorf argues that Hopi temporality is—we could substitute for the expression conceptual scheme, the expression form of life or language. Or we could speak with Husserl of a lifeworld, *Lebenswelt*, the expression that may have been in Heidegger's thoughts when he wrote that the word "world" can be understood as "that" "wherein" a factual *Dasein* as such can be said to "live" (*SZ* 65). So could we speak of the incommensurability or

otherwise of worlds understood in this sense? No harm will come if in discussing what Davidson writes on this problem we continue to use the expression "conceptual frame" that he employs without intending the restriction that is imposed upon its use by Heidegger's definition. And provided we do not forget the restriction Heidegger puts on the scope of "representation," we may use that term more generally without too much risk. Heidegger is himself committed to using the German equivalent of that word (*Vorstellung*) even in describing the world of the Greeks. But with this word world there is a greater risk of confusion. For in the course of his essay Davidson has occasion to remark, "there is at most one world."²⁸ That there are at least two worlds in the sense in which Heidegger proposes to use the word world is apparently implied by his statement that "'world' may stand for the 'public' we-world, or one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment." Yet Heidegger says also that although *Dasein* is always the being-here-or-there of an I, always *jemeinig* (compare "I am my world" and "the world is my world," *Tractatus* 5.63, 5.641), it is also a being-here-or-there-with-others, *Mitdasein* (SZ 41–3, 123). This implies that the we-world and one's own world are one world. On the other hand, Davidson's remark that there is at most one world is made in connection with the statement Strawson makes in *The Bounds of Sense* that "it is possible to imagine kinds of worlds very different from the world as we know it," so, Davidson concludes, these pluralities are metaphorical or merely imagined.

That is to say, Heidegger and Davidson each admits in some sense, literal or metaphorical, both a unity and a plurality of worlds. Heidegger, further, admits a plurality of pluralities. There is the plurality of my world being my world and your world being yours—which does not mean that we do not inhabit a common world. There is also the plurality of worlds, stressed in his writings after *Being and Time*, consisting in the fact that our common world is the world of the world picture, whereas the common world of, for example, the Greeks, was not. Heidegger, we noted, pays homage to Husserl's notion of the *Lebenswelt*, life-world or lived world. The world that is lived is the world of man, defined by Aristotle as animal endowed with reason or language, *zoon logon echon*. The world is, in Old English, *wer-eld* –old, –alt. Compare German *Alt* as in Schelling's title *System der Weltalter*, *The Ages of the World*. Compare also aliment, from Latin *alere*, to feed, nourish, grow in strength. The world is the age of man. The homage Heidegger pays to Husserl's phenomenology of *Lebenswelt* is qualified by his concern to show that the classical Aristotelian notion of man is subordinate to that of the being whose being is to be somewhere or to be the where, *etre le la*, *Da-sein*, a being that Heidegger would have us understand not primarily in terms of animality or life plus reason or language. Man's being-in-the-world is as such articulated by language, *Rede*. This suggests the metaphor of the world as a text to be read, the metaphor of the book of the world employed by Berkeley and others. But this metaphor is misleading if it leaves us with the idea of a world over against us like a book. One's living the world or, better, existing it, one's verbally and transitively be-ing the world, is in both the narrower and the wider sense of the word verbal—verb-al and worldly—one's verbally worldly being. Here is the wider truth embracing the *Tractatus* doctrine that

statements and states of affairs have in common logical form, the wider truth that Heidegger elicits from the statement made in Parmenides's Fragments 5 that being and thinking are the same, *to gar auto noein te kai einai*. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* doctrine that the analysis both of propositional symbols and of their sense contains the notion of the fact that so-and-so is the case is a corollary of what at that time he would have been inclined to regard as the strictly unsayable superfact that if the being of the world is loaded with language, the being of language is no less loaded with the world. Both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* teach that there is no unstructured world. The former would like to say that in the beginning the world is structured by the *logos*. The latter seeks to show that in the beginning was the deed, though among deeds are those performed by words. *Wrote sind auch Taten*, "Words are at the same time deeds" (PI 546). One could say that there is a certain commonness of logical form shared by Wittgenstein's earlier and later work, and by both of them and Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world.

Hence, if Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world is to be illustrated by the metaphor of the reading of a book, this last "of" must be interpreted speculatively, both as a subjective and as an objective genitive—though Heidegger would say that the grammarian's terms "subjective" and "objective" really belong to the age of the world picture. As does Berkeley's use of the metaphor of the world as book. As do the words of the text (*Wörter*) until brought alive as words of speech (*Worte*). As does the world of physical or human nature investigated by the sciences. As therefore does the one world of Davidson, if that is understood as the world as investigated by the sciences. Whether that is how his "at most one world" is to be understood is not crucial to the question he is concerned with in his essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," the question we are concerned with in this section of our essay. Indeed, if by the world that is the object investigated by science is meant an entity, Davidson is for doing without it. That is a world well lost.²⁹ According to him, neither as the totality of things nor as the totality of facts is the world required as that which the conceptual schemes of language as a whole represent, any more than things or facts need be posited as that which particular sentences truly or falsely represent. "The sentence 'My skin is warm' is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of evidence."³⁰ *A fortiori*, the idea of a theory-neutral referent that conceptual schemes fit or fail to fit goes by the board, and with it goes the very idea of a conceptual scheme that Davidson says depends on it. The same holds for the idea of a neutral world organized by a conceptual scheme. And for the same reason, not because, as Davidson says, it is nonsense to talk of organizing a single thing; this is not nonsense if what is meant by it is that structure is introduced into what would otherwise be an amorphous mass.

Davidson concludes that there is no more to the idea of a conceptual scheme than there is to the idea of truth as formulated by Tarski's Convention T according to which, as formulated by Davidson, an adequate theory of truth for a language L entails for every sentence *s* of L a theorem of the form "*s* is true if; and only if *p*" where "*s*" is replaced by a description of "*s*" and "*p*" by "*s*" itself if L

is English, and by a translation of *s* into English if *L* is not English. If we agree that Convention T “embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used” at least for the truth of assertive sentences, whatever our intuitions may be regarding the notion of truth as unconcealing that Heidegger attributes to the Greeks, then, Davidson says, “there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if that test depends on the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation.” And this divorce is what the notion of incommensurable linguistico-conceptual schemes assumes. It assumes that the incommensurability of two languages is a total or partial untranslatability that is consistent with the falsity or truth of statements made in them being determined either by reference to a theory-neutral reality or experience that the linguistic scheme does or does not fit, organize or represent (or, if there are purely conceptual truths, by reference to a “fixed stock of meanings”).

The case for the unintelligibility of the idea of radically different conceptual schemes can be made more directly. I mentioned earlier an article in which I argue that this idea is either untestable or uninterestingly because trivially true. Here now is a quick argument for the claim to coherence of the notion of incommensurability being necessarily false, once granted that Davidson is right to hold that this claim requires a “ground for comparison,” “a single space within which each scheme has a position and provides a point of view.” The argument is simply that comparability cannot be a requirement for incomparability. However, this argument is too quick if incomparability does not entail incommensurability. Perhaps we have to distinguish levels, that of the linguistic schemes being compared and that of the point of view of the comparer. If that putative point of view is unstructured by any language, it is difficult to understand how it could be a point from which to make comparisons. If it is structured by a language, it will be either another particular perspective that has to be compared or a linguistic scheme common to all perspectives. In either case, given that Convention T is accepted, it is more natural to explain at least a partial failure of comprehension, one not so radical that we wonder even whether the other party is speaking a language, to difference of belief (assuming the absence of malapropism for which we would usually be ready to make charitable allowance). Davidson concedes that no principle or evidence compels us to put down a failure in understanding to a difference of beliefs rather than of concepts. He just does not see that anything is gained by explaining it in terms of the latter rather than in terms of the former, given acceptance of Convention T.

Is there nothing to be gained at all? It seems to me that we do need to mark the distinction between on the one hand true and false sentences—whether their truth be believed, wondered about, hoped for, something one tries to bring about, and the like—and on the other hand principles assumed or presupposed by such true sentences, which are principles, primary, in that although the question of their truth may be raised when there is a breakdown in understanding, that question is not otherwise raised. They are constitutive of the language, language game, form of life or of the *L* in which in the formulation of Tarski’s Convention

T a sentence is true. Collingwood marks this distinction by contrasting absolute and relative presuppositions. The latter are true or false propositions, the former are not. This distinction is masked by speaking of sentences rather than of propositions or statements, a practice aided and abetted by the fact that *Satz* can mean either. For one thing, talking of the truth of sentences neglects the differences between interrogative, imperative and indicative sentences—as when the propositional calculus is called the sentential calculus, a practice foreshadowed by Aristotle's judgment (*De Interpretatione* 17a) that nonpropositional sentences are of interest to rhetoric and poetics but not to logic and philosophy. Talk of the truth of sentences also assumes that no grammatically interrogative sentence, for example, can be used to make a true or false statement.

The distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions is one of function, one that is well marked by distinguishing true or false statements from conceptual schemes, practices or forms of life. A language-game *L* is spoken. And just as one has to have learned to find one's way about a scene before one can point to things or call them by their name, so before one can say something that represents what one believes is the case, one has to have learned how this is done. And this, the "form of representation," is concealed when one attempts to represent it by saying of it what is the case. It cannot be said, for it shows itself only. It shows itself in language in use, most of all when one is using it oneself in conversation with someone who belongs to the same tradition. In paragraph 435 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes: "If it is asked: 'how do sentences manage to represent?'—the answer might be: 'Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you use them.' For nothing is concealed," That is to say, although Wittgenstein bids us "don't think, but look!" (*PI* 66), because what a sentence means and how it represents is a matter of how words are customarily used and what people who use them go on to do, there is no *seeing* how sentences represent, no *Sicht*, as Heidegger would say, that does not consist in using at least some of them in their customary way. Only in using sentences can you tell how they represent. If representation is telling in words how things stand, then how sentences represent cannot be represented. The *Vorstellung* or *Darstellung* of this is its *Verstellung*, its dissembling. This is why Tractarian representation as pretending to state superfacts gives way in *Philosophical Investigations* to representation as presentation, as performance, as on a stage, in the hope that we will identify with the *dramatis personae*, become actors, speech actors for whom the dependence of the apophantic "as" upon the hermeneutic "as" becomes once more alive.

SENDING ON REPRESENTATION

Derrida points out in "Sending: On Representation" that nevertheless the form of representation, the very idea of linguistic representation in the time of representation, is said even by Heidegger to be represented. For Heidegger says that it is *vorgestellt* by the Platonic idea or form.³¹ Heidegger brings himself to admit too that our idea of the truth of a proposition is anticipated, put before us,

vor-gestellt, in Platonic *orthotes*, that is, rightness, correctness or (*pace Davidson*) fittingness, despite Heidegger's insistence elsewhere that for the Greeks truth is literally *a-letheia*, unconcealing.³² The Greeks already had the experience of truth as correctness concealing truth as unconcealing. It is difficult for us not to think of this already historiographically, especially when our time of world picture, our world as will and representation, is described by Heidegger's translators as an age. This encourages us to think of the mediaeval, the Roman and the Greek as ages that occurred earlier than ours in dated chronological time. This itself is an event of concealing chronological history, and historiography, *Historie*, conceals history as *Geschichte*, history as existed or lived. The latter, Heidegger tells us, is a happening (*Geschehen*) of *Geschick*, communal dispensation, mission, sending, *envoi* or, most ominous of all, destiny or, in the broadest possible sense of *polis*, political fate. Without pausing to consider what this thinking of destiny portends for Heidegger's personal political destiny, let us note simply that the ambiguity of history as between a series of events or their description and "existed," existential, inhabited or operative *history*—*Wirkungsgeschichte*, as Gadamer would say³³—is reflected in the ambiguity of Heidegger's *Vorstellung*. On the one hand the word means representation or just presentation, like that of a performance on a stage. On the other hand it means pre-sent, sent before in time. If this pre-sending or pro-position can be understood *geschichtlich* rather than simply *historisch*, if it can be understood non-propositionally, it will not be to an inconsistency in Heidegger that Derrida will be pointing or intending to point. That Heidegger himself is intending to point to a duplicity of representation "itself" is indirectly confirmed by the resilience, as it seems to me, with which he responds when scholars make the observation that for the Greeks truth is both *orthotes*, correctness, and *a-letheia*, the privation of concealment or of forgetting, that is to say, recollection, *anamnesis*. Truth is the locus of a *Zweideutigkeit*, an ambiguity, perhaps a chiasm, a crossing, in which truth as the straight and true twenty-twenty vision of orthodoxy is darkened by the shadow it itself casts over truth as withdrawal from hiding. This very hiding is at one and the same time effected and hidden by truth as propositional representation. Similarly, *Vorstellung* as propositional representation hides *Vor-stellung* as pro- or pre-position. But it does so because *Vor-stellung* predestines *Vorstellung*. The originality of the former, its status as origin of propositional representation, is already relegated to a second place, displaced to the place of propositional placing, of language as representation, while (*weil*) and because (*weil*) it is the originally secondary representation's (p)representation. The original is secondarized and the secondary is originalized.

And this interdependence, which is not a biconditionality simply of grounding but at the same time an ungrounding, is writ large in the interdependence of metaphysics, which is typically foundational, and the a-metaphysical, whether the latter be the experience of early Greek thinkers like Parmenides or of the task of thinking at the end of metaphysics. Parmenides in his poem named *aletheia*, but he did not think it as *a-letheia*. And the moment Plato begins to think of being as idea or form, there comes to pass a concealing of being as such. Yet it is thanks

to the history of this concealment beginning with Plato that there can be a chance for another beginning at the end of metaphysics. Already, "*aletheia*, as opening of presence and presenting in thinking and saying, originally comes under the perspective of *homoiosis* and *adaequatio*, that is, the perspective of adequation in the sense of the correspondence of representing with what is present."³⁴ But if truth (*Wahrheit*) as *mimesis*, as likeness and as correspondence, shelters, and preserves (*bewahrt*) the unconcealment of being as such, then the task of thinking at the end of metaphysics will be dialectical in the sense that it must pass through (*dia*) metaphysics. Its task (*Aufgabe*) will be a giving of itself up to metaphysics, a surrender (*Aufgabe*). The task will not be to negate metaphysics, for the dialectic of negation or cancellation preserves metaphysics at the expense of leaving concealed what metaphysics preserves, namely the thinking of being as such, of presencing without the presence of some represented thing. The task at the end of metaphysics will be that of setting over (*Übersetzung*) the translation (*Übersetzung*) of the truth of being as a being, entity, thing, fact, state of affairs, process, or event (*idea*, *energeia*, *hypokeimenon*, *subjectum*, *actualitas*, *certitudo*, *vis*, Objectivity, freedom, will, Representation as conceptual scheme, framed or *Ge-stell*) toward a thinking that precisely in letting metaphysics be as metaphysics lets be the concealing-unconcealing of truth. Setting over and getting over, *Überwindung*, not in the sense of victorious overcoming, but in the sense of learning to live with it, as one twists free from and ceases to be overwhelmed by (*verwindet*) an illness in making adjustments for and coming to grips with it.³⁵

Could Tarski's and Davidson's proposal that we think of truth in language otherwise than as conceptual framework or correspondence to something presented be a step forward beyond the time of world as picture or pictured and of language as constative representation without being at the same time a step back to metaphysics? Could there be representation as the performance enacted in *Philosophical Investigations* without representation as the propositions of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*? Not only because the former as therapy presupposes the disease, but because philosophical therapy is homeopathy. The break with the proposition (*Satz*) is a leap (*Satz*) that takes off from the proposition as its base. The moment of the breakthrough is the moment when that with which one breaks becomes objectified. As much as the later Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger practice a style of writing that would inculcate a return to the non-thetic inhabiting of language that is the source of thesis itself, the hermeneutic "as" in the apophantic "as," a return to origins, to the "rough ground" (*PI* 107), the *Augenblick* of origination is the moment when the move forward to another style of thinking represents as alien the ground that it is leaving behind. No longer being that on which one stands, that ground becomes visible for the first time, as the perch it has left becomes visible to the owl of Minerva that has just taken wing. A concept that was once one's home is now no longer inhabited, but viewed, pictured, represented from outside. No longer an operatively *geschichtlich* motive, but an explanatory *historisch* cause, no longer an absolute but a relative presupposition, it is seen as one of those *Vorstellungen*—now appear-

ing to the understanding (*Verstand*), but to an understanding on the point of disappearing in reason (*Vernunft*)—that in Hegel's science of logic and science of the experience of consciousness precede every phenomenological elevation, and in Kuhn's and Bachelard's logic of science precede every epistemological break. Now "only" a propositionally representable presupposition, but still the presupposition of what is not thus representable yet.

Is this dialectic? Yes and no. It is not a dialectic of determinate negation if what is not yet propositionally representable is as such incommensurable with that by which only from the point of view of a time in the future it can appear to us to have been sent, a time when what was not yet propositionally representable to us has become so. By that time what was not propositionally representable will have become for us both propositionally representable and commensurable with its superseded *Vorstellung*—which does not, however, mean that the superseded and superseding representations are mutually consistent by the standard of the principle of noncontradiction. We shall have learned that the "ability" of the commensurability demanded by interlinguistic translation has moved to a "can" qualified by an "if" stating conditions that can now be fulfilled from a "could" qualified by an "if" stating conditions that could be fulfilled only given that "certain very general facts of nature" were different or/and that a certain "fixed stock of meanings," a certain *Ge-stell*,³⁶ were to become unfixed. Meantime, the future of the world looks uncertain. And rather than my being able to represent it propositionally, it looks as though the world looks at me, like an alien with whom I am in a conversation that is possible not, as Quine writes, "because we are bound to adapt any alien pattern to our own in the very process of understanding or translating alien sentences,"³⁷ but because we are bound at the same time to adapt ours to his. To have an open conversation with another is to be open to a conversion. How else will we ever learn about the other, whether the other be another human being or the human and natural world? How else will we ever learn about ourselves? "He who knows no other language does not know his own" (Goethe). This does not beg the question of the incommensurability of other linguistic patterns of representation. The only way to gain evidence that our languages cannot be made commensurable is to behave as if they can. And that is the only way to gain evidence that in the case of the intransitivity of commensurability (from language L1's being commensurable with L2 and L2's being commensurable with L3, it does not follow that L1 is commensurable with L3), when the other appears to say that he can understand, interpret or translate a third language that appears to be a closed book to us, he does not understand "understand," interpret "interpret," or translate "translate" in the way that we do.

The only way to open the book of nature is to open our eyes to the possibility that, whether or not we "demand that nature open up its eyes" and that "we talk with animals, plants, and rocks,"³⁸ there is a sense in which the eyes of nature are already open and upon us. Perhaps what Gadamer says of every assimilation of tradition (and tradition is traduction and translation) holds for every assimilation of the language in which that book is composed. It is "the experience of a 'view' of the object itself,"³⁹ where "view" translates *Ansicht*, and

Ansicht is not just the representation that the investigator asserts regarding the object, but the object asserting itself,⁴⁰ as though the object were lodging an objection against being regarded as no more than an object, asking to be regarded with regard instead merely as the subjected subject of an asserted and enserfing representation; asking to be represented in the political sense, given a say, suffered to have suffrage, granted a voice and a vote.⁴¹

NOTES

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1961).

2. Friedrich Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, ed. R. Harre (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 313.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 40. Unless otherwise indicated, references in the text are to paragraphs.

4. Some aspects of this question are treated in my "Meanings Reserved, Re-served and Reduced," *Proceedings of the 1993 Spindel Conference on "Derrida's Interpretation of Husserl"*, ed. Leonard Lawlor. *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 32, supplement (1994): 27–54.

5. Aristotle, *The Organon*, I, trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 115.

6. Gershom Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Schocken, 1965), 76–77.

7. John Locke, *Works*, 11th ed. (London, 1812), vol. 4, p. 529.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 134–35.

9. Richard Aaron, *John Locke* (London: Oxford University Press), 1937, p. 88.

10. Draft B, §62, in Benjamin Rand, ed., *An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent, by John Locke* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931); Peter H. Nidditch, ed., *Draft B of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Sheffield, UK: University of Sheffield, 1982).

11. Norman Kretzmann, "The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," in I. C. Tipton, ed., *Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

12. Locke, *Works*, vol. 4, p. 354.

13. Ferdinand de Saussure, *A Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (London: Fontana/Collins, 1974), 120.

14. See the essay referred to in note 4 above.

15. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967). Page references in my text are those of the edition of *Sein und Zeit* given in the margins of the translation.

16. Chomsky's depth grammar is innate. In view of Locke's attack upon innate ideas in the first book of his *Essay*, one can well imagine what he would have said about Chomsky's self-styled "Cartesian linguistics." On both Chomsky's representative structures in the speaker's unconscious and on Locke's representative ideas in the speaker's consciousness the verdict pronounced by the later Wittgenstein would be the same: that they are superfluous excuses, *unnotige Ausreden* (PI 213), words that butter no parsnips.

See in particular Noam Chomsky, *Rules and Representations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). Cf. Simon Blackburn, *Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 27ff.

17. Martin Heidegger, "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1972), 85; *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 132.

18. Protagoras fragment B, 4, cited from Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* by Heidegger, *ibid.*, pp. 97, 146. Because Heidegger cites this to help explain the part played by waiting (*Verweilen*) in the Greek way of belonging in the world, it may help to explain what he means when in the interview in *Der Spiegel* he says "Only a God [or a god] can save us."

19. Heidegger, *ibid.*, pp. 84, 131.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 131.

21. This might explain why Aristotle's emphasis upon the priority of theoretical wisdom in Book 10 of *Nichomachean Ethics* is not inconsistent with the stress he puts on practical wisdom throughout the rest of that work; perhaps to say, as it is sometimes said, that Book 10 is Plato's revenge underestimates the height of "the highest doing."

22. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

23. J. B. Carroll, ed., *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press and Wiley, 1956), 212–24.

24. Heidegger, "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, vol. I (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), 45; "Science and Reflection," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 164.

25. "C'est dans la boîte," I once heard a young photographer remark after "getting" one of the Bronze Age rock carvings of the Vallee des Merveilles in the Maritime Alps north of Nice.

26. John Llewelyn, "On Not Speaking the Same Language," parts I and II, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 40 (1962): 37–48, 127–45.

27. A. C. Graham, "'Being' in Classical Chinese," ed. John W. M. Verhaar, *The Verb "Be" and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies* (Dordrecht: Reidel; New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 8, 14.

28. Davidson, 187.

29. Richard Rorty, "World Well Lost," in *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays 1972–1980)* (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1982).

30. Davidson, 194.

31. Jacques Derrida, "Envoi," in *Psyche Inventions de l'autre* (Paris: Galilee, 1987), 109–43; "Sending: On Representation," trans. Peter Caws and Mary Ann Caws, *Social Research* 49, no. 2 (1982): 294–326.

32. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), 198–291; *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 158–61; *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'* (Bern: Francke, 1954); *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976); *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969); "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978); "Hegel and the Greeks," in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967); *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), 73–74, 133–34. See Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press; London: Macmillan, 1985, 17–27),

for a sharp assessment of the exchange between Heidegger and Paul Friedlander's various editions of his *Platons* (Berlin: de Gruyter); *Plato* (New York: Bollingen Foundation; London: Routledge).

33. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), 267ff.

34. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 78; *Basic Writings*, 390.

35. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 63, 68; "Hegel and Heidegger," in *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 100.

36. The distinction between "can . . . if" and "could . . . if" made here mirrors that between ability and capacity made by S. L. Hurley, "Intelligibility, Imperialism, and Conceptual Scheme," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 17, *The Wittgenstein Legacy*, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1992), 89–108.

37. W. V. Quine, "Speaking of Objects," in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 1, cited by Davidson, 191.

38. Jurgen Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 109.

39. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 430.

40. *Ibid.*, 422.

41. See John Llewelyn, *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Heidegger, Levinas and Others* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); "L' intentionnalite inverse," in Eliane Escoubas, ed., "Dossier: Art et phenomenologie," *La part de l'oeil*, no. 7 (1991); "Regarding Regarding," in *Painting and Truth*, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, forthcoming).

Representation and Epistemology

ROBERT A. SHARPE

The oldest theory about the nature of art is that what makes an artifact art is that it represents. It does not necessarily represent something that exists. A painter can represent Pallas Athene who, it is generally thought nowadays, does not exist, as well as the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which many people still believe to have been a historical fact. The concept, of course, goes back to Greek times, and our word "representation," as used in aesthetics, is a translation of *mimesis*. Though any translation of such a term is at best approximate, it is true to say that the English word "representation," when used in the context of art, has taken on some of the overtones of the Greek original. For we think of a representation as having something of imitation about it, suggesting the creation of an artifact that, though it perhaps could not be mistaken for an original, is closer to the original than a nonartistic representation might be. A map is a paradigm of a representation, but it shares far fewer characteristics with its original than a painting or a drama does. Equally a fictional narrative is a much fuller picture of an action than a bare recital of facts.

When we come to consider what knowledge a representation gives us, it will be important to bear in mind the comparatively replete nature of artistic representations. What do we learn from representations? What do they tell us that we did not know before? In the case of some representations the answer is easy. A map is a representation. From it, we learn the route from London to Wales or from Delhi to Bombay. A diagram of the wiring for an electric plug shows me which colored cable to attach to which terminal. At the end of examining it I know something that I did not know before.

Many philosophers write as though a sentence is a representation. Some, though not all, speak of thoughts as representations. Neither idea is quite right, though there is perhaps more to be said for the first than the second. For if a thought is a representation, then, without regress, it is obvious that the thought

does not provide us with information. For to have the thought is to be in possession of the information. Certainly if somebody states that something is the case, I may, as a consequence, know something I did not know before. So there is that difference between the two cases. Philosophers who believe that thoughts are representations must believe that they map the world in the way that Wittgenstein, in his *Tractatus*, suggests propositions do. But as "representation" is customarily used, a single statement will not be a representation. A representation has to present a complex of facts. A newspaper report may give a fair representation of what happened in a debate or in an accident. But a single statement in that report is not what we would normally call a representation. This sort of concern with ordinary distinctions is apt to seem pedantic nowadays. The sort of attention that Austin paid to usage is now regarded as old hat. But to neglect ordinary senses, to suppose that "representation" can be usefully employed to describe brain patterns, is to lay traps for both reader and writer. The usual consequence is that we slip into nonsequiturs by relying on the standard sense of a word like "representation" while professing to use the word in a technical sense.

Whereas technical usages are often *de rigueur* in science, philosophers, concerned with exploring conceptual matters, cannot use words in a purely stipulative way without destroying their subject matter. For their subject matter is, after all, the liaisons of ideas, the way that one idea connects with another, the ways in which we cannot commit ourselves to one belief in separation from others. The wretched consequences of this lack of concern for usage in contemporary philosophy can be seen in the sort of new scholasticism that fusses about the nature of internal representations of beliefs without asking itself whether it is doing speculative science or philosophy.

My concerns here are rooted in ordinary usage, and usage allows that many works of art are representations, principally in literature, drama and the visual arts. The latter includes film as well as painting and sculpture. Music is a debated case, and I have something to say about it later on.

Do the representational arts give us information? A painting may tell me what sort of clothes were common in the seventeenth century or what sorts of instruments were played. Indeed by looking at representations, I can get a fair idea of the sort of ensemble that played music of that period. Cathedral facades have been used by musicologists to work out what sort of instruments were required to perform early music. The facade can tell us the composition of the ensemble. Where written records are absent, such indications may be indispensable. It is even possible, by looking at the expressions on the faces of singers in such paintings and sculpture, to calculate what sort of vocal technique was used in the production of the music.

Historians, as well, use imaginative fiction as a source. We learn something about nineteenth-century rural life from Thomas Hardy's novels, for example. *Under the Greenwood Tree* presents to us the decline in the old communal forms of music-making in which an instrumental ensemble and choir provided the music for services from a gallery and the replacement of a group of musicians by a church organ and a single player. Only in the last few years have we been able

to hear again the somewhat primitive yet robust music that was replaced. Scholars have begun to reconstruct the music and its performing style. The description of the introduction of the steam-operated threshing machine in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* is another famous example of how fiction revivifies history. Having said all this, however, the use of imaginative fiction as a source in historical research is still somewhat peripheral and controversial.

Be that as it may, one question for aesthetics is whether we can derive information from a representation whilst being concerned with artistic content. Does concern for the artistic context somehow cancel out the informative content of a work?

The debate over the role of truth of literature intensified a decade or two ago as various thinkers reacted to Arnold Isenberg's "no-truth theory." Isenberg assumed that an intelligent reader does not take into account the truth or falsity of the propositions contained when judging the merits of a work of literature.¹ R. K. Elliot responded, in a much cited paper, that we certainly do admire poetry that simply "economically and elegantly" states what is the case and gave as an example the couplet by the English poet Pope²:

So well-bred spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the game they dare not bite.

"Civilly," says Elliot, strikes exactly the right note of obsequiousness typical of these animals. In some ways, Elliot's example is not particularly apt, as I can confirm from painful experience, having been the subject of an unprovoked and savage attack by a spaniel some years back. Still I am able to set my own experience aside and appreciate the point Pope is making. Dogs are pack animals and fawn on their owners. But even if spaniels were exceptions in general and more like rotweilers than Elliot or Pope apparently envisages, I am not sure the effect of the metaphor would be lost. After all, we allow for the error just as I subtract my own personal experience in reading the simile. Tennyson famously was under the impression that railway lines are grooves in which the trains run. Yet we do not think that the poem that contains the error would necessarily be improved if he had known better. Indeed we might imagine that Pope alone amongst his contemporaries knew that spaniels were vicious and unreliable predators who would demolish a pheasant as soon as it was shot but, knowing what his largely aristocratic readership fondly believed, chose the image accordingly. (I assume that menials handled the dogs and ensured that they retrieved the birds intact, donning heavy gloves as soon as they were out of view of the assorted peers.) Or it might even have been widely known that spaniels are evil beasts, but it was a poetic convention that they were otherwise. Classical references are part and parcel of Western literary tradition; we all know that Ulysses's exploits are fiction, that not only does a phoenix not exist but that if it did it would not feed its young on blood drawn from its breast because such behavior would be a handicap in the Darwinian struggle for existence; that bears do not lick their young into shape. But these images are potent and part of the literary vocabulary.

These are matters of detail. There are broader issues. Dante's *Divine Comedy* describes a universe in which most of us can no longer believe. Even Shakespeare's plays contain references of prevailing conceptions and overarching metaphors such as the great chain of being that are no longer current. The *Rubaiyat* is more in keeping with a skeptical and atheistical age than *Paradise Lost*. Yet I can make the necessary adjustments; my skepticism does not prevent me from appreciating the work. Of course it is also true that there are limits on the range of our sympathies. If I do not endorse spontaneity as against Puritan values, I shall not make too much of Henry James's *The Ambassadors* and a Roman Catholic may find Milton's *Paradise Lost* alien in a way that an English Protestant does not. Indeed a Moslem or Hindu might find it less rebarbative just because the religious controversies that are its backdrop are more remote.

Nirad C. Chaudhuri's marvelous book *A Passage to England* memorably recounts the effect of a first sight of the English landscape on a writer whose previous knowledge of it had entirely depended on being steeped in English literature.³ How much had Chaudhuri lost? Something certainly. But perhaps he had also gained. He speaks of the landscape seeming stereoscopic and particularly of the uniqueness of the light. But the full and precise effect of that light, its precise weight for the experience of English writing, might only be available to somebody who is familiar with the harsh light of the tropics. In just the same way a visit to the Greek islands might complete a feeling for the visual metaphors that are elements in Greek epistemology in a way that the individual to whom this is home might overlook.

One link between art and the world is the process of critical interpretation. It is above all the technique of bridging the represented world and the real world, and consequently, learning to appreciate the arts has a great deal to do with learning to interpret. In interpretation we elicit general themes; the work of art may prove a basis from which we draw wisdom. A great novel like *Middlemarch* shows us not only how idealism can fail, but how goodness is not a matter of accomplishing great things. But the moral may not be explicit. It is there to be drawn out by the reader. The representation presents us with a world sufficiently close to our own and yet sufficiently distant to offer an indirect comment. We learn through fiction the reactions of possible individuals whose like we may never actually meet. The imaginative exercise of my sympathy increases what Aristotle described as fellow-feeling and Conrad as solidarity. It is in this way that fiction is sometimes described as inductive.

Of course, the lessons may be more direct, requiring little in the way of the imagination for us to interpret them. At one point in *King Lear*, the old king, having given up his power but wishing to keep some retainers, remarks inconsequentially in his madness "I lack soldiers." This phrase is "one of those Shakespearian sentences which go a mile deep," as John Gross puts it.⁴ For we have, simultaneously, the childishness of age and the unregenerate and unreformable egotism of a once powerful ruler. He could not really grasp that his power is a thing of the past now that his soldiers are in recollection as toy sol-

diers to a small boy. Perhaps armies are always that to the men who command them. Not much in the way of commentary is required. It is a remark that reveals rather than having to be teased out.

I did not form these ideas until the line was drawn to my attention by Dr. Colin Lyas. How then do they work their magic? In Keats's wonderful phrase the accompanying thought is "almost a remembrance." Samuel Johnson remarks in another context on a different text, "I have never seen these notions in any other place; yet he who reads them here persuades himself he has always felt them."⁵ Something is drawn to your attention.

In the arts this is often what touches us. Wittgenstein spoke of the task of philosophy as assembling reminders.⁶ It is not so much a matter of telling us new facts as reminding us of what we might overlook. In the same vein Samuel Johnson observed that "men more frequently need to be reminded than informed." This is a curious phenomenon; did I know it before or not? Neither answer seems quite right. Perhaps we can say no more than that I recognize or assent to the judgment that this is what the line purports when my attention is drawn to it though I would not have formulated it myself. So often we need to be jerked into attending to a detail. Perhaps more than any other writer, Shakespeare has this faculty. Years after, a phrase remembered from "doing Shakespeare" at school comes to life in the mind and you turn over the phrase with utter astonishment, amazed that any human being is capable of such insight.

But, primarily, I would say that what we learn from the representational arts is moral. I can be moved by the death of Cordelia, a fact that many recent writers on aesthetics have thought puzzling and as requiring explanation. How can it be, it has been said, that at the death of a mere *dramatis persona*, somebody who never lived, and at the grief of her equally fictional father, we are moved? Is not this purely irrational? As Samuel Johnson remarked: "The spectators are always in their sense and know, from the first act to last, that the stage is only a stage and the players are only players." The fact is, however, that we are moved. Yet I am not equally moved by the bare record of human misery in Bosnia that I read in the paper even though this is true. It has to be vivified. I need an autobiographical account or an eyewitness report and one that has some genuine vivacity of the sort we expect in the arts. In this simple fact something of the importance of the arts can be seen. For the arts can rally our sympathy.

Wittgenstein spoke of "primitive reactions": "It is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when somebody else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is—and so to pay attention to other people's pain-behavior. As one does not pay attention to one's own pain-behavior." I do not have to internalize and feel the pain myself vicariously in order to suffer with the injured person. Nor do I exercise sympathy in order to feel it. There is nothing extra that I have to do. I simply react. If, corrupted by centuries of philosophical egoism, you, the reader doubt this, consider what happens when you see a child fall down in the road and begin to cry. It is natural for you to pick it up, to comfort it and try to find its parents. Indeed you would do the same for many small animals. I would

not say that your reactions have always to take this form. As I write, fresh in my mind is Jung Chang's *Wild Swans*. The privations and the causal cruelty suffered described in her account of three generations of Chinese women is horrifying. The torturers on either side of the civil war were not motivated by the primitive reactions Wittgenstein describes. If they had them, they suppressed them. Virtues require constant exercise. They are matters of good habit, and through neglect, the primitive reactions that are important to the moral life can be numbed. Equally, primitive reactions can be cruel; if you watch small children at play, you can observe the selfishnesses, the urge to victimize that are always apparent. Wise parents try to educate their children. They encourage some reactions and restrain others.

So the moral education of children involves such selective attention to the primitive reactions. Now such primitive reactions can be imagined. The thought of an accident happening to somebody close to me can make me feel sick. Parents are horrified at the very thought of the death or injury of their children, and we should emphasize "the very thought." We react to the thought just as, driving to work, I shudder at the thought of a small schoolchild running out into the road as I drive past. This is akin to the reaction to fictional events. In each case my reaction is vivid.

But there is more to moral education than this. For moral education shares with general education a need to know about causal chains. Children learn very quickly that fire burns or that hot water scalds. They learn much more slowly that playing with matches may lead to causing a fire, or that fires near haystacks are likely to cause very serious damage. Equally children are ready to react to the pain or laughter of other children, but they have to learn, often slowly, that a sequence of actions may lead to others' pain or their own punishment. Part of this education is actually seeing what will happen, learning that some actions visit humiliation on them from bitter experience. But this experience can never be extensive enough for them to be able to operate without imagination. For the imagination enters when I see that if I say this, then it will be taken as unkindness and that the consequence will be hurt. So I bite my tongue and do not say the cutting thing that comes to mind.

So what part do representations play in all this? My suggestion is that representations operate in tandem with the experiences that can serve as an inductive basis. For representations tell me stories, and the stories spark my imaginative reaction. No society is without its stories, and no society fails to tell stories to children. Such stories are not part of the periphery of life; they are not mere entertainment. Rather they are necessary for the child's moral growth. One of the amusing things about hearing a child tell a story to another is just how inconsequential it can be. Few children have any idea that a story needs scene setting. Even a child of eight or nine can be quite incompetent at reporting. My step-granddaughter, a bright child of nine, gave me an account of how she had spent her birthday that would have been incomprehensible had I not had a good deal of information already. Not only do children learn painstakingly how to narrate, but they also learn painstakingly how stories may end. The proverbial thought-

lessness of teenagers is as much a matter of moral and narrative incompetence as of the need to be independent and break loose.

So the view I propose is not that representations teach by example, although that is a view I have expressed in the past.⁷ Sometimes, of course, they do, but that is a contingency. Indeed the works whose lesson is most obvious may be just the works whose aesthetic qualities are damaged by the author's desire to convey a message. The plays of Shaw or the novels of Lawrence often seem to be damaged by the desire of their authors to teach us a lesson. The way representations teach us is more generalized. It is rather that they teach by showing us to construct representations ourselves. By being shown narratives, we learn how to narrate and these narrations end with imagined primitive reactions.

Drama, film, and novels can all educate us in this way. Imagination can then take us from our projected actions through to the conclusion. We can imagine what might happen if we do such-and-such. At length we can imagine primitive reactions, or we can experience in our imagination what those reactions will be. I tell myself a story about what will happen if I try to drive home after drinking. I imagine a crash. I imagine the injured. I imagine the police stopping me. I imagine the grief of the relatives and with a shudder realize what my actions can lead to. To have this capacity is to be a moral agent, and narrative is essential to it.

THE PERFORMING ARTS

Paul Thom has recently argued that a performance is a representation of a work.⁸ This is implausible. The differences between normal representation and what the performer does are too great. It is not even easy to see that Thom's position is consistent because he takes a work to be a directive, to be a set of instructions for performing a work. It is hard to see how a directive can at the same time be the object of a representation without the representation itself being a directive, though we might, of course, deduce something about the score from the performance.

When a musician performs a Beethoven piano sonata or a troupe performs Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, the work is presented to us but not represented. For, as Thom himself observes, from the performance there is no unique way of reconstructing the original. We cannot always tell what has been put into the performance by the interpreter and what was created by the composer or dramatist. We do not know what to subtract from the performance in order to reconstruct the text. So, unlike a representation *simpliciter*, which can be decoded by the reader so that he can read from the map how to get from Llanberis to Snowdon and what gradients are involved, a performance cannot be unambiguously decoded. The problem is that any work of art and particularly any work of art that is performed allows space for the performer to interpret. The performer has to make decisions, and the decisions are about such matters as how fast, how loud, how to speak a certain line, and the like.

In Act V of *Twelfth Night*, Sebastian enters the assembled company, which contains his twin, Viola, dressed exactly like him. Antonia observes:

An apple cleft in two is not more twin
Than these two creatures. Which is Sebastian?

Olivia's succeeding speech, "Most Wonderful," can register any one of a number of states from hesitation and doubt, to rapt or fearful astonishment, to sexual delight. How it is spoken must, of course, consort with the way the rest of the play is performed, but decisions have to be made by the producer and the actress here. This is a point where interpretation is crucial and can affect the whole reading of the play. It is a crux in the performance. Shakespeare offers so much scope for the interpreter simply in how the lines are uttered. How unnecessary is the modern assumption, which John Gross thinks⁹ began with Jonathan Miller's production of *The Merchant of Venice* in 1970, that "the director is free to do whatever he likes with the play—to bend it, twist it, advertise his boredom with it; to spice it up with anachronisms; to steam roller the poetry; to hit the audience over the head with what ought to be subtle implications." As if the play does not already contain the space for interpretations. As if it does not demand these.

In such cases ambiguity in the work of art is not a flaw but a necessary element. Incompleteness in a map or ambiguity in a description is usually regrettable. In a newspaper report or a transcription of a court hearing, ambiguity is unwelcome. But works of art possess what Ingarden calls "spots of indeterminacy."¹⁰ In art, the incompletely specified is an occasion for the creativity and imagination of the performer. And if the art form is not a performing art, then the indeterminacy allows for the imagination of the reader or viewer.

Reception theory concerns itself with such matters. The reader is imagined to be in a sort of dialogue with the work whereby the reader "fills in" through his or her imaginative collaboration those elements that the text leaves unspecified. In a sense, reading becomes a sort of performance. Some writers of this school have been much influenced by psychoanalysis and have suggested that the reader consciously or unconsciously projects into the texts alter egos, which enables me, as Iser puts it, to formulate myself. I rather doubt whether this "supplementation," as it is called, is of very great critical interest, but undoubtedly it is one of the features for which we value art. Equally one sort of reaction to a painting of a landscape is to imagine oneself part of the scene. Paintings vary in the extent to which they draw the viewer into the depiction. You might imagine yourself walking through the trees in the mythological landscape of a Poussin, for example.

To return to the performing arts, even in works that are very fully notated, such as the symphonies of Mahler, fully notated when compared to the works of Haydn or Mozart, there are still interpretative decisions to be made. It is, indeed, very striking how modern performances of Mahler diverge one from another despite the painstaking directions of the composer.

In normal circumstances the work is, so to speak, given. An interpretation takes the work as its starting point; it is not a representation of the work. Now at this point a broad distinction between two different approaches to art surfaces; the two approaches I have in mind are, respectively, the representational and the expressionist. As I have observed, Paul Thom's recent book presents us with a

representationalist account of music. I have already registered some misgivings.¹¹ In what follows, I suggest that a modified expressionism gives the truest picture of the relation between interpreter and performance. Now expressionism, as I have said, has had a bad press, and on the face of it, to suggest that the emotional life of the interpreter is being re-created in the audience is implausible. Do we feel as the actor feels who plays Macbeth? He might have his mind on other things. While the audience is passionately involved with the fate of the king, the actor himself is consciously controlling his movements and trying to remember precisely what intonation to give his next words. While the audience holds its breath at the sublimity of the slow movement of the Hammerklavier sonata, the pianist must concentrate.

If we adapt expressionism a bit, however, a more likely picture begins to emerge. A scientist may express a theory in different ways in different occasions, in conversation with a colleague, to himself on a walk, in a lecture, in a paper or in a reply to another speaker at a congress. Some of these may be better than others. Some may better reveal the nature of the theory; some may be eloquent, some grandiose, some elegant and some dull. All these epithets can characterize the performance of a work of art. Some are more revealing of structure, some communicate more vividly and in some the performer may seem detached rather than involved.

The error in classical expressionism was the supposition that the work stands in a determinate dyadic relationship to some state of its creator in such a way that the work represents or expresses that state. Such a theory encourages the wrong sort of explanation of the work of art. It implies that the work of art, so far from being relatively autonomous, is a means of communication.

Like most modern writers on aesthetics, I reject this theory. My view is that works of art are objects for interpretation. But how does interpretation stand with respect to the work? I have argued elsewhere that what an interpretation does is to reflect a certain structuring of the work. It must mirror those episodes that particularly strike the hearer. For the moment I want to concentrate on the way in which this view of interpretation re-creates a contrast between the interpreter's conception and the hearer's view; the contrast enables us to use concepts like "faithfulness" and "sincerity." Consider, for example, Mozart's Divertimento K563; it has the character of an unaffected conversation between friends. To make it rhetorical is unfaithful to its character, and its personality is not properly expressed in such an interpretation; equally, of course, the interpreter may fail to get over his own conception of the work due to technical failings or to a failure to articulate the conception in a sufficiently complete way.

It is because the interpreter, in presenting the work, expresses simultaneously his own conception of the work that concepts like sincerity, authenticity and faithfulness are apposite. They do not apply to the composer's conception of his work for there is nothing to which the work stands in such a way that the music composed could be an authentic expression of it. On the classical expressionist theory the value of the work depends upon the accurate communication of a certain mental state by the composer to the audience; in the present reloca-

tion of expressionism, value lies largely in the interpreter's forming a persuasive view of the work and effectively transmitting this to the listener. In both cases, accuracy counts.

So what we could say is that what is represented in a performance is a pre-conceived or logically prior interpretation of the work. For the expression that we have before us is simultaneously a representation of the interpretation expressed.

The position I advocate is this. What we learn from artistic representations, as opposed to other kinds of representations, depends on the art in question. As far as what are traditionally known as the representational arts are concerned, we can obtain certain historical information. But, *qua* art, the principal function of the narrative representational arts such as literature, theater, and film is in moral education; not that they give us moral conclusions directly, but rather that they develop and train the art of narrative and thereby equip us to construct narratives ourselves, narratives that are important in enabling us to see how we should act.

This does not apply to painting and sculpture, of course, but great portrait painting can also show us human expression and reaction. We see—at leisure—age or grief or lust and are better equipped to identify it in life. But the moral significance of the visual arts is not great.

The performing arts may simultaneously be representational. Music is not, and in the performance of music we have no representation of the work but merely a representation of the interpretation of the performer.

NOTES

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2. R. K. Elliot, "Poetry and Truth," *Analysis* 27 (1966–1967).
3. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *A Passage to England* (London: Macmillan, 1959).
4. John Gross, *Shylock* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 56.
5. Samuel Johnson, *Preface to Shakespeare* in *The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958).
6. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), 540–41.
7. See R. A. Sharpe, "Moral Tales," *Philosophy* 67 (1992), and *Contemporary Aesthetics* (Harvester, 1983; reprint. Gregg Revivals, 1991).
8. Paul Thom, *For an Audience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993).
9. Gross, 304.
10. R. Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
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Political and Historical Representation

F. R. ANKERSMIT

INTRODUCTION

We describe our political system as "representative democracies." "Democracy," in the sense of government by the people, was already found in classical Athens. But classical democracy was direct democracy, and direct democracy left no room for (political) representation (this is precisely what so many people, such as Hannah Arendt, always found so extremely attractive in the Greek polis). (Political) representation, on the other hand, is a medieval notion. One may think here of the assemblies of the three estates that were sometimes summoned by the king, and in which the nobility, the clergy, and the third estate were represented. And this certainly was not an early medieval tryout of any form of democracy. Hence, democracy has no intrinsic link with representation, and representation has no intrinsic link with democracy. The miracle of contemporary parliamentary representative democracy is that it nevertheless succeeded in combining these two completely different concepts in an extremely fruitful and creative way. Consequently, representative democracy as we know it is the result of this most unlikely marriage of Athens and the Middle Ages. And this observation invites the then obvious question of how these two notions of democracy and of representation had best be related. Because there is no necessary connection between the two of them, we have to develop an answer to that question independently of what democracy was in Athens and of what representation was in the Middle Ages. In order to develop such an answer, I start with a few remarks about the notion of representation. This may clarify our conception of representative democracy.

REPRESENTATION

In its aesthetic context the notion of representation implies two major theories: the *resemblance theory* and the *substitution theory*. According to the former

theory a representation should resemble what it represents. There are three problems with this theory: In the first place, no generally accepted or acceptable criteria of resemblance can be given. For each artistic style in the history of art could be seen as the definition of a new set of such criteria. But in the absence of such criteria the notion of resemblance appears useless. Next, the resemblance theory gets entangled in absurdities: For if we have 1) Blenheim Castle, 2) a painting of that castle, and 3) a painting of the duke of Marlborough, the resemblance theory would urge us to see 2 as a representation of 3 rather than of 1. Paintings resemble each other more closely than what they represent: One piece of canvas with dots of paint on it resembles such another piece of canvas rather than some huge building in the Oxfordshire countryside. In the third place, because words and sentences cannot in any noncircuitous way be said to resemble what they are about, the resemblance theory is helpless with regard to language as a medium for representing reality. And this would have the counterintuitive consequence that we could not speak of e.g. historical representations of past reality.

According to the substitution theory of representation—for the first time defended by Edmund Burke and, more recently, by Ernst Gombrich and Arthur Danto—the etymology of the word “representation” is our best clue for understanding the nature of representation. Representation is a making present (again) of what is absent; or more formally, A is a representation of B when it can take B’s place, can function as B’s *substitute* or as B’s *replacement* in its absence. Words and texts present no problems for this theory: For we may well say that we have the writing of history in order to compensate for the absence of the past itself. Neither do we need to worry about criteria of resemblance because this theory does not require a representation to resemble what it represents. Nevertheless, it may well be that in specific cases (for example, in the visual arts) a certain amount of resemblance (however defined) may make us see something as a satisfactory substitute for something else. So the resemblance theory could, perhaps, best be seen as a special case of the more general substitution theory.

All this can be transposed without any difficulty to political representation. In the first place there is the resemblance theory of political representation that we will all intuitively accept. According to this theory the opinions of the electorate’s representatives should be exactly the same as those of the electorate itself. This view of political representation was admirably defined by the anti-Federalists during the debate about the American constitution:

The very term representative, implies that the person or body chosen for this purpose, should *resemble* those who appoint them—a representation of the people of America, if it be a true one, must be *like* the people. . . . They are the sign—the people are the thing signified. . . . It must then have been intended that those who are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed by their interests, or in other words, should bear the strongest *resemblance* of those in whose room they are substituted.¹

The Federalists, in their turn, were struck by the egalitarian undertones in this conception of political representation. And they therefore wished to convince

their anti-Federalist opponents that the abandonment of the identity of the represented and his representative did not in the least imply a return to aristocratic conceptions:

Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. . . . Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, or religious faith, of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.²

Not the identity of the represented and his representative is what we should demand of representation, but how we can succeed in finding those people who are most suitable to function as the people's representatives and who will be least inclined to abuse their powers. Or, as James Madison put it:

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.³

And Madison even explicitly inferred from this that the person represented and his representative will not only most often differ from each other (in so far as we may expect the latter to possess a greater political wisdom than the person he represents), but that they even ought to differ on this scale of political wisdom. For one of the main aims of political representation is precisely to select the best and the wisest candidates for this so important and responsible office of being the people's representatives.

Strangely enough the anti-Federalists had no reply to this argument. The obvious response would have been to say that the kind of identity at stake in political representation is an identity of opinions and not of persons and that therefore nothing would be wrong with sending the most worthy and best educated people to Congress as long as they would express exactly the same political opinions there as those whom they represent without ever deviating from these opinions in any conceivable way. Perhaps the anti-Federalists did not think of this obvious answer because they did not yet separate opinions from the persons having them. And such a disjunction certainly is a rather modern notion. Within the premodernist conception of politics, individuals, their social roles and their opinions are still indissolubly related, and the idea of a cake of political opinions out of which everybody can cut the piece that he or she likes best belongs to a later and fundamentally different political consciousness:

But some twenty years before this discussion of the American Federalists and their anti-Federalist opponents the resemblance view of political representation had already effectively been demolished by Rousseau. As a proponent of direct democracy, Rousseau rejected all forms of representation. There are, as Rousseau pointed out, two possibilities.

Either this requirement of exact resemblance has been met, or it has not been satisfied. In the first case, representation is a useless redundancy. For if the requirement has been or will be met, we must be able to establish as much. And if we can do that, we know already what the electorate wants—and this obviously makes representation superfluous. But if the requirement has not been met, representation should be rejected on the basis of the resemblance theory of representation itself. The resemblance theory therefore either presents political representation as an irrelevance or it is in contradiction with itself.

So let us now turn to the substitution theory of political representation. Like its aesthetic counterpart, it was formulated for the first time by Edmund Burke. In 1774 Burke wrote a letter to his voters in Bristol in which he explained, first, what is wrong with the resemblance theory and, next, what view of political representation we should hold:

Certainly, Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and most unreserved communion with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinions high respect; their business his unremitting attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satisfactions, to theirs,—and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own.

Even the staunchest defender of the resemblance theory will have rejoiced in this eloquent statement by Burke. But then comes the decisive turn:

But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure,—nor from the law and the Constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. . . . To deliver an opinion is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative always ought to rejoice to hear and which he always ought most seriously to consider. But *authoritative* instructions, *mandates* issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgement and conscience,—these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our Constitution.

And then follow the famous words:

Parliament is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of *Parliament*.⁴

The identitary tie between the represented and his representative postulated by the resemblance theory has thus decisively been cut through by Burke. Just as the work of art has an (aesthetic) autonomy with regard to what it represents, so has the representative a certain independence or autonomy with regard to the voters who sent him to Parliament or Congress. After having been elected, not the opinions of his voters, but his own opinions—what he himself believes to be reasonable or acceptable in the views of his political opponents, the compromises to which he himself is prepared, and so on—these should now be the people's representative's compass in his political actions. Of course the representative will continuously bear in mind the views of his voters, because he knows that after a period of four years he will be face to face with his voters again and that he then must be able to explain his parliamentary performance in a satisfactory way to his voters. In sum, the political opinions of his voters will be an ingredient in the representative's decision-making, but his decisions ought not to have been determined by the voter's opinions. So, in practice, there will often be a gap or difference between the voter's opinions and those of his representative in Parliament or Congress.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREGOING

We observed a moment ago that there is this (aesthetic) gap or difference separating the representation from what it represents, and the same observation holds for political representation. A few comments on this gap or difference are in place here. We should realize that this gap or difference is not necessarily an indication of conflict, distortion, or incorrectness. Admittedly, we may be justified in ascertaining distortion or incorrectness under certain circumstances. For example, when Cromwell had his portrait painted, the painter asked him whether the wart on his face would have to be left out or not. As a true Puritan, Cromwell was free from personal vanity (or at least that is how he liked to present himself)—and thus Cromwell went down in history accompanied forever by his wart. But, obviously, if Cromwell would have had the less Puritanical character of, let us say, a Louis XIV, distortion would in all likelihood have been the result. So there exists such a thing as misrepresentation. But ordinarily things are different. Portraits will differ dramatically from the persons portrayed (recall now what Goodman said on the issue); yet this fact alone will not make us say that the portrait is a distortion of reality, or a misrepresentation. For the crucial datum here is that we know and expect portraits or representations to be different from what they represent.

And so it is with political representation. The adherent of the resemblance theory of political representation is like the person who does not understand art and aesthetic representation and therefore believes that each difference between the electorate and its representatives is an indication of distortion and political misrepresentation. But if one accepts the Burkean substitution view of (political) representation, one will recognize that it is part and parcel of political represen-

tation that there will be an (aesthetic) gap or a difference between the electorate and its representatives. Interestingly, it will be less easy in political representation to distinguish between simple misrepresentation (as in the case of Cromwell's wart) and the kind of difference between the representation and what it represents belonging to the nature of all representation. This probably is what the voter will have to ponder about when making up his mind after four years about the question whether or not he thinks that he has been well represented by the representative or political party that he had voted for. Being able to properly distinguish between these two things probably is a measure of a nation's political sophistication. A politically naive electorate will see all difference between itself and its representatives as an impermissible distortion; a politically lazy and indifferent electorate will not see distortion even if its representatives have recklessly reneged on all their political promises, whereas a politically mature electorate will know how to find the *juste milieu* between these two extremes and how to distinguish between mere aesthetic difference on the one hand and such a serious thing as (political) misrepresentation on the other.

This has an interesting implication. When speaking about representation, we assume that the represented is more or less unproblematically given to us. We exactly know what a person, a landscape or a still-life looks like (or so it may seem)—and next we may see how the painter has represented these things in his paintings. But if the sophisticated voter will be searching for this *juste milieu* between misrepresentation and the kind of aesthetic difference necessarily inherent in all representation, the implication is that the represented (the voter) is not such an unchangeable and objective datum. For we will now recognize that he may change his mind about himself and his own political opinions because of what his representative or his preferred political party has been doing with his mandate over the last four years. Some kind of interaction between the representative and the voter represented by him seems to have developed—an interaction transforming the represented, that is, the voter, from a hard and objective given into a kind of fuzzy continuum. But if we think a little harder, we shall see that it is no different with pictorial representation and that the phenomenon therefore is part of representation as such.

If we compare Titian's famous portrait of Charles V with the one painted by Barend Van Orley, we will probably all prefer the former. And this is not because Titian came closer to the ideal of photographic precision than Van Orley, but because Titian somehow succeeded in penetrating deeper into the psychology of the aging Emperor than did Van Orley. Both Titian and Van Orley painted what they saw—but they saw *different* things. Titian saw a man who had carried the fate of the whole Christian world on his shoulders and had been deeply aware of the immense responsibilities involved in this; Van Orley saw a man whose princely duties had not yet become part of his personality. But what they saw, they painted. This may make clear why, contrary to what we are inclined to believe, the represented is not independent of its representation. There is not a Charles V who was exactly the same to Titian as he had been to Van Orley—or to anybody else in the Emperor's entourage—and who functions as a represented

that is somehow objectively given to us. Representations partly determine the nature of what they represent. Historical representation perhaps illustrates the phenomenon in question even better. There is not a French Revolution that is exactly the same to a Michelet, a Tocqueville, a Labrousse, a Lefebvre, and so on, and that they all represent in different ways in their texts on the French Revolution. We have no French Revolution apart from all these texts (of course I am not upholding here the silly idealist or postmodernist thesis that texts actually create the past). The French Revolution as a represented is defined by its representations and has neither face nor contours without these representations. Speaking generally, historical reality—as a represented—only has its face and contours thanks to the representations historians have offered of it.

The recognition of this fact about representation in general may make clear why representation is such a supremely important phenomenon in politics. We need political representation not merely to compensate for the practical impossibility of assembling the whole nation in one national *agora*, so that the whole nation can participate in political decision-making. Political representation is much more than that—without political representation we are without a conception of what political reality (the represented) is like; without it, political reality has neither face nor contours. Without representation, there is no represented—and without political representation there is no nation as a truly political entity. Hence, to put it provocatively, even if it were possible to get the whole nation together, or to achieve the same effect by some variant of direct democracy such as electronic voting, even then we should prefer representation. Political reality only comes into being after the nation has unfolded itself in a represented and in a representation representing the represented. No representation, no democratic politics.

FOUR CONSEQUENCES

Several consequences follow from the foregoing. In the first place, we should be wary of the referendum and (variants of) direct democracy. Direct democracy can be an improvement on representative democracy only if we have to do with political problems that cannot meaningfully be discussed in political or public debate. In such cases representation will make things more rather than less complicated. Such issues may concern small-scale problems such as the quality of life in a neighborhood, the facelift of a decrepit area in a town, the reorganization of the center of a city, shortcomings in the public transport system, or what should be the precise trajectory of a road or a railway. In cases like these it will often be best to simply listen to the people involved and to follow their preferences. People will have pronounced opinions on issues like these that they are not likely to abandon even if they have been intensively discussed, and then it is best to just do what people want to be done.

Political scientists recently discovered that local bureaucracies tend to be unexpectedly responsive to this kind of issue and to react in a creative way to how problems are perceived by the people involved. So this kind of relatively local and isolated problem had best be left to the interplay of direct democracy

and bureaucracy—*bien etonnes de se trouver ensemble*. And on a larger or even national scale one might think of issues like abortion or euthanasia in the unfortunate situation at all times to be avoided that such issues have become thoroughly politicized and polarized by tactless political handling. Here also discussion is not likely to make people change their minds; discussion will probably even tend to entrench them ever deeper into what they already saw as the only morally satisfying option. And in cases in which the postponement of a decision about such issues has, for whatever unfortunate reason, become impossible, the referendum may often prove to be the best way out. Normally, however, such issues had best be kept out of politics and left to the evolution of public debate because their politicization can only damage politics, hamper the openness of public debate about them and result in decisions that a later generation will generally have good reasons to deplore.

Finally, representation is the procedure we will rely upon if we wish to put things into their wider context. Historical representation best exemplifies this general truth: When representing the past, the historian wants to show his readers how the individual aspects of the past investigated by him all hang together, how they are “contextually” related. And it follows that we should make use of representative democracy if the political problem in question is such that it can only adequately be dealt with after all its relationship to other political problems has carefully been explored and discussed. And, reversely, it also follows that direct democracy may be the most sensible way to deal with political problems that can more or less be isolated from a wider context.

In the second place, the artist’s creativity has its natural and exclusive locus in this gap or difference between art and reality—it is in this aesthetic gap that the artist’s creative genius may express and demonstrate itself. And so it is in politics. The politician’s talent to solve problems, his talent to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable political positions in a manner acceptable to all concerned, depends on his ability and success in reformulating problems and disagreements in such a way that reconciliation becomes possible. Or, to put it differently, the politician must possess the essentially aesthetic talent of being able to represent political reality in new and original ways. And we can expect little of the politician who does not have this talent and who can only give us “photos” of political reality.

In the third place, many authors have recently argued that one of the major problems confronting our contemporary democracies is the gap between citizen and representative. Both seem to live now in completely different worlds and no longer to be much interested in what the other is doing. The result is a growing political indifference of the voter and a political practice that no longer seems to be responsive to voter wishes. Of course there is much truth in this sad picture of *Politikverdrossenheit*, to use the untranslatable but most appropriate German term for the phenomenon in question. The virtual death of ideology and of the political party, the bureaucratization of government that has reduced the people’s representatives, Parliament and often even politicians to the lowly status of a mere constitutional ornament (think of the hilarious but profoundly unsettling television series *Yes, Minister!* of a few years ago), the dissolution of political

issues into the unfathomable depths of abstract and technical argument, have certainly transformed politics into an arcane bureaucratic science that no citizen can any longer be expected to identify with. In the next section I return to the issue of how government bureaucracy has affected representative democracy and of how it succeeded in transforming representative democracy into something essentially different.

But two things should be borne in mind in this context. In the first place, we observed a moment ago that this aesthetic gap between voter and representative is not necessarily a bad thing: The existence of this gap is even indispensable to the proper functioning of representative democracy. Second, against this background one might well venture the paradoxical thesis that this gap has now become too small rather than too large: For is not bureaucracy what we get when politics attempts to come as close to the citizen as possible? Bureaucracy is the politics of closeness (and therefore favored so much by totalitarian regimes). Politics, political issues and political debate all require a certain amount of distance between government and the citizen. Think of a painting: We can only adequately interpret what we see on a painting if the painting is at some distance from us. In the fourth and last place, this distance, gap or difference between voter and representative also makes clear what is the nature and origin of legitimate political power in representative democracy. If we move from the citizen on the one end of the aesthetic gap to the representative (or the state) on the other, then we move from the domain of those who are subject to legislation by the state to the place where this legislation is realized and from where its observance can be enforced. To put it metaphorically, when a population unfolds itself into a group of people that is represented and another group of people representing the former one, legitimate political power wells up, so to speak, in the hollow between the two groups. Hence, the origin of all legitimate political power must be situated in the aesthetic gap between voter and representative (cf. the state). And this would justify, to begin with, the probably amazing and certainly unorthodox conclusion that in a representative democracy all legitimate political power is essentially aesthetic. It follows, next, that in a representative democracy legitimate political power is possessed neither by the voter, nor by the representative, nor by the state. At most, one could say that the voter entrusted for a period of four years the use of legitimate political power to the administration of a certain political makeup. But political power as such, apart from its mere use, is not owned by anybody in a representative democracy. Consequently, we should abandon the doctrine of popular sovereignty: In representative democracy nobody, no segment of society and no institution can properly be said to "own" the state and the political powers embodied by it. Sovereign power exists, but it is in nobody's possession in a representative democracy.

FROM REPRESENTATIVE TO PLEBISCITARY DEMOCRACY

We have every reason to praise representative democracy as the most successful and subtle political instrument ever invented by mankind. Its capacity of

identifying the most urgent political problems, of solving them creatively and of guaranteeing a fruitful cooperation of state and civil society is unequalled by any other political system. Nevertheless, it also possesses an inherent weakness that has insufficiently been noticed by political theorists and for which, moreover, it will be difficult to find an adequate remedy within the logic of representative democracy. To put it succinctly, representation gives us all that is so immensely valuable in representative democracy, but representation also is the Achilles' heel of that political system. For if representative democracy is so remarkably good at solving our social and political problems by means of political representation, there is one category of problems that necessarily will remain outside its reach. This is the category of problems originating in or occasioned by the democratic state itself. This will immediately be clear as soon as we recall that a painting can represent everything, with the exception of itself. It is no different with the democratic state: For this whole so marvelously powerful arsenal of solving political problems by means of political representation becomes inaccessible to the state as soon as it gets entangled in problems of its own. In agreement with the logic of representative democracy the state's efficiency at solving problems is lost as soon as it has to deal with problems of its own instead of those existing in the civil society that is represented by it. This may help us comprehend the amazing fact that the democratic state itself is the most inefficient, clumsy and stupid institute in our "sophisticated" Western societies and that it is so extremely difficult to get the conflicts that have arisen in the state itself (as well as its size) on the political agenda in a representative democracy. The state resembles the well-known barber of Seville who did everybody's hair so very neatly, with the inevitable exception of his own and who, as a result, always presented himself in such an extremely sloppy and slovenly way to his surprised fellow citizens.

It will be instructive to consider briefly an objection that might be made against the foregoing. For it might be argued that my thesis of this weakness of representative democracy obfuscates a distinction that is absolutely crucial precisely in this connection. For I have been speaking rather loosely and carelessly about "the democratic state." But it might now be objected that precisely in the context of the present discussion it is more necessary than ever to carefully distinguish between the legislative and the executive power as the two components of the democratic state. For as soon as this distinction is made and respected, it may be pointed out that: 1) this alleged weakness of the democratic state is, if anything, a weakness to be attributed to the executive power only; and 2) we have the legislative power (which has been elected by the people) in order to control the executive power and to remedy its shortcomings. It would follow that the foregoing argument of this essential weakness of representative democracy is based upon a failure to properly distinguish between the democratic state (as a whole) and the executive power (as part of that whole). But this objection is less effective than it may at first sight seem to be. It should be observed, in the first place, that there is a telling asymmetry in how the legislative power functions when the state deals with problems in civil society and when it has to deal with problems concerning itself. In the former case, the legislative power functions as

the representative of those who are subject of the state's action (i.e., the people). This is in complete agreement with the logic of (political) representation: The electorate elects its representatives and in public decision-making, these representatives function as the substitute or replacement of the electorate itself. And then they may try to solve the conflicts that had arisen amongst the people represented by them. Obviously, no problems there. But things are fundamentally different from the perspective of the state (and, more specifically, of the executive)—and of how to deal with its problems. For the legislative power represents the electorate and *not* the state or the executive, and when discussing the state's problems, the legislative power relates to these problems in a way that is different from how it relates to the problems of civil society.

And if one would now wish to suggest that the political leaders of government bureaucracies "represent" these bureaucracies in their interaction with the legislative power, our reply must be that they do not represent those bureaucracies in these interactions but are identical with them from the perspective of the logic of our constitutional, representative democracies. For constitutionally these bureaucracies are mere extensions of themselves enabling them to do what they could never do alone. So the problems, internal conflicts, failures, and shortcomings of these bureaucracies are, from a logical point of view, really their own problems, internal conflicts, and the like, and dealing with them necessarily places us outside the scope of representative government and what representative government allows us to do. And we can think of a different argument leading to the same conclusion. We observed that in a representative democracy nobody can properly be said to be in possession of legitimate political power, though there are people and institutions to whom the use or the exercise of this power has been entrusted for a certain period. Self-evidently, government bureaucracies are the institutional instruments that one has to rely upon for this use. So what can legitimately be discussed within the logic of representative government is the use that political leaders have or will make of these bureaucracies (for example, in their attempts to solve the social and political problems of civil society), but not these bureaucracies themselves. These bureaucracies are a kind of heritage, so to speak, that had been taken over from previous administrations and that one has to hand over more or less as one found it to future administrations. It follows, then, that upholding the distinction between the legislative and the executive power will enhance rather than weaken my argument about representative democracy's inevitable incapacity to adequately deal with problems or occasioned by the democratic state itself.

As long as the state still was relatively small and as long as ministers could still be expected to be in control of their (departmental) bureaucracies and of the civil servants working there, this weakness of representative democracy only rarely demonstrated itself and never acquired really serious dimensions. And this is probably why—at least as far as I know—political theorists never cared much about the problem. Most of the really fruitful and creative political thinking about democracy dates from the time when government bureaucracies had not yet become a political problem themselves. But now that almost half of the gross

national product (GNP) of a nation passes in one way or another through the hands of these bureaucracies, we can no longer afford to remain indifferent to this most dangerous lacuna in the political practice of representative democracy and be content with the many (useful) things that political scientists have had to say on this. Moreover, the extent to which government bureaucracies now determine the political agenda of Western democracies has given extra urgency to the issue. Government bureaucracies identify the most urgent political problems, they initiate the decision-making procedures with regard to them, carry decision-making beyond the point of no return and, finally, realize its implementation. Moreover, they are depressingly good at all these things (which, paradoxically, makes the problem so much worse). In comparison to the actual powers wielded by government bureaucracy, the role of the legislative power has gradually dwindled to that of a naive, ill-informed, and therefore increasingly irrelevant onlooker; parliaments nowadays often do little more than acclaim what has been devised already by government bureaucracies. Within the original Weberian conception of bureaucracy, government bureaucracies faithfully worked out the decisions that had been taken by politicians. Now the situation is the reverse, bureaucracies take the real decisions, and the politician's task is to sell these to their rank and file and to the public. Their political significance is thus restricted to the public debate of a few spectacular items that also happen to fit well into the (narrow) matrices of what the media can report to the public. But long-term policies that tend to be technical, complicated, and dull but also decisive for the nation's future have thus gradually (been) moved outside the grasp of the legislative power and of the people's representatives.

Put differently, Montesquieu's doctrine of the balance of powers obfuscates rather than contributes to an understanding of the realities of actual decision-making in our contemporary democracies. The legislative power's privileges have gradually been eroded and absorbed by the executive, and as soon as we realize this, we must recognize that we had better speak of the democratic state as a whole (as I did previously) than to go on distinguishing, with Montesquieu and official constitutional law, between the legislative and the executive powers.

Or, to put the dots on the constitutional "i," citizens no longer vote for a legislative power of a certain political composition as they used to do in representative democracy—elections have gradually acquired the character of a plebiscite on the state's most recent behavior. In a plebiscite, the people are asked to pronounce on the state's past actions and on its plans for future action, regardless of the ideological origins of these actions. In the plebiscite the state is a mere black box to the citizen or to the people; the state is seen only from the outside, as it were, and not as an entity whose actions may be subject to the citizen's influence, via the people's representatives, for example. All interaction between the citizen and the state has ceased to exist in a plebiscitary democracy with the sole exception of the citizen's right to pronounce once every four years a qualified but decisive "yes" or "no" on the state's most recent behavior. In this way our contemporary democracies, both Anglo-Saxon and continental, could all be said to have become plebiscitary democracies to a greater or a lesser degree. Though it must

be added that this movement toward plebiscitary democracy on the national level is to a certain extent counteracted by a movement toward variants of direct democracy on the local level. In this way a polarization can be observed in our contemporary democracies: They tend to become less democratic on the national scale but more sensitive to pressure by the people on the local level. And this polarization is not without its dangers because it undermines the unity of democratic government; unless a great deal of care and attention are paid to the issue, a political system may be pulled apart in the end if it continues to move into opposite directions on the national and local levels in this manner.

Obviously, this gradual transformation of our Western democracies into plebiscitary democracies is in many ways an infringement on what representative government used to be. The common denominator of these infringements, I would suggest, is that plebiscitary democracy is a far cruder instrument for controlling government than representative democracy used to be. For it is really operative only once every four years and it exercises control at a far greater distance from actual government than is the case in representative democracy. In the latter the people's representatives may freely interfere with government decision-making when all options are still open and in all stages of the decision-making process. Plebiscitary democracy, on the contrary, is the democracy of the *fait accompli*, and it can only legitimize (or reject) what has come into being already. Moreover, the signals emitted by the electorate in a plebiscitary democracy are far more multi-interpretable than in representative democracy where the people's intentions are continuously detailed and refined in the ongoing interaction between representatives and the government. In fact, in a plebiscitary democracy, the people's electoral pronouncement is little more than an expression of public happiness or unhappiness—or anything between these two extremes—and it can always be interpreted accordingly. This robs the people's pronouncement of much of its political significance, for each electoral result can now be constructed as, for instance, a reaction to what the economic climate happened to be like at the time when elections took place instead of being the electorate's well-considered verdict on the doings of the administration. Elections have then been reduced to the status of those official inquiries into the citizens' feelings of happiness and well-being; and though such inquiries often yield fascinating material, we ordinarily interpret their results sociologically rather than politically. And this undoubtedly is the proper way to see these inquiries—for, *pace* the Jefferson of the Declaration of Independence, happiness is not a political category. So something has clearly gone wrong if elections are robbed in this way of the political character that they ought to have.

In sum, what takes place (or rather has taken place) in this transition from representative to plebiscitary democracy is a shift in the point of gravity of the interaction between the state and the citizen. In representative democracy this point of gravity was carried by the people's representatives right into the heart of administration; now that the political party, the people's representatives and the legislative power all tend to disappear from the political scene, this point of gravity is moving away from the state towards the citizen. Surely, it may well be that

we have acquiesced in this shift to take place because of the generally responsible and responsive behavior displayed by most Western democracies since World War II. On the whole, we tend to trust our democratic governments and fortunately have sufficiently good reasons for doing so. Moreover, the advocates of the referendum and of variants of direct democracy may even gladly applaud this shift in the point of gravity of the contact between the citizen and the state. Though I expect that their enthusiasm will considerably be dampened as soon as they discover the disheartening paradox of all democratic government that the closer this point of gravity comes to the citizen, the less political influence the citizen has. For the price to be paid for this apparent "triumph of direct democracy" by means of plebiscitary democracy, will be an irretrievable loss of control of the government by the citizen. For you can far better have somebody doing his utmost to represent you at the center of political decision-making (though the decisions that have been reached there will be binding for you) than to be miles away from this center yourself and without such a representative (even though you retain the nominal right to say "yes" or "no" after the decisions in question were made).

As may be clear from this brief and certainly not exhaustive list of what we stand to lose by the transition from representative to plebiscitary democracy, we presently have every reason to welcome a contemporary Montesquieu who will identify all the dangers to be expected from this gradual and insidious corruption of our representative democracies and who may tell us how we had best try to avoid them. All the more it is to be regretted that contemporary political philosophy has so completely lost itself in useless abstractions and focuses so exclusively on the citizen. For if political philosophy is to be of any use in our present predicament, it can best achieve this goal by giving us a theory of the democratic state at least accounting for evolutions such as I previously described. What we really need at the present moment are not still more abstruse theories about the rights and duties of the citizen, about political rights or the "good life" and the like,⁵ but an up-to-date theory of the contemporary democratic state. And, surely, this is not such an unreasonable and unprecedented demand, because for most of its history, political philosophy has precisely been an effort to develop such theories of the state. Is this not where we have always discerned the genius of philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, or Montesquieu?

WHERE TO FIND THE REMEDY FOR OUR PRESENT POLITICAL ILLS?

Because I have neither the capacities nor the ambition to be such a new Montesquieu myself, my question in the remainder of this chapter is not how to adapt our constitutional matrix so that it fits best the realities of plebiscitary democracy as just described, but rather the perhaps somewhat reactionary question of how to counteract the attraction of plebiscitary democracy and how to return to the matrices of representative democracy. So, where can we expect a remedy for what I consider as the illness of (representative) democracy rather

than as inescapable political facts that we shall have to accept for better or for worse?

Three agents in the political domain require attention in this context: the state, the voter, and the political party. Least is to be expected from the state. For as we have already described, mechanisms operative in the state and deriving their movement and impetus from the development of the modern state have been the main cause of the degeneration of representative into plebiscitary democracy. Perhaps this evolution was, in the end, bound to happen. Organisms always isolate themselves from their surroundings as well as they can and see in their success at doing so an important part of their identity and independence. It has been argued, in this vein, that the skin, demarcating ourselves from the outer world, is our most important organ.⁶ Much the same will be true for organizations—the shared etymological roots of the words “organism” and “organization” are most instructive here. Hence, we can expect that each institution will try to demarcate itself as much as possible from what is outside itself and to enclose itself within its own skin, so to speak; if so, representative democracy, by keeping open the wound of the body of the state through which the demos could more or less freely enter it, must always have been a cause of potential trauma to the state in the true sense of that word used so often nowadays. This consideration still further contributes to the thesis expounded here on the transition from representative to plebiscitary democracy. For from the state’s perspective the main effect—or rather benefit—of this transition has been that the people’s influence on it now took on a far less threatening character. In representative democracy the people exercise their influence in the heart of government by their representatives and thus force the state to speak and to listen to a language that is not its own. To put it differently, to openly invite the interference of something alien to itself has always been one of the most peculiar features of the state in a representative democracy. For the citizen this was the main benefit of representative government if compared to other political systems. But from the state’s perspective this has always rather been a source of irritation and of frustration. From its viewpoint it was as if an organism were forced to welcome the infection by certain viruses. I apologize for this most unbecoming metaphor, but I deliberately use it, because it may make clear why it has always been in the state’s own interest, as an institution with a logic of its own, to stimulate the exchange of representative democracy for plebiscitary democracy. There truly is something intrinsically unnatural about the state in a representative democracy and that will always motivate the state to avoid or to render inoperative as much as possible the mechanism of political representation. If the state has to react to and to submit to the demands of the electorate and of civil society at all, it will *sui generis* prefer to do so as a closed whole rather than as an institution that can be penetrated from the outside. This is also why the democratic state prefers the kind of direct contact between its own bureaucracies and the citizen we (discussed at the beginning of the previous section) to a contact that is channeled by representation because the former, in contrast to the latter, leaves its skin intact, so to speak. So with regard to our contemporary political predicament, little or

nothing can be expected from the state. The state is our main problem and, because of this, it could not possibly offer us a solution to it.

Then the citizen. I call to mind here what was said earlier in the section "Four Consequences" about this new kind of political problem facing us after the death of ideology. Our political problems no longer have the character of setting one part of the electorate against another part, as was paradigmatically the case in the struggle between labor and capital. Political conflict has now typically become a conflict within the individual voter's mind. It has become a conflict that most often can be situated on the axes of the citizen's short-term versus long-term interests and of the realization of social and political interests versus their potential unintended consequences. The citizen may now desire higher wages and more social security, but the unintended consequence may well be that this will contribute to his being unemployed at some later stage; he wants medical aid to prolong his life, but will then have to go through all the degradations of old age; he will wish to use the resources of this world for his own purposes, but will discover that this will result in an irreparable destruction of the environment; he wants to enjoy the conveniences of modern technology, but will then also find himself confronted with all the inconveniences of modern technology; and so one may go on indefinitely. The search for the *juste milieu* between these alternatives no longer puts his own interests in opposition to other people's interests or to public interest to the same reassuring extent as in the age of ideological politics. For here we are dealing with conflicts between mutually exclusive self-interests—mostly short-term interest versus long-term interest and where public interest ordinarily makes common cause with the latter. The old and comfortable dilemma of having to choose either self-interest or public interest (or anything in between) has thus ceased to be the Archimedean point for the citizen's political orientation.

On the one hand, we have every reason to rejoice in the end of ideological politics. But on the other, one could maintain that the current situation is hard to reconcile with both human nature and the nature of politics in a democracy. As for human nature, we tend to define our political identity by distinguishing between our own interest and that of the community (which does not in the least exclude a considerable amount of overlap between the two—think of the police or of national defense). So from this perspective the new kind of political problem tends to rob us of our political identity. This will certainly make us feel that our own fate no longer is at stake in politics and that we therefore had better leave it to the naive dupes who have not yet recognized the complete irrelevance of politics—or, worse, who seek some personal gain from it.

Next, if we define democracy (very generally) as the political system that takes into consideration all the interests of (groups of) individuals in a reasonable and responsible manner, it also follows that this new kind of political problem will dislocate (representative) democracy's political machinery. For it is hard to see what work will be left for democratic politics in the absence of political conflict. If all our individual (long-term) interests lose their specific contours and are dissolved into one comprehensive public interest, the only question still left to us will be the technical question of how the cause of public interest can best be served.

So we then had best put an end to the practice of politics and leave it all to government bureaucracies and to their experts. And this would, once again, compel us to embrace plebiscitary democracy. For the only (pseudo-)political question then left to us would be the question of the state's efficiency and its capacity to realize the public good at the smallest cost to us all. It would then be enough to have two nonideological so-called "catch-all" parties, so that the electorate can express in a general way its dissatisfaction with the state's behavior over the last few years by voting against the party that had been in power until then. More and clearer signs coming from the electorate would not be necessary in plebiscitary democracy. In this way the presence of these two parties will be sufficient to prevent gross abuses of the state's (considerable) powers and to safeguard civil society from unwanted interference by the state. (The doings of) all other potential inhabitants of the public domain could then only complicate this simple picture and jeopardize what we may hope to gain from (plebiscitary) democracy.

In sum, in our present political predicament, plebiscitary democracy seems to be the inevitable and perhaps even best outcome both from the perspective of the state and from that of the citizen. Because most of the *dramatis personae* of representative democracy—such as the political party, the ideological opinion makers either inside or outside the political party, the party's representatives in the legislative body, the legislative power itself, the executive power—are all on their way out so that only the citizen and the state (within which the legislative and the executive powers coagulated) are now left on the political stage, we probably had better start to like plebiscitary democracy, however much we may regret the disappearance of representative democracy. For if the political domain is divided amongst these two remaining political agents, plebiscitary democracy is the inevitable future, as is amply demonstrated by the United States, where plebiscitary democracy has been victorious on the federal level for many decades already.

Nevertheless, if one finds it hard to acquiesce in the (impending) victory of plebiscitary over representative democracy, one may feel tempted to ask oneself the admittedly quixotic question about how to lengthen the life of the latter. Self-evidently, this will amount to a question about which of the now moribund political agents that I just enumerated we had best try to bring back to life. Because the political party has always been the link between the individual citizen and the state in representative democracy and because the political party always provided representative democracy with its lifeblood, the political party will be our most obvious candidate. For if the political party is unable to halt the dying off of all intermediaries between the citizen and the state on the national level, nothing else can be successful here.

First of all, it should be noted that there is a categorical difference between the state and the citizen on the one hand and the political party on the other. The difference mainly is that any attempt to reform, change or influence the state or the citizen is accompanied by an incomparably greater number of more dangerous risks than experiments with the political party. Reform of the state involves a change in the instrument we possess for the sake of social change, and clearly

no source is richer in the production of unintended consequences than attempts to change the instrument for change itself. Reform of the state is only a realistic option worth considering in those very rare and exceptional cases when a revolution is truly inevitable—and history has indeed taught us that this ordinarily is a jump in the dark of which the consequences are invariably much worse than the political inconvenience(s) for which the revolution was supposed to have been the remedy. Besides, history also teaches us that nations paradoxically often seem to prefer their ruin to constitutional change (the French lust of constitutional change since 1789 being, of course, the obvious exception to this rule). So even if one were willing to consider constitutional change, the chances that proposals to that end will effectively be realized are next to nil. All of this is *a fortiori* true for the attempts to reform the citizen. The fortunately rare attempts to do so were undertaken by totalitarian dictatorships proclaiming a new humanity and a new society. This has invariably resulted in the greatest horrors in the history of humankind (and it also follows that we should be wary of the undoubtedly well-intentioned efforts of the communitarians to educate the citizen: Political philosophy had best accept, for better or for worse, the citizen as he presently is).

Attempts to change the political party, however, are not only eminently practicable but even an absolute “must” for the survival of (representative) democracy. And if we have reason to be dissatisfied or even worried about our contemporary political predicament, part of the explanation undoubtedly is that we have cared too little about the well-being of the political party. The political party, if noticed at all, has most often been seen as a mere intermediary between the citizen and the state instead of a political agent in its own right. Illustrative is the fact that both its birth and its (impending) death have remained unsung in the writings of political philosophers.

With regard to the political party, we should recall first of all that the political party bridges the aesthetic gap between the state and the citizen, between representation and the represented. The political party encompasses the entire trajectory between the citizen and the state, and its main political task is to do precisely this. So the supreme political secret of democracy, that is, the aesthetic gap between the citizen and the state, is right at the heart of the political party. Three conclusions follow from this: First, whenever we feel dissatisfaction with the state’s functioning, whenever repairs of representative democracy seem to be required, we are addressing a kind of problem that can best be diagnosed and analyzed in terms of the (dys-)functioning of the political party. The focal point of the state’s and the citizen’s activities is to be found within themselves: That of the state is to be identified with public decision-making and that of the citizen with his activities in the private sphere. However, the political party is far more part of both these two spheres than the state or the citizen (who both try to shut themselves up as much as possible within their own sphere) could ever be. The political party overlaps the spheres of both the state and the citizen, it functions as a *trait d’union* between the two and to do just these things is its whole *raison d’être*. Hence, if representative democracy functions inadequately in the sense

that something seems to have gone awry in the relationship between the citizen and the state, then the political party is the perfect medium both for analyzing the nature of this deficiency and for determining how this relationship could best be improved again. In sum, the macrocosm of (representative) democracy's vicissitudes can be derived from the microcosm of the fate of the political party.

And this brings me to my second conclusion. The crucial difference between the political party on the hand and the state and the citizen on the other is that the political party can safely be manipulated, whereas the manipulation of the state and the citizen, if possible at all, is always fraught with the gravest dangers. In the field of the political party, politics still has a human dimension, here it is still enacted on a human scale, so to speak; here it is still possible to have a reasonable overall view of the causes and consequences, here one can still make well-considered plans on the realistic assumption that these plans will not diverge from the outcome all too much. At first sight, this may seem surprising because it is precisely the political party where this *arcanum imperii* of the aesthetic gap between the state and the citizen is most prominently present. And this may make us believe that if we wish to understand political reality and to act on it on the basis of sound understanding, we had best avoid the political party and its dark and unfathomable secrets and turn to the state and the citizen instead. But this would be putting the cart before the horse: We may know all that one could possibly know about the state and the citizen and still be in the dark about how the two relate in a (representative) democracy. Similarly, even if you know all about a landscape and a painting of this landscape, you will not yet be able to define the exact nature of the relationship between the two on the basis of this knowledge. However, precisely because the political party spans both ends of the aesthetic gap around which all politics gravitates in a representative democracy, the politically relevant features of both the state and the citizen can best be investigated from the perspective of the political party. On the level of the political party, we can freely observe any potential problem of and in the relationship between the state and the citizen *in statu nascendi*, so to speak. For the same reason, the political party is also the most appropriate area of research to find out how problems in the relationship between the state and the citizen might best be solved. Any adverse consequences of experiments with political parties are far less disastrous than experiments with other elements of the political domain. On the contrary, all political parties can learn from the experiments that have been tried out by any of them and, in this way, even unsuccessful experiments may be beneficial to democracy as a whole. In short, the political party is, as a result of its position in the political field, not only a pure culture of all problems that might besiege (representative) democracy, but also our best compass for how to deal with them.

Third, and most important, because of its location in the political domain the political party is both the embodiment and the custodian of the aesthetic dimension inherent in representative democracy. So take away the political party from representative democracy, and the aesthetic relationship between the citizen or civil society and the state will be exchanged for a merely causal relationship between the two. The creative potentialities of the interaction between the two

will be lost, the citizen will no longer be represented in the proper sense of that word by the state and representative democracy will have been exchanged for its bastardized variant, plebiscitary democracy. So there is an indissoluble link between the fate of representative democracy and that of the political party. Without the latter we cannot have the former, and without healthy political parties there is no way to avoid plebiscitary democracy for the future.

CONCLUSION

I come to a conclusion. If we have reason to assume that representative democracy is about to enter another and perhaps less fortunate phase in its history and if we wish to preserve this exceptionally successful political system for the future and to adapt it as best we can to new social and political challenges, then the political party provides the key to the future. It is advisable to consider substantial alterations to the state only in very exceptional cases; disaster can only result from attempts, whether inspired by ethics or by any other well-intentioned program for social and political reform, to influence or to improve the citizen politically. Adaptations of the political party to the changing challenges of our time are least risky, and the political party is also, due to the hold that it has on the state, the most effective instrument to realize elsewhere those changes in the system of representative democracy that might be required with a view to both the immediate present and to the future. The political party is, consequently, the place where we may still succeed in cutting the world at its joints. It will be therefore decisive for the future of representative democracy whether we will succeed in reviving the political party or not. And such a renaissance of the political party can best, and perhaps only be achieved on the condition of a repoliticization of party programs. However, little is to be expected in this effort at repoliticization from the liberal or sociodemocratic ideologies that we have inherited from our past. Rather, the political party should take its point of departure in how the citizen has become divided against himself after and because of the death of ideology; hence, in the conflict between the citizen's short- and long-term interests and in how these conflicts can be expressed and articulated in terms of conceptions of the nation's future. Only in this way can the political party take up again a clear and widely recognized position in the dilemmas that the citizen feels himself confronted with and thus rescue him from his present political paralysis. Only in this way will the political party succeed in re-discovering the road to the heart of the citizen. And only this may therefore save democracy and prevent its degeneration into the political impotence and disgrace of plebiscitary democracy.

If the state is, as we have seen, our greatest and most urgent political problem at the beginning of the third millennium, then the political party is our most appropriate instrument to solve this problem. Democracy will stand or fall with the political party. This is the most important lesson that aesthetic political philosophy may teach us.

NOTES

1. Quoted in B. Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 110.

2. Ibid., 115.

3. Ibid., 116.

4. E. Burke, speech at the conclusion of the poll, in *The Works of Edmund Burke*, vol. 2 (Boston, 1866), 95–96.

5. The fascination of American political philosophers for this kind of politically useless topic undoubtedly has much to do with the fact that for Americans the Constitution is sacrosanct to a degree that never fails to amaze the citizens of the democracies of continental Europe. Because a discussion of the state and of its constitution has thus, to all practical purposes, become impossible in the United States, the citizen could become so much the obvious focus of interest for American political philosophers. Though this is all too understandable within the context of American politics, one can only regret that European political philosophers have generally been so eager to join the American liberals, communitarians, and republicans in this bizarre American prejudice with regard to what demands the political philosopher's attention.

6. See D. Anzieu, *The Skin Ego* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

Representation in Sacrificial Rites

IVAN STRENSKI

RELIGION, RITUAL, AND SACRIFICE

I have been concerned with the way the materials of traditional or exotic cultures have been converted into political ideologies, moral paradigms, theologies, and religious materials, and at the same time with the way the classic theorists of the study of religion have played their parts in this production of moral, ideological, and religious discourses. The hymns of the Vedas turn up as evidence of the greatness of the Germans; the so-called Venus of Willendorf shows us that matriarchy really preceded patriarchy; the ritual masks of West African folk confirm us in our beliefs in the profound spirituality of primitive society. In *Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History*,¹ I argue that it was the way myth had been represented and theorized for modern purposes that dominated my thinking, less than the alternately delightful, puzzling or edifying stories of traditional societies. Later, in studies of the rhetoric of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anti-Semitic uses of myth, for example, I have shown how these campaigns against Jews were informed and given scholarly legitimacy by appeals to the myths of Vedic India two to three millennia before.² In recent studies of French nationalism and racial science, I investigated how the mythologies of Celtic, Germanic, or Latin origins functioned to set apart ideological opponents fighting for a particular view of what it was to be French (roughly equivalent to today's struggles regarding Mexican identity in terms of Indian opposed to Spaniard).³ I have shown as well how the political representation of exotic or small-scale societies—say, as “primitive” or “rooted” or “religious” or “authentic”—may matter far more in the course of our lives than those very cultures themselves ever can. Traditional and exotic societies have always been there, and for a good deal of time, we have also known about their existence. But it is only when we decide to represent or theorize them for their larger cross-cultural and

comparative implications that they take on importance. Bronislaw Malinowski knew this when he presented his studies of traditional cultures, cynically in part, in terms of their being a source of cheap labor. The romantics felt this way when they cast traditional folk as survivals of antediluvian social harmony and religious vision. I have accordingly tried to bring out how the study of our colonization of the primitive and traditional mind for modern ideological, moral, political or religious purposes has been a persistent feature of how we have behaved to the past and far afield. In doing so, I think I have shown how the representation and theorizing of myths, rituals, and such really make a kind of difference that those cultural materials themselves never can on their own. In this sense, the study of small-scale cultures in and for themselves has the trappings of the study of local history. As such it is indispensable as an essential archive of human culture, a database for further thinking. But often enough, like the publications of provincial university presses, these studies seem about as consequential as the study of chair caning techniques in southwest India.

Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History was concerned, therefore, to see as well what fundamental worldviews informed the way myths were theorized by some of our greatest mythological theorists. Theories of myth, like the word itself, are highly charged and bristling with value commitments. Theories of myth, at least in a certain time and place, I argue, were not just methodological handbooks for making sense of stories; the theories typically determined what would be counted as a myth in the first place and were often vehicles for promoting certain larger ideological, moral, or religious commitments. Levi-Strauss's detached anti-anthropocentrism, his appeals to a perspective grounded in the indifference of nature, all serve to give support and impetus to a certain quietism in politics and a certain equally abstract and humanly decentered way of conceiving of human nature itself. Who reads Levi-Strauss's multi-volume *Mythologiques* today for his analyses of Brazilian myths? Who indeed reads *Mythologiques* at all? By contrast, although Joseph Campbell and his theory of myth are abominations to most critical thinkers, they remain resources for anyone seeking to understand modern religious consciousness. In short, the theories of myth interpreted could be seen as vehicles conveying and promoting certain ideologies, values, moral attitudes, worldviews, indeed, things we can call religious perspectives.

I want now to turn to theories of sacrifice with the same critical attitude as I applied to myth. That is to say I want to bring to light the underlying discourses of ideological, moral or religious concerns embedded in theories of sacrifice. I do so because I believe that these value concerns can be shown to shape and govern the theoretical moves made within theories of sacrifice—at least of a certain period and place. In fact, these theories actually constitute a kind of polemic with implications going far beyond what they indicate on the surface. In brief, I want to show how while people may seem superficially to be speaking about ritual sacrifice in exotic cultures, they are at the same time saying something about our own culture. We often therefore speak and think about sacrifice by speaking or thinking with or of it.

To test this thesis, I would like to make a single book my focus—Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss's *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions*—incidentally the most influential book on ritual sacrifice ever written. This book also warrants our interest because it was written at a time and in a place where the idea of civic sacrifice was a matter of public debate, much like the topics of violence, gender role, gender identity, or sexual preference are with us today. The raging question of the time in which Hubert and Mauss wrote was about what the individual owed the nation and what the nation could demand of the individual. Curiously enough both these discussions—the one about ritual and the other about civic morality—occur within the same book, and seem, in the minds of the writers, to depend in some deep way upon each other.

How different this approach to things was from what is now a rough consensus among ethnologists and others (to whom I shall refer as “structuralists”) as to the nature of sacrifice! Not only Hubert and Mauss, but also the nineteenth-century founders of the cultural and social sciences, assume from the start that sacrifice belongs essentially to religion and not, as most ethnologists would today say, to ritual behavior. The great Catholic modernist and student of sacrifice of Durkheim's generation, Alfred Loisy, can therefore say with total assurance that “a complete history of sacrifice would almost be a history of the religious cults of humanity.”⁴ Thus, in sacrifice we come upon one of those especially charged subjects, like myth, where an appetite to understand the way we convert the materials of traditional societies into political or civic ideology promises to be richly satisfied. The Durkheimians believed that we in societies threatened by instability, moral mediocrity, a dearth of collective passions to do great things can draw policy lessons about how individual and collectivity in modern society might articulate with one another. To learn these lessons, we should meditate on the lessons provided by the way the long history of humanity dealt with such matters: The Durkheimians felt that in studying the institution of ritual sacrifice in traditional and ancient societies, we could learn the secret of the stability and vitality of our forbears.

But why do some thinkers claim that we should not talk this way today? And how would this stricture affect how we might consider theories of sacrifice of our own time?

THE STRUCTURALISTS

Standing in the way of an approach like Hubert and Mauss are a powerful band of writers who consciously seek to suppress or expel any reference to the ideological, religious or moral aspects of sacrifice. Here I have in mind Levi-Strauss, Marcel Detienne, Frits Staal, and Luc de Heusch. They severally argue that many attempts to speak of sacrifice, such as that of the Durkheimians, are invalidated by hidden Jewish or Christian cultural biases. In particular, speaking of sacrifice as a “making sacred,” as part of religion, ideology, or morality—conspicuous at least since the writings of the Durkheimian group—testifies, in Detienne's words, to “the surprising power of annexation that Christianity still

subtly exercises on the thought of those historians and sociologists who were convinced they were inventing a new science"⁵—an unfair criticism as it happens, because the Durkheimians drew as much on the religions of India, Australia, and such as they did on a Jewish database. Sacrifice is "a category of the thought of yesterday, conceived as arbitrarily as totemism."⁶ Detienne says it is not an institution at all, but just a word used to collect a series of actually unrelated phenomena, thus "an ideological category of Judeo-Christian thought . . . disguised as an object of scientific study . . . only a word, a lexical illusion."⁷

These critics thus urge us to look instead at the constructed or provisional aspect of sacrifice. We know people like to kill, that they like to give gifts, cook, and eat communally, and that they like to raise things out of the everyday and promote them into a special or sacred domain. But do people who like to kill ritually, equally well enjoy raising what they kill ritually to some higher level—a level of sacredness? Is the only way to consecrate something, conversely, to kill it ritually? Or further, is what is ritually killed always cooked and eaten, or offered as a gift to a divine or mundane being? If such connections do not obtain, we should then just forget the whole notion of such a sacrificial syndrome, because it supposes links among ritual killing, consecration, communal eating, and so on, where there may be none. Sacrifice as a category thus lies in deconstructed ruins.

Alternately, even when sacrifice does constitute some real syndrome of killing, consecrating, and so on, as in the Jewish and Christian West, the structuralists argue that it is something that should be theorized within the domain of purely ritualized human (and even animal [Staal]) behavior, rather than, again, to religion, ideology, or morality. Note especially Victor Turner's view of sacrifice as "a process within a process within a process."⁸ Frits Staal accordingly admires Hubert and Mauss's *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions* because it takes the first halting steps in the direction of producing a synchronic or logical analysis of ritual process, yet distances himself from any part appeals to historic precedents of ritual sacrifice may play in the struggles of the day to construct meaning, such as to promote national civic morale in the face of impending warfare with Germany⁹ as the Durkheimians had imagined.

Thus whichever way we turn, "sacrifice" fails to satisfy. When deconstructed, it shows itself as just an unappetizing piece of occidental ideology, and because of that, much too indigestible for students of ritual and human behavior. But what follows from such criticism for the study of classic theories of sacrifice?

THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION

Now, if sacrifice is not an institution, or when it does seem to be one, if it is only an institution constructed by the West, we can easily set aside the ideological, religious, and moral aspects of sacrificial theories: They are products of the ignorance of earlier thinkers. If we want so to set this aspect aside, we can dissociate the classic theories from their embeddedness in a social or cultural base; we can treat them instead solely as technical approaches to the formal aspects of

certain ritual behaviors—much as analytic philosophers approached religious matters ignorant of the history of the religions in question, or much as Levi-Strauss cuts myth itself loose from its collective bases in order to track its autonomous transformations in the world of representation. Both these things can and probably ought to be done, at least by someone in the university—as indeed someone like Staal has conspicuously done.

Thus although we may want to take up the structuralist option of looking at sacrifice as ritual alone, or deconstruct Durkheimian and nineteenth-century thinking about sacrifice by exposing its Jewish or Christian assumptions, and although this desire may make us eager to abandon the realm of ideological and evaluative aspects of its study, we should pause to consider at least two problems that afflict this strategy for studying sacrifice.

First, if we too readily sweep aside the fact and significance of the ideological and religious nature of Durkheimian work on sacrifice and his generation as signs of crass error, we will produce only anachronistic, self-serving treatments of thinkers of the past. It is simply a historical fact that Durkheimian approaches to religion, especially to sacrifice, are themselves imbued with a moral, ideological and religious purpose and character—however misguided they might have been in doing so. Unless we understand these purposes and factor them into our understandings of theories of sacrifice, we cannot understand the development of nineteenth-century social thought—any more than we can understand Columbus's strategy for the discovery of the Americas without recourse to the admittedly bizarre thought world of his late medieval mind. In saying this, I am saying then that we might bracket for a while the issue of whether the founders were right or wrong in holding the view that sacrifice was essentially religious, and seek to know instead why they thought they were right in assuming so. This I take it is a fact about the Durkheimians and their generation worthy of investigation in its own right, and ready-made for students of religion. So, what I urge is that we shift focus to the moral, ideological and religious location of classical theories of sacrifice, and in doing so recapture something of the priorities of that time. Because that time was haunted by the reality of religion, it represents a rich field for the study of religion otherwise abandoned as a killing field of fallen theories.

RECAPTURING THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF DURKHEIMIAN THOUGHT

In order to recapture the priorities of the classic theorists, one will need first and foremost to understand the very religious discourse of the theoretical interests of *fin-de-siecle* scholars, including the Durkheimians and the milieu that made such writing plausible and powerful in its own time. In doing this kind of sociology of knowledge or history of the study of religion, one becomes in the process a student of religion in the first-order sense. By that I mean the object is not to determine how and why the Durkheimians were wrong to make of the category of sacrifice the religious thing they felt it to be, but to understand the ideological, moral, and religious reasons why they thought they were right to do so.

There is no other way to do this than by understanding the religious nature of the time in which they wrote, and by situating their equally religious viewpoint within the context of what becomes a kind of comparative study of religions—but in this case a comparative study of religions that puts Durkheimian neoreligious doctrines into play against those of the free thinkers, anarchists, marxists, or protofascists as well as into play with the traditional religions of the West.

Thus although along with the structuralists we can speak about sacrifice in terms of its belonging essentially to the domain of ritual behavior, exchange, and such, it would be anachronistic to speak of the thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, like the Durkheimians and their generation, in this way alone. For good or for ill, the Durkheimians saw sacrifice as a matter of religion, cultural values, and morality. In this sense, what the study of religion can contribute to the university is an understanding of those discourses that contend among each other at the level of fundamental worldview, general anthropology, value-orientation, ideology, and the like. Thus, while noting the critical arguments of those who want to see the Durkheimian theory of sacrifice simply as a defective theory of ritual behavior, the student of religion would want to see how and why it functioned as a piece of ideology and study that in and for itself. Discourses on sacrifice in the *fin-de-siecle* constitute a rhetoric, a strategy of persuasion resting on religious, moral, and ideological foundations.

SACRIFICIAL RHETORIC

What then might be the ground rules of this ideological contest in which the Durkheimians were engaged? The first item to notice is that the word “sacrifice” was for the classic theorists (and remains for us) so much a part of our language that we never really “see” it. We use the same word not only for Hindu rituals of *ashvamedha* or *agnihotra*, for what Abraham was about to submit Isaac, for what some Christians believed really happened to Jesus on Calvary and still other Christians believe continues to happen daily to Jesus in the Mass, but also for altruistic acts, patriotic death in war, or even commercial sales pitches where prices are “slashed” and goods (figuratively, one presumes) sacrificed. Small wonder that contemporary ethnological theorists like Luc De Heusch and Levi-Strauss want to eliminate the word entirely from the scientific lexicon.

Second, in calling something a “sacrifice,” we are usually investing that something with values, meanings, indeed a whole history of meanings it would not have had otherwise—or alternatively purposely devaluing or divesting the notion of these often exalted meanings. In wartime, for example, the language of sacrifice is notoriously used in a high-flown rhetoric of justification of death on the battlefield, however suicidal it might have been.

Third, these justifications for what we might call civic sacrifices are often managed rhetorically by appeals to religious precedents—to ritual sacrificial language. One speaks about civic sacrifice by speaking of and with ritual sacrificial precedents. In a prewar Rosh Hashana sermon, “L’esprit du sacrifice,” the Grand Rabbi of France argued that the sacrifice of Isaac proves something about Jewish

character: It is "doubtless a deed which is most edifying and moving—the most renown manifestation of the piety which personifies the founder of our race." When the Grand Rabbi then turned to inquire about the essence of this piety, he answers by naming a series of *civic* virtues: service to "others," which only has the "commonweal" in mind. This piety consists in patriotic virtues of "heroism," "devotion," even "devotion pushed to its extreme limits."¹⁰

WHAT KIND OF THEORY?

Bearing these three features of public sacrificial rhetoric in mind, we can ask a series of questions implicitly posed by the classic theorists, such as the Durkheimians, given that we now know that their approach to sacrifice was motivated by a polemic against the traditional religions. Thus, Hubert wrote to Mauss:

We shouldn't miss a chance to make trouble for these good, but badly informed, souls. Let's stress the direction of our work, let's be clear about our aims so that they are pointed, sharp like razors, and so that they are treacherous. Let's go! I love a fight! That's what excites us!¹¹

What kind of rhetoric for a theory of sacrifice would then one create if, like Hubert and Mauss, one were a humanist, rationalist, somewhat anticlerical, intensely patriotic, Dreyfusard, philosemitic, socialist, iconoclastic scientific student of religion, but one, at the same time, concerned to create a kind of civil religion or at least a national morale to heal the wounds of a fractious society, to reconcile individual freedom with the requisites of national unity? Thus, what kind of theory of sacrifice would Hubert and Mauss be expected to write in a context of reactionary or intransigent nationalist hysteria, emergent anti-Semitism, where the political rhetoric of the duty of individuals to "sacrifice" themselves for the fatherland emerged from the Roman Catholic religious revival's theology of total self-effacing sacrifice, often articulated in language perfected by figures such as protofascist, Roman Catholic, Joseph De Maistre? These same Catholics have insinuated that French Jews, for example, were not up to the demands of a loyal citizenry. Jews were self-seeking and egoistic, anti-Semitic slanders went, and all too willing to "sacrifice" others and in the process save themselves from the dangers of death in battle. Heeding this charge, the young Durkheimian Robert Hertz—notable for his work on religious subjects like sin, sacrifice, expiation, and such—made a remarkable declaration in the face of these charges. Hertz "had the presentiment," a contemporary report said,

that he would not return [from battle]. But this presentiment changed into a determination to become a sacrifice. Jewish by origin and French by all the thoughts of his mind and strivings of his moral being, he reckoned that the blood of the men of his race and of his own conscience would be usefully shed to liberate their children from all reproaches of egoism, particularist interest and indifference in the eyes of a suspicious France.¹²

What kind of theory would the Durkheimians have written as well at a time when their Protestant fellow humanists stood with them in the great liberal political struggles of the day (Dreyfus, the Separation Issue, the protection of the Third Republic bourgeois economics and politics), yet were also dead set against the sociological perspective they championed and moreover tended toward a pacifism and "selfishness" that militated against the enthusiastic collective action that the Durkheimians felt essential to vital civic life?

Writing as late as World War I, the celebrated Liberal Protestant intellectual Paul Sabatier complained that of his own people,

Protestants cannot unify because of "spiritual pride." A Protestant only seems able to give himself up to his individual task. He isolates himself from the past and the present, and "searches the Scriptures."¹³

Reflecting this morale from the side of scholarly studies of ritual sacrifice, the great Protestant historian of religion of their day, Albert Reville, for example, said that ritual sacrifice was simply "hideous," "terrible," and "horrible."¹⁴ He felt much the same about civic sacrifice. In its civic sense, Reville, like the Durkheimians, for example, protested the "sacrifice" of Dreyfus. There one can see how civic sacrifice developed into symbolic human sacrifice—into scapegoating for the sins of the nation. To Reville, the innocent Dreyfus stands as the degraded Jesus before Pilate's "Ecce Homo." The example of Dreyfus further discloses a "man victimized by a dreadful injustice, suffering . . . the loss of his honor."¹⁵ The mass tolerance of such maltreatment and injustice can only be explained, believes Reville, in terms of the long historical formation of human minds effected by the Catholic church in France. Reville has authoritarianism and anti-Semitism particularly in mind in these passages, but it is surely not to stretch the interpretive imagination beyond reasonable bounds to fill in the blank spaces of what Reville says here by appeal to the prestige of bloody sacrifice in the French Catholic eucharistic theological tradition, especially since the days of royal absolutism. Years before the crisis of national conscience provoked by the Dreyfus Affair, Protestant scholars had felt there to be an inner relation between reactionary political culture and the sacrificial religious mentality made prominent by the reactionary Catholics. In 1889, the *Encyclopedie des Sciences Religieuses*, published and edited by the doyen of the Protestant faculty of theology, Frederic Lichtenberger, published the article, "Maistre (Marie-Joseph, Comte de)." There, the author notes that despite Maistre's remove from the religious events of the day, his "role is quite important in contemporary religious history": He was nothing less than the "theoretician of theocracy in this century." Maistre preaches a "God who is pleased by sacrifice," a God who "loves it that the innocent pay for the guilty."¹⁶

Yet, while themselves passionate Dreyfusards, Hubert and Mauss felt that there is simply no society without civic sacrifice. Against the extreme Protestant individualism of their fellow humanists, Hubert and Mauss felt that without giving of oneself to others, without the reciprocal exchange of the giving of oneself

by others to oneself, there cannot be social bonds or human relationships: There cannot be society. Thus, a painful social truth seems forced upon Hubert and Mauss's meditation on sacrifice: As one cannot absolutely escape the crunch of victimization in ritual sacrifice, so also one cannot escape the lamentable need for human victimization in civic contexts, as much as one might want to minimize it. The world, whether religious and ritual or social and civic, is so arranged that it cannot be otherwise. But where does this leave poor Dreyfus?

The moral dilemma facing Hubert and Mauss was how at once to accept the painful necessity of civic sacrifice while at the same time wanting the institution to be just—while at the same time reducing the pain and injustice of anyone or class of individuals from having to bear forever, absolutely or unfairly the burden of victimhood. For them, the issue was what *kind* of sacrifice was sufficient to assure either the continuity and integrity of society.

Their answer was given in terms of a number of considerations: One was that although national unity requires national sacrifice, the Maistrean reading of sacrifice, under which Dreyfus's punishment was in part rationalized by right-wing Catholics, did not fulfill the needs of good national sacrifice. Maistrean sacrifice appealed to an ideal of expiation for sin and guilt. But from their researches into sacrifice in many different societies, the Durkheimians concluded that societies are not built up on the basis of victimization of the innocent or the negative motive of expiation for guilt or sin—but rather on voluntary and positive acts of public spiritedness. Thus the Maistrean logic of sacrifice, in the eyes of Hubert and Mauss, turns out to be faulty. In terms of the religious logic of sacrifice that the right-wing had in mind, the sacrifice of Dreyfus (or anyone else for that matter) was not required. Secondly, the Durkheimian commitment to the ethical vision of Charles Renouvier made them chary of extremes of sacrifice: Renouvier's theology is a kind of anthropology. It is centered rather in a doctrine of human "immortality, based on the belief in the value of human personality . . . on an energetic affirmation of personal liberty, mutual respect and liberty of faith."¹⁷ Hubert and Mauss essentially give expression to the same feeling of reverence for the sanctity of the individual couched in terms of the language of ritual sacrifice:

In any sacrifice there is an act of abnegation since the sacrificer deprives himself and gives. . . . But this abnegation and submission are not without their selfish aspect. The sacrificer gives up something of himself but does not give up himself. Prudently, he sets himself aside. This is because if he gives, it is partly to receive. Thus sacrifice shows itself in a dual light; it is a useful act and it is an obligation. Disinterestedness is mingled with self-interest.¹⁸

There is much more to be told about this story, but these at any rate are the sorts of leads for research one follows once one accepts that in various times and places social and cultural theories play within the same domain as do ideologies, value-systems, theologies, and such.

PERSISTENCE OF SACRIFICIAL RHETORIC

In conclusion, one might note that the logic of the academic and civic debates over sacrifice of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century seems to be replaying before our very eyes. Despite withering criticism by anthropologists like Luc de Heusch, for example, the work of Rene Girard remains a hardy perennial. I suggest that Girard is really doing a kind of theology by speaking about (civic) sacrifice by speaking with (ritual) sacrifice; he indicts civic sacrifice chiefly by reflecting them off his damning characterizations of ancient or primitive ritual sacrifice. Like many other theorists of sacrifice, Girard thus speaks about sacrifice by speaking with it. Hubert and Mauss's *Sacrifice* likewise plays the same classic rhetorical game with "sacrifice" these others have played, crossing back and forth between ritual and civic senses of the term in order to shore up positions in either domain as need arises. Girard's *Violence and the Sacred* or Burkert's *Homo Necans* indicate that we continue to mirror our concerns about public policy in subtle ways against what we believe about the nature of ritual sacrifice. Indeed, Girard's indictment of scapegoating, victimization, indeed of sacrifice as a whole, has made him such a favorite among Liberation theologians in Latin America who likewise employ the same moral and religious discourses on sacrifice so frowned upon by the structuralists. That such a discourse thrives moreover in the domain of the political and social, where it becomes a category around which people organize their lives, tells us that its hold is in the first-order lived religious domain, not in the senior common rooms of academe—although it flourishes there too. As long as people like Girard continue to talk about sacrifice in a way that is loaded with value implications, and as long as people continue to listen, students of religion will have more than enough to do.

NOTES

1. Ivan Strenski, *Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History* (London: Macmillan; Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987).
2. Ivan Strenski, "The Rise of Ritual and the Hegemony of Myth: Sylvain Levi, the Durkheimians, and Max Muller," in *Myth and Method*, ed. Laurie L. Patton and Wendy Doniger (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1996), 52–81.
3. Ivan Strenski, "Henri Hubert, Racial Science and Political Myth," in *Religion in Relation* (London: Macmillan; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), chap. 10.
4. Alfred Loisy, *Essai Historique sur le Sacrifice* (Paris: Nourry, 1920), 16.
5. Marcel Detienne, "Culinary Practices and the Spirit of Sacrifice," in *The Cuisine of Sacrifice*, ed. Marcel Detienne and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 20.
6. *Ibid.*, 20.
7. Jean-Louis Durand, "Greek Animals: Towards a Topology of Edible Bodies," in *The Cuisine of Sacrifice*, 89.
8. Frits Staal, *Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Victor Turner, "Sacrifice as Quintessential Process, Prophylaxis

or Abandonment?" *History of Religions* 16 (1977): 189–215. Note especially Turner's view of "sacrifice as a process within a process within a process" (201).

9. Detienne denies that sacrifice has anything at all to do with religion, although we may learn a good deal about ritualization from studying what has passed under the rubric of sacrifice.

10. Jacques Henry Dreyfus, "L'esprit de Sacrifice," sermon, 15 September 1890, Israelite Temple, Bruxelles, 4. See also Michael R. Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 111ff.

11. Marcel Fournier and Christine De Langle, "Autour du Sacrifice: Letters d'Emile Durkheim, J. G. Frazer, M. Mauss et E. B. Tylor," *Etudes Durkheimiennes/Durkheim Studies* 3 (1991): 2–9.

12. Hubert Bourgin, *De Jaures a Leon Blum* (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1938), 484.

13. Paul Sabatier, *France To-day*, trans. H. B. Binns (London: J. M. Dent, 1913), 191.

14. Albert Reville, *Prolegomenon to the History of Religions* (1881), trans. A. S. Squire (London: Williams & Norgate, 1884), 72, 79, 86.

15. Albert Reville, *Les Etapes d'un Intellectuel* (Paris: Stock, 1898), 13.

16. Jules Arboux, "Maistre (Marie-Joseph, Comte de)," *Encyclopedie des Sciences Religieuses*, vol. 8, ed. Frederic Lichtenberger (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1889), 575.

17. J. A. Gunn, *Modern French Philosophy* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1922), 300–301.

18. Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions*, trans. W. D. Halls (1899; reprint Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 100.

Possible World and Representation

RUTH RONEN

In our post-Kantian age we have been forced to give up on "the thing in itself." One can say that from a philosophical point of view, whether one believes language provides conceptual schemes or just a way to mark a rational consensus, knowledge-claims we venture to advance about things are claims that can neither be absolutely objective nor transcend the limits of what is conceivable and expressible. In a post-Kantian age there is therefore little point in asking anything about the nature of the object in and of itself; the object, insofar as it transcends the limits of conceptualization, has become irrelevant to philosophical discussion. Because the only possible way to come across an object is through ways it is conceptualized, philosophers are naturally led into discussions of ways of knowing the object and of modes of representing the object with language.

Yet, despite this unavoidable distancing of the object from the human mind, it will be misleading to claim that within philosophical discussions, the question of the object as is has been put within parentheses. Analytic philosophers' notion of "common sense" provides the official and efficient way of referring to that unknowable object that is still made present through our commonsensical world-pictures. That is, outside the relativist camp, whose position vis-à-vis the object, when strictly applied, verges on incoherence, the object and the question of how it puts constraints on representation are, even if indirectly, constantly addressed. It is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in the general question of whether the object in itself, if not knowable in itself, is still relevant to philosophical discussions, is taken into consideration or indirectly referred to in various philosophical contexts. I restrict my case to a very specific area where the relevance of the object that exceeds the limits of language (whether formal or natural) is marked. I refer here to the range of philosophical interpretations given to the notion of impossibility; these interpretations reflect a need to concretize the object of representation beyond what is demanded by language itself. The

aim is hence to show how the impossible object, or the object of impossible representation, requires more than a formal or abstract definition in order to be distinguished from possible objects.

To achieve this aim, I first concentrate on the concrete interpretation given to *possible worlds* (the kind of interpretation known as “modal realism”), the kind of understanding this concreteness of possible worlds has led to, and the reasons why this concreteness (or realism) of possible worlds has been criticized. The aim of the first part of this chapter is to show that a certain dissatisfaction with interpretations of possible worlds as linguistic or abstract constructs, a dissatisfaction to which modal realism is presumed to give an answer, indicates the relevance of an object, an object that exceeds the limits of language and representation, to our understanding of what possibility and impossibility are all about.

Within the framework of possible worlds, the most extravagant proposition is the one made by David Lewis. Lewis’s basic claim is that talk about alternative ways things might have gone for individuals in our world can be understood as talk about the counterparts of those individuals, that is, about individuals non-identical and equally real as things in our world. Other possible worlds are things like our own world—concrete objects or spatiotemporal spreads of concrete objects; and each is equally real, equally existent (Lewis, 1973:84ff). In what follows, I examine the arguments raised against, but mainly in support of, the modal realism of David Lewis. Specifically I refer to the question of whether, without the type of concreteness assigned by Lewis to possible worlds, possible worlds can still explain the modalities of possibility and impossibility. I first show, through the arguments raised in the context of debating the value of and reason behind modal realism, that without a concrete interpretation of possible worlds, impossibility cannot be distinguished from possibility. Moreover, I argue that such a concrete interpretation means that we specify the object concerned not as the effect of language and representation but as the thing that determines representation. In other words, in order to exclude impossibles from representation in a specific context, one has to specify the constraints impossible objects impose when given to the game of representation; otherwise impossibles cannot be excluded from representation.

Second, I claim that both possible and impossible worlds, formally described, refer to a contradiction, to the case of having p and $\sim p$ within the same world system. Thus contradiction as a logical relationship does not differentiate possibility from impossibility because it cannot separate contradictions that can exist in representation from those that do not. It is once a concrete interpretation is given to impossibility and to the relationship of contradiction that the set of possible worlds can be set apart from what is impossible.

Third, I show that concrete interpretations of contradictions may play a crucial role in representation. In this sense, contradiction, not as a formal condition (where it has no real existence) but as a concrete thing, does not mark the limits of representation, but, on the contrary, can be claimed to constitute its very possibility. It is, for example, by concretely thinking of Lincoln “not being a president” as the absence of his actual-world-presidency that we can represent this

state of affairs as a possibility. Representation, in other words, always includes some kind of contradiction at its very core, a fact that can be illustrated in scientific discourse no less than in modes of artistic expression, as will be shown later. It is only when they are put under concrete interpretations that impossibles (and contradictory situations) can become the object of representation.

POSSIBLE WORLDS AND MODALITY

The notion of possible worlds in philosophical logic emerges from a type of reasoning that can reveal the relations between impossibility and representation because possible worlds are supposed to represent possibilities. Missing that point, I claim, prevents us from understanding the conditions that decide which worlds represent what is possible.

The idea of possible worlds is destined to give modal propositions some specific semantic content; that is, possible worlds are claimed by their proponents to be ways of explaining modality. Modal talk, they claim, is talk that makes use of logical categories, and these can be semantically interpreted as referring to possible worlds. In other words, we can think of certain situations as true although they differ from the way things actually are. Thus, *necessity* means that a set of objects that exists or a state of affairs that obtains, in the actual world, exists or obtains also in all worlds different but possible relative to ours. *Possibility*, however, refers to a set of objects or a state of affairs that exists or obtains at least in one other world (other than the actual one). *Impossibility* refers to a set of objects or a state of affairs that does not/could not exist and does not/could not obtain in any world whatsoever.

Possible worlds, it is so claimed, give semantic content to modalities. In other words, if possible worlds are to be of any explanatory importance, they should account for possibles without recourse to modalities, a complicated demand, as one can already see, because once we adopt possible worlds to talk about certain nonactual things, modal categories and possible worlds become intensely intertwined. Yet, the demand for separation, and for using possible worlds to explain and not in place (and synonymously) of modalities, is a reasonable demand in view of claims to either the redundancy or metaphoricity of possible worlds.

Anyway, the question that engages philosophers who examine the potential explanatory force of possible worlds is whether, in order to explain modalities, possible worlds should be attributed a concrete existence, or whether they can be equally useful when interpreted as if they were hypothetical or abstract constructs. Whereas the view that possible worlds are hypothetical states of affairs is judged to be more commonsensical, the realism attributed to possible worlds by David Lewis is often described as illuminating yet extravagant, and even counterintuitive. At the same time, it is sometimes claimed that Lewis's modal realism should be defended for its being the only way for solving modal problems with possible worlds (see, for instance, Miller, 1989). Certainly, once possible worlds are viewed as no more than consistent sets of propositions describ-

ing a situation different in certain respects from the propositions describing the actual state of affairs, their potential explanatory value is, to say the least, limited. Possible worlds necessitate some degree of commitment to actual objects and states of affairs; they commit modal talk to something that goes beyond the logical structure and inferences drawn from propositions.

Thus despite a diversity of interpretations given to possible worlds, many agree that possible worlds should be taken to be actually existent objects or constructions of such, otherwise possible worlds will add nothing to what is already given in the modal categories themselves:

The various (modal) systems are not about anything, so that if we are to define the notion of validity for these systems, we need to interpret the systems, to construe them as languages about some set of objects in terms of which we can give sense to the concept of a true or false formula in the system. (Loux, 1979:29)

Yet, what does this commitment to a set of objects amount to if the objects that give sense or content to modal categories can be either hypothetical entities or real ones? Furthermore, the question is whether possible worlds, interpreted as abstract or concrete, can equally distinguish between possibility and impossibility. Although I do not intend to actually solve this problem but only expose its depth, it is curious to see that though it is obvious that in order to make sense of adding possible worlds to our conceptual arsenal these should be attributed a certain degree of concreteness so that they can serve as the entities to which modal talk refers, many philosophers of logic minimize this concreteness in a variety of ways. It is, in other words, rather doubtful that those who advance the idea of possible worlds actually commit themselves to the existence of such objects, as reflected in the fact that the contribution of possible worlds to explaining what modalities are about is recurrently questioned.¹

Interpretations of possible worlds as abstract or merely linguistic entities are varied. Those usually called "linguistic ersatzers" maintain that possible worlds are just maximal sets of sentences that offer descriptions that serve as alternatives to the proper description of the actual world (see Hymers, 1991:252). For others, possible worlds can be stipulated but only as abstract logical constructions (see Kripke, 1972:44). Some of the criticisms raised against abstract or linguistic interpretations of possible worlds refer to the fact that by refraining from the extravagance of actually believing that possible worlds exist, they fail to explain modalities (Bigelow & Pargetter, 1987:98). Because one of David Lewis's own arguments against ersatzers (Lewis, 1986:150ff) is that they use modal notions (like consistency) as a primitive (and hence do not explain these notions), one of the issues around Lewis's own modal realism is whether his type of realism can construct possible worlds while avoiding modal notions altogether. Again, rather than settling the issue, I just emphasize that the demand from the possible worlds framework is that it will be conducted on a level different from the logical one. Modalities and possible worlds should clearly be of different orders so that the latter will be able to account for the former without falling back on it.

POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

Whether possible worlds are given abstract or concrete interpretation carries some important implications for the clarity of the distinction between possibility and impossibility. When a possible world is given an "ersatz" kind of interpretation, it is defined as a linguistic construction, that is, as a consistent set of propositions (or as the content of these propositions, i.e., the states of affairs denoted); an impossible world is a set of propositions (or states of affairs) that includes a contradiction. Within the range of such interpretations, possible worlds in themselves just give a semantic vocabulary for delineating a range of states of affairs. Within the context of pure logic, such a general semantic outline suffices in order to determine possibility relations; abstractness matters little in logic where only a skeleton of a semantic theory is needed (Dummett, 1991:157).

Although it is doubtful whether the notion of possible worlds is needed for pure logical considerations (because, as we saw, they may add very little, if anything, to modal categories), once we attempt not only to determine not just the outline for a semantics of possibility but also to decide which specific worlds are possible under certain conditions, a more concrete interpretation of possible worlds is required.² These are the logical origins of possible worlds, and the gap between logical interests and more-specific considerations of representability that may account for the fact that the degree of realism attributed to possible worlds is continuously disputed. Another way to look at what determines the degree of realism attributed to possible worlds is not by measuring their distance from the logical rationale responsible for their original appearance in modal logic, but by correlating the realism involved to the type of philosophical problems one is interested in solving with possible worlds. In order to account, for instance, for the general rules of inference in counterfactual contexts, a less concrete interpretation of possible worlds is required than in order to account for the spatiotemporal relations between possible worlds and the actual world; likewise, the relations between counterfactuals and possibility require more concreteness of interpretation than is required for formalizing inference among possible worlds, the accessibility among which is symmetrical.

The fact that an abstract interpretation of possible worlds cannot explain modalities is manifested in the general nature of the restrictions imposed on delineating the range of possible worlds. In other words, my point is that although we can say that possible worlds serve as the object or referent of modal propositions, when these worlds are interpreted as abstract constructs they cannot impose specific restrictions on relative possibility.

Specifically, in view of my interest in impossible worlds, without a concrete interpretation of how a contradiction excludes impossible worlds from the range of possible ones, possible worlds remain useless in explaining the modality of impossibility. If possible worlds are just consistent sets of propositions or of states of affairs, what does this consistency amount to? According to possible worlds, semantics, a contradiction, or an inconsistency in a set of propositions, is something that cannot be represented; thus there are no impossible worlds

because inconsistent sets of sentences cannot describe a possible world (Miller, 1989:478). Yet, a certain kind of inconsistency is also what makes a world possible relative to another. That is, a world should be inconsistent with the actual world in at least one of its properties or entities, otherwise it would be identical with the actual world. But, it may be argued, possibility may be the result of an external inconsistency and is not determined by anything internal to a world. That is, a possible world can be inconsistent with the actual world, yet perfectly coherent internally.

Here we touch on another severe problem raised when possible worlds are being interpreted. When possible worlds are given an abstract interpretation, we cannot say if possibility is determined between a possible world and the actual world as an internal or an external relation. If the relation is external, then it is borne by some magical world in virtue of no intrinsic properties of either the magical world or the actual world. But if the intrinsic properties of these worlds are irrelevant to what possibilities they represent, then it seems that any world could do the job and that it is the role played by the world that is important, not the world itself (Hymers, 1991:254).

This is the reason why those who believe in ersatz worlds stumble over the question of possibility. If what makes a world possible is something external, beyond any specific features intrinsic to the actual or possible world, then any world can be considered possible. The ensuing logical difficulty is then that modality appears to be prior to possible worlds and cannot therefore be explained by these worlds. If possibility has to do with an intrinsic feature of worlds, all we have done is replace one mysterious concept—modality—with another mysterious concept—that of possibility as an intrinsic essence. That is, if possibility is determined by an intrinsic property of a world, we cannot say, in principle, what it is that guarantees the possibility of a world relative to another. A world can include an inconsistency and be perfectly possible in relation to the actual world. A world can include in its set of entities one that does not appear as part of the entities belonging to the set of the actual world, and this additional entity may carry properties that are intrinsically impossible (a perfectly consistent world can contain an entity that is a combination of a desk, a computer, and a television set—an entity that exists not in the actual world but is very likely to exist in a future state of it). Nothing in these intrinsic properties makes the entity concerned impossible relative to another world. If, however, possibility is determined extrinsically, we cannot say that an impossible world is one that contains a contradiction (a square circle, for instance); an impossible world thus has nothing intrinsic to it that makes it unrepresentable, and all worlds are equally possible.

To summarize the problem of impossibility in the context of abstract interpretations of possible worlds we can say the following: If an impossible world is one of which at least one property contradicts the actual world, the very same can be said about a possible world. What makes a world possible and not identical with another is that in this world $\sim p$ rather than p is true. To put it differently, if impossible worlds are worlds contradicting the actual world, the same can be said of possible worlds (if, in the actual world, Lincoln was the first president of the

United States, in a possible world a negation of this proposition can be true). In case impossible worlds are worlds that include an inner contradiction (both p and a negation of p are true), then impossibility is a wholly intrinsic matter and has nothing to do with its relation to the actual world, that is, with relative possibility. Thus, one may conclude that abstract interpretation of possible worlds say too little about how possible worlds can be distinguished from impossible ones.

MODAL REALISM AND CONCRETE WORLDS

Granted that abstract interpretation is insufficient in explaining the way impossibilities are excluded from the range of possibilities, the question is about what modal realism adds to the picture, and whether this addition radically changes our ability to explain impossibility with possible worlds.

In their thorough critique of Lewis's concrete realism, Bigelow and Pargetter claim that concrete realism recommends itself by saying that a nexus of properties that appears in a concrete world must be a consistent one. Yet, they claim, the representational role of concrete worlds cannot be shown to guarantee consistency. More than that is needed in order to decide whether my taller counterpart on Twin Earth inhabits a possible world or not. In other words concrete possible worlds have not succeeded to explain modality.

Bigelow and Pargetter's thesis offers a crucial point on the basis of which I can continue my argument. If Lewis's realism is not in itself sufficient in determining the states of affairs that can be represented as possible worlds, what are then the specific constraints that decide the range of possibilities,³ or in other words, what does it mean to interpret possibility in concrete terms? According to Quine (1992), possibility just refers to "the beliefs or working assumptions concerned parties do not exclude as false. . . . It is the domain of all our plans and conjectures, all our hopes and fears" (74). This liberal view of possibility, although concrete in some senses, does not tell us how possible worlds are positioned one in relation to the other and how they are distinguished from impossible ones. On the other hand, we saw how the formal logical notion of impossibility (as a set including a contradiction) does not provide enough semantic content and is hence no more than a general outline of the logical way (which is not necessarily the only way) for describing impossibility, and is in a sense a giving up on the attempt to explain the modality of impossibility. It is clear that a concrete realism toward possible worlds should provide specific semantic constraints that exceed the skeletal language of logic but also are not too permissive to give up on the distinction between possibility and impossibility altogether.

What is it that can allow us to consider a world that contains a perpetually moving machine or that contains creatures that feel human but are just brains in vats or that contains a Socrates who is a Chinese philosopher as impossible, yet consider worlds in which my height is different from my actual height as possible? Apparently, it is only when contradiction is considered in its logical abstract definition that we accept that, generally speaking, contradictions make worlds inconsistent and hence unrepresentable. In the practice of considering specific and

concrete examples, the question of whether a given inconsistency makes a contradiction is moot. I suggest to see the logical mode of interpreting inconsistencies as just one possible mode of interpreting the notion of contradiction. The logical account of contradiction, being skeletal and abstract in nature, cannot determine in specific cases which are to be considered contradictory in a way that excludes their representability. In the logical context, the general semantic outline that defines a contradiction identifies a contradiction in every case of opposition between a proposition and its negation. As was already noticed, in some contexts this rough definition cannot explain why in some contexts a positive term and its negation do not undermine representation. Without going at this point any further into the nature of logical contradiction, and in order to work out a direction for showing other ways of providing concrete interpretations of contradictions, the following is a discussion of three cases where contradiction plays a prominent role in organizing the representation. The question posed in each case is how a concrete interpretation of a contradiction can make the contradiction representable, that is, as something that can be staged as part of a possible world.

1. There is a well-known joke about a visitor to an art exhibition in Moscow standing in front of a picture that depicts Lenin's wife in bed with a young member of the party. The picture carries the title "Lenin in Warsaw." "But where is Lenin?" asks the perplexed visitor of the guide. "Lenin is in Warsaw," the guide answers with perfect composure.

In this case, the picture represents what is absent from the picture—Lenin, as indicated by the title. One can say that while the title indicates the presence of Lenin, the actual configuration represents his absence. Does this representation hence include an impossibility as part of its apparent content?

According to the interpretation given to the joke by the psychoanalytic critic Slavoj Žižek, Lenin is definitely the object of this picture. "The title names the object which is lacking in the field of what is depicted. . . . The mistake of the visitor is to establish the same distance between the picture and the title as between the sign and the denoted object, as if the title is speaking about the picture from a kind of 'objective distance,' and then to look for its positive correspondent in the picture."

Žižek's solution thus goes as follows: The title is continuous rather than distant from the picture itself. The title does not correspond to the picture, it is part of the picture (Žižek, 1989:36–37). The joke therefore works its effect because the title is not understood as a signifier that names, in a metalanguage, an object missing from the picture; the title is rather understood as a component in the representation itself; hence the title can work as an element that actually replaces the object, thus materializing the absence of Lenin from the picture.

2. In a picture by Rubens from around 1611, four very realistically drawn figures are shown whom we know to be Rubens himself, his brother and two other contemporary humanists. A bust of Seneca is positioned behind them, and some ruins of the Palatine hill in Rome can be seen at the background. The picture's title is "The Four Philosophers." If we venture to interpret what goes on in this picture, we can definitely agree that the fact that we know the identities of

the depicted figures to be what they are,⁴ that none of them is actually a philosopher points at a contradiction: The title says that these are philosophers, but the represented content of the picture itself says they are not. What happens, then, is something similar to the previous “Lenin” joke. In view of the title, we look at the four represented figures as if they were philosophers—that is, the title perceived as continuous with the picture itself, because being a philosopher is supposed to provide the missing link or to name the quality shared by these four figures sitting around a table engaged in what seems like some kind of an intellectual activity. Yet the quality that names what is shared by the four figures is in fact absent, and its absence does not just contradict the content of the picture, it disintegrates the whole composition (taking away, so to speak, the narrative coherence of the composition, the shared quality around which the relations of the four figures and the reason for their being depicted are defined).

In the case of the Rubens picture, what we see is that by merely interpreting contradiction as a formal relation between a present term and its negation, the whole function of the title vis-à-vis this picture is totally missed. The discrepancy between the depicted content of the picture and its title shows that, while we look for what is linking the figures, it is the title that, by referring to an absent quality, provides the necessary link. The spirit of philosophizing denoted by the title points, probably ironically, at the link between the figures precisely because the title names a lack. In other words, if the philosophical spirit can be represented, it is made representable through its absence, thus demonstrating that the representation of a philosophical quality in men is bound to fail.

3. In an interview with a Holocaust survivor who recounts her memories as an eyewitness of the Auschwitz uprising,⁵ the testifying woman remembers that during that uprising four chimneys went up in flames and exploded. This event was actually watched by the survivor. As it turns out, the content of this woman’s testimony contradicts historical facts gathered from other records and documents therefrom it is known that only one chimney blew up in Auschwitz. Does this invalidate the witness’s testimony? Is the contradiction between the world of the testifying person and the world of historical facts an indication that the world of the testifying subject is an impossible world?

The authors (Felman & Laub, 1992) bringing the woman’s words naturalizes the contradiction by saying that the woman was testifying not only to empirical facts but also to resistance, to the affirmation of survival, to the breakage of the frame of death, and these make the propositional content of her testimony as valid and informative as any assertion. In other words, the world of the testifying subject is as valid and telling as the world recorded by historians of the period. The two versions of the Auschwitz uprising are perfectly accessible (that is, possible one in relation to the other). Moreover, it is precisely the contradiction between the factual version and the testimonial version that constitutes, according to the authors, the nature of testimony as *representation*.

What is the interpretive operation chosen in these examples in order to make the apparent contradiction signify? Certainly, it is not the specific meaning attributed to a contradiction; that is, it is not by specifying the signification in which

a contradictory state or statement participates that one can explain how the contradiction becomes an object of representation. Rather, an interpretation of contradictions is involved only insofar as the interpretation provides the semantic conditions under which a contradiction can become an object of representation.

The procedure shared by the interpretative moves in the three examples described is that of interpreting the contradiction as a real opposition. That is, rather than interpret the one state of affairs as being the negation or as signifying the absence of the other state of affairs, the contradictory state is attributed a positive interpretation. For example, in the joke, it is not that the picture shows a state of affairs from which Lenin is absent; it shows a state of affairs in which something else is present. It is not that the Rubens picture shows four nonphilosophers, it shows (whether ironically or seriously) something else to be present in the scene—the idea of philosophizing. It is not that the eyewitness's testimony represents the absence of historical truth; it rather represents the truth of the human spirit.

Again, I do not suggest these remarks as specific interpretations. I just propose a way of illustrating what a concrete explanation of impossibility amounts to. In order to show why this concrete interpretation specifies just one strategy of making contradictions work in representation, it is worthwhile examining another case where the interpretation of contradictions specifies a wholly different set of semantic conditions that determine when a contradiction can become part of a possible world. In a manner similar to the three cases just analyzed, Hilary Putnam explains the idea of impossibility in science by examining the limits of possibility in relation to current scientific knowledge. Putnam claims that in order to understand what the modality of impossibility means in science, a concrete explanation of impossibility is required. By attributing metaphysical or abstract interpretations to impossibility, our understanding of this modality is not likely to be well served, claims Putnam in his critique of Kripke's notion of metaphysical necessity. Here is the full interpretation of Putnam concentrating on the question of what it means for water to turn out to be *not* H_2O (on Twin Earth or some other hypothetical yet possible world):

Why did I want to say that the conceivability of "water may turn out *not* to be H_2O " does *not* imply the *logical possibility* (Kripke's "metaphysical possibility") that water is not H_2O ? If water does turn out not to be H_2O , then of course it will have turned out to be *both* conceivable and possible that water is not H_2O . . . (the claim that it is necessary that water is H_2O is a *defeatable* claim, according to my theory, and discovering that water is not H_2O in the *actual* world is what it takes to defeat it). . . . If we decide that what is not substance-identical with the water in the actual world is not part of the denotation of the term "water," then that will require redescription of some possible situation when our knowledge of the fundamental characteristics of water . . . changes. When terms are used rigidly, logical possibility becomes dependent upon empirical facts. But I repeat, no "metaphysics" is presupposed by this beyond what is involved in speaking of "Physical necessity." (Putnam, 1990:61–62)

What this discussion indicates, as far as the present chapter is concerned, is that in the context of scientific discourse the notions of impossibility and possibility

are distinguishable by physical aspects that determine empirical facts. In other words, in the context of science, if we attempt to solve the meaning of impossibility in epistemic terms of conceivability, we will not get very far: Perpetual motion machines and water that is not H_2O are just as conceivable as their possible counterparts. If we say, however, that perpetual motion machines are logically (or metaphysically) impossible, we are not in any better position. Here although we can say that impossibilities are excluded from the realm of possibility, it is hard to say why this is so. As a logical concept, formal contradiction has no real existence. In order to say why certain states of affairs are regarded as impossible, a concrete condition has to be provided to account for this exclusion. In the context of science, concreteness is required so that the difference between possibility and impossibility can be decided. A perpetual motion machine is impossible not because no one can think about one or build one, but because physically, whether the relevant rules of physics are known to us or not, the existence of such an entity is impossible.

Thus, in scientific discourse, water being H_2O is possible whereas water being XYZ is impossible just because we choose to distinguish the two according to what we consider to be physical possibility. The two opposite versions for representing water are, however, equally possible if we interpret the opposition in terms of conceivability. Yet, within a physicalist world-picture, water as XYZ is impossible because it signifies the lack of a property we believe to be paradigmatic of water, its being H_2O . Under a different interpretation of chemical possibilities, we could, with equal justification, say that these are two worlds in which water is differently characterized. It is when we consider the concrete worlds represented that we can say that there is nothing that makes "water is XYZ" impossible: just its positioning at a negative pole to "water is H_2O ."

In representation, we can say that every possibility is a way to naturalize a contradiction if we decide to interpret a contradiction. Contradiction is obviously a formal logical matter, but in order to understand the nature of representation, we have to give a concrete interpretation to impossibility so that the idea of representing a contradiction will become sensible and distinguishable from the representation of possibilities. I suggest that the difference between possibility and impossibility is that between two modes of interpreting contradiction: Either contradiction is the relation between a positive term on the one hand and its negation on the other hand, or contradiction is interpreted as a real opposition between two positive terms and then contradictions become subjects to representation.

NOTES

1. This point is also open to dispute. Some, like Hymers (1991), claim that Lewis shares with the ersatzers the very same commitment to the existence of whatever entities our logic quantifies over; they just happen not to agree about what kinds of things worlds are (252).

2. "Suppose that there are replicas of our planet Earth—planets like Twin Earth, except that some of them are casually and spatiotemporally isolated from you. . . . So just

consider Twin Earth, which contains a being that shares a great many properties with you but also differs in various respects—for instance, in being a little taller than you are.

“Does such a replica of our Earth represent the possibility that you could have been taller than you are? Perhaps. But we will argue that certain conditions need to be met in order that a ‘world’ can represent a given possibility” (Bigelow & Pargetter, 1987); although the authors of this article take as an issue to show that Lewis also needs modalities to specify such conditions, it is clear that possible worlds as a skeletal semantics is far from explaining what specifically are representable possibilities, that is, possibilities that can be represented.

3. Miller (1989) claims that it is only with Lewis’s framework that impossibilities can be distinguished from possibilities and that more is achieved without the need for a modal primitive even arising. Lewis defines a world as the mereological sum of spatiotemporally related worldmates. It should be noted that Lewis’s notion of a world as spatiotemporally disconnected from other spacetimes has been subject to serious criticism (see Rosenberg, 1989).

4. The portrait of Rubens himself is easily identified; the rest have been successfully identified by art critics who generally agree that these identifications are correct.

5. The interview is recorded and analyzed in *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (1992:59ff).

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Postmodernism and Representation

HORACE LOCKWOOD FAIRLAMB

POST-METAPHYSICAL REPRESENTATION: THE LOST GROUND OF CRITIQUE?

One philosophical legacy that has proved especially vulnerable to postmodern skepticism is the representational model of knowledge, the view that true beliefs represent or correspond to reality. Once metaphysical essences and epistemological certainties are discredited, reality no longer offers foundational security. In its place, a variety of alternative views have become influential, including coherence and pragmatic theories of truth, social constructivist theories of reality, conventional theories of meaning, and cultural relativist theories of rationality. What unites each of these alternatives is the assumption that there is no uniquely proper foundation for knowledge and meaning to represent. Rather, knowledge and meaning can only be given contextually rational, pragmatically useful, and epistemically fallible justifications. When so emptied of ontological and epistemic privileges the representational notions of knowledge and meaning strike many as obsolete.

But the postmodern critique of foundations has proven ambiguous at best, and at worst self-contradictory. On the one hand, postmodern skeptics have dismissed foundational theory as impossible in principle, as well as too universalizing and imperialistic in intent. On the other hand, this view is itself negatively universalizing and therefore only seems to be assertible on the basis of a foundational theory strong enough to determine the conditions and limits of representation. No small quirk, this “performative contradiction” in postmodern anti-foundationalism infects many of its strongest and most interesting claims.

Yet, the postmodern view of foundations is not the only alternative to the traditional view. One can grant, for instance, that traditional and modern foundational theories erred in their notions of essences, self-evident principles, abstract

rationality, and myths of the given. But these errors may not imply the lack of epistemic foundations. Rather, the problem with these traditional epistemic ideals was the hope of a single ground of epistemic security, an ultimate epistemic warrant of justified, true beliefs. The problem of traditional and modern epistemology, in other words, was not foundations, but the ideal of reductive foundations. But in that case, postmodern skeptics may be right that no single ultimate foundation exists, yet wrong in concluding that there are no ultimate foundations at all.

In fact, alternative antireductive views of foundations began with the phenomenology and semiotics of C. S. Peirce. In semiotics, thought is a series of signs whose production is constrained by three types of factors: the formality of signs, the objectivity of its reference, and the history of the interpreter. Because each of these factors is necessary for the production of signs, knowledge, and meaning cannot reduce to a single ground as traditional epistemology had hoped. Yet foundations are not merely contingent either, but constitute the necessary conditions of production.

Significantly, these conditions of representation justify the critique of traditional epistemology. If the foundations of knowledge and meaning are multiple or heterological, each attempt to reduce knowledge and meaning would eventually discover the influence of some complicating constraint: All reductive models are destined to fail. But by denying all foundations, postmodern skepticism is equally destined to obscure its own foundational presuppositions under the aegis of doing only local critique.

Unaware of how foundational theory can be reconstructed without its traditional problems, postmodern theories have become too skeptical of critical grounds. In the examples of Derrida, Rorty, and Foucault, we see that representation is not rendered a purely local and contingent affair; and that too strong defenses of localism fall into the performative contradiction of making localism a covertly universal ideal. By contrast, Adorno's view of critique shows how the foundations of representation can be appealed to without involving the fallacies of metaphysical and epistemic reduction.

DERRIDA DECONSTRUCTING THE CENTER

The writer most responsible for promoting the respectability of postmodern theory and deconstructive practice is Jacques Derrida. Yet, while Derrida shows an exceptional degree of care and precision in his claims, his sympathy for Nietzschean play has led some to overestimate the role of contingency in his critical grounds. In fact, he appeals to an especially powerful, if subtle, version of foundational formality.

From Logocentric to Postmodern Linguistics

Derrida not only made deconstruction methodologically respectable but used it to discredit the entire tradition of Western metaphysics. From its origins

as a written tradition, Western philosophy cast language as the means to a conceptual truth beyond language. Pointing beyond itself, true language is supposed to yield a direct cognition of its referent, its signified: "The formal essence of the signified is presence [to the knower]" (*Of Grammatology*, 18). Of course, Saussure had already redirected linguistics away from reference, showing that signification is constructed by an internal system of semantic and syntactic differences, not by natural or direct references to the world. But deconstruction attacked even Saussure's reconstruction of proper meaning, convicting it of two mistaken presuppositions: that reference depends on presence and that the truth of writing is derivative from the truth of speech. Instead, deconstruction shows that the immediate grasp of the signified never happens, presence never appears but is always inferred or assumed. Signifieds, whatever is intended, are always possible meanings at best. By showing the liability of meaning to the interpretive uncertainties of language, deconstruction showed the indeterminacy of extra- or pre-linguistic truth, and metaphysics as the foundation of knowledge.

In retrospect, the imperfection of Logocentric closure is visible in its roots, but only now can we appreciate the impossibility of the traditional notion of scientific grounds. Rather than propose some new candidate for scientific linguistics, Derrida proposes grammatology, an inquiry into the workings of the sign, especially regarding the gap between signifier and signified.

An Epochal Genealogy of Writing

But while deconstruction discovers hermeneutic instability, its own possibility of infinite play rests on a hybrid of formal necessity and historical contingencies, a hybrid whose necessity is usually overshadowed by Derrida's attention to contingency. Given his resistance to science, Derrida stresses the historical aspect of deconstruction. But the deconstruction of Logocentrism is not a passive chronology of ideas. Its critical force depends equally on three things: The foundational operations of language, the landmark attempts to represent those foundations, and the historical trajectory of those attempts. Grammatology, in other words, is a kind of epochal, foundational genealogy. As a history, it reveals a scientific failure that is only visible across time. On the other hand, only by attention to foundations do we notice the inadequacy at all, let alone see that metaphysical inadequacy as systemic, noticeable "as such."

Not surprisingly, this inadequacy is as elusive as reference itself, less another object of science than a view of historical closure: "One must understand this incompetence of science which is also the incompetence of philosophy, the closure of the *episteme*" (*Of Grammatology*, 93). More concerned to critique bad science than posit new science, grammatology avoids representing the disclosure of epistemic foundations as another transcendental object. The history of truth is the history of a discursive authority, a promise of transcendence, whose only remaining truth is its failure of closure. Still, Derrida does not ignore foundational conditions, that is, "what constitutes our history and what produced transcendentality itself" (*Of Grammatology*, 23), conditions that are both historical

and systemic. Grammatology's insights plot a failure of past theoretical comprehension, but this critique requires that the General System allows the disclosure of a myth.

Semiotic Production

Derrida's refusal to identify the transcendental signified has misled some into thinking that grammatology is more negative than it is. Indeed, deconstruction depends on a new sort of foundational necessity, the necessity of the openness of meaning. True, deconstruction appears more critical than positive. But grammatology does not claim that language has no foundation. Rather, it claims that language has no identifiable foundation in the traditional terms of philosophy and science, that is, either in experience or as a conceptual abstraction from natural languages. To read a crude anti-foundationism into Derrida misleads several times over, obscuring the necessary conditions of meaning, effacing the conditions of Logocentric critique itself, and exaggerating the freedom of interpretation.

First, Derrida claims that there is a ground of language, although it does not appear as a presence or an object. Ultimately, the deconstruction of Logocentric linguistics reveals both speech and writing to be aspects of an "arche-writing," a possibility of inscription with its own "General System." As the condition of intelligibility, this arche-writing never appears and therefore cannot be posited as the object of science in the old sense. Just as a perceived object requires a background that is not in that object, so arche-writing is the background condition of all instances of speech and writing: "Arche-writing, movement of difference, irreducible arche-synthesis . . . cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field" (*Of Grammatology*, 60). Ironically, traditional epistemology mistook the foundations of knowledge for what is most representable (yielding self-evident truth). But the foundations of signification are unrepresentable just because they are foundations: "It is that very thing which cannot let itself be reduced to the form of a presence" (*Of Grammatology*, 57).

Yet this foundational dis-appearance does not reduce deconstruction to a play of pure contingency. The openness of language is not mere hazard but includes a rigorous economy of signification, whose absent systematicity is not without effects: "The value of the transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased" (*Of Grammatology*, 62). On the one hand, only by analytic "contortion and contention" do we attain "by deconstruction, [the] ultimate foundation" of signification (*Of Grammatology*, 60). On the other hand, these conditions are necessities for signification. Because the General System structures the manifest and unmanifest of experience with a rigorous economy, so can the thought of its "trace . . . no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it" (*Of Grammatology*, 61).

As Derrida notes, Peirce anticipated these insights in his semiotic model wherein subject and object are constituted from images of the world and inter-

pretive reflections on those images. For Peirce as for Derrida, there is no moment when cognition transcends its representations to an immediate grasping of some thing-in-itself. Cognition does not terminate in the security of presence because there is no termination outside the process of sign production: "The thing itself is a sign" (*Of Grammatology*, 49). Objectivity is merely an external constraint on an infinite production of signs, a constraint that always requires interpretation from within the field of signs. This infinite linkage of references is the very condition of semiosis, "the criterion that allows us to recognize that we are indeed dealing with a system of signs" (*Of Grammatology*, 49).

The Conditions of Hermeneutic Suspicion

But the infinitude of interpretation has often been overread, even if we assume that understanding meanings does not reduce to presence or essences. It is one thing to say that the ultimate foundations of meaning are unrepresentable in terms of presence, and another to say that there are no ultimate foundations. To the contrary, Derrida's claim that "the value of the transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased" implies that foundations can at least be pragmatically represented as causes of effects. For instance, that causal models are not pictures does mean that they do not represent. To abandon presence does not require abandoning either cognitive warrants or predictive power. Just as science is able to make predictions with oversimplified models of nature, so Derrida can predict that the critique of Logocentrism is endlessly warranted by the discovery of the openness of interpretation.

Some have taken Derrida's "closure of Logocentrism" thesis to imply the subversion of representation and foundational theory in general. But Derrida's critique only shows the impossibility of representation as presence. That this critique appeals to semiotics proves it to be not only compatible with foundational theory, but even dependent on the nonreductive, open-ended implications of semiosis. Indeed, only with such a foundational model can the possibility of presence be considered impossible in principle, and always already vulnerable to deconstruction.

RORTY'S ANTI-FOUNDATIONAL SKEPTICISM

Shortly after Derrida imported deconstruction to America, Richard Rorty coined an Anglo-American postmodernism. Yet Derrida and Rorty differed in more than their sources, including the implications they draw from the critique of tradition. Notwithstanding Derrida's epochal pronouncements, he (Derrida) is careful to note that we have only glimpsed the closure, not the end of Logocentrism, repeatedly claiming that "one does not leave the epoch whose closure one can outline" (*Of Grammatology*, 12). Where Rorty also glimpses the closure of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Popper, he would gladly step outside that tradition—and take us with him—to practice philosophy in an untraditional way.

Why is Rorty more sanguine than Derrida about making the postmodern turn? Rorty's more ambitious attitude results from three doubts about the repre-

sentational model of foundations. First, he believes that the philosophical tradition characteristically held that justified true belief depends on having true representations of the world. Second, Rorty believes that this epistemological legacy "has not paid off, is more trouble than is worth, has become an incubus" (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, xxxvii), and therefore should be discarded. And third, because the faulty foundational beliefs can be identified, we can move on to a revolutionary new conception and practice of philosophy.

But just because Rorty's vision of the end of philosophy is bolder than Derrida's, he is more liable to a number of characteristic problems of postmodern critique. In particular, Rorty hopes to critique an entire tradition without falling prey to the ambitions of that tradition. His radical pluralism is supposed to immunize him from the presumption he charges against strong foundational theories. But if we accept foundational pluralism, how can his critique of philosophy be sufficiently definitive to warrant putting that tradition aside? If his critique is definitive, must it not be true in a more than local way? As with other postmodernists, one finds a tension between his critical thrust and his pluralist stance, a tension that can only be avoided by taking a less radical view of the problems of traditional philosophy.

Beyond Truth and the Good

Even more than Derrida, Rorty turns to language to assess the possibility foundational theory. For Rorty, the Platonic legacy erred in mistaking its task for science, the search for the essential forms of Truth and Goodness. Defending critics of essentialism, Rorty concludes: "The history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the word 'true' or 'good,' supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area" (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, xiv). Nor is this merely a failure to progress in a difficult task. Rather, the very ideal of representational foundations is flawed: For "Philosophy, (as) the attempt to say 'how language relates to the world' by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, impossible" (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, xix).

The foundational ideal invited philosophy's notorious succession of claims to objectivity, rationality, and linguistic propriety. To say that language properly represents the world implies that there is an objectivity needing to be represented, a subject to which the object must be represented properly, or a linguistic form for that propriety. Whether the constraints of propriety are on the side of the object (classical realism) or the subject (Kantian idealism) is less important than the assumption that foundations have an ideal form. Rorty denies that there is an essential subject, object, or language to ground truth, asserting instead that the world gets carved up pragmatically according to the contingent needs of individuals and cultures. We should think of language neither "as a *tertium quid* between Subject and Object, nor as a medium in which we try to form pictures of reality, but as a part of the behavior of human beings" (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, xviii).

Once we abandon essential grounds in the object or subject, philosophy can provide no independent criterion of rationality but must adjust its concept of rationality to cultural conventions. Instead of projecting Truth into the world, Rorty suggests, we should acknowledge its constituted nature: "We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. The world is out there, but descriptions are not" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 4–5). Truth is a function of language, not the world. What epistemology repeatedly took to be the discovery of truth was in fact a constant reinventing of truth as a certain use of language.

Rather than reduce to essential objects, selves, or languages, truth depends on our beliefs as a contingent, evolving whole. From within that whole, of course, we can define linguistic propriety for our own purposes: Within the normative assumptions of any language, certain conventions (e.g., of the proper words, sentences, or facts) may be more or less useful as conventional grounds. But if truth is defined within languages, there is no independent ground for language to correspond to: "When the notion of 'description of the world' is moved from the level of criterion-governed sentences within language games to language games as wholes, games which we do not choose between by reference to criteria, the idea that the world decides which descriptions are true can no longer be given a clear sense" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 5).

Rorty challenges the concept of linguistic mediacy as well. Wary of essences, Rorty suspects that the notion of mediacy reifies subject and object into autonomous forms. Thus he denies that "the language we speak now . . . is somehow a unity, a third thing which stands in some determinate relation with two other unities—the self and reality." Of those assumptions he says: "Both . . . are natural enough, once we accept the idea that there are nonlinguistic things called 'meanings' which it is the task of language to express, as well as the idea that there are nonlinguistic things called 'facts' which it is the task of language to represent. Both ideas enshrine the notion of language as medium" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 13). To the contrary, he holds, if there are no independent forms of subject and object to be mediated, one errs to speak of mediacy.

But does the loss of essences mean the loss of mediacy? Even if, as Rorty says, essences seem natural to the idea of mediacy, they may not be necessary to it. We may give up the notion of essential objects and essential subjects and still conceive of language as a medium for interactions between the contingencies of consciousness, particular languages, and natural objects. Here Rorty gets the problem of essences and mediacy backwards. His blanket rejection of epistemology and mediacy only makes sense if epistemology and mediacy need essential objects or pure reason as foundational theorists had claimed. But as Peirce and Derrida noted, it is the mediacy of signs that explains the contingency of meaning. Mediacy does not imply essences, it denies essences. The semiotic triad of sign, object, and interpretant may sound like some neo-Platonic trinity of essential forms; but because each is a necessary condition for the others, the particular forms of each are contingent on the history of each. Semiotic mediacy requires the indeterminacy of meaning as a necessary condition of signs.

Rorty's Epistemic Agenda

In light of the failures of traditional epistemology, Rorty has concluded that foundational theory is impossible. Underestimating the problems of that conclusion, he assumes—like other postmodern theorists—that critique can be substantive without foundations. But his own arguments show the limits of that assumption.

The trouble starts when we ask: If truth is so relative, where does Rorty's critical authority come from? If there are no nonlocal criteria for historical progress, no "higher purposes" we should seek, no intrinsic realities to represent, this raises key questions about Rorty's own discourse: What is *his* criterion of truth? Why should we believe *him* if we don't already? These questions threaten a performative contradiction; like other postmodern critiques, Rorty's suffers a tension—if not a direct contradiction—between his call for local truth and his epochal critique of epistemology. In the spirit of localism, Rorty claims that "philosophical problems are as temporary as poetic problems, that there are no problems which bind the generations together into a single natural kind called 'humanity'" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 20). Yet he echoes postmodern skepticism by treating representation as a single object of critique. Why is representation not more than a local problem?

Nor can we disarm the epochal nature of representation by calling it an illusion. In a therapeutic spirit, Rorty suggests that we can dissolve the problem of representation by ignoring it: Once we see that it is "impossible," we ought to be exorcised of its lure. But what does it mean to say that epistemology is impossible? Is it only impossible today in America, or is its impossibility a part of the human condition? "Impossible" sounds curiously like what Kant also said about representing things-in-themselves, to which Hegel replied that one only knows a boundary when one knows what is on the other side. How can Rorty know what sort of foundational theory is impossible without knowing what sort of foundation theory is possible? Rorty's epochal claims seem to require—or even imply—a foundational authority of their own.

A central irony of postmodern theory is that it becomes more foundational the more aggressively it attacks foundations. Rorty's distinction between reality being out there but not the truth is not a local distinction; it defines the nature of representation. Skepticism about things-in-themselves did not prevent Kant from doing epistemology, and it does not prevent Rorty from doing it either. The difference between Kant saying (a) that the world is only conceivable in terms of pure reason and Rorty saying (b) that the world is conceivable in multiple forms of reason is not the difference between epistemology and local theory: These are simply two theories of representation.

Rorty's critique of tradition involves more than a residue of foundational theory. He urges, for instance, that we revise all questions about language and mind into "causal questions, as opposed to questions about adequacy of representation or expression" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 15). Far from repudiating epistemology, this injunction merely follows Hume by surrendering

ontology to skepticism about things-in-themselves while reducing science to causal explanations. But this does not avoid problems of representation. Hume noted that causes too are not immediate givens, in which case causal explanations require evidence of representational adequacy. Every prediction is a representation of the future that can be assessed as such. Furthermore, it is one thing to claim that the question of foundations is a pseudo-question—making the philosophical itch go away—and another to claim that there are no foundations or that epistemology is impossible. Rorty can only reject epistemology in principle by referring to the conditions of possible knowledge. The very force of his critique presupposes the better epistemology he repudiates.

Rorty's echoes of Humean epistemology would be less troubling if his references to causal explanations were a mere throwaway, a sop to cure the hunger for more-secure foundations. But Rorty promotes the causal model as if it functions as a foundation. Indeed, he appears to reduce all sciences to some single web of causation: "We need to see the constellations of causal forces which produced talk of DNA or of the Big Bang as of a piece with the causal forces which produced talk of 'secularization' or of 'late capitalism'" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 16–17). The centerpiece of that consolidation is the master Darwinian metaphor (privileged representation?) of a struggle for survival: Thus we ought to "see language as we now see evolution, as new forms of life constantly killing off old forms—not to accomplish a higher purpose, but blindly" (*Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 19). Less an advertisement for foundational pluralism, this argument sounds suspiciously like instructions on how to think about the big picture.

Representation without Essences

Just as Derrida has come to stand for the critique of Logocentrism, Rorty has come stand for the end of epistemology. Their resemblance reflects a shared distrust of representational security: Where Derrida denies representational presence, Rorty denies representational essences. But where Derrida's appeal to the General System acknowledges his indebtedness to the foundational conditions of critique, Rorty presumes only to refer to local authorities, an anti-foundational step that links Rorty to the central problems of postmodern critique. But this radicalism depends on a false dilemma that forces a choice between reductive foundations (knowledge as the mirror of essential nature) and culturally relative fictions (groundless inventions). The dilemma is false because foundations need not be reductive, as semiotics shows.

Because Rorty accepts that dilemma, he feels compelled to reject anything that threatens the contingency of language. Thus he explains that objectivity is really nothing more than intersubjectively held beliefs. But that explanation clearly runs afoul of his own distinction between reality being out there and the truth not being out there. When science appeals to causes by way of its contingent descriptions, what are referred to by those descriptions are not as contingent as the descriptions themselves. The survival of the fittest did not begin with Darwin, though the concept may have. Rorty's radicalism hopes to dissolve founda-

tions in contingency. But the contingency of truth does not discredit the necessary conditions of knowledge and meaning. If meaning is ambiguous and knowledge fallible, that is not because everything is contingent but because the conditions of knowledge and meaning render particular meanings and beliefs contingent in certain ways. In that case, however, we need to revise epistemology, not reject it.

Ironically, Rorty's arguments show that it is anti-foundational critique, not epistemology, that is impossible. One can stop doing epistemology without contradiction, but to argue against its possibility or to advocate causal explanation merely does epistemology in an unacknowledged form. Necessity and contingency do not turn out to be alternative views of foundations, but two aspects of heterological foundations. Likewise, to avoid Rorty's dilemma, we need only replace the metaphor of the mirror with that of the map. A map does not mirror a territory, but it can represent it more or less accurately for our purposes.

FOUCAULT'S POWERS OF DISCOURSE

Michel Foucault has proven a difficult figure to place in postmodern debates over foundations. He has produced detailed theoretical models of the structure and functions of discourse, suggesting that he does a kind of foundational theory. But he has directly challenged standard notions of theoretical foundations, especially in regard to objectivity, prediscursive constraints, and collective normativity. Not surprisingly, his influence on recent foundational debates has been inconsistent, if not confused. Some of that confusion can be explained by reference to his methodological intentions.

The Pragmatic Conditions of History

Where Derrida and Rorty attack the claims of metaphysics and epistemology to grounded representation, Foucault explores the possibility of a nonrepresentational historiography. From the nineteenth century onward, much of modern historiography reflects the influence of empiricism's ideal of evidence and fact, but Foucault refused to take the factuality of the historical object for granted. Rather, much of the early part of his career sought to expose how discourse constructs the authority of rationality through discursive practices.

In *The Order of Things* (*OT* hereafter), for instance, Foucault discovers an epistemological history embedded in the history of discourse. Analyzing historical periods, Foucault determined that there are "the laws of a certain code of knowledge" (*OT* ix), certain "epistemological figures," that define "an epistemological space specific to a particular period" (*OT*, xi). Whereas various disciplines have explicit methodologies for their immediately practical purposes, assumptions typical of a period determine deeper rules about how representation takes place at all (*OT*, xi). The history of nonformal knowledge, Foucault believes, has a system or series of systems (*OT*, x). Such systems constitute a "positive unconscious" of knowledge, a historical *a priori* that defines what can be known in that *episteme*, the period governed by those epistemological figures:

It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological. (*OT*, xi)

Archaeological inquiry discovers an epistemic substratum that constitutes what is known, a discursive formality that is both positive and unconscious.¹

The findings of archaeology challenge standard views of the meaning of history by severing the link between conscious life and the wider "motives" that traditional historiography was supposed to discover. If language, biology, and production are driven by structural forces rather than purposes, then the surface of life no longer expresses human meanings. Not only does human history no longer represent the aims of reason, it no longer represents. For Foucault, this discovery of deep structural determinacy constitutes an "absolutely essential displacement, which toppled the whole of Western thought: representation has lost the power to provide a foundation" (*OT*, 258).

Having discovered the historical displacement of representation in *The Order of Things*, Foucault sought to explore the nonrepresentational organization of discourse in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (*A* hereafter). There Foucault repudiates an orthodox assumption of his historian predecessors: The ideals of unity and continuity. If history reflects deep structural rather than human direction, it is no longer a narrative of purposes, a history for a subject. Conversely, the traditional search for history as unified, continuous narrative misleads by obscuring the directionlessness of history. Continuous history is a relic of anthropological and humanist philosophies, which put the spectator subject at the center of history. Instead, Foucault seeks "a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism" (*A*, 16), a method that questions the human being, consciousness, origin, and the subject. Instead of seeking an artificially unified and totalized perspective on history, archaeology uncovers the heterogeneous discursive material from which those fictions of unity have traditionally been fashioned.

The Constitution of Objects

Foucault's archaeologies do for historical coherence what Derrida and Rorty did for metaphysical and epistemological coherence: question the transcendental meaning of history. Where Derrida and Rorty expose the myths of presence and correspondence, Foucault challenges historiographical reduction to independent grounds, hoping to "free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence": "My aim was to analyse this history, in the discontinuity that no teleology would reduce in advance. . . . My aim was to cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism" (*A*, 203).

Of course, the most traditional ground of transcendence is objectivity. And Foucault does not deny that there is a question of the "real content" of our historical categories (*A*, 40), and he admits that a "history of the referent" is "no doubt possible" (*A*, 47). But Foucault challenges the assumption that the object of cognition is the primary datum of historical truth. His doubts about objectivi-

ty were confirmed by his work with marginal sciences where he discovered that the objects of psychopathology (for instance) were "very precarious, subject to change and, in some cases, to rapid disappearance" (A, 40). On closer inspection, psychiatric science appeared less determined by the pre-existent coherence of its "privileged objects" than by "the way in which [psychiatry] forms objects that are in fact highly dispersed" (A, 44).

Foucault's doubts about scientific objectivity cut across a variety of disciplinary boundaries. Everywhere, it seemed, one finds rules of representation that bring quite disparate objects together under some disciplinary authority. One finds repeatedly: "It is not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain that they form; it is not even their point of emergence or their mode of characterization; but the relation between the surfaces on which they appear, on which they can be delimited, on which they can be analyzed and specified" (A, 47). There is in representation itself a pragmatic logic that transcends the particular objects of any discipline. The discovery of these rules locates the primary ground of representation in the rules, not the objects. For archaeology, discourse is a transparent medium of pre-existing signifieds than a highlighting of "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak," practices that are "irreducible to the language and to speech" (A, 49).

Archaeology thus yields a kind of pragmatic nominalism: It sees discourse less as a medium than an empowering system of rules of object formation, the discursive ground that renders objects "manifest, nameable, and describable" (A, 41). This nominalism is positive because it enables the naming to happen. It is a nominalism because it does not assume the independent existence of the object, but assumes that the object as represented can only be constituted in the context of such rules of formation. These rules, that is, are the necessary conditions of objectivity:

One cannot speak of anything at any time. . . . The object does not await in limbo the order that will free it and enable it to become embodied in a visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itself, held back by some obstacle at the first edges of light. It exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations. . . . They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear . . . to be placed in a field of exteriority. (A, 44, 45)

Like nominalism in epistemology, archaeology brackets the independent existence of the historical object to focus on the enabling conditions of concept formation.

The Problem of Postfoundational Critique

Foucault's work has inspired ardent defenders and equally ardent critics. For instance, some theorists have challenged Foucault's bracketing of objectivity. But from one point of view, his bracketing of objectivity is easily defensible. After all, if skeptical scientists can interpret their physical models "instrumentally" rather than ontologically, why not historiographers? Even if we cannot

know objects-in-themselves, why not know the conditions of their appearance? Why not define the contexts in which institutions become possible and effective? Yet, even if we credit Foucault's "effective" history with new insights, it remains to be seen how critically authoritative those insights are.

In fact, it is on the implications of Foucault's bracketing of foundations that his followers encounter serious difficulties. Taking a page from Rorty, we might ask: Once transcendental objects and subjects are dismissed, can critique be anything more than descriptive, more than local? But if not, then how critical is it? Can Foucaultian critique transcend its normative localism?

Foucault's analyses do have critical force. For instance, he shows the inadequacy of the standard concepts of power—sovereignty and markets—by showing other forms of empowerment, especially regarding the normalization of the self. Though he does not say that these traditional theories are insignificant, he shows that they are narrow. Yet Foucault himself is liable to charges of narrowness precisely because he brackets causation, objectivity, and the self. By bracketing causation (*OT*, xii–xiii), for instance, Foucault discovers the discursive conditions of objectivity though he infamously obscures some of the conditions of social exploitation. Nor is he naive about these brackets on causation; he admits that at some point one wants to ask: "Why this enumeration rather than another?" (A, 43). Once such wider questions are asked, Foucault's methodological austerities would no longer be appropriate: We need to consider objective causes and subjective agency. Yet some of Foucault's followers appear defensive about placing him in contexts of other discursive paradigms, as if his authority were somehow immune to other critical standards.

For example, Paul Bove introduces Gilles Deleuze's Nietzschean reading of Foucault by comparing it to Charles Taylor's "analytic" reading of Foucault. Being an analytic philosopher, Taylor represents Foucault in the "incongruously alien style" of analytic philosophy; Taylor faults Foucault for not having a political "position"; Taylor accuses Foucault's statements of "not making sense" according to analytic philosophy's standards of rationality. Not being a genealogist, conversely, Taylor fails to explicate the institutional conditions of professional philosophy; and finally, by failing to identify his own presuppositions, Taylor falls prey to his own accusations that Foucault is trying "to stand nowhere." In short, Bove charges that Taylor assumed the perspective of analytic philosophy and did not produce a genealogy of his own position. But the thrust of this account is ambiguous: Is Bove's view of Taylor and Deleuze merely a description of two contrasting views of Foucault, or is Bove criticizing Taylor and approving of Deleuze? How much normativity, that is, does Bove imply?

At first we might think that Bove follows Foucault's avoidance of position-taking, offering only a contrast of perspectives. This seems implied, for instance, by Bove's admission that "[t]here is no point to debating Taylor's [analytic] 'reading' of Foucault," that is, because without foundations there is no privileged position for critique. In that case, Bove notes, to hold Taylor responsible to something besides Taylor's own analytic standards would be to accuse him "of not being Nietzsche or Foucault!"

Yet Bove does not rest with merely drawing attention to their differences. He announces: "One can easily see that Deleuze's is the best study of Foucault to date." But by what standards is Deleuze's reading "easily seen" as best? Presumably, by those of Nietzsche and Foucault. On this point, one suspects that Taylor and other analytic critics might disagree. If Bove is to take his own advice and practice the "sympathetic" reading for which he praises Deleuze, why would he not praise the virtues of Taylor's reading and refuse to take a position on whether his or Deleuze's is better?

Pluralist overtones aside, Bove's suggestion that we cannot expect Taylor to be Nietzsche or Foucault turns out to be more sarcastic than pluralistic. Taylor, it seems, suffers the "hermeneutic blindness" of one who does analytic philosophy rather than genealogies. Because Taylor does not analyze institutions, something is "being avoided." Because Taylor "refuses to engage" Foucault as a specific intellectual (which Taylor "recognizes" as challenging both his left-liberal assumptions and his position within the regime of truth), Taylor "erases" Foucault. In short, anything short of "a full reading of Foucault's work as an attempt genealogically to cast in relief the positivities of power/knowledge" must be an "aggressive defense" of analytic philosophy's regime of truth and one's place in it, however crippled by hermeneutic blindness.

But Bove evidently underestimates the degree of hermeneutic blindness that is required by the archaeological view of discourse. As Rorty readily acknowledges, once you have bracketed transcendental grounds, blindness—whether normative or epistemic—is in the eye of the beholder. When comparing methodological paradigms, each one will either seem narrow by the standards of the other or naively presumptuous by the standards of the other. This reduces most of the charges Bove levels against Taylor to normatively empty truisms. Taylor may not have accounted for his institutional preconditions; but no one else does either, given Foucault's historical *a priori*. If Foucault is right, some presuppositions always remain unconscious. So should we simply do as much genealogy as possible? But why privilege institutional history over Rorty's causal model? Historical preconditions are no more indispensable for critique than are those causal preconditions that Foucault willingly brackets for *his* purposes but that have something to do with the mechanisms of oppression. Foucault's brackets (on causation) do not account for their contents; rather, they merely indicate his unaccountability, begging the question of critical foundations. Foucault's omitting of objectivity is finally no less questionable than Taylor's assuming objectivity.

Bove relishes the irony that Taylor's failure to genealogize avoids positioning of a certain kind, but he seems oblivious to the irony of his own appeal to hermeneutic blindness. As Rorty has rightly insisted, hermeneutic blindness is not unique to analytic philosophy but is inherent to critical localism: If no critical paradigm is more foundational than any other, then there are no best and worst, but only more and less familiar. The most one can do is contrast normative visions—which is to say contrast normative blindness—not choose between them. All incompatible paradigms equally convict each other; all charges of

blindness are equally legitimate and equally untranscendent. Hence, the end of transparadigmatic critique.

By promoting local critique, the practitioners of archaeological and genealogical methods do not avoid the nominalist's favorite charge that no one can stand outside her own discourse. If anything, they intensify the problem, often without recognizing it as such. On the one hand, by bracketing transcendental grounds, Foucaultian localists invite the circularity of endless self-reference, though this risks trading transcendental narcissism for localistic narcissism. On the other hand, where Foucault's localism would seem to foster a pluralistic view of methods (as Rorty recommends), some Foucaultians practice a double standard: They deny having a position yet feel free to attribute naïveté or blindness to those who do criticism by unfoucaultian principles. Yet archaeological and genealogical standards do not convict other methods of anything but difference.

Some of Foucault's followers have mistaken his foundational austerity for a new methodological standard. But the authority of his assumptions is pragmatic, not normative. He assumes foundational skepticism; he does not justify it. And though useful for analyzing discursive conditions, his skeptical assumptions cannot, without circularity, be taken to imply that less-skeptical perspectives are necessarily naïve, presumptuous, or imperialistically totalizing. Conversely, by Foucault's own admission, a full analysis of power will finally require more foundational substance than Foucault himself chose to assume.

THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CRITIQUE

Postmodern critiques of traditional and modern philosophy have led to skepticism about the foundations of thought, leading some to deny the existence of such foundations. But semiotic theory explains the critique of traditional epistemology in terms of three sorts of constraints on representation, whose necessity blocks foundational reduction to any single, ultimate foundational principle. Likewise, semiotic theory predicts that critique must, if pushed far enough, discover the necessity of those conditions. These necessities explain both the strengths and limits of the critiques typical of Derrida, Rorty, Foucault, and their followers.

Derrida's case is quite straightforward. The very possibility of deconstruction depends on the economy of the General System, a systematicity that determines that the ultimate rules of representation are at once absent and necessary. Because they are absent, theories of signification that appeal to presence must fail. But they must fail only because the rules of the General System are necessary. Thus Derridean critique presupposes a formal necessity underlying the realm of appearances.

Rorty's critique of tradition is complicated by his having drawn anti-epistemological conclusions from past failures of epistemology. Rather than assume that reductive epistemologies can be critiqued by a nonreductive epistemology, Rorty concludes that there are no necessary foundations for meaning and knowledge, and that contingency explains the necessary failure of foundational theories. But as soon as Rorty claims that epistemology is impossible, and as soon as

he begins to suggest what should happen instead of foundational theory, he begins to invoke the rhetoric of natural and social causes, a rhetoric whose intelligibility exceeds the constructivism of discourse to something prediscursive. Thus Rorty reintroduces objective necessity without being able to account for it.

Having bracketed transcendental constraints in order to discover the pragmatic conditions of discourse, Foucault is thought by some to have wedded skepticism and critique in a way that avoids foundational problems. But this view often fails to distinguish Foucault's personal avoidance of transcendental analysis and collective normativity from the pragmatic value of his methods. And so his localism gets raised—contradictorily—into a new standard of methodological rigor. For instance, some have ignored the fact that Foucault's ideal of the specific intellectual expresses his personal desire to avoid prescription, which becomes self-contradictory when it is used as a normative generality. These problems arise because of a false choice between the general and the local, whereas semiotic foundations show the relevance of each.

ADORNO'S CRITICAL REPRESENTATIONS

Having noted these problems in postmodernism, anti-foundational skeptics may not be satisfied by suggestions that critique needs foundations after all. For foundational theory is often a far cry from the sort of contextual critiques that are of primary interest to postmodern critics. So even if foundational theory can be reconstructed, postmodernists are likely to be less interested in foundational generalities than in the details of contextual critique. After all, does not the contingency of contextual critique ignore the generalities of formal conditions for the specifics of particular contexts? But this view is shortsighted for the very reasons shown earlier: that even local critiques depend on their foundations. To dismiss this fact makes: 1) the factual error of suggesting that foundational necessity and contextual contingency are not linked, and 2) the prescriptive error of drawing attention away from one's most general assumptions. Yet these are the widest interests of critique.

Postmodern critiques have made indifference to foundational theory sufficiently current that many contemporary readers might wonder how general theory and contextual critique could possibly be reconciled. I suggest that an instructive (if imperfect) example can be found in the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno. Like other Western social critics in the shadow of Marx, Adorno's view of philosophy was fraught with foundational ambivalence, denying him complacency with either theory or practice alone. Adorno shared with Western Marxism the doubt that the future would arise spontaneously in the consciousness of the working class. It would not be enough, he feared, to want to change the world without a way of interpreting it. Still, Adorno was not complacent about philosophy's "defeatism of reason," its failure to resolve the Hegelian-Marxist challenge to find adequate foundational and critical leverage against the concreteness of existing social institutions. For Adorno's ideal of social critique,

neither the ahistorical abstractions of traditional philosophy nor an uncritical practice of politics would do.

As I have argued elsewhere, the Frankfurt Schoolers believed that social critique needed to be grounded in logic, in objective truth, and in the contingencies of history (Fairlamb, 1994). This departed from Idealism, which sought truths without histories, and crude historical materialism, which sought a utopia without normative foundations. Respecting the openness of history, Frankfurt Schoolers never expected *a priori* blueprint for freedom, though they presumed to identify obstacles to freedom in the form of instruments of domination. What could not be predetermined in a definitive, positive form could be approached by concrete, local negations. Together philosophy and social theory could critique domination through what Adorno called "negative dialectics."

Foundations without a Method

Because society is complex, its grounds are of several kinds, including cultural, economic, and political. This insight is the origin of Foucault's insistence that power is of many forms, which cannot be reduced to a privileged form of power. Given the heterogenous nature of society, social theory cannot have a single, ultimate method. Of course, the objects of philosophy are even more heterogenous, ranging from the purely formal to the historically particular. Furthermore, because society operates through the interaction of these domains, foundations are not authoritative in the abstract, but only in context where their precise historical effects can be determined. Philosophy and social theory may conceive their principles in abstract, but they have no critical force until applied. Likewise, Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* (*ND* hereafter) is not justified by its fidelity to methodological rules or to an *a priori* utopian blueprint for the free society; rather, it proceeds by criticizing past errors, being justified by the obstructions to freedom it discovers in its material.

But although the critique of domination can only occur in context, we can still define in general why traditional foundational theories are inadequate for social critique. According to traditional philosophy, science is supposed to discover the rule that is *represented* in all instances of its objects. But if there is no blueprint for a free society, no such utopian "rule" pre-exists the critique of domination. Indeed, normative critique works in just the opposite direction: Whereas past exercises in domination all appealed to normative ideals they were supposed to serve, progressive social critique shows where those ideals are imperfectly met.

In fact, the critique of conceptual limitation is not merely normative. Once we abandon epistemic foundations in essences, this form of conceptual critique applies to knowledge in general. This shortfall between concept and object explains why traditional epistemology was destined to fail, a point sought by deconstructors as well: "The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder" (*ND*, 5). Where essences are supposed to define identity, negative dialectics discovers the

Other within; where systems are supposed to be consistent, it discovers incoherence; in what is supposed to be unitary, it finds difference. This practice might be called "anti-system": "It attempts by means of logical consistency to substitute for the unity principle, and for the paramountcy of the supra-ordinated concept, the idea of what would be outside the sway of such unity" (*ND*, xx).

But where this failure of cognition to be essentially defined leads some post-moderns to doubt the groundedness of knowledge altogether, Adorno finds the possibility of critique in the dialectic of universal and particular grounds. It is not that knowledge has no foundations, but that knowledge moves between kinds of foundations. Here Adorno sharply disagrees with radical skepticism. Postmodern skeptics dismiss philosophy's traditional universalisms for the contingencies of local knowledge and norms, but Adorno stresses the critical importance of foundational constraints, epistemic wholes, and concrete particulars.

Indeed, for Adorno, radical skepticism and relativism are "reactionary" insofar as they jeopardize critique in principle. True, the failures of epistemology leave philosophy without the kind of security it had traditionally sought. But the implication of that failure is not endless contingency. To the contrary, Adorno finds the prospect of infinite play misleading and dangerous. It is a vapid freedom that boasts: "If you want me to, I'll make innumerable analyses . . . rendering each [claim to foundations] worthless" (*ND*, 35), as facile deconstructions sometimes imply. Thinking is not "bottomless," as it has become fashionable to say. Dialectics "is as strictly opposed to that [relativism] as to absolutism" (*ND*, 35). Ironically, postmodern skepticism would substitute its "localism" for the universality of theory, whereas Adorno recognizes that such a "flatly anti-intellectual posture must necessarily remain abstract" (*ND*, 36), exchanging a reduction to necessity for a reduction to contingency.

The problem with skeptical excess is twofold: It obscures the necessities that provide the ultimate grounds of critique, thereby exaggerating the degree of subjective play and postponing accountability to the parameters of freedom. Here philosophy resembles literary criticism, as Rorty notes, but not for lacking foundations. Though there is a deep contingency in the reading of texts, there are also constraints that demand rigor and precision as well. So too philosophical virtue amounts to "the consistency of its performance, the density of its texture" by which its analyses may hope "to hit the mark" (*ND*, 35). One may have philosophical richness, precision, and even accuracy without claiming final perfection or unshakable security of meaning.

Formal Necessity as Foundational Contradiction

Because of their pessimism about foundational theory, postmodern critics tend to ignore foundational contradictions when they arise. This has the unfortunate consequences of subverting the authority of their own critiques of traditional philosophy as well as distracting audiences from the contradictory implications of their own quasi-foundational arguments. By contrast, rather than dismiss foundational contradictions, Adorno highlights their endless necessity as the very

motive for negative dialectics and is thus able to account for them. This is especially obvious in the case of representation. Nominalists (such as Rorty) force the issue of representations by suggesting that either the mind is a mirror of nature or there is no correspondence between thought and thing. But Adorno recognizes that representation does not require a literal reflection of reality. Closer to Aristotle's notion of poetic universals, Adorno's notion of representation is a kind of modeling of nature that can be more or less accurate for different purposes.

Put this way, Adorno's notion of truth covers both philosophy and art. The complexity of experience poses the same challenge of representation to both: Each tries to tell the truth but each "tells it slant," as Emily Dickinson said. Philosophy, for instance, ought not illustrate concepts as such but rather show what happens to concepts as they fall short of their objects. On the one hand, such critiques show the limitations of concepts; on the other, they illuminate the nonidentical substance of concepts, their ways of differing from themselves. In a word, negative dialectics represents concepts as much in their nonbeing as in their being.

This representational contradiction reappears in Adorno's aesthetic theory: "Art is and is not being-for-itself" (*Aesthetic Theory*, 9). For most people, modern art is best known for being nonrepresentational. But in Adorno's view, it is just as important to note that the denial of representation can never be complete. On the one hand, art negates life by creating its own world; on the other hand, the meaning of art is only possible as a transformation of the reality it negates. The very attempt to deny representation is itself a flight from the fact of unfreedom, and therefore expresses it. The freedom of art can only be truly understood through its reflection of worldly unfreedom. Even the most "nonrepresentational" art reflects something of its context of origin, its conditions of production. Likewise for philosophy: "The freedom of philosophy is nothing but the capacity to lend a voice to its unfreedom" (*ND*, 18).

Where traditional metaphysics and epistemology reflected philosophy's desire to purify scientific representation, negative dialectics derives its motive from the endless imperfection of the concept. Where postmoderns fear the "totalizing" thrust of foundational theory, Adorno trusts the generalizing thrust to discover the contradictions that underlie reductive legitimations. This turns the tables on postmodern skepticism: Where postmoderns reject epistemology for failing to discover the formula of truth, Adorno rejects that view as itself too simplistic, denying that foundational theory must involve: (a) an essentialist theory of reality and/or (b) a theory of proper meaning. Instead, Adorno's view does not assume essential forms but suggests rather that these are merely necessary elements of experience between which a developing form of experience must emerge. While meanings are historical, their most abstract conditions are not—for example, meaning will be conditioned at once by subjective agency, objective resistance, and social conditions.

Representation, whether philosophical or aesthetic, is inherently flawed, perhaps even "tragic" in its inevitable failure. But paradoxically, it is just in imperfection that art succeeds best, both as a representation of life's imperfection

and as a critique of it. Just as scientific models need not be mirrors of nature to be useful, so aesthetic *mimesis* need only represent a "type" of situation and a "type" of solution to be meaningful or even progressive. Assuming that no representation is absolutely proper, Adorno's *mimesis* requires only that art represent some social blockage to a greater subjective freedom, or perhaps represent some possibility of freedom beyond a current form of blockage. Criticism need not be essential, proper, or final in order to show something substantially true.

RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUNDATIONS OF REPRESENTATION AND CRITIQUE

By the middle of the twentieth century, the Frankfurt School version of critical theory was already suspicious of Enlightenment universalism, admitting that "Enlightenment is totalitarian." Yet Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse all attempted projects in critical theory that reformed rather than rejected the subject-object based categories of traditional epistemology. Not until Habermas and postmodernism do we find a fundamental challenge to the basic terms of critical theory. But where Adorno critiqued foundational theory, and where Habermas would fundamentally reform it, postmoderns dismiss it as totalizing, universalizing, and imperialistic. Unfortunately, this dismissal of foundations means that postmodernism is both unable and unconcerned to assess the price of its suspicion of theory.

To be sure, the failure of traditional philosophy renders the prospect of foundational theory a daunting one. Yet there are two reasons for refusing anti-foundationalism. First, postmodern skepticism cannot cure our Enlightenment ills simply by resorting to localism, or even make sense of its radical claims in any but foundational terms. The more seriously we take the implications of postmodernism's critical assumptions, the less complacent we become about the inner contradiction between its universal negations and its promotion of localism, a contradiction that leads to either critical paralysis or localistic narcissism. But secondly, the postmodern critique of tradition does not require the counsel of despair. The Peircean legacy suggests that foundational theory is the strongest basis for critiquing tradition, and the Frankfurt School legacy suggests that a nonreductive view of social foundations best underwrites the critique of domination. We need not, nor ought we, to choose between the ideal of contextualized critique and the need to understand and justify our most basic presuppositions.

NOTE

1. Though unconventional, Foucault's project is not without precedents. Foucault discovered his own ancestors in Europe's Age of History, those who anticipated both contemporary structuralism and Foucault's archaeology. Near the end of the eighteenth century, scholars began to notice diachronic structures that underlay successions of changes in cultural practice that organized those changes in identifiable ways. As observers paid more attention to the functional and practical effects of underlying systems, they came to

appreciate the historical effectiveness of deep structures. Theories of grammar, natural history, and economic production all gravitated toward deep-structural models of historical connection and change.

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PART TWO



Aesthetics
and
Arts

Some Current Philosophical Theories of Pictorial Representation

DIETER PEETZ

I wish to retrace the familiar ground of E. H. Gombrich's illusion, delusion, or, as I prefer to call it, "realist" theory of pictorial representation and the theories it gives rise to by way of rebuttal. In particular, I wish to examine the aspect theory of representation, put forward my projection theory and conclude by contrasting the latter with another powerful projection theory of pictorial representation, that of Nicholas Wolterstorff in his *Works and Worlds of Art* (1980). This outstanding work, in its philosophical and logical rigor, its innovative power and imaginative sweep, promises to do for philosophical aesthetics in the 1980s what Gombrich's *Art and Illusion* (1960) did for everyone concerned with aesthetics and in our tradition for the 1960s and 1970s. Please note, by the way, that Gombrich's theory also incorporated projection.

Central to, and implicit in, my concerns is a distinction, not to be argued for and elaborated here, except *en passant* with a reference to Kant at the end, that, I think, needs to be made between ordinary pictorial representation, where there is no claim to aesthetic merit or properties, on the one hand and aesthetic representation on the other. This distinction appears to have been overlooked by all theorists of pictorial representation with the notable exceptions of Kant and, in our own day, Harold Osborne.¹

What is it for that particular canvas covered in configurations of oil paint by Constable, say, to be a pictorial representation of Wivenhoe Park? What is it more modestly for that configuration of colored lines and circles to represent the routes and stations of the London Underground? And even more modestly, what is it for that configuration of dots to represent, say, fields of magnetic force or even a triangle? Let us start with three possible accounts of pictorial representa-

tion, of which the first and third will be found to be polar extremes whereas the second will be found to be pretty close to the first:

(1) *Conventional Theory*: X is representation of Y, if by X, Y is understood.

X here functions as a code for Y. But straightaway we are in difficulties. As Wollheim suggests:

We could imagine a painting of a landscape, in which, say, the colours were reversed so that every object, tree, river, rocks was depicted in the complementary of its real color; or we could imagine . . . an even more radical reconstruction of the scene, in which it was first fragmented into various sections and these sections were then totally re-arranged without respect for the look of the landscape, according to a formula.²

It would no longer be a picture, but a puzzle! Wollheim's difficulties with the conventional theory are well illustrated, if we consider, for example, the dubious enterprise by the American space agency NASA in dispatching space rockets to planets beyond the moon. Such space vehicles carry pictorial diagrams, rather like those to be found on public lavatory doors within the European Economic Community, representing an adult male and an adult female, suitably, if somewhat schematically attired, in case such a craft happens in the path of an other-worldly, planetary, intelligent being. But such a one would be confronted by a puzzle rather than a picture. That being would have to crack the code. I suggest that the being would learn much more about us mundane beings from the space capsule than from such representations. A reasonable close variant to the conventional theory is one that we may describe as the intentional theory.

(2) *Intentional Theory*: X is a representation of Y, construed intentionally if jointly (a) as in (1), by X, Y is understood, and (b) X is of-a-Y or X is a Y-picture, where the hyphen(s) conjoin(s) an unbreakable, one-place predicate.

In this theory, representation becomes a kind of denotation and is fully extensional. A picture of Napoleon is a picture of the man who won the Battle of Austerlitz. This is Goodman's theory,³ which emphasizes the analogy between describing and depicting, as does Wolterstorff's to be discussed later. A description, like a picture, denotes an object through its sense, by giving it a character. A fictional painting, like a sentence with a fictitious subject-term, has sense but lacks denotation. According to Goodman, "X is a picture of-a-mermaid," for example, is to be understood as the joint assertion of two propositions: "X is a picture," and "X is of a mermaid." Because "of-a-mermaid" is an unbreakable, one-place predicate, it follows that we must learn to recognize mermaid-pictures independently of the way we learn to recognize mermaids. But Scruton⁴ rightly objects that we usually learn to recognize objects in pictures and the objects themselves dependently and not independently of each other, especially and *a fortiori*, where the objects are not, as unicorns are, fictitious beings. We might first come across a picture of a horse, and then we learn to recognize a real horse when we see one or vice versa.

A polar extreme to the conventional and intentional theories is the "realist" theory.

(3) "*Realist*" Theory: X is a representation of Y, if there is at least a partial subversion of belief by the spectator that he or she is seeing Y and not X.

This is Gombrich's theory,⁵ and I prefer to call it "realist" rather than an illusionist or (better) delusionist one. One does not do justice to Gombrich's theory if one compresses it into a one-sentence definition, which gives no hint of his epistemology and, in particular, his theory of projection. But this I will do at a later stage.

But, *pace* Gombrich, is it really the case that when we are looking at a picture in an art-gallery, say, helpfully illuminated by concealed lighting above, or by sunlight, that there is ever, however partial or minute, a subversion of our beliefs, in that we are in the least tempted to delude ourselves that we are confronted, say, by a real bottle of wine, venison and fruit, rather than a still-life painting of a bottle of wine, venison and fruit? It is obvious that in most cases of picture viewing, we are not so tempted.

However, in certain very abnormal conditions, we might be—as I sometimes am—partially tempted. To be somewhat lost in contemplation, say at dusk, when confronted by a self-portrait of Rembrandt, might be to cease to notice the frame of the picture, to concentrate on and be absorbed by the poignant facial expression, its mood, its quiet, almost placid stoical resignation, and perhaps to be so lost in its contemplation to forget momentarily that one is in the Kunsthistorische Museum in Vienna or the Scottish National Gallery in Edinburgh confronted by the person-in-the-picture and to delude oneself in this rather extraordinary way that one is confronted by the great master Rembrandt himself. This is akin to daydreaming; but in a standard setting of picture viewing, such delusion, although possible, could hardly enter into an account of what it is for a picture to represent Rembrandt. It is only in the cases of *trompe l'oeil* pictures, in which the artist sets out deliberately to mislead the spectator into deluding herself that she is confronted not with a picture of a violin but a real violin, that she is confronted not with a painted curtain obscuring part of the picture but a real curtain draped in front of the picture, that such a "realist" account can serve. Neither my example of self-deluding acquaintance with a reincarnation of Rembrandt, nor Gombrich's cases of *trompe l'oeil* art, which he elevates into paradigm cases, account for the truly standard cases of picture-viewing. When confronted by the representation of Isaac Newton on the back of a one-pound note, or by Queen Elizabeth II on the front, in neither case are we even marginally tempted to express our wonderment or awe at the first or patriotic loyalty or republican amusement in the second, as we might by encountering a reincarnation of Isaac Newton or the real Queen Elizabeth II.

Gombrich fails to distinguish, and quite consciously fails to distinguish, between seeing a real fork, say, and seeing a picture of a fork. In both cases we have something in our visual field to be perceived, in both cases there are objects that reflect and modify light rays that impinge on the retinas of our eyes. So far so good. But Gombrich is encouraged by these similarities into further but quite unwarranted assimilations between picture perceptions and object perceptions. This he does by his famous argument of the impossibility of "stalking an illusion":

Works of art are not mirrors, but they share with mirrors that elusive magic of transformation which is so hard to put into words. A master of introspection, Kenneth Clark, has recently described to us most vividly how even he was defeated when he attempted to "stalk" an illusion. Looking at a great Velázquez he wanted to observe what went on when the brush-strokes and dabs of pigment on the canvas transformed themselves into visions of transfigured reality as he stepped back. But try as he might, stepping forward or backward, he could never hold both visions at the same time, and therefore, the answer to his problem of how it was done always seemed to elude him.⁶

These considerations lead to Gombrich's illusionist theory. They are reinforced by Gombrich's use of Jastrow's famous duck/rabbit picture. We can see that configuration as representing either a duck or a rabbit, but not both at the same time. As Gombrich uses this item:

The shape on the paper resembles neither animal very closely and yet there is no doubt that the shape transforms itself in some subtle way when the duck's beak becomes the rabbit's ears and brings an otherwise neglected spot into prominence as the rabbit's mouth. I say "neglected," but does it enter into our experience at all, when we switch back to the reading "duck"? To answer this question we are compelled to look for what is "really there," to see the shape (configuration) apart from its interpretation (representation), and this, we soon discover, is not really possible.⁷

But in trying to "stalk an illusion," Kenneth Clark did manage, as anyone might, to see Velázquez's brush strokes, encrusted pigment, and the like, close up, to notice possibly the techniques he employed in laying on the paint, the indentation of brush strokes on pigment, and so on. The impossibility of "stalking" this illusion suggests the impossibility of seeing at one and the same time configurations represent, say, *Las Meninas*, "The Ladies in Waiting" at the court of Philip IV of Spain. But, of course, as has been pointed out most forcefully by several commentators, especially Wollheim,⁸ the impossibility of stalking Clark's illusion points to a dichotomy, if there is one, between configuration on the one hand and what is represented or representation, on the other. And here the duck/rabbit dichotomy cannot be pressed into service as Gombrich has done. For that dichotomy is between representation of duck or rabbit and not between configuration and representation. Wollheim goes on to observe that an artist painting a scene must surely be able to attend simultaneously both to the configurations of his paint on the canvas, employing all the necessary techniques at his disposal, and to the content of the picture, that is, the "looks" of the landscape before him that he is attempting to represent by these configurations. He would hardly be able to paint at all if it were not possible for him to attend to both configuration and representation at one and the same time. The illusion to be stalked dissolves into a simple and unproblematical case of bi-dimensional seeing.

Wollheim also considers an absolutely minimal example of representation: a black dot on a white canvas.⁹ This, with suitable shading, can be made to look as if it were actually behind the canvas, or level with it, or, as it really is, without shading, in front of it. Of course, it is only in the physical dimension (configuration) that the black paint is really on the white canvas. As a representation it might

be made to appear projecting in front of the canvas, level with it, or behind it. Let us take the last case mentioned, in which the black dot is made to appear with ingenious shading as if it were through a hole behind the canvas. We have both the physical, real relation (configurational) of black on white, which is visible if we examine the canvas closely, successfully attempt to scratch off the black paint, and so on. But in the pictorial dimension (representational) the black spot and, in particular, its relation of black behind white is not visible but merely appears so. In other words, part of what I see here, the black spot behind the white canvas, is a mere appearance of something that is not visible but illusory according to Hannay.¹⁰ He uses such considerations to rehabilitate Gombrich's illusionist "realist" theory. He asks us to consider two cases of resemblance, one symmetrical and one asymmetrical. Consider the case of a visit to Paris on which I view the Eiffel Tower. On my return, I am presented with a model of the Eiffel Tower in Paris. In this case, according to Hannay, a "noted resemblance between the model and the absent real Eiffel Tower in Paris" does not require the latter's appearance by proxy, or the model described or labeled, but merely the knowledge that a property or relation seen to be exemplified by the model resembles that exemplified, but not now seen to be exemplified, by the original, real Eiffel Tower. The resemblance relation in this case is clearly symmetrical. But compare this case with the more appropriate case for explicating pictorial resemblance, that is, the case of asymmetrical resemblance. Suppose a psychotic person (or Paul Klee) sees the Eiffel Tower's legs as threatening soldiers' legs. This is clearly asymmetrical because for someone prostrate on the ground viewing actual soldiers' threatening legs is not thereby to see them as the Eiffel Tower's legs. Hannay argues that "the correlate here of seeing X as Y is seeing Y in (or on) X." This shows that in seeing X as Y, what I see in X is Y, but Y must (as is not the case with symmetrical resemblance) figure somewhere in the description I give of what I see. But, because in this case I do not really see Y, this constitutes, according to Hannay, the sufficient condition of there being an illusion of Y.

Hannay is correct in claiming that asymmetrical resemblance is the appropriate relation for pictorial resemblance analogous to the psychotic person's perceptions, but he is totally mistaken in his conclusion that illusion (or delusion) must be involved. It is certainly true that I do not see Y, but Y-in-the-picture: but although this needs to be explicated, it is patently not a case in most instances, excluding *trompe l'oeil*, of illusion or delusion.

We need to clarify the difference involved between seeing real objects and seeing object-aspects in pictures, clouds, inkblots, or whatever. Here, following Wollheim,¹¹ Scruton,¹² and Wilkerson,¹³ we need to distinguish the two different kinds of seeing:

- A. *Ordinary, nonrepresentational seeing of objects.* Here, seeing an object X under the description Y (say ashtray) in standard circumstances entails that the spectator believes that the object X is Y, is an ashtray. The acquisition of beliefs such as this is nonvoluntary.
- B. *Representational or picture seeing.* Here, seeing a Y-aspect (say an elephant-aspect, a camel-aspect) in an object X (say a cloud or a picture) standardly entails not believing that X is a Y (the cloud is literally an elephant or a camel, the picture is literally an ele-

phant, a camel). Because belief is not involved, such aspect-seeing is voluntary. We can choose to see the cloud or inkblot with the roughly appropriate shape as, say, an elephant or a camel. This is certainly a decisive refutation of Gombrich and Hannay. Let us call it the "aspect" theory.

(4) *Aspect Theory*: X is a representation of Y, if standardly, X may be seen as containing a Y-aspect, without, however, any belief by the spectator that X is Y.

Although this theory points us in the right direction, I do not think that it is at all adequate as a theory of pictorial representation. It is far too vague and allows much too much latitude to the spectator's imagination. After all, pictures, unlike clouds or Rorschach inkblots, very severely delimit the spectator's roving imagination and constrain the spectator as to what he or she sees the representative features of the picture as. For most cases of representational art, we can ignore Wittgenstein's observation that sometimes the blurred photograph is just what we want. Even late Turners and late Cézannes still constrain us very severely as to what we see them as. So the theory is too bland and too broad. I wish now to produce a decisive problem case to illustrate this criticism; Escher's problematic lithographs apparently depicting impossible states of affairs.

There is a sense of "conceivable" in which to conceive of something is to think of it or imagine it. Now if a picture depicts or represents a given state of affairs, then that state of affairs is imaginable and therefore conceivable in that sense. Hume states that nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction,¹⁴ that is, everything that is conceivable, imaginable—therefore depictable—is possible. Now Escher's lithographs depicting impossible states of affairs appear to refute Hume's claim. One lithograph, for example, depicts water feeding a mill running simultaneously upwards and downwards; another, perhaps more potentially, depicts steps by which one, in ascending, also descends.¹⁵ How are we to resist such threats to Hume's claim? May I here relate an act of supererogation in defense of it? A very serious male philosophy postgraduate of my acquaintance suddenly renounced his long-standing attachment to a highly intelligent and beautiful economics postgraduate student of the opposite sex. "But why?" I asked incredulously. "Because she told me in bed that she could imagine a round square" was his reply.

To continue: Do Escher's lithographs really provide a refutation of Hume's claim by representing impossible states of affairs? I suggest that they do not. Escher's effects are obtained by the cunning use of two or more perspectives apparently unified or fused by the edges or outlines of some of the key objects depicted. In examining them closely, one becomes aware of the different perspectives that are made to masquerade as one perspective under which the objects depicted are seen. So on closer inspection it is clear that it is not at all the case that in ascending the steps, one is also descending. Ascending is depicted by virtue of perspective A, descending by virtue of the cunningly fused perspective B. Escher's lithographs no more depict, and *a fortiori* no more depict falsely (*pace* Wolterstorff in anticipation later), an impossible state of affairs than a Picasso painting of a female head in profile, but two-eyed, one eye above the other, depicts a real female head in profile. Studying in detail such an Escher lith-

ograph is analogous to conceiving the possibility that a valid theorem is invalidated. I can in such a case imagine the subscript QED being withdrawn. But this is trivial. What I cannot conceive without necessary absurdity are all the detailed logical consequences of such a supposition. *Reductio ad absurdum*.

Escher's lithographs do serve to remind us to ask whether the aspect theory is adequate as it stands, because it allows the incorporation of contradictory aspects even, so betraying its blandness and absurd catholicity. It needs to be refined. So far we have confined the discussion of theories of pictorial representation to the configuration/representation dichotomy. In no theory so far discussed has it been thought necessary to specify the conditions, so-to-speak, under which depiction is achieved. We are led in the aspect theory to concentrate on the picture's "looks" or "aspects" without reference to how such "looks" or "aspects" are brought about. For my solution of the Escher lithographs problem it was necessary to make reference to perspective. Now, perspective is surely at least an essential part of the mode of representation, or, more accurately, a mode of projection of representative aspects. Here I have a problem: When I look at a painting, is the perspective part of the configuration or is it part of the representation? It does not naturally appear to be part of the representation because it is precisely by the use of it that certain representative "looks" are obtained. Neither does it appear to be part of the configuration, because again it may be argued that the configuration's shapes are determined by it. Thus we cannot adequately consider any theory of representation by confining ourselves to the configuration/representation dichotomy. Somewhere the mode of representation or, better, the mode of projection of representative "looks" must feature in the account. Escher's lithographs force us in the future to employ the trichotomy of configuration, mode of projection/representation.

What is a mode of projection? We have suggested that perspective supplies one important example, or at least is an ingredient in a mode of projection. Here we might usefully consider Gombrich's account of projection:

The amount of information reaching us from the visible world is incalculably large and the artist's medium is inevitably restricted and granular. Even the most meticulous realist can accommodate only a limited number of marks on his panel and though he may try to smooth out the transition between his dabs of paint beyond the threshold of visibility in the end he will always have to rely on suggestion when it comes to representing the infinitely small.¹⁶

Again:

Whilst standing in front of a painting by Jan Van Eyck we fall under this very spell. We believe he succeeded in rendering the inexhaustible wealth of detail that belongs to the visible world. We have the impression that he painted every stitch of the golden damask, every hair of the angel's every fibre of wood. Yet clearly he could not have done that, however patiently he worked with a magnifying glass. Little though we may know about such effects they must be based on illusion I believe that this illusion, is assisted by what we might call the "etc. principle," the assumption we tend to make that to see a few members of a series is to see them all.¹⁷

Without adopting an illusion account of representation, we can reach some clues of what Gombrich means by his principle: A painting is always incomplete, and yet it can be made to provide sufficient clues to allow the beholder's imaginative powers to project what is not there and to complete the representation. There are two conditions according to Gombrich¹⁸:

1. The spectator must be left in no doubt about the way to close the gap;
2. he must be given a "screen," that is, an empty, ill-defined space on to which he can project the expected image.

We need to retranslate this from illusionist into aspect-theory terms. It is obvious that Gombrich's account of projections that applies to illusions can just as readily apply to aspects. No visual "aspect" is ever complete. An etc. principle is required for pictorial aspects as it is for Gombrich's more full-blooded "illusions." The aspects generated or projected by a configuration are incomplete, "gappy." In order for representation to be successful, the overall aspect must be projectible from the given, partial material generated by configuration. I now propose to exchange the aspect theory for my "projection" theory.

(5) *Projection Theory*: X is a representation of Y for X if standardly, without any belief by Z that X is Y, Z sees X as containing the projected Y-aspect, and the overall Y-aspect is successfully projected by their means.

In anticipation of our discussion of Wolterstorff, which comes next, I take the notion of projection in its customary sense and I believe that it needs no further explanation or analysis. Again, I think I need not further define or probe what I mean by "successful" projection. Successful projection I take to be primitive in the philosophical sense, just as Collingwood takes "expression" and, in particular, "complete expression" to be, quite literally, self-explanatory in the expression theory of art. Furthermore, the means employed by the artist in successfully projecting representational "looks" is a subject of moment for the art historian and art theorist, but is a contingent matter *per se*, raising no conceptual problems for the aesthetic philosopher.

Given my projection theory, we can now easily dispense with the offending Escher lithographs, whose contradictory aspects have only been confusedly and therefore unsuccessfully projected, if we examine them closely and then we shall see that the overall Y-aspect fails to be projected.

It would be outside the scope of this chapter to go into a detailed exposition of Wolterstorff's book. I give only such details as are required to make comprehensible my criticisms of how his theory deals with Escher's lithographs. Wolterstorff holds that pictorial representation is essentially the projection of a world.¹⁹ For him, representation is an activity. He makes a novel distinction between two kinds of actions: causally-generated actions and count-generated actions. The causal generation of actions is a relation holding between acts: If an agent *P* causally generates an act of *b*-ing by performing an act of *a*-ing, then *a* causes *b* (e.g., John's playing of the Brahms' sonata delights his old teacher). The count-generation of an action on the other hand is a relation holding between an

agent and a pair of actions. If an agent *P* count-generates act *b* by act *a*, then the act of *P*'s *a*-ing count-generates *P*'s *b*-ing (e.g., *P* uttering the sentence "would you close the door?" count-generates the action of this issuing a request to close the door). Furthermore, he distinguishes between representing existing and therefore quantifiable entities (rendering) and representing nonexistent entities (depicting/portraying). For example, Rembrandt used his model and mistress Hendrickje to portray Bathsheba. So Rembrandt's artistic action in rendering (*Q*-presenting) Hendrickje count-generated the action of portraying (*P*-representing) Bathsheba. Two quotations will serve to show how on his theory pictorial representation becomes almost identical with linguistic representation:

We in our culture are surrounded by examples of assertions being made by producing occurrences of pictorial designs. Consult any guide for the field identification of flora and fauna. Characteristically for each species the guide will contain both a paragraph describing properly formed members of the species. The design functions exactly like the paragraph. By producing it, or arranging to have it produced, the author asserts, say, that the common loon looks thus-and-so. Accordingly he can make a mistake with his pictorial design as well as with his paragraph.²⁰

What I have said about asserting something by producing a picture applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to issuing commands, to asking questions, to making promises. By producing a picture of a closed door I can command that my study door be closed or ask whether it is closed, or promise that it will be closed. Likewise, by producing a picture of a closed door I can invite others to take up a fictive stance towards the state of affairs of my study door's being closed. . . . The point is too obvious to labor: by producing a picture one can perform a mood-action.²¹

Wolterstorff controversially holds that propositions and their pictorial counterparts, designs, are identical and that *P*-representation is always *de dicto*. Now let us see what bearing all this has on Wolterstorff's treatment of the Escher lithograph problem:

Specifically, in picturing a man on a horse one introduces the state of affairs of there being a man on a horse. And likewise, in picturing a unicorn, one introduces the state of affairs of there being a unicorn. Unicorns have never existed. Nonetheless there is a state of affairs, or proposition that there is a unicorn—this proposition is false. And so at once we see how a *de dicto* theory of *P*-representation can handle, with ease, those special cases of "representations of what has never existed" in which "the thing represented is impossible of existing." Though there cannot be such buildings as Escher depicts, nonetheless, there is the proposition that there is a building of such-and-such impossible sort. It just happens to be a necessarily false proposition.²²

Wolterstorff's ease in handling such self-contradictory propositions is only a sham. For on his *de dicto* theory of *P*-representation, it must be possible to conceive of the inconceivable, and because propositions such as this are on all fours with their pictorial analogues, that is, designs or pictures, in his theory, then it must be possible to imagine or picture self-contradictory falsehoods. And so, that

poor postgraduate student should have continued to cherish his girlfriend, instead of giving her up.

In all that has been said concerning pictorial representation here, there is nothing that does not apply to the simplest, most boring diagram, the meanest sketch, the clumsiest photograph. And I am surprised that most accounts of representation, including Gombrich's, do not distinguish between aesthetic and non-aesthetic representation. As Kant rightly says when contrasting works of nature with representational works of art: "A natural beauty is a beautiful thing: artificial beauty is a *beautiful* representation of a thing."²³ Kant goes on to say: "Beautiful art shows its superiority over nature in that it can be described as beautiful, things that may in nature be ugly and displeasing."²⁴ So there is a need to separate and explicate aesthetic representation from nonaesthetic representation. This, together with the problem of artistic intention in defining pictorial representation, I hope to pursue in another study.²⁵

NOTES

1. H. Osborne, "Aesthetic Relevance," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 17, no. 4 (1977).
2. R. Wollheim, "On Drawing an Object," in ed. H. Osborne, *Aesthetics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), sec. 23, 139.
3. N. Goodman, *The Languages of Art* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), chap. 1.
4. R. Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1974), 193.
5. E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (London: Phaidon, 1960), especially the Introduction, parts 1 and 3.
6. *Ibid.*, 5.
7. *Ibid.*, 4–5.
8. Wollheim, 138–39.
9. *Ibid.*, 140–44.
10. A. Hannay, "Wollheim and Seeing Black on White," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 10, no. 2 (1970): 112–13.
11. R. Wollheim, "Art and Illusion," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 3, no. 1 (1963).
12. Scruton, chap. 8.
13. T. E. Wilkerson, "Art, Illusion and Aspects," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 18, no. 1 (1978).
14. D. Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, section 9. I am deeply grateful to my departmental colleague, Donald McQueen, for focusing my attention on Hume in this context.
15. Another departmental colleague, Terry Wilkerson, has argued in discussion that even Escher's "Ascending and Descending" steps case is not one of logical impossibility, but merely a matter of mundane physics. I strongly demur.
16. Gombrich, 182, 184.
17. *Ibid.*, 184. The painting by J. Van Eyck is *Music-Making Angels*; see illustrations no. 174 (p. 178) and no. 183 (p. 183).
18. *Ibid.*, 174.
19. N. Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), Preface, Introduction, parts 1, 3, 4, 6.

20. Ibid., 280.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 282–83.

23. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, para. 49.

24. Ibid.

25. I read an earlier version of this chapter as a paper with the title “Aesthetic Representation” to the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the British Society of Aesthetics in September 1983. This did contain the additional items stated.

A Causal Theory of Pictorial Representation

T. R. QUIGLEY

I

In a paper entitled "Two Theories of Representation" Jenefer Robinson raises the question whether Fregean and Kripkean theories of reference can be used to construct a theory of pictorial representation.¹ Robinson develops a descriptive theory out of Frege's notions of sense and reference, and a genetic or causal theory from Saul Kripke's account of reference of names and natural kind terms. She concludes that neither theory alone nor a pooling of the best features of both theories can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all kinds of pictorial representation. In particular, the combined theory fails to provide an adequate account of metaphor and misrepresentation. In what follows, I attempt to show how causal theories of linguistic representation forwarded by Dennis Stampe can offer further insight into those problems of pictorial representation raised originally by Robinson and left unsolved by subsequent analyses.

It is generally acknowledged that Goodman's *Languages of Art* provides a basis for all subsequent discussions on pictorial representation. So before looking at Robinson's attempt at filling in the details of his theory, let's review the general structure of Goodman's view as found in chapter 1 of *Languages of Art*.

II

An account of pictorial representation must address two general questions:

1. What, if anything, is represented by a given picture?
2. How is the putative object represented, which amounts on Goodman's view to asking what kind of representation it is. (This characterization will be modified somewhat in the second half of the chapter.)

The answer to the ontological question deals with certain classical problems of reference. In a frequently quoted passage, Goodman claims that "a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relationship of reference."² The arguments in support of his claim are well known:

- a. Resemblance is reflexive—representation irreflexive. Simply put, an object resembles itself more than any other thing, but one would not generally say that an object represents itself, at least not if it is part of the concept of a representation that it be in some way distinguishable from its object.
- b. Resemblance is symmetric—representation asymmetric. While it is not too much of a strain to admit that Napoleon resembles his portrait as much as the portrait resembles Napoleon, it would be wrong to say that Napoleon represents his portrait.³
- c. Finally there are countless examples of pairs of objects that are nearly identical in appearance, but neither object represents the other. One thinks of adjacent cars coming off an assembly line, or perhaps of identical twins, neither of which would be said to represent the other. The conclusion is that no degree of resemblance is going to be sufficient for representation.

Goodman in fact goes on to argue that resemblance is not necessary for representation either. Almost anything, he contends, can stand for anything else. "A picture that represents—like a passage that describes—an object refers to and, more particularly, denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance."⁴ Thus, denotation (which Goodman apparently takes to be a primitive, because he gives no analysis of the concept) forms the central notion around which an analysis of the relation between a picture and what is depicted is conducted in a way analogous to that of a predicate and what the predicate applies to.

But representation is not simply a matter of denotation or a case of mere reference. A representation may frequently present its object in a certain light, as being a certain way. This is what Goodman calls *representation-as* and what we shall see is akin to the Fregean *sense*, or in more contemporary terms, the content expressed by a representation. "Representation-as" plays a classificatory role in the Goodmanian scheme, determining how we refer to the representation as a type of representation. A picture of Napoleon in full battle array denotes Napoleon (the object of representation) and represents him as a soldier. It is, Goodman would claim, a type of picture falling under a large class of pictures referred to as soldier pictures. Similarly, a picture of Reagan as clown would be, *inter alia*, a clown-picture denoting Reagan.

Thus, a picture can perform both denotative and classificatory functions. The former serves to fix the object of representation, whereas the latter depicts the state of affairs with respect to the object, characterizing things as being a certain way with respect to the object.

This brief summary leaves open a number of questions concerning how pictures get the particular denotative and classificatory features they supposedly have, as well as questions concerning how one could determine that a picture has the features it has. It is at this stage that we may ask what theory of reference one

would need to capture both the denotative and classificatory aspects of pictorial representation. We begin by looking at Robinson's attempt to apply Frege's theory to pictorial representations.

III

Robinson divides Frege's view of referring expressions into two large categories: (a) singular terms, that is, proper names and definite descriptions, and (b) general terms or indefinite descriptions. A singular term has both a sense and a reference and refers to a thing by virtue of its sense. If the singular term has no extension, then it has a sense but no reference. About the Fregean sense, Robinson says that it "seems to be the set of properties 'expressed' by the name or description."⁵ Thus, the sense of a proper name such as "Aristotle" is the set of properties belonging to Aristotle, given expression in the term "Aristotle," and sufficient for uniquely referring to the individual named by the singular term in question.

The most obvious pictorial analog to the proper name is the portrait. Applying the Fregean theory to this type of picture, one gets the result that a portrait refers to the portrayed by means of its "pictorial sense," that is, the set of properties "expressed" by the picture. (It should be noted that the scare quotes appearing around the word "expressed" belong to Robinson. When discussing pictorial representation, "represented in" is used as a synonym for "expressed by.") Given this way of applying the Fregean theory of names, a picture of Aristotle functions very much like a proper name or definite description. Robinson, however, inserts the proviso that the properties represented in a picture will depend to some extent upon the symbol system in which the picture occurs. This, she claims, is analogous to the way sense varies according to what language the linguistic expression occurs in. Unfortunately, Robinson gives no examples of how the pictorial sense might vary from context to context. I suppose a plausible distinction might be between a realistic symbol system where conventions of depicting correspond closely to those of projective geometry and a religious iconographic symbol system where the means of depicting certain people or associations might rely more on an established set of relations or associations sanctioned by an independent set of religious beliefs and teachings.

The second general category of referring expressions, general terms and indefinite descriptions, brings together terms like "eagle" or "blonde-haired biped," terms that refer to whatever it is that satisfies the expression. The similarity between the functioning of words and pictures in the context of indefinite descriptions is brought out by Goodman's example of pictures used in reference books. The picture of an eagle that one finds with a dictionary definition of "eagle" refers not to some particular eagle but distributively to every eagle. Likewise, the descriptive illustration of a creature with light yellow hair and two legs refers to every creature satisfying the pictorial description. It should be remembered, however, that general terms and pictures, like singular terms, may refer to no thing and yet have a sense. A picture of a man with three heads, like

the expression "three-headed man," has a sense—that is, a set of properties "expressed" by the terms or the picture—but does not designate an existing thing.

Finally, two descriptions may have a single reference and multiple senses. "The Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" both refer to Venus, but each description is related to a different set of properties, each set constituting the difference in sense between the two terms. Robinson argues that pictures share this feature with linguistic expressions. Thus, two pictures of Venus may represent different properties, namely those associated with its appearing in the evening sky and those associated with its appearing in the morning sky. "In general, it seems that a picture which represents *a* as a *b* is a picture the represented properties of which are those of a *b* yet determine the reference of the picture to be *a*. For example, a picture of Venus as the Morning Star represents Venus via the represented properties of the morning Star. It attributes to Venus certain properties, such as 'appearing in the morning' which would not be attributed to her by a picture of Venus as the Evening Star."⁶

Having seen the range of situations that can be captured, one may ask whether the theory as outlined can account for all cases of pictorial representation. Robinson claims that it cannot and cites three major problems:

1. If pictorial sense determines reference, then it follows that a picture represents whatever the represented properties belong to. If a portrait of my grandfather looks just like your grandfather, then the portrait represents both grandfathers. The reason why we fail to get singularity of reference, on Robinson's modified Fregean account, is that pictures do not necessarily express the essential, or uniquely individuating, properties of the object represented. "It might, for example, be an essential property of Aristotle and part of the sense of the name 'Aristotle' that he was the most famous pupil of Plato. But being the most famous pupil of Plato is not a property that is easily picturable."⁷

Now a number of objections should be made in response to Robinson's criticisms here. First of all, on her reading of Frege, a sense is a set of properties represented in a picture. Her first objection takes the form of a conditional. If sense determines reference in the way outlined, then a picture represents whatever the represented properties belong to. As it stands, I would not object to the conditional. However, one cannot conclude so quickly that portraits are likely to be ambiguous. What Robinson leaves out of her objection is the important point that she made on the previous page, namely that the properties that may be taken to be represented depend on the symbol system in which the picture is used as a character. This is roughly equivalent to saying that the rules governing the interpretation of the pictorial statement have some bearing on the representational features of the work. This is an important point and one Frege urges with respect to language. And although it may be acknowledged that ambiguity can arise in portraiture, it is surely a problem that is not unique to pictorial representation. Consider "Kennedy's wife lived with Aristotle," a sentence used to express the fact that Jackie lived with Onassis. Frege held that even in such cases, sense does determine reference; that context (a) always determines sense, and (b) that even in sentences like the present example, the context determines the sense of "Aris-

totle" to be surnamed Onassis.⁸ Robinson, however, objects that a picture of an identical twin will represent both twins on a strictly Fregean view. Even if she were right about this, I don't see how the objection has any more bite than the objection that "Paul Smith" taken out of context may refer to more than one person. So even if the range of pictorial representations fails to match that of linguistic representations, the problem of singularity goes to the heart of any theory of reference. Looking at pictorial ambiguities only serves to distract one from this basic issue.

Robinson finds similar problems with the representational strength of general terms like "eagle" and their pictorial counterparts. Though she seems content with the linguistic term as a means of referring to any eagle whatsoever, the same feature found in pictures strikes her as problematic. Because "the essential properties of eagles are not easily picturable," she claims that the analogy with general terms breaks down. But, one wonders, what is there in a merely formal, linguistic sense to a term like "eagle" that makes it refer to any eagle? The expression of essential properties is, it seems to me, no more readily found lurking in a term with the form "eagle" than it is in a simple line drawing of an eagle. Surely if there is a problem unpacking the merely physical properties of a Fregean sense, it will apply *mutatis mutandis* to pictorial and linguistic expressions alike.

2. A Fregean theory of pictorial representation fails to account for representation-as. A picture that is purported to represent Churchill as a lion would be a picture with a set of properties belonging to lion and that refers to Churchill by virtue of those properties. Thus it has the sense constituted by leonine properties but refers to a man, not to a lion. Robinson claims that such a position cannot be sustained because a picture of a lion is not a correct pictorial description of Churchill. Likewise, a correct picture of Churchill cannot be a correct pictorial description of a lion. Thus, in the case of metaphorical pictures with contrary properties, sense fails to determine reference.

3. Another related problem is that it is not at all clear how one could misrepresent an object and yet succeed in referring to it. One may be tempted to say that a picture of the Parthenon with the wrong number of columns represents the Parthenon, even though some of the properties expressed in the picture are not those of the Parthenon. The picture is commonly said to misrepresent the Parthenon. A Fregean theory, Robinson claims, cannot account for the reference of such a false picture. A picture is a representation of its object precisely because it gives true information about it. Frege's theory thus rules out cases of reference due to inaccurate representations, as well as cases of accidental reference.

In summary, the Robinsonian version of Frege's theory of reference fails to satisfy the needs of a pictorial theory of representation. Its main defects are the following:

- a. It fails to account for the singularity of reference, that is, how it is a particular thing represented as opposed to some other thing sharing many of the same properties.
- b. Many important, if not essential, features of persons and things are describable but not picturable and, therefore, cannot be referred to by pictures.

- c. It fails to account for representation-as. If a picture represents an object by virtue of the fact that it expresses a set of properties belonging to one object and one object alone, the metaphorical representations with properties belonging to no one object end up referring to nothing.

IV

A modified Fregean approach to pictorial reference highlights a number of important features but falls short of providing a complete theory of pictorial representation. The remainder of Robinson's paper is devoted to exploring the possibility of adding Kripke's causal account to the classical theory of reference with a view to solving the problems left open in the previous analysis. This tack appears, *prima facie*, to have a good deal to offer.

First of all, we look briefly at Kripke's causal account of reference. Next, we see how it helps answer the singularity problem but fails to address the problem of representation-as. Given that Robinson has already rejected Frege's view of representation-as, we conclude, with her, that neither theory alone nor a combination of the two theories can provide the theory of representation that we seem to need. In the last section, I attempt to show how Stampe's theory succeeds where the previous theories have failed.

Once again we assume that pictures behave like singular or general terms. In the case of proper names, reference to a particular individual such as Aristotle succeeds if the appropriate causal connection obtains between a particular use of the term "Aristotle" and the individual so named. This causal chain is established at what Kripke calls a "baptismal ceremony," where an object or individual acquires the name that is to be associated with it and used to refer to it in the future. Thus, since Aristotle was given his name let's say at birth, the word "Aristotle" attaches to the individual and is used to refer to him by anyone who intends to do so. It is not necessary to know anything essential about the man so named, nor to be aware of the essential properties or sense of the name "Aristotle." One merely uses the name one has come to know via the historical chain formed by teachers, acquaintances, books, and the like. As long as one holds the belief that there exists a man named "Aristotle" and uses the name to refer to him, reference to the individual succeeds. For example, when my reference is to the Stagirite and not to Jackie's late husband, it is simply because I intended to single out the philosopher and not the shipping magnate. This intention is what hooks me up to the particular causal chain.

Applying the analogy of singular terms to pictorial reference, we look once again to portraiture. What makes the artist's portrait a picture of twin A and not twin B is just the causal link between the painter and twin A. The reference is determined historically by the fact that it was twin A who sat for the picture and not twin B, and that the artist intended the picture to be a portrait of twin A. In general, the singular term of a picture turns out to have both causal and intentional features.

What about general terms or indefinite descriptions? These are handled by analogy with Kripke's theory of natural kind terms. In this view, a paradigm case

is picked out and used to fix the reference of the general term. For example, when one uses the term "eagle," there is a definite class of creatures that gets singled out or referred to. A given speaker may not be able to provide a complete account of what differentiates eagles from other closely related species, but that knowledge is not essential to his using the general term to refer to such creatures as a group of natural kind. In a similar way, Goodman's picture of an eagle accompanied by a dictionary definition of "eagle" manages to refer, via a paradigm case, to every eagle rather than to one particular eagle. It is not necessary for this picture to be true of all and only eagles.

At this point one should begin to suspect that the Kripkean view, though not sufficient in itself, may prove adequate if combined with the Fregean, because the former provides us with a solution to the singularity question whereas the latter accounts, via sense, for the way in which the properties of a representation determine how a given picture represents its object. Thus, relieved of the onus of answering the singularity question, the Fregean sense may be put to good use in accounting for representation-as. Putting the two theories together, we get that if A represents B as a C, then A "expresses" the properties of a C—that is, has the sense of a C—but is caused in the relevant way by B in virtue of the fact that B served as a model or that it was the artist's intention to represent B. Putting off for the moment the usual problems of accounting for "relevancy" in causal stories, it appears that this description gives a more complete theory of pictorial representation. However, as Robinson shows, more careful scrutiny reveals that even our hybrid theory does not give sufficient conditions for representation. Robinson suggests two kinds of problems that remain. What follows is an embellishment of her counter-examples.

The first problem arises in the face of gross incompetence and deviant causal chains. Suppose a painter intends to paint a portrait of Margaret Thatcher and uses her as a model. During the execution of the portrait, something goes completely haywire in the artist and totally disrupts his hand to eye coordination with the result that the properties of the picture do not correspond in any way to the properties of Thatcher. Thus, the causal and intentional links are in place—the artist intends it to be a picture of Thatcher and uses her as his sitter, so the picture, on a strictly causal view, would be a portrait of Thatcher, even though there is nothing about the formal qualities of the picture that would allow one to reach such a conclusion. Our intuitions may lead us to say that it is not a picture of Thatcher, despite the causal link to her. Support for our intuition is provided (albeit rather incompletely) by Robinson: "For a picture to represent the (sitter), there must be a mapping from its pictorial properties to the represented properties of the (sitter)."⁹ Robinson, however, does not explain how, in general, such a mapping could occur nor what constraints need to be placed on it. So although we may agree that the Frege/Kripke model would fail to give satisfactory results in the present case, if we were to stay within the domain of classical theories, we would need a fuller explanation of the object to image mapping.

Secondly, Robinson argues that the Kripkean theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for representation-as. This objection turns on the notion that it

would be wrong to think that anything can represent almost anything else. In the Kripkean view, a straightforward picture of a lion that was intended by the artist to be an inspiring portrayal of Churchill and given an appropriate title would qualify as a picture of Churchill as a lion:

But this cannot be the whole story. The only reason we accept a picture of a lion as a picture that represents Churchill is that it is both meaningful and opposite to regard Churchill as a lion. A picture of a vase of flowers entitled Churchill on the Eve of the Normandy Invasion is likely to be merely puzzling unless we supply a context in which it might be appropriate to regard Churchill as, say, a vase of snapdragons as opposed to a vase of forget-me-nots. In other words, *what* is represented is not determined independently of *how* it is represented.¹⁰

And just where the Fregean theory should be brought to the rescue, Robinson argues that it reveals itself as inadequate to the task after all. In order to understand a metaphorical picture, we need to know what it is that makes the metaphor appropriate, which is to say, what properties Churchill and the lion have in common. But it is just that information that seems to come, if at all, from a source external to the picture. If the point is that Churchill is fierce and courageous, that has not been represented by the picture. What has been represented is a lion and perhaps a very odd lion at that. The picture may have a sense, but its referent is not the object supposedly aimed at, at least not within the present theoretical structure.

V

As a general rule, any account of pictorial representation must address two general questions:

1. The question of its object: What, if anything, is represented by a given picture (drawing, photograph, etc.)?
2. The question of its content: How is the putative object represented; what is it represented as, or what is represented as being true of it.

Stampe provides an explanation in terms of the causal connections needed for a thing to be the object of a representation, as well as the causal and counterfactual relations that determine the content of a representation.¹¹ The primary concern in the determination of what object a picture represents is the specification of an essential causal link between the actual properties of a pictorial representation and the existing properties of the represented object. Unlike the traditional Fregean account of reference wherein an expression essentially refers to whatever particular object instantiates the properties expressed, the present view insists that it is the fact that the properties of the object are causally related to the pictorial properties that forms the essence of the representing relation. Thus, the kind of relation we seek is between a set of properties (F) of the thing represented (O), and a set of properties (G) of the representation (R). It will normally be the case that the relevant causal relation preserves an isomorphism between O's

being F and R's being G.¹² For example, consider a portrait of your Grandpa Harold painted in honor of his eightieth birthday. The picture, we want to say, has the properties it has only because your grandfather has the properties he has. Your grandfather's physical properties cause the portrait to have the properties expressed therein. The nature of this hookup is expressed in the following way:

Ordinarily, if O's being F causes R to be G, R is G *only* because O is F, and R wouldn't be G were it not for the fact that O is F. Where this ordinary situation obtains, it will be possible to acquire knowledge of the thing represented from the representation of it. Specifically, it will be possible to tell, from the fact that R is G, that O is F (that is, to know *of* O that it is F). There being such a causal relation as this can be made to account for the central fact about representation—that is, that representations provide information about what they represent.¹³

By looking at the portrait of your grandfather, it will be possible, under certain conditions, to tell what he looks like, to know of him that he has certain properties.

Of course, it is not a necessary feature of a picture that it looks like what it is a picture of. But in the case of poorly executed (realistic) portraits, for example, it seems natural to say that if the portrait had been accurate (had it been well executed), it would have shown what the sitter looks like. Such an analysis applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to systematic distortions found in cubism, mannerism, and other stylized works as well, insofar as they are representations. The critical, underlying assumption here is that if the picture is a representation of something, there is a route, however circuitous, that one could conceivably trace from the features of the picture to the features of the object represented. This route or mapping is accounted for by means of the counterfactual covariance between the picture and its object. Furthermore, it should be allowed that, in the case of portraits that are not merely bad or distorted but, let's say, mad, there is no rational method of reconstructing the features of the sitter from those of the picture. If one were to explain why the particular configuration appears on the canvas, one would not be able to give this account in terms of the features of the sitter. There would be no essential causal relation of the kind specified here that would provide a mapping of properties from O to R and vice versa, and the picture would fail to represent the sitter. The picture is a representation of an object only when the two are related in the appropriate causal way.

Such is the case for the object of representation. What is it that constitutes the content of a representation, what the representation expresses? To know what a representation (R) expresses is to know what would be the case if certain conditions obtained. In a causal view, these are conditions having to do with the causal background of the representation. So, to know what R expresses is

to know what would be the case were certain conditions to govern the *production* of the representation. The conjecture is this: if certain conditions do characterize those processes, the production of the representation would be caused by that state of affairs that the representation represents as being the case. That is to say, it is exactly the fact that would

make the representation an accurate one, that would also cause the representation to be produced, provided that this particular set of conditions governs its production. If, however, those conditions do not obtain, then it is not to be produced.¹⁴

The conditions referred to are called "fidelity conditions" and are generally understood to be conditions that identify well-functioning or normal systems. A thermometer, for example, may be used to tell what the temperature is. Its function is to represent the temperature, and it will do this if it is in normal working order. Similarly, in a realistic portrait, the function of the painting is to represent the portrayed, to show what the sitter looks like. Our understanding of a particular kind of representation-generating system or mechanism (e.g., realistic portraiture, naturalistic landscape, etc.) determines the range of potential representations acknowledged as the appropriate output relative to a particular system or mechanism. This is central to understanding how to look at pictures and to our specification of the content of a picture, because content amounts to what would cause the representation under the relevant conditions of fidelity.

For example, if one encounters a picture that goes by the title "Portrait of Ronald Reagan," one would ordinarily expect it to have been produced by an artist who intended to show what Reagan looks like and intends that the picture be taken in that way. Sincerity and some level of competence are expected or presupposed by the viewer. That is, one assumes that those things that would make the picture an accurate picture of what Reagan looks like form a part of what brings the picture into existence. To know how to look at the picture, how to understand it, is to know what would be the case if these conditions obtained. Without such knowledge, it would not be possible to form an interpretation of the picture. It should be noted here that fidelity conditions might hold even for inaccurate representations. Fidelity conditions are those under which an interpretation of the representation would be reasonable to accept. They are conditions governing the production of the representation and are not to be identified with conditions governing the accuracy of the picture. So to specify the content, one forms the conditional hypothesis that if fidelity conditions hold, a thing's having the properties it does would cause the representation to have the properties it does. Altering the conditions for fidelity, however, would significantly alter the set of reasonable interpretations. If a shop assistant were taken off the job and used as a model for St. Eloy in the painting by Petrus Christus, then the religious and iconographical system of fifteenth-century Netherlandish painting would dictate which properties are to be understood as expressed by the work of art. Knowing how to look at such a picture is to understand the functional role that pictures of this kind play within a system of such representations. In this case, those things that would make the picture an accurate representation of St. Eloy are what play the relevant causal role in the production of the picture. If fidelity conditions obtain, it would be reasonable to accept "Eloy was a goldsmith" as true. In general, interpreting a picture amounts to forming a conditional hypothesis that if fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would cause R to be G.

We are now in a position to see what would constitute an inaccuracy or misrepresentation. First there is a true subjunctive conditional, namely, if fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would cause R to be G. But a correct interpretation will not necessarily reflect the actual causal explanation. All the interpretation provides is a hypothesis concerning what state of affairs would cause R if fidelity conditions hold. The representation is accurate if and only if that state of affairs obtains. It is not necessary that the state of affairs cause the production of the representation. "Representations may quite by chance or accident be accurate, as statements may merely chance to be true."¹⁵

Suppose I draw a picture of the Temple of Fortuna in Rome and operate within a realistic representational system, which means that as an artist I am (to put it roughly) depicting the way the Temple looks to a typical observer under relatively normal viewing conditions. Furthermore, assume that the Temple has thirteen columns. But my picture, which otherwise looks just like the Temple of Fortuna, represents it as having only twelve columns. Now you, as a viewer, have available the following true hypothesis: If fidelity conditions hold, then the Temple's having twelve columns would cause the picture to show twelve columns, and it would be reasonable to accept "The Temple of Fortuna has twelve columns" as true. But in this case, fidelity conditions have failed us. I have made a mistake, and as consequence we are left with a misrepresentation of the Temple. By way of contrast, suppose that under the influence of my superstitious beliefs I intended to represent only twelve columns but miscounted and accidentally gave the picture the correct number of columns. The picture then would correspond to the actual state of affairs but only by chance. Furthermore, the cause of the picture's expressing "The Temple of Fortuna has thirteen columns" would not be due to the Temple's having thirteen columns, at least not in any straightforward kind of way. Nonetheless, the picture would be accurate independent of the causes of its production. "Accuracy can only be that property a representation has if and only if the thing it represents has the properties that it represents it as having (that is, the properties it expresses)."¹⁶

So much, then, for accuracy. But what is it for a property to be expressed by a picture? The properties a representation expresses are the properties that would be instantiated by something that would cause the productions of that representation, provided that a certain set of conditions obtained. And recall that the conditions (fidelity conditions) referred to are not the conditions under which the representation would be accurate, but rather they are conditions governing the production of the representation. So to summarize:

- (A) Accuracy is a property R has if and only if the object of representation has the properties expressed in R.
- (E) Expressed Properties are those proprieties of an object that would cause the production of R under fidelity conditions (FC).
- (FC) Fidelity Conditions are conditions under which an interpretation (I) of the representation would be reasonable to accept, as being true. And for the form of an interpretation, we have said that (I) If fidelity conditions hold, then O's being F would cause R to be G.

What we have here is an account of how one can tell from the content of a representation what its object might be, in such a way that explains both representation and misrepresentation. Like the Fregean view, the content is seen to play a central role in the theory but, unlike the Fregean view, does not determine the object of representation. That would of course, be a fatal error in a causal account. The object of representation, if one exists, is a purely extensional matter, as we have seen. Recall that *R* has properties *G* only because *O* has properties *F*, and *R* would not be *G* if *O* were not *F*. The content, on the other hand, is due to a counterfactual relation between properties of a thing that would cause *R* to be *G* if fidelity conditions were in order. This, of course, allows for representations of objects that do not in fact exist and is consistent with both fictional and metaphorical representation. What remains to be done is to check the theory against the kinds of examples frequently encountered in the literature.

Let's start with an easy one. Suppose that *A* and *B* are identical twins. Twin *A* has his picture taken by twin *B*. The resulting picture is a picture of twin *A* because the physical properties of *A* cause the picture to have the properties it has. The picture looks the way it does only because *A* looks the way he does, and the picture would not look the way it does if it were not for the fact that *A* looks the way he does. If twin *A* is wearing a Cubs uniform at the time the picture is taken, the picture will express properties of *A* in conjunction with properties of a baseball player. Suppose that the photograph is a straightforward picture—a snapshot taken around home plate in Wrigley Field. Then relative to an interpretation determined by the functions of such pictures—photos on baseball cards indicating a player's affiliation—one concludes that it is a picture of twin *A* the professional baseball player, and it is reasonable to accept "*A* is playing for the Cubs this year" as true. If it is true of *A* that he is playing for the Cubs, then relative to the interpretation offered, the representation is an accurate one. However, if the situation had been different and the same photograph had been used in a news story reporting on the man who has been posing as Thad Bosley, the picture might represent *A* as the notorious impostor. The interpretation might be: If fidelity conditions obtain, *A*'s being the guilty party would cause the picture to have the properties it does. And if *A* is, in fact, the impostor, the picture is an accurate representation of that state of affairs.

What does the theory say about the picture of an eagle that accompanies a dictionary definition? What are the properties expressed by the picture and to what do they belong? In this case, it appears that there is no one thing *O* that is *F*, but rather a class of things, a kind of creature that one can roughly identify on the basis of a certain morphology. Application of the theory gives us that *R* is *G* only because (the species in question) *F* and *R* would not be *G* if *O* were not *F*. This case as well seems unproblematic, provided one is willing to admit a type or natural kind as the object of a representation.

Let's turn to a harder example suggested by Jenefer Robinson: a representation of Churchill as a lion. There are two important cases to consider, namely straightforward pictures of lions and pictures of odd-looking lions that smoke cigars and sit on the Front Bench of Commons. As far as the straightforward pic-

ture of a lion goes, it seems clear that, apart from any contributing context, the question whether or not it represents Churchill would not even arise. I think that squares with what one would want. It can't be the case that one can simply present any image willy-nilly and expect it to take on any arbitrary meaning or refer to any individual solely because one intends it to. However, in an appropriate context, the lion could conceivably be taken as a metaphorical representation of Churchill. For example, a lion might be pictured running in front of the troops toward the German border on the night following an inspiring speech by Churchill, indicating that Churchill is to be thought of as acting like a lion. And it is because he has acted thus that the expressed properties are leonine as opposed to bovine. A conceit might even take hold if artists repeatedly used the image of a lion in a visual context where one would ordinarily expect to see a picture of Churchill—for example, on the Front Bench of Commons. Fewer and fewer clues would be needed in subsequent illustrations for pictorial reference to succeed. Such examples are familiar in the history of iconography.¹⁷ What is essential to the present story is that there be some plausible explanation for Churchill's behavior causing the picture to express the properties it does. Churchill's speech tonight might have been sufficient to cause the staff artist to pull his favorite drawing of the raging lion out of his file and paste it up for tomorrow's editorial page.

In one interpretation of the latter case of a composite depiction, that is, the lion/man, we see that the picture is not intended simply to represent Churchill's physical appearance. That would be to miss the point. Much like the previous case, one wants to represent Churchill as fierce and courageous. In our causal theory, we don't have a problem of who is referred to by the picture. That gets handled in the usual way—by the rule for the representation of an actual object. A subset of Churchill's physical properties fixes the reference (it is only because Churchill looks the way he does that this lion has some of the features that it does), while the leonine properties determine (at least a part of) the content, namely the fierce and courageous aspect. Now this is not a trivial problem, this representing the properties of being fierce and courageous, even if one uses the King of Beasts to do it. Lions have a multitude of properties of which the sought after are only two. On the other hand, the problem is surely no more difficult than that of representing Churchill himself as fierce and courageous. The problem, in any case, is reduced to one of expression, not of reference.

Now the expressed properties are those that would be instantiated by something that would cause the productions of the representation under fidelity conditions. But the fidelity conditions are conditions under which a hypothesis about the cause of R would be reasonable to accept. I submit that Churchill's literally being part man/part lion is not among the reasonable options. So one looks for an interpretation that does seem reasonable. Suppose for the sake of argument that there is an established practice in the history of art of using lions to represent various psychological states such as courage, strength, leadership, and the like. On this basis, one may reasonably conclude that the representation is of Churchill as a man with such qualities. Of course, the picture may be ambiguous with respect to which particular qualities are represented. (I said it was no easy

task to represent psychological states pictorially.) If the depiction is of Churchill as a lion roaring, perhaps the field of reasonable interpretations may be more tightly constrained. Obviously, a lot more needs to be said about the problems of interpretation, but this would take us well beyond the scope of the present discussion. All we need for the moment is the assumption that reasonable interpretations could be found. As far as accuracy is concerned, it would of course be determined by whether the expressed properties were in fact qualities that Churchill possessed.

Finally, the problems of fictional reference can be handled by identifying the thing represented with whatever it is that explains the production of the representation.¹⁸ To be represented, an object need not actually exist. This is not to suggest that every nonexistent object can be represented:

It seems that non-existent can be represented so long as there is a correct specification of what is represented in which a reference to that object occurs within an intentional context, which context is created by an expression (such as "proposed" or "alleged") which identifies an actual occurrence which can appropriately enter into the projection of the representation. Thus we may have representations of the alleged assailant, the predicted eruption, the mythological unicorn.¹⁹

The identity of objects such as Don Quixote or Pan are fixed within an iconological or historical tradition that gives to these fictional objects certain determinate and distinguishing properties. These properties, when expressed, are properties that would cause the production of the representation under fidelity conditions. What is essential once again is that there be sufficient historical basis for the determinateness of the putative object. The interesting question here has to do with the conditions determining what kind of context one needs in order to establish a fictional character. Again, one might want to look at the historical conventions surrounding so-called "initial baptism" as discussed in Kripke.²⁰

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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NOTES

1. Jenefer Robinson, "Two Theories of Representation," *Erkenntnis* 12 (1978).
2. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976), 5.
3. I think the intuitions here are determined by the difference in the role causality plays with respect to resemblances and representations. At the risk of getting too far ahead of ourselves, let it be said just briefly that if R represents S, it is due roughly to R's being caused by S. Given that causes must precede their effects, it follows that representation is asymmetric. Note, however, that this is not the case for resemblance relations, which accounts for the intuition that the portrayed resembles his portrait as much as the portrait resembles the portrayed.

4. Ibid.
5. Robinson, 38.
6. Ibid., 39.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 46.
9. Ibid., 49.
10. "Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 2; reprinted in ed. P. French et al., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
11. Ibid., 85.
12. Ibid., 86.
13. Ibid., 88.
14. Ibid., 89.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).
18. See Stampe, Appendix to "Show and Tell," in *Forms of Representation*, ed. Bruce Freed et al. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1975).
19. Ibid.
20. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

Painting, Photography, and Representation

DONALD BROOK

The claim that photography is or might become an art has been resisted for generations on the ground that photographs are essentially mechanical products, whereas artistic representations in forms of which painting is the paradigm engage the essentially free and imaginative human creator.

Recently it has been argued that photographs are not even representations, and *a fortiori* that photography is not a representational art. This claim is so outrageous to common sense that we had better take it seriously. It seems to be founded on the contentions that representations are intentional objects; that ideal photographs are not intentional (in the required sense), and that they are therefore not representations. What sense of "intentional" can such an argument rely upon?

Roger Scruton has volunteered to clarify the point, in a paper called "Photography and Representation."¹ There are very good reasons to reject accounts of the kind he gives, and perhaps some consideration of them will lay a useful foundation for a different story about representation, in which the important philosophical business is not done entirely at the expense of common sense.

"The ideal *painting*" (emphasis added), Scruton writes,

stands in a certain intentional relation to a subject. In other words, if a painting represents a subject, it does not follow that the subject exists. . . . Furthermore, the painting stands in this intentional relation to its subject because of a representational act, the artist's act, and in characterizing the relation between a painting and its subject we are also describing the artist's intention. The successful realization of that interpretation lies in the creation of an appearance, an appearance which in some way leads the spectator to recognize the subject.²

By contrast, he tells us that the ideal photograph stands in a causal, and not an intentional, relation to its subject. "The photograph," he writes, "also yields

an appearance, but the appearance is not interesting as the realisation of an intention but rather as a record of how an actual object looked."³

Representational paintings, it seems, qualify as representations because "an appearance which in some way leads the spectator to recognize the subject" is "intentionally" achieved by the artist, whereas ideal photographs do not qualify as representations because this sort of appearance is causally generated through an optical, mechanical, and chemical process. "Intentionally," used in this way, seems to mean pretty much what we would mean by "deliberately" or "on purpose" in ordinary language. But this surely cannot—or cannot consistently—be what Scruton wishes us to understand, because in that case, photographs must also qualify: Photographers deliberately and purposefully manipulate their apparatus in such a way as to generate objects with appearances that in some way lead spectators to recognize their subjects. It was by no mere accident that Eisenstaedt's photograph of Bertrand Russell (1952) led informed spectators to recognize the distinguished philosopher as its subject, and uninformed spectators to recognize at least a man, if not a man with a skeptical expression. Scruton's suggestion sometimes appears. To be that, the "represented objects" (a phrase confusingly alternated with "subjects") in photographs cannot be intentional objects because there are no represented objects in ideal photographs—we see things, as it were, through them (like a window) rather than in them. But this contention would be blatantly circular and question-begging, because the main thrust of his argument is that the absence of represented objects in photographs is attributable to the fact that the "appearances" leading spectators to recognize subjects in photographs are not intentional.

One thing is clear: The historical Bertrand Russell (the portrait subject, as we ordinarily say) is not to be identified with the represented object in either a painted or in an ideal photographic portrait, because represented objects are never real objects, as portrait sitters are. They are entities with the curious status of "intentional inexistence"—a phrase attributed to Brentano—partly disowned by scare quotes and explained in the following way. The represented object in a painting of Russell, like the represented object in a painting of Pickwick, is not real but "intended" in, or by (or through, or with) the dabs of colored paint. The painting exists; the represented object that is "intended" in it enjoys "intentional inexistence." Ideal photographs do not have represented objects "intended" in them, as paintings do. Why not? We shall come back to this, but first we might ask what relation the represented object in a painted portrait bears to the subject of the portrait.

Some paintings, we are told, yield an "appearance" (which is to say that they manifest an "intentionally inexistent" represented object) that is true to a particular historical subject. Scruton does not explore this relation in detail, and we are left at a loss to know whether a painting containing a represented object that is "true to" the identical twin who was the *de facto* subject, will also be "true to" her sister. The appropriate criteria of truth, or correctness, are not spelled out. This aspect of the matter is conveniently displaced to some region of speculation outside representation: We are simply given a schema in which what might be

called “representational fact” and “representational fiction” are put on an equal footing. In both cases some artifact has a represented object “intended” in it, and these represented objects have precisely the same “inexistent” status, whether they happen to be (as in the Russell case) “true of” a real subject or (as in the Pickwick case) not “true of” any real subject.

Other ways of putting it might be to say that representation, in this assessment, is not relational, and in particular that representation is not an extensional, or a referential, relation between an artifact and some independent, autonomous subject or subjects. The model here is very obviously linguistic. Representations “intend” their own represented objects much as linguistic structures “intend” their own sense or meaning—as well as having a referential use, and perhaps even being true of subjects, in appropriate contexts. Dennett economically captures the gist of it, contrasting this usage of “intentional” with that invoked when we speak of “an intentional shove”:

For me, as for many recent authors, intentionality is primarily a feature of linguistic entities—idioms, context—and for my purposes here we can be satisfied that an idiom is intentional if substitution of code-signative terms do not preserve truth or if the “objects” of the idiom are not captured in the usual way by quantifiers.⁴

A central question then must be: Do pictorial and other nonverbal representations share with linguistic idioms the possession of something analogous to meaning or sense, independently of any referential use that might be made of them? On the face of it an affirmative answer to this question would not lead one to anticipate a difference between paintings and photographs such that (representational) paintings have intentional objects whereas photographs (we cannot say “representational photographs”) do not. If we pursue the analogy with language, we do not think that, whereas our own naturally uttered words or sentences are intentional (that is to say, roughly, they have sense or meaning), the words and sentences trumped up by machines are not intentional (i.e., roughly, they are gibberish). We are already familiar with scanning machines, analogous to Scruton’s ideal camera, that do not translate their input light into a photograph but, instead, print out such phrases as “that is a square” when a square subject is presented. The intentionality of machine-talk is a consequence of the intentionality of language itself. Nothing turns on whether the input is processed by glass or by organic tissue; nothing turns on whether the output is uniquely determined by the interaction of the input with processor’s wiring and program or whether—as it may be with human perceivers—there is some degree of freedom or voluntariness exercised at points along the causal chain.

It is obvious—although it is not easy to demonstrate by succinct quotation—that positions like Scruton’s impose a condition on the intentionality of pictorial representations that is not imposed on the intentionality of linguistic idioms. Roughly, it is the condition that perceiving and acting are implicated in the generation of (intentional) pictorial representations, as contrasted with the mere sensing and behaving of the machines used to make photographs. Represented

objects, it seems, are “intended” in or by the dabs of color in a painting not only in the sense in which meanings or denotations are “intended” by language, but also in the sense that somebody must actually intend an object, such as a painting, to be a representation of something-or-other. The key word in inverted commas here is *not* the (orthographically similar) word that is italicized. We had better distinguish the homonyms with a subscript. Let us rule that “intentional” equals “intentional in the manner of language (“inten[s]ional” is a usage that might introduce new confusions); and “intentional”_v equals “intentional in the sense of voluntary action—something achieved neither by accident nor by a purely causal process, but only deliberately or purposively.”

Now the difficulty about the proposal that representations are both intentional_L and intentional_v is that representations, like all other artifacts, can only be intentionally_v generated if they have themselves been in some way represented in the course of the generative act. Putting the point very crudely: We cannot be said to have made an X voluntarily, deliberately, purposefully (etc.), unless we had available to us some sort of representation of X-as-possible to guide our voluntary intervention in the world that has resulted in the production of X-as-actual. Either, in some plausible sense, we “knew what we were making at the time” (in which case we made it) or we did not (in which case it merely happened).

If our account of representation requires an intentional_v origin for all representations, then the representation that guides our intentional_v making of anything whatsoever must itself have been guided in the making by a yet further antecedent representation, and so on *ad infinitum*. No criterion of representation can afford to be genetic in this way on pain of reduction to absurdity by infinite regress. The ultimate representations of what we are making, that guide our actions when we make it, must somehow be formally or consequentially understood. At any rate they cannot be understood in a regressively genetic way.

The most familiar of current stories is of the formal sort, in which representations are necessarily intentional_L, and only accidentally, if at all, intentional_v. This story (in Goodman’s version) explicitly rejects the consequential criterion that representations are objects having a certain effect—namely, the effect that they are indiscriminable from (i.e., they resemble) their subjects. The position is succinctly put in one sentence of Goodman’s: “Denotation is the core of representation, and it is independent of resemblance.”⁵

One thing that must be said in favor of this position is that it allows photographs to qualify as representations, and hence, not impossibly, as works of representational art. Against it, one might remark that the denotative function of an inscription (or the representational function of dabs of colored paint) must relate somehow or other to the *de facto* ability of users to understand by seeing (hearing, etc.) what is denoted, or represented, in or by an inscription or a painting—and to do so coherently and consistently enough for effective communication. In ordinary language, the meaning of a mark cannot be entirely independent of what people are able, in practice, to mean by it, or to take it to mean. But the domain of meaning is a notorious mine field. Let us persist with “representation” and ask

once again why we should not define the word extensionally, in such a way that (for example) the historical Bertrand Russell becomes a member (not impossibly the only actual member) of the class of objects each of which is represented by an adequate portrait painting or photograph.

There are two very obvious objections to this. One of them is deeply implicit in Scruton's readiness to countenance the "intentional inexistence" of the objects of representations: namely, that this egregious ontological embarrassment is a price payable for the convenience of treating fact and fiction evenhandedly in terms of representation. A picture representing the real, historical Bertrand Russell is one thing; a picture representing Samuel Pickwick is quite another. What is the object (or objects) to which a Pickwick-picture stands in the relation of its (or their) representation? We cannot reject Scruton's solution to this difficulty, however distasteful it may be, without facing squarely up to it ourselves.

The second major objection to a relational account of representation that relies foundationally upon an alleged resemblance between representations and their objects takes the form of a skeptical rejection of any "natural" standard or criterion of resemblance between things in general and between pictures and their subjects in particular. In the case of pictures, it is said that they are two-dimensional by definition, that their real subjects are three-dimensional in practice, and that it must be a more or less arbitrary or conventional matter to decide what will count as looking alike, among things that are known not to be alike. The most radical expression of this sort of skepticism is to say that anything "resembles" any other thing, via the appropriate code. A more gradual and historically modulated view is of the kind put by Marx Wartofsky: "My thesis is that human vision is a cultural artifact, created and transformed by the historical practice of representation in art."⁶

The skeptical position as it has just been outlined is vulnerable to several objections. For example, although it is true that ordinary pictures usually represent three-dimensional things, they sometimes represent things that are as flat as themselves. What should we say of the limiting case, in which a picture of a picture (or of some other flat thing) is so made that the subject lies exactly on the picture-plane of the presentation, and is precisely the same color and size? Well, cases of this sort might be ruled out by fiat. The skeptic might make it a strict matter of definition that whatever is to count as a picture must differ from its subject, in every respect in which it is to qualify. If a putative picture does not differ in a certain respect (suppose that the proportions of the painting represented on the back wall of a Vermeer picture are precisely the same as the proportions of the represented painting) then the Vermeer is not, in that respect, a picture of its subject but, let us say, a match.

Is this a tolerable rule? It would certainly embarrass the moderate skeptic whose position is founded upon the contention that all apparent resemblances between pictures and their subjects must be to some degree conventional (or in some way artificial) because pictures are in fact unlike their subjects. The conversion of this "fact" from a contingent truth (attributed to the 2-D-3-D distinction) into a necessary truth (derived from the definition of "picture") robs of all

its interest the claim that fancied resemblances between pictures and their subjects are never founded on fact. The interesting position becomes that of the radical skeptic who says, in effect, that however "picture" may be defined—whether matches are or are not permissible in them—the relation of resemblance between a representation and its subject is always artificial.

MATCHING

On the face of it this claim of artificial relation is preposterous. Surely the concept of matching is founded upon the idea of absolute or natural resemblances between things. Don't we, explicitly or implicitly, define "match" in terms of perceptual indiscriminability? Are not matching colors, or lengths, or angles, colors or lengths or angles between which we cannot discriminate? When we say that two things resemble each other in some respect, are we not saying that we are unable to discriminate between them in that respect?

Very likely we are saying just that, the radical skeptic may agree, and if so, then we must be extremely confused. Our inability to discriminate between two things in a certain respect (he may continue) does not establish that these things are naturally or absolutely indistinguishable in that (or any other) respect. They may well be quite different. And if we amend our claim from the subjective "We are unable" to an objective form ("When we say that two things resemble each other in some respect, are we not saying that it is impossible to discriminate between them?"), we beg the question. For what would guarantee the impossibility of discriminating between two things in a certain respect? Only the indistinguishability of these things in this respect would guarantee it, and that cannot be assumed.

The radical skeptic seems to have the better of us. Unless we already know that two things are indistinguishable in some respect, we cannot be sure that their fancied indiscriminability is a genuine indiscriminability.⁷ Every fancied resemblance might be as spurious as the fancied resemblance between green balls and brown balls is in the judgment of a color-blind snooker player. But the claim that we lack a basis of certainty when trying to distinguish between genuine, objective cases of indiscriminability (i.e., examples of real, or natural, resemblance) and merely "subjective" or "fancied" cases (i.e., examples of conventional or artificial or coded resemblance) falls far short of proof, that no cases of real, or natural, resemblance are ever encountered. And what would be required for proof is unlikely to be forthcoming from even the most radical of skeptics. Roughly, it would be a persuasive argument either deriving from or entailing the proposition that whatever is not certainly the case is certainly not the case.

A theory of representation founded on resemblance is therefore not ruled out by the arguments of those skeptics who say that representational resemblance cannot be foundational to a representation practice because resemblance itself is always insecure, being more or less mutable, conventional, or, at an extreme limit, quite arbitrary. It is still an available position to maintain, consistently with common sense and ordinary language, that, for example, half of a divided color chip

is an excellent object to use as a representation of the color of the other half of the same chip, because of the resemblance between the two halves in this respect. This, we might well insist, is a paradigm case of matching representation in which we think it very probable—although we do not know it to be certain—that the *de facto* perceptual indiscriminability of the two halves in respect of color is objectively founded upon their ultimate indistinguishability in this respect.

These half-chips may well, of course, be indistinguishable (and hence indiscriminable) in other respects, such as shape or chemical composition. A persistent radical skeptic may now ask us how we shall know that we are finding the two halves indiscriminable in respect of color, and not in some other respect. And to this we had better reply (if we mean to be brief) that this is a problem about the practical application of language in general: It does not confront the proponents of a resemblance theory of representation in any peculiarly testing way. How shall we know that we are admiring a flower quite uncomparatively for its color, and not for its shape?

SIMULATION

So perhaps matching is a process in which our inability to discriminate in some respect between two things may depend ultimately upon an objective resemblance between the two. Perhaps. A realist would insist on it. But what should the realist say about those elements in pictures that do not match their subject, while yet seeming somehow to be indiscriminable from them? Let us invoke the jargon word *simulation* to contrast with match, in such a way that pictures may be allowed to contain both matches and simulations (the colors of a pictured painting on the back wall of a Vermeer room will simulate the subject; the proportions—if it is pictured *en face*—will match those of the subject). The picture-blue that simulates the color of the distant hill, and the picture-ellipse that simulates the shape of the tilted disc, will serve as convenient paradigms of simulation.

The problem for the resemblance theorist is obvious: If—by definition, in cases of simulation—the picture and its subject do not match in the respect in which a perceiver finds them indiscriminable, the resemblance between them lacks an objective basis. What sort of basis does it have?

The story that the basis is conventional (or arbitrary, or otherwise unnatural) is sometimes countered—ineffectively, as we shall see—by pointing out that simulation often has limiting cases, as when we paint our landscape from positions closer and closer to the distant hill, so that our simulating blue becomes progressively greener until, at the limit, it matches the adjacent grass. This limiting match is “preserved” (so it is said) through the modulations of a “natural” transformation. (Perspective is alleged to be such a transformation: The small house in the picture really matches in size the big house in the landscape—after applying the regular transformation rule of the perspective.) Simulation is “really” a sort of matching complicated by the introduction of a “scale” or “conversion factor.”

This defense of simulation will not do, and fortunately there is a knockdown argument that will preserve us from the more tedious intricacies of the dispute.

The blue that perfectly simulates the color of the distant hill simulates that color in exactly the same sense of “simulates” as the blue that exactly simulates the color of the sky. And the blue that simulates the color of the sky does not match the color of the sky after any kind of transformation. There is no process we might conceivably undertake that would count as matching the color of the sky; that color can only be simulated, from wherever we happen to stand.

Nevertheless, simulation has a natural basis—although not an objective one, like matching. Simulation amounts to a confession of perceptual failure, of a profoundly important kind. Under appropriate conditions of constraint, perceivers are simply unable to discriminate between presented objects in certain respects, although they might often and easily do so under more propitious circumstances. The main factors governing this mundane state of affairs are obvious: Different species of perceivers have grossly differing sensory organs; within a species, there are genetic and other accidental variations; “organically” similar members of a species may differ in their practiced or educated accomplishments. Within each species, however, there are natural limits toward which mechanically unaided perceptual skills converge. For example, humans stationed at a peephole into a darkened psychological laboratory containing luminous rods of different lengths, suspended at different distances, find that they cannot discriminate in respect of length between rods so artfully placed as to court this particular failure. If we were more sensitive to the diminution of intensity of luminous paint with distance, or had an ancillary echo sounder, like bats, we should not be caught in this way. But we should be caught in other ways; no perceptual organism is perfect.

But (it might be answered) suppose that the lights are turned on and we’re allowed to move, so that we can see the different distances of the rods—by parallax effect, for example. Will it not still be the case that we are unable to discriminate between them in respect of length?

Yes and no. Given the information that the rods differ in distance, it must surely stick in our throats to say that we cannot discriminate between the two in respect of length; yet we so patently can, even despite the fact that they are not lying in the conveniently adjacent posture that would help us to see that they do not match. But there is nevertheless a conditional sense in which we might concede the persistent simulation. If we attended solely to length, discounting all those relations to other things, in other positions, in which the lengths of the rods participate, we might say that we cannot discriminate between them. Or we might say (to evade the difficulty) that if we were drawing a perspectival picture, or taking a photograph of the two rods, we should expect to find their lengths indiscriminable in the picture—although we can see that they aren’t in the subject of the picture.

The example of the rods introduces a complex pair of relativities (between the two subject rods and the two picture rods). Let us revert to the simpler case in which a color in a picture simulates the color of a distant hill. To say that this is so is to say that we experience some natural difficulty—if we attend solely to colors—in discriminating between the hill and the picture in respect of color.

This is of course a heavily conditional remark—as it was in the example of the rods—artificially discounting information about distance, vegetation, and the like, that modern speakers might well prefer to put in a different way, namely, if we were painting a picture, or taking a photograph, of this picture and its subject, we should expect to find these two colors genuinely indiscriminable—that is, matching—in that (second) picture.

Wartofsky and other “cultural” theorists of perception have noticed, correctly, that our ability to make such substantive and hypothetical remarks about pictures relies upon our cultivated acquaintance with pictures. But their supposition that what we shall expect of a picture depends upon *de facto* current (and historically mutable) pictorial practices is misleading in the implication drawn from it. The point would be sound enough in relation to pictures in an unqualified sense of the word. In relation to pictures that incorporate simulation, it is thoroughly unsound because true simulation originates in the natural perceptual failures of perceivers and terminates, at the second generation of pictorial simulation, in objective matching. Not any “convention of simulation” will produce, at the second generation of application of the same “convention,” a match. In fact only simulation (twice over) reduces to matching, and there can be nothing conventional about this.

Nevertheless, there is something conventional about ordinary pictures, apart from their symbolic content, which is, of course, in some degree conventional. What is it?

It is this. The viewing conditions under which a picture will genuinely and accurately simulate, say, the color of a distant hill, would be quite unnatural and very hard to specify. Under ordinary gallery conditions they will almost certainly not be met. Moreover, those precise viewing conditions under which the color of the hill would be accurately simulated may not be the conditions under which other nominally simulating elements actually do simulate. The “convention” invoked when we employ simulation in pictures is one that permits some loose degree of general approximation (under which, it may be, none of the nominally simulating elements actually simulates its subject) to sustain a reading of appropriate elements as if they were all actual simulations.

There will be two aspects to this sort of “convention.” One of them will concern the picture itself and the approved conditions of viewing. Where is the picture plane in relation to the viewer and subject? How big is it, how is it angled, and how is it lit? The other will be concerned with the question of which, among many ambiguous elements, are to be interpreted as (nominally) simulating and not as matching, or symbolizing, a subject. Disputes about the precise way in which these questions have been, or should be, settled case by historical case will be complex and not always easy to decide. We had better put aside the temptation to resolve even the most general of them here and now except, perhaps, to observe in passing that it is very obvious why animals do not respond positively to pictures in spite of the natural basis on which simulation rests, and the objective basis of matching. For one thing, creatures of another species do not share the range of perceptual failures on which even the most acute of humans con-

verge, because they differ organically. The simulations that catch them out are not, or not precisely, the same. But perhaps even more significantly (for very similar animals to ourselves, such as the other primates) they do not share in our common cultural understanding of which elements in a picture are (nominal) simulations and which have some other function. We know, and some other creatures—perhaps even some other humans—do not know, that, for example, a small hill in a certain picture is to be read as simulating a large hill in the distance, and not as matching a small hill nearby, or as representing a hill of some size determined by the application of a scale, like a map.

THE INTENTIONALITY OF PICTURES

Pictures, we might say, are intentional in a third sense—neither the voluntary nor the linguistic sense. They are, of course, usually voluntarily made, but they need not be voluntarily made. We might pick up any sheet of blue paper and then treat it as (intentionally_R) a simulation of the sky. To do this is to invoke the principle—which is not a linguistic principle—that under easily imaginable viewing conditions it could well be very difficult, if not impossible, for a normal perceiver to discriminate between the sheet of paper and the sky, in respect of color. And that is to say, another picture, constructed on the same understanding and simulating together the first picture and the original sky, would display its simulations of the two in a matching blue.

We must be careful not to identify pictures with simulations or, of course, with representation itself. Pictures are intentional_R, but genuine simulations, in which perceptual failures of discrimination actually occur, are not intentional at all—neither intentional_R nor intentional_V nor intentional_L. What pictures finally depend upon—as language does not—is an invocation of these entirely natural perceptual frailties.

REPRESENTATION, PAINTING, AND PHOTOGRAPHY

We are now sufficiently armed to return to the first main problem, left suspended earlier, posed by an extensional account of representation having as one of its consequences that, for example, the historical Bertrand Russell is a member of the class of objects represented by an adequate picture, such as Eisenstaedt's photograph. The second main problem—how the adequacy of such a picture can be established on the allegedly infirm basis of resemblance—has been given a solution. Resemblance, we have said, divides into matching (with an objective basis) and simulation (with a natural foundation that is reducible to matching at the “second level” of simulation). Residual difficulties in relation to pictures are resolved in terms of their “intentional_R” component—a component attributable to prevailing customs on the issue of which elements in a picture are to count as simulating elements (and not as matching or symbolic elements), in spite of the fact that under current *de facto* viewing conditions they do not truly simulate their objects.

The first (and suspended) problem was that of accounting extensionally for pictures of Pickwick, pictures of unicorns, and in general of "things" that do not appear to enjoy, with Bertrand Russell, the blessed ontological state or condition of existence. The suggestion that representation is not extensional but inten[s]ional (or that, as Scruton puts it, represented objects are "intentionally inexistent") seems to deal with the difficulty, but at a price. The price is the need to develop some ancillary theory of truth, or correctness, that will, on appropriate occasions, connect represented objects with real subjects. Perhaps it can be dealt with differently.

Let us notice, for a start, that Bertrand Russell does not exist; or at any rate he does not now exist in the bodily form that is indicated by portraits of him and remembered by acquaintances. He did exist in that form, and if we grant a momentary indulgence to reincarnationists, it is perhaps not impossible that he may exist again in that form. It is certainly possible that some other person may exist now or in the future, of whom an adequate portrait of Bertrand Russell will also be an adequate picture. If we introduce modality into our story about representation, permitting ourselves to speak of possible, as well as of actual, objects of representations, we shall soothe our sudden anxiety about how Eisenstaedt's photograph can have a currently nonexistent philosopher as its represented object. Bertrand Russell is a possible philosopher. The evidence that he was once an actual philosopher is, indeed, remarkably strong. Pickwicks and unicorns are possible creatures, although the evidence that they and their kinds did, do, or might exist is remarkably weak.

What permits this modal indifference in representation is essentially the symmetry of both of the two fundamental forms of the resemblance relationship. Matches match their objects just as objects match their own matches. Simulations simulate their objects just as these objects simulate their own simulations. In both cases there is a *de facto* failure of discrimination (optimistically attributable, with matches, to objective indistinguishability). We can take an object—take any object at random—and instead of making or seeking a representation for it, we can treat it as a representation and make or seek a subject for it. Now if it should happen to be the case that there is, at the moment of nominating something as a representation, nothing that looks like it (and why must there be such a thing?), then we have nominated a fictional representation. Our concept of representation does not give the subjects of representations a necessary real existence, although admittedly we could not have arrived at the conception if there had not been real things that look like other things. Fact is, in that sense, more fundamental than fiction; but fiction is not therefore a kind of fact requiring for its validation access to "things" that do not exist.

It is worth noticing in passing that Scruton's conception of the relation between fact and fiction is seriously wrong. He writes:

For unless it were possible to represent imaginary things, representation could hardly be very important to us. It is important because it enables the presentation of scenes and characters toward which we have only contemplative attitudes: scenes and characters which, being unreal, allow our practical natures to remain unengaged.⁸

But imaginary or “unreal” scenes and characters do not “allow our practical natures to remain unengaged.” Quite the contrary: Imaginary scenes and characters are represented possibilities, and whatever is represented as possible can in principle be made actual by voluntary action. There must be very few represented possibilities that do not arouse in us a positive interest prompting us either to intervene in the world or to withhold our intervention in such a way that what was only possible becomes, or is prevented from becoming, actual. The realm of the possible is, arguably, a more provocative challenge to our “practical natures” than the realm of the actual, because all purposeful action is directed toward a goal that, in advance of the action, is no more than a possible state of affairs. Our entire conception of value might fruitfully be analyzed in terms of the systematic ordering of impulses to mediate between the possible and the actual by voluntary intervention in the causal flux of the world.

CONCLUSION

Photographs represent, as paintings do, by virtue finally of resemblance—which is to say, in the end, by virtue of failures in discrimination. Some of these failures are, optimistically, attributable to the indistinguishability of things. Whatever cannot be distinguished cannot be discriminated. Our problem, as acquirers of knowledge of the world, can be put in this nutshell: How shall we push our powers of discrimination between things toward that limit at which failure is irremediable because nothing and nobody could discriminate further—for the best of reasons? Pictures are the most potent of those nonverbal representations by means of which we ambivalently seek to open and to close the gap between what is actual and what is only possible, and to discover in that space what our values are.

NOTES

1. R. Scruton, “Photography and Representation,” *Critical Inquiry* 7 (spring 1981): 577–603.

2. *Ibid.*, 597.

3. *Ibid.*, 579.

4. D. C. Dennett, “Intentional Systems,” in *Brainstorms* (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), 3.

5. N. Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1968), 5.

6. M. W. Wartofsky, “Art History and Perception,” in *Perceiving Artworks*, ed. J. Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 23.

7. Goodman makes much of this point in chapter 3, “Art and Authenticity,” in *Languages of Art*.

8. Scruton, 585.

Representation in Literature

COLIN LYAS

If discourses articulate concepts through a system of signs which signify by means of their relationship to each other rather than to entities in the world, and if literature is to be a signifying practice, all it can reflect is the order inscribed in particular discourses, not the nature of the world.

—C. Belsey

In this chapter I wish to do three things. First I wish to show, by a comparison with the visual arts, some of the ways in which the problems of representation in literature arise. Then I want to outline a way in which we might understand how representation in literature might be conceived and how that involves literature with questions of truth. Finally I wish, in the main part of the chapter, to discuss some of the ways in which, in recent years, the whole notion of literature as a reflection of the world has been attacked, an attack based on certain considerations about language and meaning that purportedly derive from the work of de Saussure.

I

The problems that I wish to discuss about representation in literature can be best approached by considering certain problems about representation in the visual arts.

The history of representation in the visual arts is sometimes said to follow a line of development that begins with an effort to hold a mirror up to nature, the task of the visual artist being to produce a two-dimensional replica of the way things look in the three-dimensional world. The unfolding history of the representational arts then becomes the story of the developing techniques by which the task of mirroring was better and better achieved. In that story certain developments, such as the understanding of perspectival rendering, become pivotal moments in the search for more perfect ways of re-rendering the world.¹

Two sets of problems arise about this task. One set, which I call internal, arises when, although the coherence of the project of mirroring the world is

accepted, difficulties arise about the full and proper understanding of that project. Thus one ancient question is, Granted we can mirror the world in representations, why should we bother? Why, that is, paint pictures of beds when there are already in the world perfectly good beds available for our scrutiny? Again, a much asked question, which presupposes the viability of the mirroring project is, What makes one object a picture of another?² To which there is the related question, What makes one thing a better, more realistic, picture of another? And finally, here one might mention the question, What capacities are called for from us if we are to see something as a picture of something? The other set of problems, which I call external, arises when, far from accepting the project of representation as mirroring the world, the very viability of that project is called into question. Thus Goodman has queried any attempt to characterize representation using any notion of resemblance. For a resemblance view presumes that there is, prior to the work of the representing artist, a structured world that it is the job of the artist to make his or her picture resemble: And it is Goodman's contention that this view is incoherent. There is no pre-existent structured world to be mirrored. There is only that upon which various acts of picturing impose a structure.³

II

In seeking parallels in the story of literary creation to what I have said about the history of representation in the visual arts, one immediate difficulty arises. It is tempting to think of representational painting as holding up a mirror to the world because both the world portrayed and the pictorial object that portrays it are visual. Both are looked at and, it is commonly believed, what can be seen in the one is visually matchable to what can be seen in the other. But a collection of words, a novel say, does not visually resemble any world, either actual or possible. So a first problem for those who wish to talk of works of literature as holding a mirror up to nature is to spell out the relationship that encourages us to talk of mirroring here at all. That this can be attempted, whether or not the attempt can survive various sorts of skepticism to which we will later come, is suggested by the fact that writers since antiquity, beginning notably with Aristotle, have wanted to use the notion of *mimesis*, or imitation, with respect to literary works.

A clue may be found in the propensity to talk of works of literature as plausible, true to life, realistic and the like. For the implication of that is that such works in some way match the world, and this notion of matching seems to be the literary analogue to what we are talking about when, rightly or wrongly, we posit a matching relationship between a picture and reality.

One apparently simple way of spelling out this relation of truth to the world of a work of literary art is not always available, and that is that way that talks about the truth of a literary work in terms of the correspondence theory of truth: where it is alleged that what is said in the work corresponds to the facts of the world in the way in which an assertion made in nonliterary contexts is thought to be true if it corresponds to the facts as they really are. Two things stand in the way of this. One, which does not concern me here, is some problems that have

occurred about the coherence of the correspondence theory as an account of the truth of anything, be it a literary or a nonliterary set of words.⁴ The other is the fact that any correspondence theory of truth is committed to there being a match between how things really are in the world and how some set of words says they are. "Swans are white," Tarski remarks, is true only if there are actually some white swans. But that commitment to correspondence runs up against the fact that many of the works to which we impute true to life are fictional, it being an implication that there can be no actual things, persons, or events in the world that actually correspond to things persons or events of the literary fiction. And if that is so, how can one even begin to mirror the other?

Those who wish to talk of true-to-life as a property of literary works, including fictions, are not without resource here. In a remarkably persuasive paper, J. P. Day has attempted to demonstrate in detail how the notion of artistic verisimilitude works, even for fictional works.⁵ Thus, one source of implausibility in fiction is inconsistency, as when someone is said to be bald and fat in one part of the work and thin and hirsute in another without there being some connecting story of how the transition was made between the two states. Again, the time scheme of *Othello* is incoherent, a fact that, for anyone who notices, reduces the plausibility of the narrative. We see this sort of inconsistency in bad dramatic productions where a character leaves by the front door and re-enters from the drawing room. More interestingly, Day explores the way in which implausibility, lack of truth to life can arise from a flouting in the work of our understanding of the laws of physics and psychology. For our attention to a play or a book is underpinned by a background of knowledge of how people behave, of how the world works and by certain assumptions about the probabilities of events. Thus, if someone sets out on an errand to Rome from London and returns three minutes later, there is some explaining to be done.

One of the interests of Day's work is the way in which it enables him to explain various kinds of literature, fantasy, realism and the like. For one of the marks of fantasy, fairy story and the like is that it is made clear to us that the natural scientific laws governing events do not apply. Puck really can put a girdle around the earth in forty minutes. It seems, however, that we are much less ready to suspend belief in our knowledge of the laws and probabilities of psychology. A mouse can talk, but if it does, we expect it to behave as we expect talkers to behave. What is stunning about the Alice books is the fact that although most of the laws of physics, and even logic, are overturned in Wonderland, Alice and many of the other characters are recognizable human types, whereas one of the defects of Forster's *Howard's End* is that Margaret Schlegel's behavior in marrying Henry Wilcox does not seem to conform to what we know of the like behavior of a person characterized as Margaret painstakingly is in the earlier parts of the novel. And one final remark: We are often annoyed by *deus ex machina* solutions to problems in novels, as when a character is suddenly rescued from misfortune by the infinitesimally probable event of winning a lottery. That is because this strikes us as too improbable. (Hardy's novels are often thought to be marred by such coincidences.) But, as Day points out, there is nothing wrong in

beginning a work with an improbable event and working out some of its consequences, as John Fowles does in *The Collector*. Similarly, if Gregor Samsa changed into a bug half way through *The Metamorphosis*, the effect would be harder to deal with than if we are told, right at the outset, that this is one of the framework assumptions of the work.

It looks then that if the mirroring assumption is to be made for literature as well as for painting, what underlies it is not the notion that the events of the work have their counterparts in reality but the thought that the sequence of events in a work conforms in part or whole to what we know about the laws of logic, physics, human behavior, and the probabilities we know to govern events of our world. This knowledge is brought by us to the work, and that is why we often feel that our characteristic response to what happens in fiction is recognition, as when we say "I know people like that" when reading of the activities of Mrs. Bennet in a Jane Austen novel.

Various things might be said by way of elaboration of the view just sketched.

First, it is no objection to that view that the psychological and physical laws and probabilities in terms of which we talk of works as true or not true to life are constantly evolving. All that means is that our judgments of mimetic plausibility change as our knowledge evolves, which may be why some people are supposed to have found Hamlet's behavior more plausible given a knowledge of Freud's psychology. Similarly, someone persuaded by the truth of Marx's analysis of the objective materialistic laws of history may well come to feel that a work, say Dickens's *Hard Times*, displays a lack of intuitive understanding of those laws and is for that reason lacking in realism. This is merely a more sophisticated version of the fact that growing experience may help us to see realism where we previously doubted it, as when we think as children that love stories are soppy and uninteresting only to find them all too true when we ourselves are smitten for the first time.

Second, the account might in two ways help us to begin to understand what we mean when we talk of someone learning from a work of art. For, a work can tease out the implications of the pre-existent knowledge that I bring to the work in ways that may turn my life around. Thus someone may believe it wrong to torment a human being but not have particularly thought of Jews, say, as particularly human. But a play might plausibly bring home to me the fact that a Jew can suffer as I do ("If they prick us, do we not bleed?"). And then, given that I operate with the premise that it is wrong to torment humans, the inclusion of this character in the set of humans may, by a suppressed syllogism cause me to change my attitudes.

That, third, is related to the use that Aristotle makes of *mimesis* in literature, which seems to me to presuppose some account such as Day's. Thus some of his remarks about the unities seem to me to do with questions of consistency and plausibility rather than with visual mirroring. The play is an imitation of an action. Moreover we may consider this: My judgments of plausibility presuppose in me some understanding of the laws and probabilities that govern the world that is depicted. If I do not have such an understanding, then I must be at risk in mak-

ing such judgments (though not from other judgments such as judgments of consistency). I have no way of judging, save in the most general terms that are not specific to salmon fishing, what is or is not plausible as an account of fly-fishing for salmon. This does not stop me from saying that a book is plausible or persuasive as such an account, but I run the risk that when I find out more about the activity, I shall need to make some hasty revisions in my judgments. If I am completely ignorant about something, say the rules for corporate accounting, I have no way of making judgments about the plausibility of an account of such a process. This must be precisely why Aristotle remarks that "if one has not seen the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or the coloring or some similar cause."⁶ Now could I enjoy something as an imitation if I was not acquainted with the thing imitated? As well ask me to enjoy a mimicry of the call of the dodo or the voice of Moses.

Next, I remark that the account that I have given is not unrelated to questions of aesthetic value. Quite apart from the value we attribute to something because of the sheer delight that Aristotle rightly says is one of our responses to good imitation, plausibility and consistency often contribute to such things as the unity of a work, where unity is often thought to be something that we can value in a work of art.

Finally, I remark that what I have said bears on that much loved figure of contemporary literary theory, the Dramatic Speaker. One of the forms that radicalism in literary theory has taken has been the attack on the notion that reference to the creator of the work of art can be relevant to critical appraisal. In view of the account I have given, it can be seen that that radicalism does not entail but may rather presuppose some sort of mimetic theory. For suppose we take the case in which the writer creates a *persona* in the guise of which to tell her or his story, as when Tennyson adopts the guise of Ulysses, Conan Doyle the guise of Watson or Dickens the guise of Pip. True, then, we will have no right to attribute the views of the narrator to the author (although it is unclear, as I have argued elsewhere, that this allows us to ignore the author entirely⁷). But this distinction between narrator and author will not entail that the work does not have a mimetic dimension along the lines I have indicated. For we will want to ask whether the narrator is believable, consistent and the like, and that will be judged by deciding whether the person presented to us conforms, or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, mirrors, the understanding that we bring to the work of the psychological laws and probabilities that govern human behavior.

Granted that we can construct some sort of account of mimesis that applies to literature as much as to the visual arts, then the two sorts of questions that I said arise with the notion of *mimesis* in the visual arts, arise also for literature. On the one hand there will be internal questions. We may ask, for example, why we produce mimetic fictions at all. For granted that we have murders, love affairs, crimes, and the like in everyday life, it might be asked, as Plato asked, why we need to replicate these in fiction. Second, we may ask what capacities are called for if we are to enter into a fiction. Then, granted that a fiction is a narration of events and the reaction of people to events, we might, as exercises in

narrative theory do, ask what kinds of narrations there are. Again there are deep questions about how we are able to respond emotionally, say, to fictions at all.⁸ For example, it is argued that emotions are founded on certain beliefs, including existential beliefs. I can only be sorry for you if I believe that you exist. But because we know that Desdemona does not exist, we might wonder how then we can be sorry for her. All these questions presuppose that a narrative is mimetic and ask how the narrative *mimesis* functions, what its point is and what it demands of us. But for the remainder of this chapter I want to look at a different set of questions, corresponding to the external questions that I mentioned with respect to visual representations, namely questions that have been raised in recent years about the very coherence of the notion of *mimesis* as a feature of art.

III

We know that it has been argued for the visual arts that at the end of the nineteenth century the mimetic project was superseded. Thus Danto has argued that the notion that the work of art should be mimetic, should hold a mirror up to nature, was superseded by the view that art, far from imitating the already present world of real things, people and events, should instead be replaced by the view that it is the task of the artist to create new real things.⁹ Similarly, there are things in the work of recent literary theorists that have raised questions about the viability of the mimetic project in literature.

Why might it be denied that the task of literature is mimetically to represent, in the way I have explicated and in the way Aristotle believed, reality.

Here we might borrow a line of argument used by Goodman in his discussion of representation in the visual arts. For the mimetic claim seems to be that to the world of the literary or visual work there corresponds, in a way reminiscent of the picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus*, a real world, the structure of the latter being mirrored in the structure of the former. But, so the argument goes, there is no such thing as a structured world that we copy in our representations. In our conceptual schemes, our sciences and our arts we structure our worlds. But, then, representation cannot be conceived as a mirroring process, the adequacy of which is checked by holding the representation up to the world and looking from the structure of the one to the structure of the other. And because this is what the account of representation as mirroring seems to require, that account is shown to be inadequate. What we have instead is Turner, or Monet, or Mondrian ways of structuring the world. With this goes the notion that one value of these structurings is that they give us ways of seeing. Only after Turner has performed his structurings can we say of a sunset "How Turneresque." The thought here is, indeed, not a new one in aesthetics. It is at the very core of Croce's *Estetica*. There, too, we find the notion of the stimuli of the world as being "unformed material" that we can possess "only by giving form to it" in our representations of it.

This line of approach to the visual arts has its counterpart in contemporary literary theory, and I am going to examine it as it is to be found in what is called

structuralism and post-structuralism. I wish to show that it is here that we find the most trenchant attacks on the theory of Representation as *mimesis*, and I wish to show that the arguments upon which that attack are founded are ill-conceived.

Structuralism and post-structuralism utilize, somewhat dubiously it has been argued,¹⁰ certain master thoughts of de Saussure.¹¹ Let us begin with two of them.

The first master thought is the distinction between *la parole* and *la langue*. In de Saussure's account, there is first *la parole*, the total corpus of all actual written and spoken utterances. Some of these utterances will be grammatical, some not; some will make sense, some will not; some will be understood, some will not. Underlying this corpus of actual utterance episodes lies *la langue*, a structure of rules that allows those who encounter an utterance to do such things as understand the meaning and decide upon the grammaticality of the actual utterances that they encounter. Any speaker has it in his or her power to understand an infinity of new utterances, most never heard before. But this ability, as Chomsky was to argue,¹² requires the grasp of only a small number of rules, the grasp of which allows us to permute a relatively small number of linguistic items to produce infinitely many new utterances. This structure of rules underpins our linguistic competence. *La langue* is transpersonal. The individual speaker enters into it at birth, and it continues after any individual speaker dies. It is, further, implicit in this account that meaning is determinate. Given the possession of the structure of rules that specifies the contributions that elements, such as words, can make to complexes of elements, such as sentences, we can assign a determinate emergent overall meaning to the latter. From this, incidentally, it seemed inexorably to follow that reference to the author of a literary work can drop out as unnecessary if our purpose is to understand the meaning of a work of literature, both its meaning as a set of linguistic items, words, and its meaning in terms of the meaning or significance that is assigned to literature as a cultural phenomenon in this or that culture. The author does indeed issue a set of words to the world. But it is the reader who brings to this set of words a set of rules governing the meaning of these words and rules, and, also, governing their combination into more complex utterances. These rules are the common possession of all who can speak or read the language. They belong not to individuals, such as authors, but to the transpersonal system of the language. The rules possessed by readers, of which the author now becomes merely one more, are the source of any meaning that a text has. Reference, therefore, to the author as a source of authority over the meaning of the text drops out as unnecessary. "The death of the author," Barthes writes, "is the birth of the reader."¹³

More generally, the model became the tool for the analysis and understanding of social life in all its forms. For social life is not composed of elements that have the brute meaninglessness of, say, subatomic particles, which were what they are before humans came on the scene and will continue to be what they are even were humankind to vanish from the universe. Social life is made up of meaningful episodes, and in this respect seem to share a property, meaning, with language. That meaning is given to these episodes by structures of meaning-giving

rules and conventions. So, in order to understand that an event is a wedding, it is necessary to be in possession of a series of rules, without which nothing could be a wedding. A visitor from another culture, unacquainted with these rules, simply could not understand that a wedding is taking place, and the absence of such rules from his culture would mean that there could be no weddings there. By contrast, to observe the decomposition of a metal under heat is to observe an event that exists whether or not there are human beings to give it a significance. If it takes on significance, it does so by being incorporated into some humanly constructed body of theory that will have its own structures of understanding. Social events, therefore, like the words of a language, obtain their very existence from a structure of rules, a structure that has to be mastered if their existence and significance are to be apprehended. To understand the elements of social life, either within a culture or, as with myths,¹⁴ across a culture, is to understand the rules that give these elements their existence and the rules by which these elements are organized. And just as underlying the manifold utterances of *la parole* there may be the relatively small number of the rules of *la langue*, so the structure of rules underlying a complex web of myths as they occur across all cultures may be a relatively simple one. We understand the myths by showing how the combination of their elements emerges from a simpler underlying structure of rules.

If we put the matter this way, we already have a reason to begin to suspect mimetic theories, theories that are committed to some kind of matching between our representations in words or pictures and an independent order of reality. For in the account that I have just sketched there may seem no way of escaping from the structural meaning-giving rules. The languages we have are not checked against reality. They determine reality for us. There is, as Derrida famously put it, no "*hors de texte*."¹⁵ And Lacan wrote, "It is the world of words that creates the world of things—things originally confused in the *hic et nunc* of the all in the process of coming-into-being."¹⁶

The inclination to deny the twofold structure of language plus a matching reality is reinforced by another double master-thought wrongly imputed, as we shall see, to the work of de Saussure, namely that first there is only an arbitrary relation between language and the world and, second, the matching thought that meaning is determined not by relations between words and the world, because that relation is merely arbitrary, but by relations between words and words. De Saussure writes that "the bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary."¹⁷

To the claim that the sign is arbitrary, de Saussure adds the claim that is to motivate much of Derrida's work. Consider chess.¹⁸ Here the grasp of this game does not consist in asking what the pieces stand for, but in understanding how these pieces have different roles and how those roles combine with each other to form a system that is the game of chess. So, too, with language. The language is understood not by asking what its units stand for, because they are only arbitrarily related to things, but by understanding the difference that using this linguistic unit rather than that would make.

"In language," de Saussure writes, "everything boils down to differences." A term acquires its value as a separate element of language "only because it

stands in opposition to everything that precedes and follows it.”¹⁹ Thus “boat” is different from “coat” only because the substitution of the latter for the former in the sentence “I bought a boat” makes a difference. The two signs “father” and “mother” “are not different, only distinct. Between them there is only *opposition*.”²⁰ How this might work in practice is illustrated by the following assertion by de Saussure:

Modern French *mouton* can have the same signification as English *sheep* but not the same value, and this for several reasons, particularly because in speaking of a piece of meat ready to be served on the table, English uses *mutton* and not *sheep*. The difference in value between *sheep* and *mutton* is due to the fact that *sheep* has beside it a second term while the French word does not. . . . The value of a French plural does not co-incide with that of a Sanskrit plural although their signification is usually identical; Sanskrit has three numbers instead of two. . . . It would be wrong to attribute the same value to the plural in Sanskrit and in French; its value clearly depends on what is outside and around it.²¹

So there emerges the notion of a system of differences, where the value of a linguistic unit is a function of its place in the system and the difference it makes to the utterances when it appears. “Boat” has a different value from “coat” because substitution of the one for the other makes a difference. The user of language, in using “boat,” must be implicitly aware, if she or he has mastered the language, of the possibility of using “coat” instead of “boat” and of the difference this would make. One way to capture this implicit awareness would be to say that the user of the word “boat” is implicitly aware of the word “coat,” which she or he could have used. “Coat,” we may say, leaves a trace in the implicit awareness of the user of the word “boat.” That was a possible substitution that would have produced a different utterance.

Words, then, it is argued by those who utilize these remarks by de Saussure, do not get their meaning by mirroring the world. For first, outside the structuring of words themselves there is no structured world for language to reflect. Second the relation between words and the world is arbitrary, so that their meaning comes not from some mimetic relation but from the system of differences. And if that is true, *mimesis* is not an option for literary representations. The prelinguistic structures of reality that Aristotle believed to be mirrored in art just do not exist.

Earlier in this chapter I summarized a master thought of de Saussure thus:

[The] . . . structure of rules that underpins our linguistic competence, *la langue*, is transpersonal. The individual speaker enters into it at birth, and it continues after any individual speaker dies. It is, further, implicit in this account that meaning is determinate. Given the possession of the structure of rules that specifies the contributions that elements, such as words, can make to complexes of elements, such as sentences, we can assign a determinate emergent overall meaning to the latter.

To this we add the notion that this whole structure, this meaning-generating machine needs no help from the structures of reality to give it meaning. It does

not, in its structure, reflect some pre-existing structure of reality: It gives reality what structure it has, an echo of Goodman's view that we "take and make" reality rather than copy it. Moreover, meaning is not a matter of correspondence between language and reality. Meaning is a matter of differences within the tokens of a language structure.

Three problems arise with this account. The first, which illustrates the striking propensity to partial and misleading appropriations of de Saussure, is that the account, which is supposed to replace the author as source of meaningful utterance with a determinate meaning-generating linguistic machine, manifestly fails in its purpose. For a system of rules only becomes a language if it is put into operation by individual speakers. Any casual reading of de Saussure would reveal that he was well aware of this fact, which is why he thought of *la parole* and *la langue* as both necessary in the actual speech situation. A language would not be a language unless individual human beings constantly projected their words into new situations in ways that could not be anticipated merely by a knowledge of the rules in operation at a particular time. If the structuralist dismissal of the author depends upon the truth of the claim that it is the structure of the rules of the language that is important and not the individuals that operate them, then that dismissal is ill founded. Indeed it would render speaking a language impossible.

So there is an oddity in the appropriation of de Saussure's work by the anti-authorial structuralist. De Saussure offered a distinction between *la parole*, the total corpus of actual speech episodes performed by members of the human race, and *la langue*, a structure of rules that underlay these episodes and explained the linguistic competence of speakers. The structuralist borrows this distinction but gets his or her results by concentrating, without any explanation for the choice, on *la langue*. If attention is thus focused on *la langue*, then there will be a temptation to ignore the individual consciousness, for *la langue* is transpersonal, the structure of rules into which individuals are born and that survives the death of any one of them. But nothing but an already decided determination to eliminate authors and all other individual consciousnesses could begin to explain the total attention given to *la langue* and the total indifference to *la parole*. Both are integral to de Saussure's account, and necessarily so. He writes in a passage ignored by those who wish to use his account to substitute the impersonal structures of *la langue* for the humanly impregnated activity of speaking:

Within the total phenomenon represented by speech we first singled out two parts: language and speaking. Language is speech less speaking. It is the whole set of linguistic habits which allow a speaker to understand and to be understood. . . . But this definition still leaves language outside its social context; it makes language something artificial since it only includes the individual part of reality; for the realization of language, a community of speakers (*masse parlante*) is necessary. Contrary to all appearances, language never exists apart from the social fact. . . . Its social nature is one of its inner characteristics. Its complete definition confronts us with two inseparable entities. . . . Under the conditions described language is not living—it only has potential life.²²

For there is human language, speaking and writing, only if the rules of *la langue* are applied (and creatively applied) in *la parole* by individual acts of individual speakers, just as there are only football matches if the rules of football are put into effect in individual games, all different, in which individual creativity is shown. *La langue* needs *la parole* if it is to become concrete in actual utterances (including actual works of literature). (Every *langue*, we might say, needs to be let out on *parole*.) But once we admit the necessity for *la parole*, then individual consciousnesses, no matter how structured they may be by their culture, are inescapably involved in acts of language, including works of literature. None saw this more clearly than Merleau-Ponty. Noun and verb, he agreed, may only be allowed by the rules to combine in certain ways to form grammatical sentences. But they are only combined into sentences when someone actually speaks. "Between the noun and the verb," as he put it, "lies the gap that each person who speaks and writes must leap."²³ In our capacities to project words, including words like "I" and "person" in ways that the system of rules could never allow us to predict nor ever guarantee will be understood, lies the possibility of our freely transcending the otherwise determining structures into which we are born.

But now, there is an implication of this that suggests a profound misreading of de Saussure by those who have invoked his name in the effort to show that there is no extra linguistic structure that provides a check on the truth or plausibility of linguistic utterances. Those who wish to invoke de Saussure's work in support of this are likely to refer to such passages as the following in which de Saussure asserts that signification is carried only by differences:

The conceptual side of value is made up solely of relations and differences with respect to other terms of language . . . differences carry signification . . . a segment of language can never in the final analysis be based on anything except its non-coincidence with the rest. *Arbitrary* and *Differential* are two correlative qualities. (*Course in General Linguistics*, 117–18)

Verbal meaning, that is, is carried by relations between words, and not by relationships between words and reality. But what is important here is to note that the structure of relationships of which de Saussure is speaking is a structure that characterizes *la langue*, which is an abstraction from the total speech situation. There, no less than in chess, elements get what value they have by contrast one with another and without reference to some extralinguistic reality. But in *parole* signs are put to use, so that de Saussure remarks that they then become "positive." The sign put to use breaks out of the circle of linguistic interdefinability and can be used to do such things as make a reference to reality. The distinction in de Saussure between sign and signified is not, as too many casual though influential readers have assumed, the same as the distinction between sign and its use to refer to a referent.

But even if it were true, as is often believed, that signs only owe their meaning to a place in a structured system, would it follow that extralinguistic refer-

ence is, as Lacan and Derrida have asserted, not possible? One reason for believing this is the belief that a structure of meaning must somehow be closed off from reality. Hawkes, for example, speaks of systems as being "self-regulating" and as "making no appeal beyond themselves," as constructions not formed by reference to reality "but on the basis of their own self-sufficient rules."²⁴

The difficulty with this is that from the fact that a system is highly structured and self-regulating it simply does not follow that that system is of necessity cut off from other systems and from reality. Here, as Tallis has argued, we might consider the nervous system, which has rules of internal transformation and subserves the self-regulating homeostasis of the body. But from that, it does not follow that this system is cut off from reality. Quite the opposite. The system, no less than the system of language, is what it is because it is open to reality. That this is so, for structures of language as much for structures of brains, is shown by the fact that the belief that a system of *langue* is self-contained and uninfluenced by a pre-existing reality runs up against an awkward fact, namely that some strings of words in the system are more common than others. As Tallis points out, "The dog is barking" is more common than both "The dog is quacking" and "The dog is reading *Of Grammatology* with pleasure and profit." In a view that word strings are self-contained, this fact has just to be accepted as a brute, inexplicable fact. It is only when we think of language as responsive to reality that we begin to get some explanation of the fact that some strings are relatively more frequent than others.

Finally, on this matter, one truth underlying much of what has been dubiously derived from de Saussure is this: The fact that this system of phonemes is correlated with this reality is arguably an arbitrary matter. For French and German, for example, use different phoneme sets in the task of talking about the world, and neither has more justification than the other. But from that, it does not follow that the systems cannot be used to talk about the same reality or be influenced by that reality.

There is a difference between the use of de Saussure's insights by structuralists and the use of them by post-structuralists, such as Derrida. One way of putting the difference is this: The structuralist thinks of the system of rules of *la langue* as a system that generates determinate meanings independently of the intention of any individual speaker. Armed with the rules of the language system, we can, as readers, derive a determinate meaning from texts. Even if that is true, then we have no argument as yet for believing that the system of rules of languages exists independently of reality or, more extremely, that it in fact establishes what reality is. For, I have argued, a system of language can be a system the learning of which alone allows us to interpret utterances without that system needing to be uninfluenced or unshaped by reality. The question is why the structure is as it is, and the answer to that may be that it is shaped by reality. And if that is the answer, then the way is open to us to argue, as I have argued, that our understanding of that reality may be brought to bear when we ask whether a set of utterances, fictional or not, conforms plausibly to what we know of the laws and probabilities of physical and psychological reality.

The more radical attack on this view, the kind of attack that we may find in Foucault and more especially in Derrida, raises the whole question of the viability of the notion of *la langue* as a system that generates determinate meaning. What we have instead is the claim that determinacy cannot be guaranteed by the existence of structures of rules of grammar and meaning for a language. Here there are two components of the demonstration to consider.

First, there is the argument that the structures of a language cannot close out the creativity of the speakers who operate those rules. In the structuralist account, and also in the account given by Chomsky, any language speaker is in possession of a set of rules or conventions that defines the place of a word in the system of language and a set of rules for the combination of these words. These are supposed to allow those possessed of these rules to read off the meaning of whole utterances from sounds or marks. The notion is one of a closed, underlying structure that is mechanically operated to give an effective procedure for the assignment of a determinate meaning. This notion fails to take account of a creative openness that is an essential feature of language and that I can introduce by quoting a passage from Stanley Cavell:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place (in particular not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules²⁵), just as nothing will ensure that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all that whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rests on nothing more, but nothing less than this.²⁶

An example may make clear what I wish to extract from this passage. Suppose I have learned the word “deep” according to the rules of the meaning-giving structures of my language. For example, I have learned to use “deep” in talking of ponds and oceans. Then, one day, with no apparent sense of strain, I say, “I felt the slight deeply.” What is more, no one seems confused or surprised by this, although I have gone beyond the rules I have learned for the use of the word “deep.” So it is throughout the daily life of our talking: Feelings are deep, people feel blue, notes are high or low, music is sad, and so on and so on.

This is to say that our use of language is essentially creative, and, indeed, unless it were so, it would not be a use of language. Consider here the difference between learning a phrase book for a foreign language so as to produce phrases like “my position has been struck by lightning” by rote and speaking a language. Even my use of a term like “dog” is creative, for I am required creatively to project what I have learned to talk about dogs quite unlike those in the presence of which I might first have learned the term. This is why Searle and Dreyfus may have been right to suggest that a computer that can merely apply the rules with which it has been programmed cannot speak and why computers have such dif-

difficulty translating poetry, where the creative projection of language is especially marked.²⁷ The rules leave open the creative “projectibility” of the terms that we learn in one set of contexts into different regions. Derrida may have this in mind when, at the conference at which the achievements of structuralism were to be celebrated, he began the undermining of that movement by remarking that what he “could not understand about a structure is the means by which it is not closed.”²⁸ Hence he can talk of the disruptive possibilities of language, disruptive, that is to say, of any belief that the rules of a language close things down. The rules do not cover every eventuality. Wittgenstein, whose work has been illuminatingly compared to Derrida’s by Henry Staten,²⁹ noticed the same thing:

I say “There is a chair.” What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight?—“So it wasn’t a chair, but some kind of illusion.”—But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.—“So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.” But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have we rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word “chair” to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word “chair”; and are we really to say that we do not attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?³⁰

This is related to Derrida’s Nietzschean master project, the exposure of every attempt to be definite, and final, attempts that always exclude some aspect of the infinitude of the world and misrepresent its infinite variety. For sometimes Derrida sets himself against the view that one can grasp and finally express the truth of a matter. Here the point is more subtle. If I assert something, then what I assert must exclude something. The assertion that it is raining conveys information because it is at odds with the claim that it is not raining. A statement that ruled out nothing, a tautology such as the claim that either it is raining or it isn’t, is empty. But the claim is that often what I seek to exclude is not rightly excluded. And then the words in which I try to say what I wish to say will often, often in the smallest of hints, reveal my tacit recognition of the existence of what I seek to exclude. To deconstruct a text, to introduce a notion famously associated with Derrida, is to find in it evidence of a commitment to the existence of that aspect of reality that its writer seeks to deny. Thus the deconstruction of a text that centers the world on men, treating women as, at best, fallen males with no real existence in their own right, might show, to use Derrida’s words, words that carry an echo of Hegel’s analysis of the master/slave relationship.³¹ The text may reveal to a close deconstructive scrutiny:

That man in what he is only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out this other or opposite, defining himself in antithesis to it, and his whole is therefore caught up and put at risk in the very gesture by which he seeks to assert his unique autonomous existence. . . . Man needs this other even as he spurns it, is constrained to give an identity to what he regards as no-thing. Not only is his own being parasitically dependent upon woman, and upon the act of excluding and subordinating her, but one reason why such exclusion is necessary is

because she may not be quite so other after all. Perhaps she stands as a sign of something in man himself which he needs to repress, expel beyond his own being, relegate to a securely alien region beyond his own definitive limits. Perhaps what is outside is also somehow inside.

One reason for the belief that meaning cannot be determined by the rules of linguistic structure is the openness of those rules. But there is another reason that requires us to note, again a possibly questionable borrowing from de Saussure's notion that "the bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary."

From this, as I explained earlier, there emerges the notion of a system of differences, where the value of a linguistic unit is a function of its place in the system and the difference it makes to the utterances in which it appears. Thus, we saw, "boat" has a different value from "coat" because substitution of the one for the other makes a difference. The user of language, in using "boat" must be implicitly aware, if she or he has mastered the language, of the possibility of using "coat" instead of "boat" and of the difference this would make. One way to capture this implicit awareness would be to say that the user of the word "boat" is implicitly aware of the word "coat," which she or he could have used. "Coat," we may say, leaves a trace in the implicit awareness of the user of the word "boat." That was a possible substitution that would have produced a different utterance. But now consider something that, for Derrida, undermines the notion of determinate meaning. "Boat" means something different from "coat" because the substitution of the one for the other in an utterance makes a difference. I understand "boat" in contrast to "coat," and the meaning of the former is bound up with the meaning of the latter. But it is not only the substitution of the word "coat" for "boat" that makes a difference: Similar effects would be produced by substituting for "coat" the words "moat," "groat," "map," and indeed any other word of the language. Hence the meaning of each word is bound up with the meaning of all other words, and the meaning of all other words remains as a trace within any word of the language. Anyone wishing to give a determinate account of the meaning of an utterance is faced with the unending task of recording all these traces and echoes. The task can never be completed, and hence every interpretation is provisional. This is what leads Julia Kristeva to talk of a "geno-text," "containing the whole historical evolution of the language,"³² which exists as the substratum of every actual literary work or "pheno-text" in the way in which some writers of the Torah believe that every possible meaning is contained in the utterances of God. Every combination of or relation of meaning is implicit in every text. Interpretation is not, therefore, a matter of finding the meaning of the text, but of taking part in and enjoying the infinite play of meanings in a text. (Puns, of course, have a special interest in this activity, autonomously directing us to cognate areas of signification.) But the outcome, in Derrida's words, is that in the absence of "ultimate meaning" there opens "an unbounded space for the play of signification" and a delight in the "infinite dance of the pen." This, of course, is the end of any mirroring view of language. For if all meanings are equally present in a language, all possible realities are there, too.

No one reading of what a work says about the world has any priority over any other.

What, then, of the claim that the structures of the language leave the meaning of utterances indeterminate?

I mention first a puzzlement I have always had about Derrida's methodology. For he is emphatic, rightly it seems to me, that the first task of any critic of a philosopher, or any other writer, is to determine precisely what that writer said by the most minute examination of the textures of that writer's discourse. Only so will it be possible to deconstruct that text and so force it to reveal its internal contradictions. Thus we find such passages as these: "As to Descartes . . . no historical question about him . . . can be answered before a rigorous and exhaustive external analysis of his manifest intentions, of the manifest meaning of his philosophical discourse has been made."³³

However, that appears to reinstate a world-words relationship that Derrida is at pains to query. For it appears to ask us to match something, our words, against something in the world, the text of the person we are studying, which has a self-sufficient structure.

Second, we might bring against Derrida an earlier criticism. The words of all the speech acts that amount to *la parole*, the total corpus of uttered utterances, do not occur with an equal frequency. Some strings are more frequent than others. This is a fact that has to be explained, and, I have suggested, the most likely explanation of this is that these frequencies are best explained by the conformity between what we say and the structure of reality.

Third, we find in Derrida, Lacan, and others the notion that a text is merely an endless chain of signifiers. The chain of signs is endless, as is interpretation. Any particular sign has to be interpreted using other signs, which in themselves are to be interpreted and so on *ad infinitum*. On this matter Derrida quotes Peirce, who says that a sign is "Anything which determines something else, its interpretant to refer to an object to which it itself refers (its object) in the same way, this interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on *ad infinitum*."³⁴ And that is treated as a version of Derrida's claim that "the sign as a whole evaporates into pure differences." In a striking passage he writes: "Thus there is no phenomenality reducing the sign . . . so that the thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. . . . The *represented* is always already a *representamen*. . . . From the moment there is meaning, there is nothing but the sign."³⁵

Two things need be said against that. First, much of the plausibility of this comes from the conflation of natural and nonnatural signs. It may be possible to argue that words are purely signs, but this is not true of clouds, when we take them as a sign of rain, or spots when I take them to be signs of measles. (In this connection, Tallis, whose discussion is exemplary, quotes Robert-Grillet's remark that "objects exist before they signify."³⁶)

Second, behind much that Derrida and others, such as Eagleton have said, is an almost willful misreading of de Saussure. Three terms are in play in these discussions: signifier, signified, and referent. The signifier is, roughly speaking, the word (an inscription or phonetic item). The signified is the meaning. Together, a

poems and never about reality, or as one writer put it: "There are no texts, only relations between texts."⁴¹ True, poems often do bear the marks of influence. Who would ever deny that? But how do we get from that to the claim that poems are only about other poems, never about such things as World War I or the agony of loss? One answer is that people were seduced into this view by the kinds of claims that I have been examining about the sufficiency of an account of language that reduces meaning to a system of differences and ignores the fact of reference. If that is the source of claims about intertextuality, then those claims, when they go beyond legitimate references to the way in which one poet in talking about reality may be influenced by another poet, are ill founded.

IV

A short concluding note: In denying that we can detach language from a pre-existent reality, there are all sorts of things that I do not wish to deny. One is a view, to which I subscribe, that is to be found in Wittgenstein, according to which the distinction between what is real and what is not may be relative to areas of discourse, so what is meant by saying that God is real is relative to the form of life in which people talk about God. Likewise what is meant by saying that there exists a prime number between 11 and 17 is relative to the activity of mathematics. But, and it would take another chapter to show this, nothing follows from that about the impossibility of their being a reality that is independent of us and of our speech ways. Similarly I do not wish to deny that our inherited language structures may condition our view of the world, and in particular our view of the social world. It may well be, for example, that our speech habits are impregnated with a set of masculine prejudices. But from that fact it does not follow that language is somehow independent of reality. Why else call these "prejudices," with the implication that the true status of women is mischaracterized in defective forms of language. But those are issues I shall have to deal with elsewhere.

NOTES

1. See E. Gombrich, *The Story of Art* (London: Phaidon, 1984).
2. See F. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
3. N. Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1968).
4. P. F. Strawson, "Truth," *Mind* (1956).
5. J. P. Day, "Artistic Verisimilitude," *Dialogue* (1964).
6. Aristotle, *Poetics*, chap. 4.
7. C. Lyas, "Anything Goes," *British Journal of Aesthetics* (1984).
8. K. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
9. A. Danto, "The Art World," *Journal of Philosophy* (1964).
10. See T. Pavel, *The Feud of Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); and R. Tallis, *Not Saussure* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
11. F. de Saussure, *Courses in General Linguistics*, trans. W. Basking (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

12. N. Chomsky, *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* (New York: Plenum, 1955).
13. "The Death of the Author," in *Image, Music, Text* (London: Fontana, 1977).
14. The structuralist analysis of myth was the life work of Claude Levi-Strauss. But see the comments in Pavel, chap. 2.
15. J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
16. J. Lacan, *Ecrits* (London: Tavistock, 1977).
17. de Saussure, 67.
18. Ibid., 107.
19. Ibid., 120, 122.
20. Ibid., 121–22.
21. Ibid., 115–16.
22. Ibid., 77.
23. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 30.
24. T. Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics* (London: Methuen, 1977), 17.
25. For an account of why certain generative models of rule-following may be inadequate, see G. Baker and P. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 155–70.
26. S. Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," in *Wittgenstein*, ed. G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1968), 160–61.
27. J. Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science* (London: BBC, 1984); and Dreyfus and Searle, *Listener*, 25 February 1988.
28. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 160.
29. H. Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
30. *Philosophical Investigations*, sec. 80.
31. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 232.
32. J. Kristeva, *Semiotike* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 284.
33. *Writing and Difference*, 44.
34. Quoted in *Of Grammatology*, 50.
35. *Of Grammatology*, 49–50.
36. Tallis, 92.
37. T. Eagleton, *Literary Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 108.
38. Catherine Belsey, *Critical Practice* (London: Methuen, 1980), 46.
39. Hawkes, 16–17.
40. Ibid., 85.
41. H. Bloom, *A Map of Misreading* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 3.

Musical Representation

STEPHEN DAVIES

In this chapter I consider whether music is representational, and I conclude that it is rather limited in what it can depict. I approach the topic by comparing music with realistic paintings, for these provide our paradigms of representational art works.

THE MUSICAL REPRESENTATION OF SOUNDS

As a visual art form, paintings represent that which can be seen. They do so via a particular medium—pigment, canvas, and the like. The viewer remains aware of the medium of representation even as she observes the subject in the picture, so that, in appreciating a representation as such, she does not mistake the pictured subject for itself.

The medium of music is sound. If music is representational, one would expect it to depict that which can be heard and to do so in a fashion that prevents the listener from mistaking the sound-as-represented for itself. Some alleged examples of musical representation fit the model just described. It is said that musical works contain the calls of birds, the ticking of clocks, claps of thunder, the hiss of steam engines, the sighing of wind, gunfire, and so on.

It might be thought that, even in these simple cases, there is room to doubt that music is representational. Appearances usually are individuated in terms of that which produces them. As a result, a painting can represent a person by re-creating his appearance. But if sounds are individuated in their own right—as bangs and crashes, for instance—and not by reference to the things from which they issue, and if music merely reproduces sounds in trying to represent them, musical representation must fail for the want of a distinction between subject and medium. In this view, music generates an instance of the given sound but does not thereby depict the sound or its source. Music is capable only of re-presenting, not of representing, sounds.

I think the key premise of this argument—that sounds usually are individu-

ated in their own right—is false. Sounds are often tied in our perception of them to their sources. As a result, we hear in the clarinet's falling third the sound of a cuckoo, not merely a sound as of a cuckoo's. Moreover, even in those cases when we hear in the music the firing of a cannon or the rattle of a typewriter's keys precisely because a cannon or a typewriter has been included in the orchestra, I doubt that the distinction between medium and subject is destroyed. We are (or can be assumed to be) aware of the musical context of performance, and that gives a new significance to the use of these sound-generators. A painting can use the likeness of a particular Amerindian to represent a generic, nonactual person—the Noble Savage, for instance. Also, a painting might incorporate part of a newspaper by the use of collage and, in so doing, provide a setting in which the text must be interpreted anew. In that context, it is necessary to consider if the cutting “says” what it did in the newspaper from which it was taken. Similarly, when ordinary cannons or typewriters are appropriated to the orchestra, they are recontextualized in a fashion that prevents their being taken to be doing their usual thing. A distance is preserved between the sounds they make and the sounds of battles or of busy offices to which they refer the listener.

In general, I think music is capable of representing the sources of sounds, either by imitating the sounds in the orchestra or by appropriating them, provided that the given sound is one that is characteristic of, and hence widely identified with, its source. Clarinets can represent calling cuckoos, and cannons can depict the barrages and fusillades of battle.

MUSIC AND DYNAMIC PROCESSES

The claims made on behalf of musical representation usually go much further than those acknowledged thus far. Indeed, the representation of sounds and their sources is thought to be only the simplest form of musical depiction. It is widely held that music deals more often and more subtly with other subjects, such as moonlight on water, the passage of clouds, bubbling brooks and flowing rivers, flashes of lightning, the flickering of fire, the rising of the sun, the ascension of Christ, the moods of the sea, and the emergence of order from chaos.

What is at first peculiar about this claim is that the phenomena supposedly depicted seem to be visual rather than aural. The idea that music could represent such things is not as puzzling as it first seems, however. Music, as an art of sound, is both structured and temporal. As such, it articulates pattern and process. It embodies conflict and resolution, growth and decline, rising and falling, seeking and finding. The phenomena listed earlier are ones in which a pattern unfolds through time, and music is well-suited to the presentation of equivalent structures, if not to their visual character. In consequence, music seems to be better suited to the depiction of temporal processes than paintings are. A single painting might show a time-slice of an event (the sun peeking above the horizon) and might indicate a context from which we can infer the causal sequence of events (a cat perched tensely on the corner of the table; a broken glass of milk on the floor by the table's leg; a person with a startled expression turning to look at the

glass), but it cannot present the unfolding action unless it becomes a "moving" picture or is integrated with a series of others.

The residue of the earlier puzzle remains, however. Processes tend to be individuated not in terms of their elements but by reference to their dynamic structure. A musical work might exemplify growth and expansion, but could it thereby represent the sun's dawning, given that the same dynamic pattern might be apparent in the relation between entirely different elements? Unless fire is signified by the music, how can its flickering be that of fire and how could we distinguish flickering from quaking, shivering, waving, vibrating, or shaking?

DRAMATIC MUSIC AND SONGS

The questions just posed can be answered readily enough in the case of opera, film, and the like, where the action identifies the things and events the sounds or dynamic character of which are illustrated in the music. As the weighty stone is heaved aside, the string basses produce a rumbling sound; as the fire flickers, leaping arpeggios mimic its effervescent motion; the cymbal accompanies each flash of lightning. In songs, the relevant events are recounted or described in the text, rather than shown or enacted, but this need be no bar to their musical depiction. At the mention of a spinning-wheel, rapid whirling passages issue from the accompanying instrument. Examples such as these provide some of the most convincing instances of representation in music, I allow, but it is important to notice that, in them, the music works in conjunction with other, nonmusical elements to which it is married.

THE REPRESENTATION OF EMOTIONS IN MUSIC

Emotions can be expressed in music. Music can be sad or happy, for instance. (There is disagreement about how the phenomenon is to be analyzed, certainly, but it is commonly accepted that it occurs.) Is it the case that music represents the emotions it expresses? It does so sometimes, I claim, and at others not. Where what is expressed is the emotion of a character in a work, that emotion is represented. But where it is the piece that is expressive, the emotion is not also represented.

Consider the case of paintings. Emotions have characteristic behavioral expressions and causal contexts. As a result, they can be represented in pictures. Fear might be apparent on the face of a person depicted as facing a charging lion. A weeping child holding a broken doll is shown to be sad. If a sentient being is represented in the painting, it is possible that its emotions also are represented. Cases of these kinds do not exhaust the expressive potential of paintings, however. An expressive attitude toward the depicted subject (and its emotions) might also be expressed through the style of representation. For instance, the sadness of the child might be shown in an indulgent fashion, or in a cool, documentary manner, or in an ironic light that rejects, while highlighting, the elements of Kitsch or caricatures. Also, a painting might express an emotion or attitude toward a depict-

ed subject that is itself expressively neutral. All this suggests that we should distinguish the expressiveness of the painting from that of its subject. Whereas the emotions of the subject are represented, those expressed by the painting are not. The painting adopts an expressive attitude to its subject, but that attitude is not represented as any particular person's. Expressiveness of this latter kind is distinct from representation, though it is effected via the style of representation. That is, sometimes expression is distinct from representation. Because an interest in art typically concerns itself not solely with the subject depicted but also, and more importantly, with the manner in which that subject is portrayed, the kind of expressiveness that is aesthetically significant often is not of the representational sort. With this in mind we can return to the topic of musical expressiveness. Where a musical work presents human characters and deals with their actions and feelings, it will be appropriate to regard the emotions as represented (just to the extent that the subject experiencing the emotions is). This is common in opera and song, where the expressiveness of the music frequently serves an illustrative role. As the character sings of his aching heart, music expressive of languid sadness is played; as he acts bravely, he is buoyed along by noble, martial strains. In these cases, the expressiveness of the music contributes to the representation of the character's emotions. But if a musical work is expressive either independently of its subject or in the absence of a subject, it will best be regarded as not representing the emotion it presents. In general, an emotion is represented only if its "owner" is; otherwise the emotion is expressed by the artwork without thereby representing anyone's experiencing that emotion. Expressiveness is not always to be equated with representation.

ABSTRACT INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC

By contrast with opera and song, abstract music unaccompanied by literary texts or titles has limited potential for representation because it is ill suited to identifying nonmusical topics. If a musical work cannot secure a reference to fire, then we can doubt that it represents fire, but, more than this, we can also doubt that the pattern of rapid fluctuations in tension and relaxation that it exhibits is a representation of flickering. That is, a piece of "pure" music can display a dynamic structure without thereby representing or referring to any of the nonmusical things that share a similar structure and also without representing any one, as against any other, of the properties of dynamically similar nonmusical patterns. Admittedly, when instrumental music is expressive, it is bound to put us in mind of the world of human experience. Words like "sad" retain (one of) their usual meanings when applied to music. In my view, this use is one that refers to the expressive character of appearances rather than to occurrent emotions as such. But in any case, the expression of emotion in music is bound to invoke a broader context than that of purely musical sounds. Nevertheless, I have suggested earlier that in such cases there is expressiveness without representation as such. That is, when pure music is expressive, it presents an expressive character without representing anyone as experiencing what it expresses.

Against this last claim, it might be suggested that, when listeners follow the dynamic and expressive vicissitudes of an instrumental work, they imagine a persona who is embodied in the music. They then hear the music's expressiveness as revealing the feelings of this persona. If this is so, perhaps the music should be regarded as representing the persona's feelings.

It is not necessary to listen to instrumental music in this fashion in order to become aware of its expressive character. And even where such imaginative projection is involved in the listening experience, I doubt that the music is then made or revealed to be representational of the emotions it expresses. If the persona is not plainly represented in the music but instead is imagined by the listener, the emotion present in the music is not represented there as the persona's. There is no distance between the music's point of view and the persona's emotions, as there is in painting between its point of view or expressive character and those of a represented subject. I conclude that this manner of listening is not a means to discovering what the music represents but, rather, to identifying and following its expressive progress.

MUSIC WITH DESCRIPTIVE TITLES AND PROGRAMS

I suggested earlier that if abstract music cannot represent a subject, it cannot represent properties of that subject, or qualities the natures of which depend on the characters of their bearers. By contrast, opera and song supply subjects, topics, descriptions, actions, situations, events, and the like, and this allows music to contribute significantly to representation in the whole. But what of instrumental music with descriptive titles and/or accompanying texts? Is representation possible in program music, which is intermediate between pure and dramatic music?

The title of a painting, when it is given by the artist, counts as part of the work and can play a crucial role in specifying what is represented; for instance, by disambiguating its subject. So, a work's title might identify Aristotle as the person depicted, though this person might more closely resemble the painter's model than the philosopher. Notice that the contribution of the title relies on a prior degree of representational success within the picture. It is only because a person is depicted that the title can indicate who, specifically, that person is. If the painting is not already representational, it cannot be made so by its title alone. A uniformly white canvas titled "Aristotle" does not depict the philosopher (though the title may be suggestive of ways in which the painting could be interpreted). This is not to require, however, that the picture's representational character must always be apparent to a viewer who is ignorant of its title. If the subject is treated in an abstract or highly stylized fashion (as in a Cubist work, for example), or if the subject is itself abstract in appearance (as in a closely cropped picture of a pebble beach), or if the perspective is unusual (as in a diagram showing an area of skin magnified 100 times), the work's representational character might not be obvious without reference to its title. A small but significant class of instrumental musical works have descriptive titles; for example, *The Four*

Seasons, The Sea, My Country, Till Eulenspiegel's Merry Pranks, Harold in Italy, The Sorcerer's Apprentice, Wellington's Victory Symphony. Also, some pieces, such as Berlioz's *Fantastic Symphony*, are accompanied by a text or program setting out the events they purport to relate. If titles and texts count as part of the work, are these pieces representational of their subjects? Or, rather, is it that the named topic is merely complemented in the music with a suitable mood or expression; for instance, with calm peace, happiness, energetic vitality, tension, and release? I think that the latter is more often the case. Program music provides the most plausible instance of representation in instrumental music, but, even here, it is arguable that full-blooded representation fails.

A listener who is ignorant of the work's title usually cannot tell what is allegedly represented in the music. Indeed, it might not be apparent to her that the music is different from abstract works that make no pretension to representation. I accepted earlier that, in the case of paintings, a title could make apparent the representational character of a work that otherwise might seem abstract, so the point just made about the musical case is not yet decisive. Three further observations strengthen it.

First, in paintings there are unequivocal examples of representation, such as works that can be seen to represent the human figure whether or not one knows their titles. Equivocal pictorial representations often are so because they abstract away from the detail of what could have been a more realistic depiction. They reduce the welter of visual detail to a few lines and symmetrical forms, for example. In the case of music, however, most attempts at representation are equivocal at best. And it is not as if it is only the composer's restraint that stands in the way of greater realism. It is far from clear how music could achieve a more specific level of depiction than that attained by Smetana in *The Moldau* or Honegger in *Pacific 231*. Equivocal representation in painting presupposes the possibility of realistic representation and of an established tradition in which this is achieved. Attempts at musical representation take place in the absence of an equivalent tradition and possibility. As a result, it is not obvious that results as equivocal as those that are produced qualify as representations.

Second, in the case of representational paintings, we would doubt that a person could understand the work if she failed to notice that it is representational. The same is not obviously true of music. One can imagine a person who reveals a deep understanding of Beethoven's *Pastoral Symphony* or Mussorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition* although she is ignorant of the work's title or does not know what the individual movements are supposed to depict. That understanding would be apparent in her descriptions of the work's form, of the interrelatedness of its various parts, of its expressive or dynamic patterns, and so on. These descriptions would not mention what the work is supposed to represent, because the listener is unaware of its alleged representational character.

Usually, the listener does know the title and is guided by it in framing her descriptions of the work. If her account is apt, it will map neatly onto most features of the music. The listener can reveal her understanding and appreciation of the music by the way in which her narrative, one that is inspired by the work's title

and program, corresponds to the style, structure, mood, and dynamic character of the music. I accept all this but deny that these truths show that the music represents what is described in that narrative. The same high level of musical understanding and appreciation can be revealed in technical accounts of the music, or in narratives based on quite different analogies or topics than those suggested by the title. Yet it cannot be that instrumental music is representational in a full-blooded way if a listener's ignoring its (alleged) representational content does not diminish her understanding and appreciation of the work in question.

Third, in paintings there are general conventions the point of which is to facilitate representation. These can vary from style to style and culture to culture, but within a given type, they apply to many works. For instance, according to one set of perspectival conventions, where one object partially blocks the view of another, the first is in front of the second, the first is not transparent, the second possesses parts that cannot be seen, and so on. A grasp of the relevant conventions allows the viewer to perceive what is depicted in different pictures that share the use of those conventions. The conventions provide a general system allowing the viewer to match the very different pictorial subjects of various paintings with real or imagined items. She does not have to learn new "rules" of representation for each picture she encounters.

The syntax of musical styles is governed by conventions, but it is not apparent that there are general conventions in music the purpose of which is to effect representation. There are continua within musical features that are regularly harnessed in the pursuit of representation—high/low, soft/loud, relaxed/tense—but these are limited in what they can achieve. As I have already indicated, these generate mood, movement, and pattern, but are inadequate to specify concrete non-musical events or actions in detail. When composers set out to write representational music, it as if they must create the vocabulary, techniques, and rules of representation for each work they write. In the absence of general conventions for systematic musical representation, music is severely limited in what can be accomplished by way of depiction within it. At best, musical representations are limited to those that can be achieved solely through sonic or dynamic isomorphisms, or by importing musical ideas that carry with them associations established outside the context of the given work. And whereas pictorial conventions for representation involve the painting in its entirety, musical depiction is convincing mainly at the level of moments or segments within pieces most aspects of which appear not to be directly implicated in the attempt at depiction.

As just noted, composers often circumvent the need for general conventions like those for pictorial representation by including in their pieces sounds or musical ideas that bring with them a host of associations. For example, when the composer quotes *La Marseillaise* and the *Hymn to the Tsar*, we can be sure that he is referring to the French and the Russians, and we are likely to construe much of what we hear in light of that reference. In Tchaikovsky's *1812 Overture*, we come to hear a depiction of battle followed by a Russian victory. Moreover, it is arguable that the listener who is unaware of the relevant associations thereby has an impoverished understanding of the music.

Though this last point shows that representation might sometimes be achieved despite the lack of general conventions for depiction, it also makes apparent how limited is the potential of this method. To be blunt, the technique is crude. The composer must rely on connections previously established outside the boundaries of her piece. And, although these may provide the work with a recognizable subject or topic, they do not make its subsequent musical articulation, development, or elaboration any easier to achieve than would a title. Even in works that employ this technique, what is accomplished often might better be described as reference plus musical complement (expressive mood, dynamic pattern, or whatever), rather than as the representation of the subject.

REPRESENTATIONS OF MUSIC WITHIN MUSIC

I have suggested that instrumental music does not readily lend itself to representation, either because it cannot easily introduce an extramusical subject or because it cannot elaborate the character of that subject. One intriguing possibility remains to be discussed: that music can represent itself, or, more accurately, that a given piece can represent an aspect of another or of a musical style. If there is anything that music should be able to identify and comment on, it is its own materials.

This idea has a paradoxical air. Earlier I insisted that representation presupposes a distinction between medium and subject. If music as a medium is transparent to itself as a subject, the depiction of music by music will be impossible. This transparency is apparent in most cases. When a theme is repeated later in a movement, it neither represents its former occurrences nor, more generally, itself. Simply, it is re-instanced. The same point applies usually to those cases in which a theme from one work is quoted in another (for instance, as the theme on which a set of variations is based). So long as the style remains the same, the quoted theme is re-presented, not represented.

A distinction between subject and medium making possible the musical representation of musical ideas can obtain under special circumstances, however. In Benjamin Britten's ballet *The Prince of the Pagodas*, the Western classical orchestra represents a Balinese gamelan by imitating its sound and style. Similarly, in Stravinsky's *Petrouschka* the orchestra represents the sound of a barrel organ. These are examples in which one group of instruments emulates another in order to impersonate it. In Stravinsky's *The Rake's Progress*, the tonal idioms of the eighteenth century are invoked, yet the harmonic language retains an unmistakably twentieth-century character through the use of added discords, hints at polytonality, and so on. In Bartok's *Concerto for Orchestra*, a tune from Shostakovich's *Seventh Symphony* is mocked for its banality.

In these examples, differences in orchestration, style, grammar, or treatment separate the medium of the work from its musical subject, allowing the latter to be filtered through the former so that it is not merely repeated. To take the last case as an example, Bartok maintains a distance between the quoted theme and the rest of his work by the ironic mockery that is apparent in his handling of it. I

allow, then, that the cases described qualify as ones in which one kind of music is represented within another. Notice, however, that it is only under rather special conditions that this can be achieved; namely, under circumstances in which there are differences between the music that serves as the medium of representation and the musical ideas that are the subject of representation.

CONCLUSION

I have suggested that music can represent things that produce sounds, provided that the sound is characteristic of its source. In opera, ballet, or song, it can represent the actions or feelings of persons internal to the drama. It can also depict subjects that are introduced in the work's title or that are associated with musical ideas imported to the work. And I have allowed that music can represent aspects of music itself, provided that the subject and the medium of representation are distinguishable.

At the same time, I have stressed how limited is music's representational power. Musical depiction relies on crude isomorphisms in sound or structure, or on external association, or on the conjunction of music with drama or descriptive terms and names. Where representation does occur, it usually concerns only parts of the music rather than the whole. In the case of instrumental music without literary titles and the like, the music presents a dynamic character and expresses emotions without thereby representing these. For these reasons, music is not primarily a depictive art form, and the value of musical works is not mainly concerned with representational achievement, even where representation occurs.¹

NOTE

1. In chapter 2 of *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), I discuss the issues raised here in greater detail.

Representation in Dance: Reference and Resemblance

MILTON SNOEYENBOS

This chapter discusses three issues concerned with the topic of dance representation. First, I argue against recent attempts by Noel Carroll and Nelson Goodman to show that all dance is representational in the broad sense that dance must refer. Second, I discuss the nature and scope of dance representation in those dances that do represent. And third, I discuss central connections between the concepts of representation and expression in dance.

REFERENCE

Dances such as George Balanchine's *Agon*, Merce Cunningham's *Summer-space*, and Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A* raise questions as to whether representation is necessary to dance, for these dances do not have a narrative structure and do not employ standard storytelling theatrical devices. Furthermore, they neither directly express emotion nor represent the expression of emotion. These dances seem to be patterns of movement and nothing more; they do not seem to refer to anything or be "about" anything. Nevertheless, two arguments have recently been employed to show that these dances, and dances in general, do refer, and in that sense are representational.

The first argument that dance is inherently referential, developed by Noel Carroll, is that a dance refers to the tradition of which it is a part.¹ Discussing Rainer's *Trio A*, Carroll acknowledges that it does not represent an object or event and that one of Rainer's goals is to simply present movement. But Carroll says that in attempting to simply present movement, Rainer also rejects or repudiates ballet's representational structures. In deviating consciously from ballet tradition, Rainer in *Trio A* refers to the tradition she repudiates.

Now, *Trio A* was definitely a ground-breaking dance; one might say that it initiated the rejection of the representational and expressive strategies of ballet.

So what Carroll says about *Trio A* is correct; it is "about" the rejection of the ballet tradition, and hence refers to that tradition. But now consider another dance within the Rainer tradition. It is simply done in the Rainer style and does not refer to the ballet. One could even imagine a choreographer working in the Rainer tradition who has no acquaintance with or knowledge of the ballet tradition. Nor need the work "refer" to *Trio A*. It doesn't "refer" to a tradition; it is simply in the Rainer tradition. Of course, some dances do refer to a tradition of which they are a part. Classical ballet is structured hierarchically, and pique turns are normally reserved for the ballerina, not the corps. Yet, in his *Serenade*, Balanchine has the entire corps do a sequence of pique turns. In doing so, Balanchine refers to the ballet tradition of which *Serenade* is a part. But such reference is not essential to a dance in the ballet tradition. Accordingly, a dance need not refer to a dance tradition.

Nelson Goodman also claims that all dances involve reference.² For Goodman, art works (here dances) are symbol systems, and as such they perform one or more referential functions: representation, description, expression, or exemplification. Let us exclude from consideration those dances that represent, describe, or express. If Goodman is correct, the remaining dances must exemplify. For Goodman, exemplification is possession plus reference; a dance exemplifies property P if and only if it (1) possesses P, and (2) refers to P. So, for every dance that neither represents, nor describes, nor expresses, there must be a property the dance both possesses and to which it refers. Of course, any dance possesses numerous properties. But why must such a dance refer to at least one property the dance possesses? Goodman offers no reason; in effect he merely asserts his central thesis that art must refer.

Now some dances that neither represent nor describe nor express do exemplify in Goodman's sense. David Gordon's *Sleepwalking* is neither representational, nor descriptive, nor expressive. It features dancers who focus on walking, then trotting, then running, and then running very fast. The dance exemplifies acceleration; it possesses (or has or consists of) acceleration—it is "about" acceleration. But for Goodman's general thesis to be true, all dances that neither represent nor describe nor express must exemplify. So, consider Lucinda Childs's *Untitled Trio*, which consists of dancers moving parallel to or perpendicular to each other in nonrepetitive permutational sequences. The dancers are often parallel, yet it would be odd to say that the dance refers to the property of being parallel. And though the dancers are sometimes perpendicular, it would be odd to say the dance refers to the property of perpendicularity. Does the dance refer to the property of being a nonrepetitive permutational sequence? Well, it is one of any number of such sequences, it possesses this feature, but it seems strained to say that *Untitled Trio* refers to this property. Modernist dancers such as Merce Cunningham and postmodernists such as Deborah Hay or Laura Dean present us with numerous such works in which it is not that it is difficult to specify which property possessed by the dance is referred to, rather no reference is intended or specifiable. Consider a social dance, such as the foxtrot, which consists of a variety of steps in 4/4 time. One simply does the dance; the steps and movements do

not refer to anything. Accordingly, Goodman's general thesis that dances refer seems not only asserted but false.

I conclude that neither Carroll nor Goodman establishes that dances represent in the very broad sense that they refer. Furthermore, numerous examples point to the conclusion that some dances do not refer.

REPRESENTATION

Dances such as Childs's *Untitled Trio* do not represent anything. And this is not a remarkable finding, because almost all social dancing (waltz, foxtrot, jitterbug, etc.) is nonrepresentational. But some dances clearly are representational. Loring's *Billy the Kid* represents the life of Billy the Kid, and Humphrey's *The Shakers* represents a Shaker dance. What, then, is dance representation, and how do dances represent?

A storytelling ballet like *Billy the Kid* represents sequences of events and acts in the life of Billy: his witnessing the killing of his mother, his act of killing her killer, how he becomes an outlaw, is then captured, escapes, and is finally killed by Pat Garrett. The representationalism of *Billy the Kid* is largely based on represented actions. We have, to take a simplified example, dancer William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing his pistol to shoot Billy. Although from a spectator's point of view there is only one sequence of movements seen, logically speaking the representation of an act involves two actions; we have, in this case, William Carter drawing and William Carter representing Sheriff Pat Garrett drawing. In the stringing together of such complex acts, the saga of Billy is represented.

The recognition that the performance we are watching is a representation of Billy's life is, in part, based on resemblance, in the sense that resemblance is necessary for representation. If there were no scenes, sequences of events, or actions that resembled the events and actions of Billy's life we would not say that we were presented with a dance that represents Billy's life. But resemblance is not sufficient for representation, for the sequence of actions on the stage may more closely resemble the life and demise of Two-gun Jack, a little-known desperado who lies buried in Boot Hill Cemetery. There are, however, other factors, such as the title, program notes, costuming, and scenery, upon which representation may also depend; program notes are particularly important in establishing the representation of particular individuals.

If representation in dance is based on convention and resemblance, then realism is based on degree of resemblance. *Billy the Kid* is fairly realistic; there are signature dances for characters—for example, the riders have bowed legs and spread elbows, there are realistic scenes in which everyone recognizes that guns are being drawn, and the costumes and sets are realistic. But even here we do not find the degree of realism achieved in some theater and mime; Billy the Kid never danced a pas de deux with his girlfriend. The degree of realism is thinner in most full evening Romantic ballets, where realism is established at the beginning with mime and character dances as opposed to the white acts that feature

pure ballet. In Ashton's *Enigma Variations* the resemblances are even more attenuated. The costumes and staging are very realistic and capture Elgar's social milieu, and there are some character dances, but the dancers in the Nimrod variation stick strictly to a classical sequence of arabesques, tombes and pas de basque. Perhaps some relationship among the trio is represented, but the reference is unclear. Finally, a dance such as Balanchine's *Four Temperaments* is a borderline case—it can be regarded as nonrepresentational or as a sequence of character representations. If the dance does represent, it does so by vague hints and allusions.

Given that dance representation often occurs via allusions or hints of resemblance, an understanding of style is important, and sometimes essential, in recognizing resemblances. An example is the pas de deux for a tipsy couple in Christensen's *Filling Station*. The couple reach for each other and miss, or collapse awkwardly into each other, but the resemblance obtains not between the movements of a typical drunken couple and the dancers' movement, but between the distortions of natural movements we see in a drunken couple and the distortions in the general ballet style exhibited by the dancers. And to see that resemblance, one must understand ballet style. Similarly, in *Giselle* the ballerina representing Giselle and the dancer representing Albrecht must be capable of representing a range of emotion in both mime and classical style. In the waltz scene of the first act, their mutual joy is represented by a series of ballone-chasse-coupe, with a beckoning movement by the raised arm on the ballone. Yet the same series, repeated by Giselle after she becomes hysterical, and now done a bit tentatively and with some stylistic unevenness, represents her torment and disintegration. In both cases a grasp of the emotional state represented depends on an understanding of ballet style.

In modern dance, Doris Humphrey's *The Shakers* realistically represents a Shaker dance in terms of floor plan, separation of men and women, and costuming, but it also represents the tensions of Shaker life—the struggle to overcome the gravity of flesh and achieve spiritual communion. Humphrey herself pointed out that her style, based on the fall-and-recovery principle, is integral to the representation of this struggle. In sum, then, representation is based on convention and resemblance, but an understanding of style is important in recognizing and articulating resemblances.

The dances discussed in this section give us an indication of the range of representation in dance. Individuals, their actions and sequences of events (*Billy the Kid*), sorts (a Shaker dance in *The Shakers*), and types of stereotypes (the heroic gas station attendant in *Filling Station*) are representable. So are fictional individuals (Oedipus in Graham's *Night Journey*) and sorts with no members (the Lilac Fairy in *Sleeping Beauty*), for in saying that Bertram Ross looks like or resembles Oedipus, we are saying that what we see on stage is what Oedipus would look like if he existed as historically specified; the resemblance is in a counterfactual context. Processes are also representable: natural processes, such as the movement of water in *Water Study* or the play of light on crystals in Balanchine's *Jewels*; and psychological processes, such as the process of sexual

repression, indulgence, guilt, and redemption in Tudor's *Pillar of Fire*. The expression of emotions and moods may also be represented; Fonteyn portraying Giselle represents Giselle's love for Albrecht.

A dance may also refer by denotational devices. Dance mime exhibits a range of referential devices, from the sign for stop (holding a hand up with the palm out), which resembles an ordinarily used conventional sign for indicating to someone to stop, and is recognizable to one not acquainted with theatrical conventions, to purely conventional devices based on denotation, not resemblance. In the first act of *Giselle*, for example, when her mother warns Giselle that if she continues to dance she will die and become a Wili, she does so by extending her entwined hands above her head, then clenching her fists, crossing her wrists, lowering her arms in front of her, unclenching her fists, placing her hands at her lower spine and gently fluttering her hands. Here we have conventional mime devices that do not resemble or hint at natural gestures, and the meaning of such movements is not available to one who does not understand the conventions. Because such mime conventions are embedded in the ballet style, an understanding of that style is necessary for grasping their meaning.

Finally, dance representation may occur via representational symbolism, in which an action or object represents by resemblance and what is represented is symbolic of a quality or set of qualities. In Ted Shawn's *Labor Symphony* we see the acts of laborers represented by resemblance—scattering seeds, cutting wood, pulling oars, among others—but the acts themselves are symbolic of the nobility, dignity, and honesty of manual labor. Mary Wigman effectively employed representational symbolism in *Face of Night*, the third dance of her solo *Shifting Landscape*. The dancer works off a rigid representation of a cross—feet together and arms extended; the pose resembles a cross, which, in part, symbolizes suffering. Wigman's movement variations from the cross-posture themselves resemble agonized suffering and are especially effective in the symbolic context. In many cases the symbolism is not as clear-cut. Graham's *Errand into the Maze* features a male dancer who represents the Minotaur by resemblance; he wears a bull-like mask, and his arms are fixed on a yoke that rests on his shoulders. Yet the Minotaur is symbolic of crude force, perhaps, or blind oppression, or sexual power; it is difficult to unambiguously pin down the symbolic meaning. And in certain instances the symbolism seems to be personal or private. At one point in Meredith Monk's *Education of a Girlchild* the dancers assemble carrying certain objects: a little model house, a stuffed lizard, a set of deer antlers, and a scythe. The scythe symbolizes death and time, and one feels that the other objects are presented as symbolic, but taken together their symbolism remains unclear to the viewer.

REPRESENTATION AND EXPRESSION

We can now consider briefly some important connections between the concepts of representation and expression. It is common to distinguish the expression of an emotion from an emotion expressed, exhibited, or naturally worn. Jack Palance, for example, could be said to exhibit a cruel facial expression even

though he may not be expressing cruelty at a particular time. This distinction is acknowledged in dance. In ballet, for example, both the character dancer and the classical dancer have to be able to do the steps, and certain physical features such as height and limb proportions do, in part, differentiate them, but the character dancer also typically has an expressive or "magnetic" personality; in part this means that he can exhibit a wide range of expressions, not that when he does so he is actually expressing his emotions. For the character dancer typically exhibits his expressions in mimed action or dramatic representation, and these typically do not involve the actual expression of emotion at all.

This brings us to an important link between the concepts of representation and expression. If I mimic your fear of a snarling dog, I may cringe and grimace in a way that resembles your expression of fear of the dog. But my behavior is not an expression of fear because I am not afraid. My action is not an expression of fear but a representation of your expression of fear. So there is a "surface" of expressive behavior that can be used for representational purposes in dance. In dancing the role of Giselle, for example, Fonteyn represents Giselle's love of Albrecht, but Fonteyn is not necessarily feeling the emotion of love. And Nureyev represents Albrecht's love of Giselle, but does not necessarily express his personal love. In fact, Fonteyn noted that Nureyev often worked himself into the role of Albrecht by getting angry; he found it easier to dance the role feeling that emotion. In that case we have Fonteyn expressing fear of Nureyev while representing Giselle's expression of love for Albrecht.

Now in most cases in ballet the expression of emotion is not the dancer's focus. Standardly, the dancer concentrates on executing her movements and staying in unison with other dancers. Yet in many cases expression and representation reinforce each other powerfully in dance. Fonteyn, for example, may express delight in the progress of a performance and also represent Giselle's delight in Albrecht's love. In modern dance, Martha Graham's works are representational, yet training, technique, style, and narrative structure are often employed to reinforce expression. In *Appalachian Spring*, Graham represented a slightly nervous excited, happy bride, but she was in fact a slightly nervous, excited, happy bride, having recently married her dance partner Eric Hawkins. *Errand into the Maze* as danced by Graham not only represents a woman's indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression, it probably expresses Graham's own indignant fear of crude power and sexual oppression.

Expression and representation, then, thread together in three central ways in dance. In many theatrical dances we have the representation of an expression with no emotion being actually expressed by the dancer. But where representation is effective, it typically rests on the use of a dancer who is expressive in the sense that he can exhibit, and thus represent, a range of expressive postures. Finally, we have dancers, such as Graham in *Appalachian Spring*, of whom it can be said that they both express their emotions and represent a portrayed character's expression.

NOTES

1. Noel Carroll, "Post-Modern Dance and Expression," in *Philosophical Essays on Dance*, ed. Gordon Fancher and Gerald Myers (Brooklyn, NY: Dance Horizons, 1981).
2. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

Film and Representation

THOMAS E. WARTENBERG

When Jimmy Stewart died, to honor his memory, many television stations broadcast some of his old films. As a fan of his, I watched a number of these films and many of the news reports that featured clips from them. While I was watching *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*—Frank Capra's 1939 film of the travails facing an idealistic young senator in the nation's capital—I was surprised to see how young and good-looking Stewart was at the time he made that film. Having become used to him in his later years, the memory of his younger self had faded from my memory.

That, after his death, I learned something about Jimmy Stewart by looking at a film that he made is an example of the sort of fact that has led philosophers of film to claim that film puts us in touch with the world in a distinctive manner, one that is very different from paintings, the other art form that so centrally involves looking. Although looking at a painting that portrays Jimmy Stewart as a handsome young man might incline me to believe that he was handsome, I would not simply conclude that he was on the basis of an artist's rendering of him. So, the question is whether film, like other art forms such as painting, involves the representation of the object it presents to its viewers. Or does it, because of its basis in photography, show us the objects themselves?

No one who loves film can doubt its extraordinary power, especially in the face of death, to preserve the appearance of people at a particular time and place. But whether this power entails that films are realistic in the ontological sense of transparently presenting us with the very objects themselves is a further, and more controversial, issue. The point of my telling you about my reaction to seeing Jimmy Stewart as he appeared at the time of the filming of *Mr. Smith* is that this seems to support the idea that films allow us to see the world in an unmediated fashion, so that we can directly see objects in the world, such as Jimmy Stewart himself, even though Stewart was dead at the time that I saw him. In these concrete terms, then, the question facing us is: When I saw that Jimmy

Stewart was extraordinarily handsome as a young man, was I actually seeing him as a young man or only a representation of him?

I begin my discussion of this issue by looking at attempts to defend the realist thesis. After a quick look at André Bazin's statement of the realist position, I focus upon a recent article by Kendall Walton that presents a strong defense of realism. I then consider a critique of realism and defense of representationalism put forward by Noel Carroll. After canvassing a number of problems with Carroll's position, I develop a version of representationalism that I see as defensible.

Before beginning, let me make a terminological point. The ontological issue of realism in film depends upon the broader question of the nature of photography. Although I am discussing the question in relation to film, many of my remarks also apply to the photograph as such, be it still or moving. So when I make a claim about the nature of film, it needs to be understood that such a claim generally is a claim about photographic media in general, although I do not always explicitly gesture to the more general claim. And when I make a claim about the nature of photography, it needs to be understood that this entails a related claim about film.

TRANSPARENT REALISM

The realist in regard to film argues that a film, because of its reliance on photography, presents us directly with the objects that we see depicted in it. So when I see Jimmy Stewart playing Jefferson Smith in *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, according to the film realist I am quite literally seeing Jimmy Stewart, the actor. Because he was photographed when the film was made, I am able to perceive him, and not just his representation, when I watch the film in which he acted. Seeing him as a young man, I can then unproblematically conclude that he was handsome on the basis of his visual appearance in the film.

On the face of it, the realist view of film is puzzling. There clearly is a significant difference between seeing Jimmy Stewart in person and watching a film in which he acted. Nonetheless, in trying to account for the power of films, many theorists have maintained that one element of their ineluctable power over us as viewers is their ability to present us with objects themselves.

André Bazin is the theorist who stands at the beginning of this realist tradition. In his writings about film, Bazin always championed realism, both as a cinematic style and as a characteristic of film as such. Indeed, his ontological view of film as an inherently realistic artistic medium and his championing of realism as a film style mutually support one another. The terms in which Bazin couches his presentation of realism as an ontological characteristic of film are quite striking:

The photographic image is the object itself; the object freed from the conditions of time and space that governs it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.¹

This quotation conveys some of the enthusiasm of Bazin's reflections on film. His equation of the photographic image of an object and the object itself is, however, rather puzzling. Though it may be true that films present us with objects directly, the film images of the objects are not the objects themselves, do not belong to the same order of being. But despite the exaggerations in Bazin's statement of his position, it is clear that, at the very least, he believes that films present their viewers directly with the very objects that they see in the film. From this point of view, film is a very different art form than painting, for paintings can only represent the world, show us its objects through the mediation of an artist's consciousness. The distinctive nature of film, according to Bazin, is that it does not merely represent things, but it presents them directly and immediately to us, and it does so in virtue of its basis in photography.

In the passage just quoted, Bazin also explains why the photographic basis of film is so central to the realist's account. He asserts that the realism of a photograph derives from its "very process of its becoming." By this phrase, Bazin is here referring to the fact that, like all photography, film relies on a mechanical reproduction of the physical world.² Bazin is more specific about this aspect of the photographic image when he states: "For the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man [*sic*]."³ Once a view has been selected, according to the realist, the camera reproduces reality without the intervention of human agency, proceeding in a purely mechanical manner in accordance with physical laws of optics and the like. As a result, there is supposed to be an accuracy, a truth, an immediacy to the view of the world presented by a film that is necessarily lacking in painting, where human intervention is constitutive of the existence of its worldly representations.

As Bazin formulates the position of realism, there are many serious difficulties with it. Not the least of these is trying to account for the way in which things themselves are directly present to viewers of films.⁴ Further, Bazin does not clearly distinguish realism as an ontological thesis about the nature of cinematic representation from the question of whether there is a specific film style that is superior to others. Indeed, as I have mentioned, much of his rationale for the ontological characterization he adopts is his enthusiasm for realism as a cinematic style.

So in order to investigate the possibilities for realism as an ontological account of the nature of film, it will be useful to turn to a more recent account, one that does not confuse the ontological question with the stylistic one. The account I investigate is one put forward by Kendall Walton in an important and very influential article, "Transparent Picture: On the Nature of Photographic Realism."⁵ Like Bazin, Walton defends an account of film and photography according to which they present their viewers with the things themselves rather than their representations, but his account is more carefully nuanced and thus presents a more suitable version for our critical investigation.⁶

The central claim of Walton's realism is that photography should be thought about as making "a contribution to the enterprise of seeing" (251), as allowing us to see the same objects that we see by the unaided use of our eyes, but in a dif-

ferent manner. To make this point, Walton asks us to consider the nature of various different aids to vision, like mirrors, glasses, telescopes, and microscopes. These “visual prosthetic devices”—to use a term introduced by Noel Carroll in the article I discuss in the following section of this chapter—allow us to see the things that we normally see, but in ways or circumstances that we would not be able to without their intervention. Mirrors allow us to see things that are around a corner; telescopes and microscopes reveal things that are either too far or too small to be seen without the mediation of the appropriate instrument. Even glasses bring into focus for us things that we would see only fuzzily without their aid. Such devices help us see things when we normally would not be able to. In Walton’s account, a photograph is simply a different type of aid to seeing, one that allows us to see not only things whose spatial relations to us make them impossible for us to see without mechanical intervention, but also things whose temporal relations to us keep us from seeing them, namely, objects that belong to the past: “Photography is an aid to vision also, and an especially versatile one. With the assistance of the camera, we can see not only around corners and what is distant or small; we can also see into the past” (251). As Walton points out, we regularly employ instruments that allow us to get better and more-accurate glimpses of the objects that surround us. Despite the fact that visual prosthetic devices affect our vision, we don’t think of them as doing anything but allowing us to see objects better than we normally could. We certainly do not think of them as interfering with our vision of the things themselves, as screening us from objects, although some philosophers have been tempted in that direction. Instead, we believe that the use of a lens improves my view of objects in the world by allowing me to see them more perspicuously. All such devices are *transparent*, Walton claims, in that we see things through them, without their contribution mattering in anything but the sense that they make our view of objects clearer than it would be without their aid.

The central contention of Walton’s version of film realism, then, is that a camera is nothing more and nothing less than another transparent visual prosthetic device, an instrument that allows us to see objects better than we could without its help. Like other devices that employ lenses, cameras allow us to see aspects of the object around us more clearly, more precisely than we would in their absence. One of the early facts that Muybridge’s study of motion revealed, for example, was that a horse did have all of its feet off the ground at one point in its run, something that was not determinable by the naked eye alone. Because a camera allows us to break up our normal perception into much more finely grained spatial and temporal units, it is able to reveal aspects of our world to us to which we could not have access without its intervention.

Relying on such facts, Walton claims that cameras produce transparent pictures, that is to say, pictures that, unlike paintings, present us with objects rather than representations of objects. He emphasizes photography’s “remarkable ability to put us in perceptual contact with the world” (273). Whereas Cézanne’s still-lives of apples do not present us with apples but rather with Cézanne’s depiction of them, Capra’s film allows us to see Jimmy Stewart, not just his representation.

The contrast between painting as opaque pictures and photographs as transparent ones is central to Walton's version of film realism. To say that paintings are opaque is to say that they present us with representations of objects. We do not see objects directly in a painting, but only a painter's representation of them. What we see in a painting depends on the beliefs of a painter in a way that what we see in a photograph does not. Cézanne's vision of apples may make us see the fruit differently the next time we encounter one in a grocery store, but his painting of an apple is a rendering of his vision of the apple, not the apple itself. In this view, it is a unique characteristic of photography that it can allow us to see the things themselves without interposing itself between us and the things they present to us.

REPRESENTATIONALISM

Walton's defense of the transparency of photographs, with its concomitant assertion that film is a realistic medium in an ontological sense, has given rise to a great deal of discussion. For my purposes, I want to focus on Noel Carroll's attempt in "Defining the Moving Image" to show that Walton is wrong in claiming that films are transparent, that they put us in touch with objects themselves.⁷ From Carroll's point of view, films, like other art forms, involve representation.

Carroll develops a number of different lines of objection to Walton's thesis. He points out, for example, that not all films involve photography, so that it cannot be an essential feature of the medium that it be photographic. As more and more films come to employ computer-generated images rather than actual photographs of objects, the realist account of film as an art form would simply turn out to be mistaken about what a film involves. However, instead of pursuing this criticism of film realism, I want to focus on a line of argument that involves a more direct contestation of Walton's analysis of photography and its link to film realism. Here, the main claim that Carroll makes is that there is a "principled reason for regarding telescopes [and other instruments] as visual prosthetic devices while withholding the same status from photographic and cinematic images" (61). Carroll believes that producing a criterion that differentiates cameras from transparent visual prosthetic devices will reveal a fatal flaw in the strategy that Walton employs in his argument in favor of film realism.

Carroll argues that what distinguishes film and photography from transparent visual prosthetic devices is that the former involve what he calls "detached displays," that is, "displays whose virtual spaces are detached from the space of my experience" (62). This distinction can be explained as follows: When I use a transparent prosthetic device such as glasses, there is a continuity between the space my body inhabits and the space that I see by means of the prosthetic device. Although instruments like glasses allow us to see things that we normally could not, the objects that I see by means of them are always situated in a space that is continuous with the space that I occupy as a perceiver.

When I look at a photographic or film image of an object, Carroll claims, things are very different:

Suppose that I am watching *Casablanca* and what I see on the screen is Rick's bar. I cannot, on the basis of the image, orient my body to the bar—to the spatial coordinates of that structure as it existed some time in the early forties in California (nor could I orient my body by means of the image to the putative fictional locale [in North Africa] of the film). The space, so to speak, between the set of Rick's bar and my body is discontinuous. (62)

Carroll's point is that films present us with objects in a space that is discontinuous with the space we occupy as perceivers. He claims that this differentiates the camera as a mechanical device from visual prosthetic devices, for the latter always maintain a continuous spatial relationship between our bodies and the objects they present to us.

Carroll introduces the term "detached display" to characterize the manner in which films present objects in the world to us. To say that a film involves a detached display is to say that it represents or "displays" objects to us in a space that is discontinuous with the space of our experience. Because the objects that we see in a film are displayed in this detached manner, Carroll asserts that they are not presented to us transparently; we do not see them directly.

One problem with Carroll's analysis is that it doesn't really allow us to see what the problem with the realist's claim is. Even if we grant Carroll his claim that there is a spatial discontinuity between the space of a photographic depiction and the space that I occupy as a perceiver—a claim that is not true of all films (think here of documentaries)—why does this show that the realist is wrong to claim that I can see objects directly in a photograph or a film? Surely, Walton would not argue that when he is looking at a photograph of his great-grandfather, he knows (except perhaps accidentally) how to orient himself in relation to the space depicted in the picture. (The setting of the photography might, for example, be a woods that cannot be identified.) But even so, Walton would claim that he can see his great-grandfather by looking at his photograph.

Despite the failure of Carroll's claims about detached displays to provide an adequate response to the film realist, they do point in the right direction by calling attention to the photographic image itself. However, Carroll's emphasis upon the spatial discontinuity between the space that my body occupies and the space depicted in a film or photograph obscures an important difference between the camera and transparent visual prosthetic devices. Whereas transparent visual prosthetic devices allow us to see objects directly, cameras interpose an image—what Carroll calls a "display"—through which we see the object. What is significant about this display is not the fact that it is spatially detached from the space that my body occupies, but that it presents an image through which I see the objects it displays. This is an important difference between how cameras present objects to us and how transparent prosthetic devices do, one that Carroll fails to emphasize but that provides the criterion that he was seeking.

This difference is important because it allows us to understand why visual prosthetic devices allow us to see objects directly while cameras do not. A visual prosthetic device alters the actual visual experience that a perceiver has by changing the input that her eyes receive. This alteration is experienced directly when, for example, I put on my glasses. The glasses intervene in the causal chain

through which an object impacts upon my retina by changing the direction of the light rays emanating from the object. Other visual prosthetic devices like telescopes and microscopes work similarly, using lenses to alter the light patterns that strike our eyes. These instruments are transparent precisely because their impact on the causal chain through which we see objects is only a certain type of lawful alteration of information that is supplied independently of their effect.

But cameras are different. Although they do intervene in a causal chain through which we see objects, their intervention is of a different character than that of a visual prosthetic device, for they create an image of the object and it is this image that is the immediate object of our visual perception. It is not a matter of contention that this alters the nature of the object, if only to "freeze it in time," as Bazin poetically puts it. But what is important from an ontological point of view is that a camera creates an image through which we see objects. This mediation of our view of the world by an image is why a camera is not simply a visual prosthetic device.

In his response to objections raised by Edwin Martin, Walton specifically rejects the existence of an image as a characteristic that distinguished cameras from visual prosthetic devices. Walton's remarks are made in the context of considering whether there is some point in the sequence of optical instruments from glasses through microscopes and telescopes to cameras that marks a significant enough change to warrant the claim that only instruments on one side of that point are visual prosthetic devices:

Does the important change come with the use of optical instruments which project *real* images rather than merely *virtual* ones? If so, we would see through simple magnifying glasses but not through ordinary compound microscopes, since the lower lens of a compound microscope produces a real image which serves as an object for the upper lens.⁸

Walton's response here is inadequate, for the issue is not whether images exist in the process of visual perception, but whether an image is the immediate object of a person's perception of an object. Cameras are different from many of the optical instruments that Walton discusses precisely because they present a real image for a perceiver to see. Glasses, simple microscopes, and simple telescopes do not present objects to perceivers by means of a real image that the perceiver sees. This is, *pace* Walton, a significant difference precisely because the image that is interposed in the case of cameras—and, it is important to acknowledge, many other complex optical instruments—is the immediate object of perception.

But it is not only such complex devices as radio telescopes to which we may deny the status of transparent visual prosthetic device. As simple an optical instrument as a mirror will not count as such precisely because it also presents things in the world to us by means of an image. Once we are looking at an image of a thing rather than the thing itself, we are in the realm of representation. Whereas devices that employ lenses like glasses, microscopes, and telescopes work without the mediation of an image, mirrors and cameras do not. For this reason, they involve representations of objects rather than their direct presentation.

Walton's failure to acknowledge the significance of this distinction leads him to attribute to the photograph an ontological distinction that is not warranted.

This distinction also saves us from some of the problematic consequences of Walton's view. As Martin points out, in Walton's account, if I were looking at a dinosaur's footprint, I would be seeing the dinosaur, for the impression, like a photograph, is mechanically produced by the object in question.⁹ Although Walton seems not to be bothered by this apparently odd result—he simply claims that such diverse items as glasses, telescopes, and footprints form a natural kind¹⁰—it does provide a reason for rejecting his account. Once one differentiates between instruments that produce an image of the thing seen, and hence involve its representation, and those that do not, one can drive a wedge into this supposed natural kind, a wedge that divides those things that we use to see things in the world and those things that merely represent them to us. Glasses may allow me to see you, but your photograph provides me with your representation.

THE LOGIC OF SEEING

Because cameras produce photographic images, then, they allow us to see objects by looking at those images. Nonetheless, my contention is that we do not directly see the objects whose images we look at, but only how they are represented by those images.¹¹ So far, we have seen that this view can be defended against the claim that cameras are transparent visual prosthetic devices. In this section, I explore the logic of seeing in order to show why realists may have been tempted into claiming that film and photography are transparent art forms.

Previously, I claimed that what distinguishes cameras from visual prosthetic devices is that cameras allow us to see things by means of the images they produce. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between the immediate objects of perception—in the case of cameras, an image—and mediate objects of perception—the objects that the camera photographs. Although there is a sense in which we want to say that we really only see immediate objects of perception, there is another sense in which we can say—though not without some philosophical peril, as Walton's views make apparent—that we can see a mediate object of perception by means of an immediate one. But all this requires some further explanation.

First off, let me issue a warning: Nothing in what I am now saying bears any but the most superficial resemblances to sense-data theory. Although I distinguish immediate and mediate objects of perception, I am not introducing a new ontological realm to occupy the position of the former. All that I want to call attention to is the fact that we use the word "see" in a stricter and looser sense. Failure to attend to this fact has, it seems to me, caused Walton and others to make misguided claims about the nature of film as an artistic medium.

The distinction between immediate and mediate objects of perception can be made without any reference to images. Consider the claim that I saw that there was a fire next door. In certain circumstances, when I make this claim, it might be because I looked next door and saw that there were flames leaping from my neigh-

bor's house. In such a case, the fire was the immediate object of my perception. However, there may also be cases when I make this claim but the fire was not the immediate object of my perception. For example, I might have noticed great billows of smoke coming from the direction of my neighbor's home and concluded on the basis of the familiar dictum "Where there's smoke, there's fire" that there was a fire next door. In cases like this, I might claim that I saw (mediately) the fire next door, but I would do so by seeing (immediately) the smoke.

In such cases, we see that something by looking at something else. The situation is very much like that of using a thermometer to measure the temperature. Although I might claim that I saw that my son had a fever, I do not literally see his fever. What I do see is the level of the mercury column in a thermometer that I use to indicate his temperature. If we distinguish between the mercury as the immediate object of perception and my son's fever as the mediate one, we can make sense of my claiming to see my son's fever without getting into ontological muddles.

I want to claim that looking at films is like watching smoke or looking at a thermometer in the sense that the images that we see on the screen are the immediate objects of our perception that allow us to see objects in the world in a mediated manner. Though we do see these objects, we only see them in a mediate manner, never as the immediate objects of our perception, when we look at films. By failing to distinguish between the immediate and mediate objects of perception, the film realist winds up making the unjustified claim that because we do in some sense see objects in the world by means of film images, those objects must be directly seen in a film.

If we consider Walton's description of how looking at a photograph of his great-grandfather allows him to see his great-grandfather, we will be able to see (that is, understand) how his claim to see his great-grandfather relies on the elision of the very distinction I have been drawing:

My great-grandfather died before I was born. He never saw me. But I see him occasionally—when I look at photographs of him. They are not great photographs, by any means, but like most photographs they are transparent. We see things through them.¹²

What is noncontroversial is that when he looks at the photograph of his great-grandfather, Walton sees an image of the man that he takes to be his great-grandfather. What is controversial, however, is Walton's claim that he is actually seeing his great-grandfather himself when he looks at his photograph. Indeed, there seems to be all the difference in the world between seeing a person in the flesh and looking at their photograph. Walton wants to deny this difference because he thinks that it makes sense to say that he sees his great-grandfather when he looks at his photograph.

But we can allow Walton to say that he sees his great-grandfather when he looks at his photograph, so long as we are clear that he is not seeing through the photograph but rather by it. What I mean is that the image of his great-grandfather is precisely what he sees immediately and that licenses any claims that he

makes about him. His great-grandfather is the mediate object of his perception, the object that the immediate object of his perception is of.

Walton's failure to distinguish between the immediate and mediate objects of perception has some odd results, a number of which I discussed in the previous section of this chapter. Let me explore an additional one now by considering shadows. Walton claims that "to see something is to have visual experiences which are caused, in a certain manner, by what is seen" (261). If we rely on this sense of "see," I can see things by looking at shadows. For example, I can see that my son is thin by looking at his shadow. Of course, not just any shadow might do an equally good job of allowing me to see this fact about my son, but that is also true of photographs. But in Walton's account, this means that shadows allow us to see objects through them in a transparent manner. This hardly seems plausible, however.

The problem, again, is that when a shadow is the immediate object of my perception, it allows me to see things about the object whose shadow it is, but only in the sense that the object itself is the mediate object of my perception. There is nothing problematic about learning things about objects by looking at their shadows. The problem is in taking our perception of the shadow to result in our seeing the object itself, as Walton does.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have considered the question of whether film and other photographic media put us into contact with objects themselves. I have argued that they do not, that films present us with images and not things in the world themselves. Once we are clear that the primary objects of visual perception are the images presented in a film, then we can see what is wrong with the temptation to attribute transparency to film, to claim that film puts viewers in touch with the physical world in an unmediated fashion.

Settling the ontological question of film realism, however, does not settle all the questions of representation and film. Indeed, it opens the door for considering how films represent objects to us in a more specific sense. This chapter is thus a prolegomenon to further discussion of filmic representation and all the issues raised by this most fascinating of artistic media.¹³

NOTES

1. André Bazin, *What Is Cinema?*, vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 14.

2. The fact that film involves a mechanical reproduction of the world was the basis of Walter Benjamin's famous reflections on film and the loss of aura. See "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken, 1969), 217–51.

3. Bazin, 13.

4. Stanley Cavell discusses this issue at some length in *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

5. *Critical Inquiry* 11 (December 1984): 246–77. All future reference to this text will be given parenthetically.

6. There are other realist accounts of photography. See, for example, Roger Scruton, “Photography and Representation,” in *The Aesthetic Understanding* (London: Methuen, 1983); and Patrick Maynard, “Drawing and Shooting: Causality in Depiction,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 44 (1985).

7. In Noel Carroll, *Theorizing the Moving Image* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49–74. All future references to this work will be given parenthetically in the text.

8. Kendall Walton, “Looking Again through Photographs: A Response to Edwin Martin,” *Critical Inquiry* 12 (summer 1986): 806.

9. Edwin Martin, “On Seeing Walton’s Great-Grandfather,” *Critical Inquiry* 12 (summer 1986): 797.

10. Walton, 805.

11. My discussion in this section, and in this chapter in general, is deeply indebted to Trevor Ponech’s excellent discussion of vision in “Visual Perception and Motion Picture Spectatorship,” *Cinema Journal* 37, no. 1 (fall 1997): 85–100.

12. Walton, 801.

13. I discuss some of these issues in *Unlikely Couples: A Cinema of Transgressive Love* (Boulder, CO: Westview, forthcoming).

Representation in Painting and Drama: Arguments from Indian Aesthetics

ANANTA CH. SUKLA

PREFACE

As early as the 4th century B.C. drama was conceived in India as the representation of actions of the three worlds—heaven, earth, and the underworld, that is, the actions of the gods, human beings, and demons. The Sanskrit words used for representation by Bharata, the father of Indian aesthetics in general and dramaturgy in particular, in his work entitled *Nāṭyaśāstra*, are *anukṛti* and *anukaraṇa*, which literally mean imitation, or doing after. But Bharata creates problems when, in his definition of drama, he also uses two other Sanskrit terms *bhāvānukīrtana* and *anubhāvana*, which mean re- (or/after) description of emotion and re-/after occurrence of emotion respectively. These two sets of terms allow a scope for the commentators of Bharata for interpreting the nature of representation in drama in different ways. But before coming to the commentators, it is necessary to understand Bharata's own conception of drama as available in the information he provides about the origin and the nature of dramatic art taking both the artwork itself and its experience by the audience into consideration.

INTRODUCTION

Once, the gods appealed to Brahmā, the proto-creator of the universe, to present them a toy (*kṛīḍanīyaka*) that should be both visible and audible. Such a toy would delightfully purify the creatures of Jambudvīpa (the mythical name of India) who, being deviated from appropriate conduct being afflicted by passions (lust, jealousy, anger, and the like) Brahmā, the composer of the four Vedas, was

pleased to grant the appeal and devised the drama, an audiovisual toy, combining physical gestures, dialogues, music, dance, and costume. The first appropriate occasion for exhibiting this toy was the banner festival of Indra, the king of heaven, and the action represented therein was the battle between the gods and demons that led to the defeat of the latter. The action naturally enraged the demons because their defeat delighted the gods, their rivals. Therefore, they immediately avenged their offense by destroying the stage and stopping the performance, and finally, complained that Brahmā had exhibited parochialism by upholding the victory of the gods and ridiculing their own defeat. Brahmā understood that the demons in the audience had identified themselves with the demons represented by the actors on the stage, and this identification had been the root of all disturbances. He then addressed the demons, the core point of his address being that the audience should not identify the dramatic representation with factual reality. As a toy, this representation is meant for the delight of the audience, and what is represented on the stage is not any particular action or event that could be identified with any such phenomenon ever occurring in the course of history; it is rather the law of action, a general principle that governs the course of action. So the action and its agents represented in a drama are only the illustrations of this law of action. What was therefore represented in the particular drama staged by Bharata was the principle that in the battle of good and evil, the former always wins and the latter loses. It was only incidentally that Bharata took the gods and demons as the examples of good and evil. There might have been any other event and any other agents exemplifying this principle. The subject matter of drama covers the whole range of cultural activities—religion, arts, philosophy, customs, laws, emotions and events—not in any particular but in a generalized form.¹

At the same time, Brahmā was aware of a critical point: the audience-demons' identification with the actor-demons was due to the fact that the whole event was factually true. It had happened in the very recent course of history with the same gods and demons, which constituted the audience of the drama, as actual participants. So this personal identification was due to the contemporaneity of the action represented. Brahmā therefore instructed that no contemporary action should be represented in the drama;² and by such proscription Brahmā wanted to say that the dramatic representation is a fiction and not a fact, and the fictionality of an action means a particular illustration of a general law of action. The same law of action may be illustrated severally by several particular actions and their agents. The particular events and characters in a drama do (or should) not have their counterparts in the real world. The nature of the events and agents of the drama is further explicated by Bharata in the sixth chapter of his text where he understands drama in terms of the experience of audience. Although in the first chapter he states that the subject matter of drama is as wide ranging as to include the whole range of learning and action—arts, crafts, morals, history, religion, pragmatic information, and the like—so as to attain the authenticity of the fifth Veda, in the sixth chapter Bharata mentions that the sole object (*artha*) of the dramatic representation is to generate emotional experience called *Rasa*. A correla-

tion of both the contexts leads to an observation that the actions represented in the drama are necessarily expressive of emotions. In other words, representation of actions means representation of emotions through actions and their agents, which ultimately generate delight. The same point, therefore, explains the nature of the dramatic representation as well as the nature of aesthetic experience. Although any discussion of this point tends toward an overlapping of both the issues, it is possible to separate the issue of representation and examine it in the light of interpretations offered by several commentators of Bharata who lived during the eighth to tenth centuries.

Bharata states that *Rasa* is generated by the combination of *Vibhāvas*³ (characters that shelter the emotions and situations that stimulate the emotions), *anubhāvas* (the actions of the characters) and *vyabhicārībhāvas* (temporary feelings).⁴ So far as the question of representation is concerned, this statement, by implication, refers to the trilateral relation among reality, drama as a literary text and its performance on the stage. The combination as mentioned here takes place in the real world (where they are called cause and effect respectively), it is described in a literary text by the playwright, and, finally the text is performed on the stage. As Bharata has already stated, the events and characters of the drama (and by implication in all the literary forms such as epic, lyric, and prose narrative) do not represent any particular fact or character of the real world, but illustrate the general laws of actions. Now what is the relation between the textual characters and the actors in the performance of the text? A performance in general is a specific action or set of actions, and a dramatic performance in particular is the single occurrence of a repeatable and pre-existent text. The text therefore anticipates and even authorizes its several performances (or occurrences) logically transcending them all.⁵

In other words, if the characters and so on of a dramatic text are the illustrations of the general law of actions, performances (or role-playing) by the actors in different occurrences of the same play are also illustrations of the characters and their actions. The fact that different performances of the same play are repeatedly attended by the same audience evidences the hypothetical "perfection" of a performance.

The Sanskrit critics, however, have viewed the representational relations differently. Out of several commentaries on Bharata only one by Abhinavagupta (tenth century) survives, and from Abhinava's accounts of different commentators, one might extrapolate several theories of representation.

REPRESENTATION AS ILLUSION

Lollaṭa (ninth century A.D.) understands that the dramatic representation in a performance is an illusion of reality—the characters and so on in the world are pre-existent to their representation by the actors.⁶ He thinks that in the real world when an emotion (say love) is intensified (*upacita*) by virtue of its combination with characters and their actions and the like, it generates delight (*Rasa*) primarily in those characters, and secondarily in the actors when they represent those

characters and the like. Here Lollaṭa is reported to have rejected the views of his predecessors Udbhata (eighth century A.D.) and his followers who did not accept such a view, because, they argued, if the actors would personally feel delighted or shocked (by the dramatic incident of death or whatever) then it would be difficult for them to concentrate on acting. This kind of understanding is therefore erroneous (*bhrama*). But Lollaṭa answers that because the actors are specially trained, by the power of their memory they can manage to keep up their concentration even when they are affected by pleasure and pain and so on. To quote Abhinava's text on Lollaṭa: "The state is present in both the character represented, i.e., Rāma etc. primarily (*mukhyayā vṛttyā*) and in the representing actor by the power of a recollection (*anusandhāna*) of the nature of Rāma etc."

The view thus presented does not make any reference to the audience explicitly. But any theory of representation must make a reference to the addressee: Representation is always of something or someone, by something or someone, to someone. Bharata has very clearly mentioned the role of audience, which is rather the center of representation in his text. Because there is every doubt for an adequate presentation of Lollaṭa in the text of Abhinava available so far, the purport of Lollaṭa may be reformulated in a way that would mean that reality is the primary aesthetic object and art, its representation, is a secondary aesthetic object by virtue of its becoming real (*tadātmaka*).

In other words, to the audience an actor represents the reality to the extent that he becomes reality. But the question is whether the actor really becomes real for the audience or for himself—that is to say, whether the audience experiences an illusion of reality in the actor because of his semblance to the reality or the actor himself experiences an illusion of reality by factual identification (*tadātmakatva*), or both are true simultaneously. The issue becomes a serious one for the use of the Sanskrit words *anusandhi* and *anusandhāna*, which are polysemous synonyms meaning recollection, memory, consciousness, reflection and awareness. If the trilateral structure of representation is read into Lollaṭa's thesis, the Sanskrit words play a significant role in establishing the theory of theatrical representation as an illusion of reality. Because both words mean recollection, the theory of perceptual error relevant in the context refers to the Mīmāṃsā theory of *akhyāti* or nonapprehension as advanced by Prabhākara Bhaṭṭa (seven to eighth century A.D.).⁷

The Mīmāṃsā school believes in the self-validity of knowledge, that is, every knowledge is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ prāmānya*); its validity is not determined by extraneous factors. A necessary corollary of this theory, therefore, is that every apprehension must be valid. Prabhākara states: "It is strange indeed how a cognition can apprehend itself and yet be valid." In explaining the nature of perceptual errors such as illusions and dreams Prabhākara distinguishes experience from memory and holds that though every experience (*anubhūti*) is valid, memory is not valid because it is the impression or recollection of the past experience. In an illusion when a shell is mistaken for a piece of silver, our cognition is "This is silver." This cognition, though it appears as a single one, is a composite of two cognitions—apprehension and memory. "This" (shell) is perceived,

but “silver” is remembered. The cognition as a whole is valid because its object “this” is never sublated even in a sublating judgment. But the object of memory “silver” is sublated by shell. The error consists in our nonapprehension of the distinction between the objects perceived and remembered. The common quality or qualities of the objects of our perception and memory is/are responsible for such nonapprehension (*akhyāti*) of their difference.

Similarly, in a theatrical performance, an actor is a representation of reality (Rāma and so on) for the audience by virtue of the common qualities—both formal and gesticular such as matted hair, bark garments, holding bow and arrows, weeping for separation from his wife, and so on, as described in the authentic text, for example, the epic *Rāmāyana*—to the extent that for the time being the actor becomes Rāma and the audience cognizes Rāma in the actor by virtue of his memory (*anusandhānabalāt*) of the textual descriptions of Rāma. The audience perceives the actor, but remembers Rāma. Therefore the cognition “This is Rāma” is not a composite perceptual experience. It is a confusion of experience with memory, and Prabhākara says, this confusion is due to a defect of mind (*manadoṣaḥ*).

That art is an illusion of reality by virtue of the accuracy of its resemblance with reality is as old a notion as the Homeric appreciation of the shield of Achilles culminating in the legendary pictures of Zeuxis and Parrhasius that could confuse both birds and human beings so much so that the birds even pecked at the picture of a bunch of grapes made by the former.⁸

The theory of illusion has recently migrated from myths and legends to the psychology of artistic vision and the optics of aesthetic perception. E. H. Gombrich’s central thesis of artistic illusion is based on a relativist psychology of perception, and he consciously avoids the epistemological questions in both our perception of the external world and its representation in art. He understands that the two types of reaction are closely allied: perception and representation. Because there is no innocent eye and because of the relativity of our vision, there is no objectively “correct vision” of things. Transformation of the three-dimensional world into our two-dimensional perceptual vision is a question of psychological and physical perspectives. Both perception and representation heavily draw on conceptual schemata. Pictorial representation is therefore not a duplication (a two-dimensional form is not obviously a duplication of the three-dimensional world) but a visual description of what the artist sees. If what the artist sees is not the objectively correct view of the world, then, in a sense, all our perceptual knowledge is only illusory, and further, its representation in a picture, if not an illusion of an illusion, aims at least at a partial subversion of belief by the spectator that he sees the world and not its representation. To put it symbolically, X is a representation of Y, if there is at least a partial subversion of belief by the spectator that he is seeing Y and not X.⁹

Instead of making any attempt at criticizing Gombrich’s view of art as illusion (which has been already done by several others¹⁰), we now examine its relevance, by way of putting it as a contrast rather than a parallel, in the context of Lollaṭa’s view of the theater as illusion. Leaving aside the question of visual per-

spectives and the conceptual schemata in the case of the pictorial representation of the three-dimensional world, because it is not applicable to the theater, which is a three-dimensional kinetic representation, it is pertinent to ask whether there is any subversion of belief by the spectator that it is not a drama but reality—whether, as Gombrich thought of painting, it is impossible to “stalk” the illusion in dramatic representation. Obviously not so, Gombrich’s duck–rabbit analogy does not hold good here. Actors and the like are not sometimes taken as actors and sometimes as real characters. Nor is there any confusion of the configuration with the representation, because in the theater both the configuration and representation are ontologically identical—here action is represented by means of action. Besides, as Wollheim observes, Gombrich’s notion of representation does not explain the nature of representation in general, that is, a representation is always different from what is presented.¹¹ If to see the picture of a horse is to see it as a horse, then the picture is not a representation of a horse. The point is, precisely, Gombrich’s treatment being purely psychological, it eludes the epistemological issue of the problem, which is extremely significant. What might be true of the situation is that in seeing the picture of a horse, we psychologically see it as a horse, but not epistemologically. Therefore the story of the birds pecking at Zeuxis’ picture of a bunch of grapes is only a legend and has nothing to do with any philosophical treatment of the subject.

Apart from the major differences noted in the approaches of Lollaṭa and Gombrich to the notion of illusion in art—Lollaṭa’s being an epistemological and Gombrich’s psychological or perspectival—both critics almost agree on one point that in art the representation is taken (mistaken) as the represented. Although Lollaṭa’s ideas do not approve of any subversion of vision and beliefs swinging between seeing art as a configuration and as a representation, Gombrich’s idea of the impossibility of stalking the illusion only partly explains Lollaṭa’s drawing upon the Mīmāṃsā theory of illusion that the confusion of art with reality or the perceptual experience with memory is due to a defect of mind.

Besides, if understood correctly, Gombrich’s theory of art as illusion overlaps the Indian doctrines of illusion and doubt. Gombrich understands the artistic illusion as an ambiguity of vision typified in the duck–rabbit figure, a visual puzzle where either the duck or the rabbit can be seen at a time, not both. Similarly there is the “canvas or nature” dichotomy, that is, the difference between seeing something as a configuration and as a representation. But apart from the truth that it is absolutely possible to see the configuration as a configuration and as a representation simultaneously, Gombrich’s duck–rabbit figure is not an appropriate example of his “canvas or nature” dichotomy: because whereas in the case of the puzzle it is a question of choosing one from the two representations, in the other case it is a question of choosing either a configuration or a representation.¹² To follow the Indian thinkers, an illusion is free from doubt, it is a definite cognition. One sees a snake in a rope, does not vacillate between a snake and a rope—a case of doubt (*saṁśaya*). If a statue is accepted as a man, then it is a case of illusion. If the vision moves in between a man and a statue (*sthāṇurvā puruṣovā*), it is a case of doubt. Gombrich’s idea of the impossibility

of “stalking the illusion” does not form part of the Indian theory of illusion. No Indian critic, however, has considered art as a form of doubt.

However, the principal defect that is true of both the theorists of illusion is to ignore that a representation should be experienced as a representation and not as reality. In other words, the audience perceives art as the representation of reality, not as the reality itself. This is what Friedrich Nietzsche emphatically states in *The Birth of Tragedy* (section 7):

The right spectator, whoever he might be, must always remain conscious that he was viewing a work of art and not an empirical reality. . . . We had always believed in an aesthetic public and considered the individual spectator the better qualified the more he was capable of viewing a work of art as art that is, aesthetically.

It is therefore logically unwarranted to ascribe any “defect of vision or defect of mind” to the audience.

REPRESENTATION AS ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION/ REPLICA/RE-PRESENTATION

Śaṅkuka (ninth century A.D.), the successor of Lollaṭa as a commentator on Bharata, appears to have understood the defects of an illusion theory; and since Śaṅkuka's thesis has been presented by Abhinavagupta in a more detailed and unambiguous discourse, it is easier to examine the thesis with greater accuracy. Śaṅkuka criticizes Lollaṭa pinpointing his attack on Lollaṭa's view of representation as the illusion of reality. He views art as a representation and distinguishes the nature of this representation from four types of related phenomena such as illusion, reality, doubt, and similitude (analogy).¹³ He also acknowledges three modes of communication or sign system—linguistic, pictorial, and theatrical, and, while distinguishing the linguistic sign system of denotation from the theatrical sign system of acting, he considers the pictorial and theatrical systems as of the same kind. The main thrust of Śaṅkuka's argument against Lollaṭa is on the nature of the aesthetic object as a representation of reality. Lollaṭa thinks that an emotion in the real world becomes itself an aesthetic object when it is intensified by the combination of characters or determinants and their actions and so on (*vibhāvādi*), and the same (combination of emotion or permanent mental state with determinants and the like) is represented in the theater by the actor by way of an illusion. But Śaṅkuka says that because Bharata does not mention the combination of the emotion in his axiom where he mentions the combination of the determinants and the like only, it is obviously the purport of Bharata that the emotion is represented in the theater not directly but through its indexical signs (*liṅga*) such as the combination of the determinants and the like.

Śaṅkuka's discourse, as reported by Abhinavagupta, makes the point clear that it is the theatrical performance that is the ontology of the dramatic art. In other words, no phenomenon of the real world is an aesthetic object, only its representation (*anukaraṇa/anukṛti*) in art becomes the aesthetic object, and aesthetic percep-

tion is not the perception of this representation as reality—experiencing an illusion thereby—but the perception of this representation as the representation of reality.

Śaṅkuka insightfully distinguishes between the verbal representation or denotation (*abhidhāna*) and the theatrical representation or acting (*abhinayana*). Both are the media of communication different from each other. Even there is a difference between reading the dialogues of a dramatic text by a nonactor and that by an actor in a theatrical performance. An actor's reading his dialogues involves the "illocutionary" function of language, whereas a reader's reading the same involves the locutionary function. In other words, the dialogues of a dramatic text communicate their meaning by the referential power of language, but the dialogues read by an actor communicate by their perceptible gesticular form. Śaṅkuka explains this difference by several examples quoted from different plays. One such example is from Śrīharṣa's *Ratnāvalī*: "This multitude of drop-lets, fine rain of tears falling while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand." A reader understands the happiness of the love-struck hero Udayana as described here by way of reference; but an audience experiences this state of the hero directly perceiving the "illocutionary" functions of the language as performed by the actor when he touches his body and projects the state of perspiration as the sign of happiness.

It is understood that the linguistic representation is referential. But what exactly is the nature of theatrical representation? Śaṅkuka states: "Though these determinants etc. are brought into existence by the conscious efforts (*prayatna*) [of the actor] and are thus artificial (*kṛtrima*), yet they do not appear so (*tathā-nabhimanyamānā*). Since the characteristic signs (such as tears, beating hands on the forehead, choaked voice, etc.) of an emotion (permanent mental state of sorrow) lie in (or projected by the actor) the emotion that actually belongs to the original characters (in the epics or legends) such as Rāma, it is (necessarily) represented by/in the actor. Therefore Rasa (aesthetic emotion or drama as an aesthetic object) is nothing but another name for the representation (or replica/reproduction) of emotion . . .; not the same as (*tadātma*) or derived from emotion (*tat-prabhava*) as Lollaṭa thought."

Śaṅkuka's distinction between the verbal description of the events, characters, and their emotions, and their theatrical performance is clear enough for understanding the difference between the narrative and the theater. But a doubt lurks as regards the status of Rāma whom the actor represents. Does he mean the Rāma who is supposed to have actually lived some time in India or the Rāma who is described in the epic? It seems that Śaṅkuka means the latter, because he says that the determinants (characters *vibhāvāh*) are known from poetry (*kāvya-balāt*). Therefore the actor's representation of Rāma does not imply any factual existence of a real Rāma whom he has seen or is expected to have seen. Śaṅkuka further says that the gesticular movements, the very means of acting, are learned by the actor through training (*śikṣā*), obviously referring to the director's instruction and the actor's rehearsal and not to the actor's imitating (copying/replicating) any actual Rāma. Śaṅkuka also stresses the actor's own experience of the transitory feelings which he employs in acting.

According to Śaṅkuka, what actually is given on the stage is the performance or the combination of determinants (*vibhāva*), gesticular movements (*anubhāva*), and facial expression of the feelings (*vyabhicārībhāva*) that forms the indexical signs of the permanent emotion. As fire is not directly seen in the smoke but is inferred from it, so also the emotion through its indexical signs is inferred (*pratīyamāna*) by the audience.

Coming to the experience of the audience, for whom this representation is intended, Śaṅkuka straight rejects Lollaṭa's theory of illusion and explains that when the audience infers the permanent emotion from its signs as performed by the actors, it does not identify the actor with the real Rāma, nor does he have an illusion of Rāma, nor does he doubt whether the actor is real Rāma or not, nor does he cognize the actor as somebody bearing the similitude (*sādrśya*) of Rāma as a crow looks like a cuckoo, or a cat like a tiger, or a wild ox (*gavaya*) like an ox. He concludes, as in the case of a picture horse, the beholder cognizes "This is a horse"—so also in the case of the actor the audience cognizes—"This is that happy Rāma" and not "This actor is happy," "This is real Rāma," or "This is somebody like Rāma" or "Is this Rāma or not?"

But Śaṅkuka explains that although the gesticular movements and the like are made by the actor by his conscious effort and are therefore artificial, the audience does not realize so. In other words, although artificial, it looks real (or natural). If this experience is not an illusion, then what is it?

Śaṅkuka answers that acting is not an illusion or mistaken cognition that misguides the subject. It is true that illusion takes place when something appears as some other thing. But all such cases are not of the same type. There are some cases where something appearing as some other thing, far from misguiding the subject, rather guides him properly and therefore is not a case of illusion. Śaṅkuka takes recourse to the arguments of Dharmakīrti, a logician of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, who considers causal efficiency (practical efficacy), the capacity to produce the desired effect (*arthakriyākāritva*), the criterion of valid cognition and the real existence of a thing. Mirage is a common example of illusion where the subject is misguided. Similar are the cases of a shell's appearing as silver or a rope's appearing as snake. But Dharmakīrti provides the example of a peculiar case.¹⁴ A gem and a lamp remit rays of light. From a distant place two different persons see only these two rays of light, not the objects that remit the rays. Because none of them has seen the object but only its indexical sign—the ray—each one is under the impression that the ray comes from a gem. So both of them run to the objects concerned guided by this impression. But where one gets the gem, the other does not. Now Dharmakīrti argues that although both are under illusion in the beginning, the illusion of the man who gets the gem is practically not an illusion because it produces the desired effect, that is, getting the gem.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti interprets the impressions of both the persons as illusion, although, commonly viewed, for the man who gets the gem there is no illusion even in the beginning, because, he thinks, he has seen the gem and his thinking is correct. But from a rigorously logical point of view, it is one

thing to see a gem as a gem and another thing to see a ray of light as a gem. For both persons the experience is inferential, not perceptual. Their illusion is the fact that they have mistaken inferential knowledge as perceptual. In other words, where a single sign stands indexically for more than one phenomenon, it is undoubtedly an error to cognize it as an index for any one only.

Because Śaṅkuka distinguishes dramatic representation from both illusion and reality, the more judicious interpretation of his observation in the light of Dharmakīrti's logic happens to be this: Drama is not an illusion of reality because it does not misguide the audience. It is not that they visit the drama with a hope for getting something, but finally return frustrated. They rather come back fully satisfied because they have got the thing they wanted. But what did they want to get and how did they get it? They did certainly not want to see the real Rāma, the Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa* moving in flesh and bones or even his similitude, because they know very well that, as described in the epic and other texts, Rāma lived (or might have lived) long, long ago and there is no possibility of his reliving now. They wanted simply to cognize directly (or perceptually) the performance of Rāma as described in the verbal discourses. Very clearly, in this sense, Śaṅkuka distinguishes between the communication (*avagamana*) by verbal description (*abhidhāna/vācana*) and the communication by acting (*abhinaya*). Dramatic representation means the audiovisual presentation (or transformation) of the textual description. Therefore, the accuracy of representation as cognized by the audience is judged by comparing the performance with the verbal description and/or with other performances of the same play. Śaṅkuka's understanding of the dramatic representation as "artificial" is the same as to understand the literary representation as "fictional." They have nothing to do with the external reality. Artificiality is not necessarily a property of illusion, nor are all illusions artificial. It is only at times that artificial objects create illusions. The primary difference between artificial object and an illusion is that the former is always a man-made object, whereas the latter is a natural occurrence. The Sanskrit word *Kṛtrima*, equivalent to the English word *artificial*, literally means an object intentionally made/composed/manufactured by a human agency (*karāṇājāta/racita*).¹⁵ Śaṅkuka's concept of artificiality also corroborates Bharata's treatment of drama as a toy. Although the terms "natural" and "artificial" are antonyms, some artificial objects sometimes (not always) create illusions with or without the intention of the maker. But no illusion is artificial. Artificiality is not also necessarily pretension. Dramatic performance is artificial in the sense that the costume, speech and action of the actor have no reference to his natural identity. In this sense, acting is not necessarily an illusion because the actor does not intend to create any illusion although sometimes, for some audience, it becomes (or might become) an illusion.

The relation of the gem and its ray in Dharmakīrti's example explains the relation of the permanent emotion with the gesticular movements and the like respectively; and although the gesticular movements and the like that are the indexical signs of the emotion appear to be illusory because of their artificiality,

they are not practically illusory because the desired object, that is, the permanent emotion, is cognized through them.

The next important point in Śaṅkuka's discourse is the comparison of acting with painting. Śaṅkuka states that the actor's status as Rāma is similar to a picture's status as the object it depicts. Pointing to a picture of a horse, one says, "This is a horse," and similarly, pointing to the actor one says, "This is Rāma." In saying so, Śaṅkuka obviously considers the artificiality of both the arts, and the point of resemblance pertaining to the term *anukṛti* in Bharata's definition of dramatic representation is also obvious. But the deeper critical implication of this comparison becomes clear when it is viewed in the light of recent scholarship. If representation is interpreted in the sense of "standing for," then there is a justification for Śaṅkuka's comparison. As the configuration stands for a horse, so also the actor stands for Rāma. Both of them are distinguished from reality, illusion (though sometimes some pictures like *trompe l'oeil* are illusory, not necessarily all), doubt, and similitude. But the interpretation of "standing for" in the light of linguistic denotation as a purely conventional symbol—ignoring completely the question of resemblance, ignoring the pictoriality of a picture—accepting anything as standing for any other thing does not hold good of Śaṅkuka, because while equating pictorial representation with acting, he explicitly distinguishes acting from linguistic denotation (contra Goodman). For Śaṅkuka, acting and painting belong to one order, whereas a verbal text belongs to another. The common characteristics that Śaṅkuka observes between these two representations are undoubtedly their visibility and artificiality. In both cases there is a difference between the represented and the representation as well as a correspondence. Although prior to Śaṅkuka, in the vocabulary of pictorial art, Indian antiquity conceived of symbolic representation not as any material picture but as an abstract, spiritual likeness (*pratirūpa*),¹⁶ it seems, he considers only the cases of pictorial or iconic images and not the aniconic once, and what he further considers necessary to make a representation is not accuracy of depiction or realism, but depiction of something visible and the intention to depict. Because he excludes the nonrepresentational arts from his discussion, on the basis of pictorial signs, he uses the expression "This is a horse" and not "This represents a horse"; and similarly "This (actor) is Rāma" and not "This (actor) represents Rāma." Nor does he distinguish between "simple" and "complex" objects of representation.¹⁷ Like a word a pictorial representation does not only refer to a thing, it necessarily involves something about the shape or form (*ākṛti*) of the thing it represents.

Hanna Pitkin, probably of all the recent critics on the subject, comes very close to Śaṅkuka and puts her analogy rather reversely. When Śaṅkuka explains acting in terms of pictorial art, Pitkin explains pictorial art in terms of acting:

The way in which an artist represents is closely related to the way in which an actor represents a character on the stage. For if we are merely identifying the part an actor plays, who he is supposed to be, we say simply "He is Hamlet." In the same way we would iden-

tify a piece of scenery: "That is the castle gate." . . . Again, as with the picture of a tree which simply "is a tree," the scenery and the character of Hamlet lack the distance or difference that representation requires: they *are* what they are supposed to be. But in another sense the actor represents Hamlet, and the whole company represents the *Hamlet* on the stage. This refers to their activity of presenting the play and the character in a certain way.¹⁸

Pitkin proposes here two kinds of representation: representation as the identification of the represented with the representation as in the case of "is" relation where the representation is what it is supposed to be and representation as representation or presenting again, or presenting something not present. Pitkin examines the political notion of artificiality as proposed by Thomas Hobbes. An actor's performance is artificial in the sense that he is not the owner of the stage action, and the ownership of an action is defined in terms of authority or right. Therefore an actor, like a legal representative, acts for others. Correlating an actor with the notion of dramatic *persona*, Hobbes understands that because in its Latin origin "persona" signifies the "disguise" or outward appearance, an actor as a person, like a mask, is always a false front. Therefore to personate necessarily means to act or to represent either himself or another.¹⁹ But the difference between the political or legal representative on the one hand and the dramatic actor on the other is that whereas the first two are authorized by the "owner of action" to act for them, there is no such authorization for the dramatic actor. Pitkin therefore argues for an illusion theory of theatrical representation: "He (actor) does not pretend to act on authority of Hamlet, but to *be* Hamlet. His entire manner and appearance are directed to creating the illusion that he is someone else, someone whom he is playing or as we say, representing on the stage."²⁰

But Śaṅkuka upholds the difference between the representation and the represented, and rejects the identity (*tadātmakatvam*) relation. The actor might be psychologically identifying himself with the character, a situation implied by Śaṅkuka's stress on the actor's education and effort necessary for acting, but the audience does not cognize this identity that would lead him to an illusory experience. Identity relation, however, is accepted by the Indian tradition only in the case of religious rituals where the material images are identical not only with the spiritual potency they represent but also with the worshipper, the priest implying an identity of all the three points in the triangular structure of representation—of, by, and to (*devo bhūtvā devaṃ yajet*). The same also holds true of a ritual representation.

Now the question is this: If Śaṅkuka rejects the identity relationship between representation and represented both in drama and painting, then what exactly are the terms in which this relationship is defined? It is already observed that according to Śaṅkuka theatrical signs are indexical. Obviously the means of theatrical representation is different from that of painting. Lines and colors are the media of painting; and gesticular movements, language, facial expressions, and costume (*āṅgika*, *vācika*, *sāttvika*, *āhārya* respectively) are the four constituents of acting (*abhinaya*).²¹ All these are in conformity with the verbal description of the *Rāmāyaṇa* or *Mahābhārata*, the authors of which are believed to have personal-

ly witnessed the action of Rāma and others that they have described. The actor's conformity to such description may be termed as nominal portrayal.²² But not all the pictures are of this kind of representation. Particularly the example cited by Śaṅkuka, that is a picture of a horse is a real portrayal, a visible shape or *ākṛti* of an animal that exists in the external world. The nature of such an *ākṛti* is explained by Mīmāṃsā philosophers of the seventh and eighth centuries.²³ There is a Vedic injunction: "One should construct an altar like a śyena-bird (*Śyena- citam cinvita*)." The meaning of this likeness is analyzed by Kumārila in terms of Śabara's definition of differentia, a specific combination of substance, properties, and qualities. This ontic factor is signified by the word *ākṛti* (the visual shape), which is not only an epistemological percept (*saṁsthānam*) but also a mental concept. It is the aspect through which an individual of a class is formed. *Ākṛti* does not mean any universal (*Jāti*) existing independent of an individual. Because a universal is always realized in a concrete particular, Kumārila holds, as against the Vaiśeṣika realism, that there is no absolute difference between an individual and a universal. Applying this notion of *ākṛti* Kumārila interprets the Vedic injunction. Construction of an altar like a śyena-bird means that one should construct an altar with bricks the visual form of which must be similar (*sādrśya*) to the *ākṛti* of not a particular śyena-bird, but to that of any śyena-bird that is born or is yet to be born.

The picture of a horse, interpreted in the light of Kumārila's doctrine, means a visual shape of two dimensions made of lines and colors, which is similar to the *ākṛti* of a horse. This is the meaning of Śaṅkuka's statement "This is a horse"; and in the cases of nonexistent objects Śaṅkuka would accept the notion of nominal portrayals. Representation of *ākṛti* comes very close to the representation of the essential characteristics, representation of the species rather than the individual. But according to Kumārila *vastutvam* (thingness—the Sanskrit parallel for "essence") is an abstract concept that cannot form part of the denotation of a word and, therefore, like *Sattā* (beinghood), it cannot form (*ākriyate*) the concrete individual or *ākṛti*.

This may lead to an understanding that by analogizing an actor with a picture, Śaṅkuka thinks that if a picture of a horse is a visual representation of *ākṛti* of a horse, or, for that matter, even of any nonexistent objects described in a text or a legend, an actor is an audiovisual representation of the *ākṛti* of the character in the epic or a legend. If this hypothesis is accepted, then the characters of the narrative genre are treated not as unique (*asāmānya*) individuals but as members of a class (*sāmānya*). In other words, proper names are only different names given to the members of a common class, and the emotions they shelter are also common (*sādhāraṇya*, *sāmānya*). This hypothesis finds a strong grounding in the classification of the dramatic characters such as Dhīrodātta, Dhīraprasānta, Dhīralalita, and Dhīroddhata among males and Mugdhā, Pragalbhā, and others among females. All the characters available in the whole range of Sanskrit literature are accommodated within this principle of classification. Śaṅkuka's statement "This (actor) is Rāma," therefore most probably means that this actor audiovisually represents the *ākṛti* of Rāma, that is, a Dhīrodātta character: Rāma

being only one proper name for a member of this class, there may be as many names as possible for other members. Rāma is not the only member of Dhīrodāt-ta class. Yudhisthira is another member. Similarly, representation of this character by the actor in the sense of performance is either an illustration of the principle of classification or a re-presentation of a member of the same class, that is, presenting again the same character as described in the epic or elsewhere in a different medium (*anukīrtana*-Bharata). The relation among several such presentations or re-presentations may be defined in terms of the relation of one horse to another horse, that is, not in terms of similarity but in terms of belonging to the same class. Although the pictorial and theatrical representations differ in their representational codes (or media of representation) and the manners (style/genre) of representation, the principle of their representation is the same, that is, representation of the *ākṛti* of an object or character.

REPRESENTATION AS PERFORMANCE/DETERMINATE PRESENTATION OF THE INDETERMINATE/ILLUSTRATIVE TOKEN OF TYPE

Śaṅkuka's tendency for propagating a sister arts theory as evident in his analogizing the arts of the theater and painting has been severely criticized by his successor Abhinavagupta (tenth century A.D.) who is the last among the classical commentators on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Abhinavagupta strongly argues that the codes and genres of representation determine the uniqueness of each art form. He writes:

Some people say, "the pigment, orpiment, etc. undoubtedly compose (*saṁyuj*) a cow." Now if the word "compose" is understood in the sense of "manifest (*abhivya*)," these people also are in error. For we cannot say that minium, etc. manifest a real (*pāramārthika*) cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp etc. All they do is produce (*nirvṛt*) a particular aggregate (*saṁūha*) similar to a cow. The only object of the image "It is like a cow" is simply this minium etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the determinant etc., the situation is different: this—as we have said—cannot be perceived as similar to delight. Thus it is not true that *Rasa* is the reproduction of mental states.²⁴

Here Abhinavagupta indicates the difference among three art forms—literature, painting, and drama. He does not understand pictorial art in the light of Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *ākṛti*. He thinks that in all these three art forms the means of representation are three kinds of aggregates: aggregate of words in literature; aggregate of lines and colors in painting; and aggregate of determinants and the like in the form of four constituents of acting in drama. The functions of these different media are completely different, and accordingly the relations between the object represented and its representation in the art forms are also different. In the case of painting, the identity of the art form is nothing but an aggregate of colors that is understood in terms of its formal resemblance with a particular object in the external world, say a cow.

On the other hand, representational functions in literature and drama are quite different. Abhinavagupta's theory of language is based on the Mīmāṃsā and the Grammarian's view that language reveals (manifest *abhivyaj*) reality (*pāramārthika*) as even a lamp reveals an object, and the reality according to the Śaiva School of Abhinava is pure consciousness (*viñāna*) named as Śiva or Parama Śiva endowed with five kinds of potency—absolute consciousness (*cit*), delight (*ānanda*), volition (*icchā*), wisdom (*jñāna*), and action (*kriyā*). This ultimate reality is also identified with the highest level of language, which is called *parāvāk*, the other levels of language in their hierarchy being *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā*, and *Vaikhari*. If the highest level reveals the ultimate reality, the lowest level reveals the phenomenal world. The difference between the pictorial sign and linguistic sign rests on their difference in function. The former resembles the objects it signifies whereas the latter reveals its signified. A picture denotes a particular object in the sense that it resembles it. But a word denotes or reveals the whole of the object (not only its visual aspects)—its material and the spiritual aspects, all of which are real for a Śaiva thinker. Poetry, according to Abhinava, in its highest level, reveals the human emotions as unafflicted consciousness identical with the ultimate reality or Parama Śiva, and it does so by the peculiar linguistic potency called *vyāñjanā* (from the same root *vyaj* "to reveal" from which *abhi-vyaj* is derived).²⁵

Abhinava finds his notion of pictorial art as distinguished from verbal art on Bhartṛhari's metaphysics.²⁶ The highest reality is the all-pervading word *Śabdabrahman*, which has two potencies, Time and Space. Out of these two, Time is more fundamental and identical with the Reality Verbum. Language as well as the world are, therefore, basically temporal phenomena, and the order of sequence is the basic structure of both language and the world it designates. Sentence is the primary unit of language (not word), and verb (*kriyā*—action), the embodiment of Time potency, is the central element of a sentence that determines the subject-object relation.

The evolution of the world means a course of constant change and modification due to this change. They are of two kinds: temporal (*kriyā vivarta* = action modification) and spatial (*mūrti vivarta* = image modification). The former indicates the state of continuity (*sādhya*) and the latter the state of stagnation (*siddha*). Pictorial art or a material image (*mūrti*) belongs to the order of the spatial modification because it is static and limited in extent, whereas language (and poetry) belongs to the order of temporal modification. Painting, for its very medium and the nature of its modification is a limited sign system, and is therefore inferior to poetry, both the means (language) and manner (narrative) of representation of which indicate Time in its eternal continuity.

According to Abhinavagupta, drama is an art form the medium of which is spatiotemporal where time dominates over space. The peculiarity of this art form is the perceptual presentation of an action that determines the space of its occurrence. Acting, with its four constituents (gesticular, verbal, mental, and visual), is a medium of communication that manifests (*abhi-vyaj*) the reality with its completeness and is therefore the highest form of art. Long before Abhinava, Patanjali the grammarian (second century B.C.) had already attributed the highest aesthetic

status to the theatrical representation. Observing the difference among the representations of the same event in different media—pictorial, verbal, and theatrical—he asserted that the theatrical representation of an event is the most effective because of its perceptualization of the action in its temporal form that is absent in the static form of pictorial representation; and the verbal representation of the action makes the reader or listener realize the event only mentally. Referring to the theatrical representation of the mythical events such as Kṛṣṇa's killing Kāṁsa or Viṣṇu's captivating Balī, Patañjali writes: "There are the actors who kill Kāṁsa and bind Balī before your very eyes. Such events of the past are also presented to you in pictures and recitations; the reciters use only the verbal medium and make you realize these past events in your minds"²⁷ (*Mahābhāṣya* 3.1.26). Bharata's basic notion of drama as a toy is interpreted by Śaṅkuka as an artificial object distinguished from a natural one, and therefore there is a scope for comparison between toy as a visual art and its analogy in drama—both being man-made are artificial and the replicas of Nature. But Abhinavagupta interprets the metaphor of toy rather as a principle than as an artificial object.²⁸ The Sanskrit word *krīḍanīyaka* for toy is derived from the root *krīḍ*, which means to play with a purpose to delight the mind; and *krīḍanīyaka* in its instrumental form means an object with which one plays for delighting the mind by withdrawing it from distractions. The suffix *ka* indicates a hidden purpose—in the present context a therapeutic one—to purify the mind like a sugarcoated medicine. A toy is used by persons who are neither too happy nor too sad, persons who experience both pleasure and pain. Like a toy, drama can be used by the mass (*loka*), by all castes and classes without any social or religious restrictions. It is audiovisual, not tactual (*sparśya*) because had it been tactual, only one could experience it at a time, not many. Drama is meant to be experienced by a mass of people simultaneously. According to Bharata the subject matter of drama basically concerns the four objectives (three mundane and one supermundane, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*) of human beings as legitimized by the Vedas and other authorities such as scriptures and histories. This subject matter is presented perceptually in drama by way of illustrating causal laws as relevant in each case. Abhinava argues against Śaṅkuka that in drama reality is perceived not inferred. Therefore the determinants and the like are not the signs. Because in drama the performance is an autonomous event, it does not convey any meaning by its reference to some other event, as smoke refers to the existence of fire. Acting is an autonomous, self-contained communication system. Bharata therefore uses the term *sasaṅgraha*, which means self-evident experience or perception; and Abhinava refers to its explanation in the Nyāya philosophy—*sarvā ca pramā pratyakṣaparā*—"Perception is the basis of all other means of knowledge."²⁹ The instructions of the scriptures and the events of history are all presented perceptually in drama, and it is therefore (contra-Śaṅkuka) erroneous to think that one infers reality from one's perceptual knowledge of drama. When one perceives fire directly, what logic of inferring it from smoke is there?

Abhinava's interpretation of the Sanskrit word *itihāsa* (literally, history) used by Bharata is also quite significant for understanding his notion of dramatic representation.³⁰ *Iti-ha-āsa* (it is certainly like this or it certainly happens like

this) refers to the perceptualization of a cause-and-effect relation on the one hand, and perceptualization of past (it certainly happened like this) or re-occurrence of what happened earlier, recurrence or illustration of an archetype (in the sense of myth in narrative) on the other. Here past is presented or the present form of the past continues to the future; the eternal truth of causality that continues through the past, present and future is perceptually presented or illustrated. It is a re-presentation of what has been presented repeatedly. Abhinavagupta uses the Sanskrit word *anuvyavasāya* to designate this nature of dramatic representation. The word literally means after (*anu*) contact (*vyavasāya*) and it has different denotations in the epistemology of Nyāya, Yoga, and Śaiva systems explaining the nature of perceptual cognition.

In the Yoga psychology of perception, the word *anuvyavasāya* refers to the function of the mind in its intelligent (*sāttvika*) aspect by which the sensations (due to the sense-object contact *ālocana*) are associated, differentiated, integrated, and assimilated into percepts and concepts. It is therefore the creative faculty of mind.³¹ This creative faculty of mind has been accepted and interpreted differently by the post-Yoga Buddhist logicians of both Yogācāra and Sautrāntika schools—by Dinnāga (A.D. 500) and Dharmakīrti (A.D. 650) respectively. Dinnāga believes that the nature of reality is absolute consciousness devoid of any subject-object relations that are the constructs of mind (*vikalpa*) and expressed in language. Therefore he states that the cognitive state is a “self-conscious” or “self-luminous” awareness and its expression in propositional form is a mental construction.³² This is attacked by the Nyāya realist who holds that there are two stages of perception—the first stage a nonjudgmental awareness of the given, the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception; the second stage is the judgmental awareness, the determinate (*savikalpa*) perception. Both stages of perception are denoted by the term *Pratyakṣa* or *Vyavasāya*. But there is also a third cognitive stage, which follows the second stage when the mind relates it to the second: At the first sight of a pot, for example, one cognizes it as something—“This is something.” In the second stage, one cognizes—“this is a pot.” In the third stage, the cognition is “I know this pot.” This third stage is called *anuvyavasāya*.³³ But Abhinavagupta does not understand this third stage of perception as *anuvyavasāya*. For him, there are only two stages of perception—one is indeterminate, which is due to the contact (*vyavasāya*) of the sense with the object; and the second stage that occurs after (*anu*) the contact (*vyavasāya*) is determinate perception or *anuvyavasāya*.³⁴ He therefore is in agreement with the Yoga philosophy in explaining the determinate perception as an *anuvyavasāya* or creative function of the translucent mind predominated by its intelligence stuff (*sattva*).

Abhinavagupta's link with the Buddhist and Yoga idealism is obvious insofar as he considers the nature of the supreme reality (*paramārtha*) as absolute consciousness and the possibility of its valid cognition only by indeterminate perception. But he differs from the Buddhist as regards the nature of the phenomenal reality (*samvṛti*) and its cognition by determinate perception. For the Buddhists, the *samvṛti* is as illusory as two moons and so also is the determinate cognition. But Abhinava holds that since *samvṛti* is the self-manifestation of the

Supreme Reality by his own *Māyā* potency, it is also a kind of truth (*satyasya prakāra*), not illusion or unreal like two moons. If the unlimited nature of this supreme consciousness is the object of indeterminate cognition (*vyavasāya*), the phenomenal world (*samvṛti*), which is the limited form of this reality, is the object of determinate cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). Both aspects of reality are true and both of the means of their cognition respectively are also valid.

Now Abhinavagupta argues that Bharata in his *NS* 1.106 understands the word *vikalpaka* in the sense of this *anuvyavasāya*, which is synonymous with *pratisākṣātkāra*. Elaborating upon this stanza, Abhinava states that drama is not a replica of any particular character or event of the phenomenal world or the world of determinate cognition; it is rather a presentation of the eternal law of causation, the object of indeterminate cognition presented in the form of determinate cognition. In other words, like any other object or event of the determinate world, drama is just another event. Both of them are the same kind of events, because they belong to the same class (*sajātīya*). The relation between the drama and the external world is just the relation between two horses, so to speak, not between a horse and its replica as in a picture or its reflection in water (*sadrśa*).

Abhinavagupta uses the same terms of the Buddhist logic *arthakriyā* (causal efficiency) and *svalakṣaṇatā* (particularity) that were used by Śāṅkuka, but applies them skillfully to explain his own arguments as against that of Śāṅkuka.³⁵ If the events and objects of the drama are just parallels of the *samvṛti* reality and not their replicas, then they should be as efficacious causally as their co-events are. Abhinava's answer is that the characters and events of the drama are not causally efficient, because they are not particular with *svalakṣaṇatā* as their co-phenomenal events or characters are. Only particular objects (*viśeṣa*) are efficacious, and the presentness (*vartamānatā*) is the essential property of a particular.³⁶ The dramatic characters such as Rāma and the others are not present. Although they are described as particulars in the epics and histories, they are not so, because even there they lack the causal efficiency owing to lack of their presentness. It is just for this reason that Brahmā proscribed the re-presentation of contemporary events and characters in the drama.

Having thus established his own theory of dramatic representation, Abhinavagupta distinguishes it from ten several other phenomena such as imitation or replica (*anukaraṇa*), reflection (*prativimba*), picture and portrait (*citra* and *ālekhyā*), similitude/analogy (*sādrśya*), metaphor (*āropa*), symbol (*adhyavasāya*), ascription (*utprekṣā*), dream (*svapna*), illusion (*māyā*), and magic (*indrajāla*). He also distinguishes the nature of its experience (by the audience) from both the valid cognition (*pramā*) and the four kinds of invalid cognition such as perceptual error (of five kinds), doubt (*saṁśaya* = confusion between two similar objects, i.e., seeing a statue at dusk, one might confuse it with a living man or statue), ignorance (*anadhyavasāya* = inability of knowing an object not seen before), and confusion (*anavadhāraṇa* = inability of recognizing a thing seen before).³⁷

Although Śāṅkuka has distinguished the dramatic representation from four kinds of phenomena—reality, similitude, erroneous perception, and doubt—

Abhinava is not satisfied with the explanation of the nature of cognition that Śaṅkuka gives, "This is that Rāma." He argues that Śaṅkuka avoids the critical responsibility in stating that this cognition is subject to the experience (*anubhava*) of the audience and particularly he explains that on verification this cognition will be either true or false, but cannot be neither true nor false.

In the conclusion of his long discourse on the nature of dramatic representation, explaining Bharata's words *anukṛti* and *anukaraṇa*, which literally mean imitation or replica in the Platonic sense of the terms, Abhinava remarks that while performing the role of Rāma, the actor certainly does not imitate the action of Rāma, because such imitation requires the simultaneous presence of two particulars—the imitated and the imitator. Obviously this is not the situation concerned. Further, imitation in the sense of mimicry provokes laughter as in the case of a jester's imitating a hero. Role-playing by an actor means doing the same kind of gesticular movements and the like (*anubhāvānstukaroti sajātīyāneva*), but not doing like what Rāma did (*natu tatsadṛśān*).³⁸ The point is that since Rāma and the others do not have any particular identity either in the epic or in the drama, and their existence is only nominal in the sense that these names are given to certain characters that illustrate the law of causality, they stand for certain types, that is, four in number already mentioned in the section on Śaṅkuka. The actor's performance is ordinarily viewed as an after-doing (*anukaraṇa*) only in a pseudo-chronological sense, that is, Rāma did this long ago and the actor does this now. But critically considered, the actor does what any other man of the type of Rāma should/might have done. In performing the actions that express sorrow or happiness, the actor (and/or the director) does not look for the descriptions in the epic as much as he looks to the people in his society behaving in similar situations. In the course of his training, he also associates his own personal experience with others' behavior, and in this sense of learning he may be said to be imitating the actions of people in general (not Rāma) for the sake of propriety.³⁹

CONCLUSION

It is tempting to formulate an illusionistic theory of representation, particularly dramatic, following the Vedantic theory of the phenomenal world as an erroneous existence that is neither true nor false—it is a *Māyā* the nature of which is ineffable. Correlating with Bharata's metaphor of toy, a Vedantin might argue that there are two ways of playing with a toy—a baby's playing with it under an illusion of considering it as real and an adult's playing considering it as an artificial object. But theoretically, illusion, and play are not necessarily correlated. A baby plays with the images of men or other beings, but is sometimes afraid of an image of a snake or of other animals of formidable shape. Therefore one can play with a toy only when one considers it a toy without suffering from any illusion of reality. In other words, enjoyment of pictorial or dramatic representation is not similar to enjoyment of illusions. The illusion theory of representation precludes the enjoyment of representations of nonpleasant things and

events. Therefore the Vedantins, who have considered the worldly attachment of a common man ignoble and have compared this attachment with appreciation of pictures, are aesthetically unsound.

Illusion is not the paradigm of aesthetic realism. Realism in art (both painting and drama) to the extent of illusion is unaesthetic or anti-aesthetic. It is worse than our experience of the phenomenal world because illusion is a deceptive cognition. Aesthetic cognition is not at all deceptive because the object of this perception (artwork), according to Abhinavagupta, is the illustrative token of a type. It is true that sometimes art works, both painting and drama, create illusions in the audience. But such art works never stand superior to the ones that do not do so. Rather the audience falling victim to such illusory experience is disqualified aesthetically. Illusionist realism is neither desired nor encouraged by the Śaiva aesthetics, which, therefore, does not share ideas with the Homeric audience that the beauty and significance of art lies in producing a *mimesis* of nature in an artificial medium—the more the degree of resemblance, the better the value of the artwork. The theater is superior to painting not because it creates the illusion of reality better, but because, for the peculiarity of its medium, it is capable of representing the indeterminate in its determinate form. Saivite aesthetics is therefore far from falling victim to any Platonic charge.

Nevertheless, Bhaṭṭanāyaka's interpretation of the word drama (*nāṭyam*) in the very opening stanza of the *NS* is a significant contribution to the Vedantic view of art.⁴⁰ Drama, according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, is an art form, presented by the Supreme Reality (Brahman) as an analogy of the unreality of the phenomenal world. As the nature of the world is determined by the multiplicity of names and forms, so also is the drama where the actors, like Brahman, are the sole creators of their world with various names and forms such as Rāma and Rāvaṇa. If the drama is an example of the unreal world, the world is also a drama (*jagan-nāṭyam*) created by Śiva. Both worlds are continuously changeful and are attractive for their instantly changing novelty. But their unreality does not end in an illusion only. In fact both of them serve the means of attaining the highest objective of humanity through great contemplation—*mokṣa* (salvation) in the world and *Rasa* in the drama.

Whereas the ignorant are misguided by the unreality of the world and fail to discriminate between illusion and reality, the enlightened succeed in such discrimination and consider it a toy to play (*līlā*) with. Īśvara of Yoga and Vedānta as well as the sages are the enlightened beings who enjoy the whole creation as a dramatic representation. But, once again, this amounts to the rejection of the illusion theory. Illusion does not exist if illusion is viewed as illusion. In fact, to extrapolate the indications of Yoga and Vedānta, aesthetic cognition is a wisdom that only a few can attain, and this cognition is an experience of the Supreme Reality through its manifestation. The central aim of human wisdom is to experience the transcendental, the unchanged amidst the changeful while enjoying the beauty and dignity of the changeful itself. This is the truth in aesthetics, religion and philosophy.

NOTES

1. NS, I, 11–18, 51–57, 106–7, 116.
2. NS, 106–7; also see Abhinavagupta's commentary on 57—*na ca vartamānacar-itānukāro yuktah*.
3. NS, VI. Prose after stanza 31.
4. Ibid., *Vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārībhāvasaṃyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ*.
5. See Henry Sayre, "Performance," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, ed. Lentricchia and McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 91.
6. See Abhinavagupta's commentary on NS, VI. Rasasūtra (see note 4 above).
7. G. N. Jha, *The Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 21, 124, 126.
8. Pliny, *Natural History* 35.5.62. Also see my *The Concept of Imitation in Greek and Indian Aesthetics* (Calcutta: Rupa and Co., 1977), 30.
9. E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1969), 5, 296–98; J. B. Derogowski and E. Gombrich, ed., *Illusion in Nature and Art* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), 195; Dieter Peetz, "Some Current Philosophical Theories of Pictorial Representation," in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 27, no. 3 (summer 1987): 228 (reprinted in the present volume).
10. For example, see Richard Wollheim, "On Drawing an Object," in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 264–66; also see Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976), 34–38, and Goodman's review of Gombrich's *Art and Illusion* in *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1972), 141–45.
11. Wollheim, 266.
12. Gombrich, 296–98; Peetz, 228–31; Wollheim, 265–66.
13. See Abinavagupta's commentary on NS, Rasasūtra (note 4 above).
14. *Pramāṇavārtika* 2.57; see R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Chowkhamba, 1968) (originally published in Rome, 1956), 31.
15. *Śabdakalpadruma*, Calcutta, vol. 2.
16. See, for details, Sukla, pt. 2, chap. 2.
17. Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 68.
18. Ibid., 70; see also 67–73 for a fuller account of her view.
19. Ibid., 24–26.
20. Ibid., 26.
21. NS, 6.23.
22. John Hospers, *Understanding the Arts* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 153.
23. Kumārila's Ākṛtivāda in *Tantravārtika*. See Francis X D'sa, S.J., *Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śābara and Kumārila* (Vienna: De Nobili Research Library, 1980), 151–65.
24. Abhinava's commentary on NS, Rasasūtra (note 4 above). The English translation of this passage is from Gnoli, 41.
25. Śābarabhāṣya, 1.1.12–13; *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.4; *Vākyapadīya*, chap. 2; also see K. A. S. Iyer, *Bhartṛhari* (Poona: Deccan College, 1969); G. Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning* (Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit College, 1959).
26. *Mahābhāṣya* 3.1.16.
27. See Sukla, "Dhvani as a Pivot in Sanskrit Literary Aesthetics," in *East and West in*

Aesthetics, ed. Grazia Marchiano (Pisa and Rome: Instituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1997).

28. See Abhinavagupta's commentary on *NS*, 1.2.
29. *Ibid.*, commentary on *NS*, 1.14.
30. *Ibid.*, commentary on *NS*, 1.15.
31. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (London, 1924; reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 176.
32. B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1971), 82.
33. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1922; reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), 343.
34. Abhinavagupta's commentary on Utpalācārya's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā—Sūtra*, 2.2.3.
35. *Ibid.*, 2.3, *passim*.
36. Abhinava's commentary on *NS*, 1.107.
37. *Ibid.*, also 1.1.
38. *Ibid.*, 1.57; 1.107.
39. *Ibid.*, 1.107.
40. Abhinava's commentary on *NS*, 1.1.

Representation, Representativeness, and Non-Representational Art

CHARLES ALTIERI

I

Kasimir Malevich spoke of his Suprematism as offering a mode that “represents . . . the signs of a force” and of his representing “the energies of black and white” so that they serve “to reveal the forms of action.” Piet Mondrian made similar statements about representing “balanced relations . . . which are the purest representation of universality, of the harmony and unity which are inherent characteristics of the mind.”¹ If we were to take such statements as naive or desperate evocations of neo-Platonist spiritualism, we would have a good deal of company among art historians. But we would ignore both the distinctive conceptual intelligence of these artists and the challenge they offer us to develop a concept of representation capacious enough to incorporate what we usually consider as “presentational” strategies. The aesthetics developed as a response to these presentational features—in Suzanne Langer, in the British tradition inaugurated by Fry and Bell, and even in much Heideggerian discourse about immanence (some of it mine)—will not suffice in itself. At best, it pertains only to the Romantic heritage. And though it explains immediacy of response and the effects of form, it has no interpretive category for the various rhetorical aspects that distance us from what is presented and guide our interpretive reflections on it.

It is thus all too obvious that conventional ideas either of representation or of presentation will not suffice as a general account of art’s powers to implicate extratextual dimensions of experience. Both concepts, I think, are too concerned with the direct relation between signs and world—either as resemblance or as direct experience. I propose instead a rhetorical view that emphasizes the self-

conscious use of signs as mediations defined by possible uses, some of which involve conventional representation, others conventional presentation. Both uses share at least one basic function: They invite an audience to identify with some feature of the work, on its mimetic or on its authorial level, so that the work can be experienced as representative. The representative work is one that exemplifies in a way that allows members of an audience to see that each of them can participate in the life of the work while recognizing that the same possibility holds for others. Kant saw this state as the image art gives of the moral order, but I am content if it helps us avoid the mental cramps that develop when we strain to see art always in a two-term, work-referent model. If I am correct, the theory of representation makes sense as a comprehensive theory of art so long as we recall the connection of *mimesis* with rhetoric, which gets lost once philosophy develops empiricist standards for judging the "accuracy" of a representation. Representation makes sense, and includes presentational elements, so long as we take a rhetorical stance equating representation with the way a work becomes representative for an audience connecting it to some area of experience.

I understand "representation" as a use of signs to "make present" phenomena from which the sign differs and yet, in and as its difference, confers certain characteristics on the phenomenon or places it in a set of practices. A flag does not represent a flag, but it can represent a nation or, in another register, a kind of cloth. Exemplifications are representations because they alter the mode of presence—they use particulars to elicit a sense of class terms not typically associated with the entity. Theories of representation are theories of how the sign, which differs from what it represents, can take on that additional signification, how it can be itself and also a figure within a larger practice. Those influenced primarily by empiricist theory, even if not in its cruder "pictorial" models of the sign, define that signification primarily in terms of resemblance, or how the sign stands for a phenomenon. My rhetorical approach must also treat this "standing for" relationship, but it subordinates the static parameters typically invoked to define resemblance to concerns based on possible use values. Thus, "acting for" becomes in my view a more inclusive and more flexible class of relations than "standing for." This is why representativeness, a condition of actions and examples, strikes me as a concept that can subsume what is valuable about representation theory. Thus I shall try to understand the representativeness of art as a process, within our cultural practices, whereby we are invited to identify with a variety of stances—from simulacra of experience projected within the mimetic level of a text, to conditions "representing" possible worlds, to the overall attitude displayed on the authorial level as the work's most comprehensive compositional purposiveness.² We then can treat "uptake" as matter of reflecting on the possible use of what is represented or exemplified in a text, whether or not it fits present criteria of "truth." Representation and presentation lose their oppositional qualities and become means to the same end, while the emphasis on possible worlds provides a theoretical space for understanding why art as exemplification has so often been considered a means of instruction or vehicle for idealization. So long as we remain, however covertly, obsessed with the "truth" of art as in

some sense documentary of external states of affairs, plausible psychology, or realms of ideal universals, we will find its engagement in projection and idealization an embarrassment.³ A rhetorical concept of representativeness, on the other hand, fits precisely these desires of art works to extend beyond the boundaries of the specific action they display. Such extensions need not involve truth claims and a hypothetico-deductive model of inquiry, yet they do allow us to speak of several modes of possible significance. The old dichotomy between referential ideas of representation and aestheticist models of autonomy is not our only framework.

II

I use as the vehicle for my arguments a visual example, Malevich's "Suprematist Composition: Red Square and Black Square," because what significance the work has clearly eludes both representational and formalist, aestheticist categories. We need the terms of presentational aesthetics, but they do not suffice for the intellectual and affective complexity inherent in Malevich's simplicity of surface. Because my concerns are theoretical, I treat the painting schematically and somewhat simplify, although I hope not to distort, Malevich's intentions.⁴ Moreover, my reading is perhaps excessively "literary," but the painting invites such thematizing. I by no means assume that other noniconic works sustain the same style of inquiry, but I do consider my arguments about mind, movement and elements metaphors for what takes place in Kandinsky as musical notation of color and in Mondrian as the relation of literal forces held in balance. All the major first-generation noniconic painters sought ways of making art embody the sensuality of the mind while insisting that as acts of the mind the very processes objectified retained what Malevich called a principle of nonobjectivity. What draws us to the elements leads us to an elemental sense of force and movement no materialist language can describe or account for.

If we provisionally treat the painting in three conceptual stages, we are able to see just how this movement emerges and signifies as "representation" of "the forms of action." The first stage consists of a series of dynamic principles all involved in subverting a potential domination of black. Imagine this work upside down. Everything would achieve rest in the black square, and all the movement and openness would be negated. Here, instead, everything denies resolution by that single shape. As the eye moves downward to the conventional place of rest, it finds sharp contrast and reversal. The smaller square is by far the more active because its tilt denies the coordinates established by the black square while its primary color leaps forward from the canvas. The tilt, in turn, opens out into white space, and it asserts, in its small but almost weightless presence, a powerful refusal to echo the black squares echoing the shape of the picture frame. The red's projection forward is duplicated then by its horizontal movement as each denies an order of repetitive form.

The very elementariness of these relations invites us to bring thematic analogues into our visual experience. Too bare to be decoration, the work must sig-

nify, and its contrasts fulfill this expectation. Thus on a second level, we reflect upon the “meaning” of the tilt. In simple movement a separate world is born. Elements themselves project intentionality because the red square introduces the possibility of the canvas enclosing more than one world: The red produces spatial coordinates that entail a different schema, a different model for processing information and relations to other phenomena. Autonomy becomes a visual experience. In fact, autonomy rendered spatially becomes a remarkably complex visual experience because we see of what it is made—namely, opposition and difference. The bareness of the canvas virtually reduces to the semiotic categories of opposition that make the assertion of autonomous identity possible. For the red square to establish its force, color requires noncolor, smallness a corresponding larger shape for contrast, new space an old set of coordinates, singleness duality, and freedom or difference a sense of imminent norms and perhaps immanent oppression.

All these forces, we must remember, are at once extremely abstract and yet absolutely literal. Our thematic reflections do not depend on some virtual drama interpreted from the painting but simply describe the force of a concrete set of relations staged as art and hence as inviting us to reflect upon what they can be said to display. Thus, on a third level the painting can be seen as directly addressing the idea of what sustains and grounds the relations and the reflections they allow. But I have been too abstract to capture the significance of these meta-reflections. We must attend to the range of lyrical effects created by the specific way the red square tilts. Visually it at once leads us out to the surrounding white space and, by that relation, creates or restores a delicate balance with the very figure of order whose demands for repetition it had denied. In studying theosophy, Malevich also learned the dynamics of Hegelian logic. By negating one form of order, the black square's, the red tilt makes the eye seek out larger contexts. In these contexts we recover a new balance; indeed we recover a new principle of balance. Instead of balance based on repetition of shape, we have a balance that in or as movement integrates all the diverse elements. The very pull among the competing coordinates and forms literally produces a sense of their interdependence, while that interdependence has as its ground the white space of canvas. This ground, like the mind and like infinite space, holds all by allowing what is held to become manifest as force and as relationship: “Tranquility itself is defined by movement.”⁵

I allow myself the luxury of citing Malevich because statements like these justify taking such complex presentations of balancing force as thematic, that is, as self-conscious figurings of how the painter can understand the powers he has practiced or brought into being. Here the very process of reading this painting in levels allows us to reflect on the strange ontological properties of its elements. Because there is nothing virtual about the painting, it can be said to signify nothing beyond itself. It simply is—as a structure of shapes, colors, and movements. We cannot read these as means intended to represent or stand for something else. Yet as we meditate on the painting, we also cannot treat its literalness as simply physical. What we see, what is only physical form and movement, nonetheless

grows in sense, so that sense itself becomes an elemental condition bridging mental and physical. At each level of the painting, its elements signify while never taking any of the allegorical or representational forms of our typical signifying codes. It is as if we were in the presence of a pure form of signification—of the mind in elements and elements in mind—that needs no specific structure of representations. One might say that Malevich sought a form of meaning or something like a Kantian schema that captured semantic force without any of the positivities of semantic content that are subject to historical displacements.⁶ The meaning of this painting is simply its structure as a force. Yet its force involves both the series of physical movements we have been discussing and the process of mental movements that recover that literal force. I border here on mysticism, on Malevich's "meaning," so perhaps the best I can do is offer a simple emblem for what I am trying to say about sense in spirit and spirit in the literalness of sense. We must be spiritually moved by the painting in order to experience its physical movement as fully present in its elemental concreteness. Change and meaning become conditions of reappropriating the life in what we normally see only as already constituted for interpretive sight. Now we are asked to step back and reflect upon the mystery of sense in sensation and the sensation of sense.

As we step back, two further figural extensions of these movements appear possible. They are not necessary for my argument, but they should help extend its analogical force, so I will briefly indulge in spelling them out. Malevich, we know, desired to produce through paintings a condition on nonobjectivity where art captures permanent conditions of "spiritual" force. As one version of the nonobjective, consider again the nature of the tilt, which breaks repetition, creates new coordinates of sense, and opens the possibility and necessity of new forms of balance or coherence among conflicting forces. The tilt itself can be equated with a fundamental force of differentiation, itself never locatable except in the movement it imposes by making us seek new balances. I allude, of course, to Derrida. But here a picture is worth a thousand philosophers: The visual example enables us to see what Derrida imagines—indeed what all thinkers of the self as negation from Hegel to Sartre have imagined. The principle of autonomy is in essence a principle of tilt, of the possibility of new coordinates of desire and interpretation entering on an objective, cognitive world. The analytic philosopher and conceptual artist John Perry provides a concrete basis for such attributions in his indexical definitions of self. Self, in my somewhat reductive version of his argument, is not a property agents possess but a function or condition of experience whereby the use of the indexical "I" makes possible "a crossing of life and cognition."⁷ The "I" takes up the world from a point of view: The world does not change, but the investments it allows and sustains do. We approximate here Lacan's "imaginary," that is, an inescapable source of erotic energies and of an ego ideal/ideal ego that has, in effect, no content but can be characterized as a demand to produce investments allowing an agent to make identifications with-in positions he occupies in language.

If this tilt will figure the self as a principle of difference, if it figures the imaginary, will it not also present (or represent) the nature of the artwork itself

in its nonobjectivity? The movement of sense and signification is insistently physical, yet entirely dependent on the painting as an organizing point of view. The objects as they take meaning here cannot be substituted for, even though each element is infinitely reproducible. So in their very affirmation of objective sense, the force of this painting in balance insists also on their nonobjectivity or untranslatability. The painting is at once within the world and not congruent with it—as is perhaps indicated by the way my attempts at critical description border on the parodic. Roland Barthes coined the concept of textuality in order to indicate how certain relations in an artwork resist all naturalizing interpretations. Malevich's point is more general: Even what invites figural elaboration in its ideal specificity as a locus of self-generated forces and stimulus to audience meditation remains ineluctably different from all our efforts to appropriate it. The artwork must, to be an art work, retain its own control over the coordinates that generate its sense of sense.

III

I must now face my own problem of representativeness. How does so obviously an extreme example allow us to make generalizations on the subject of representation in art? On one level the challenge is clear: Malevich's stylistic strategies are presentational, whereas his language for them is representational. So he focuses the question of how we can correlate presentational elements—the signifying force of what art works display in or as actions or movements—with representational elements that allow the work to stand for nonaesthetic properties of experience. The problem is complicated, however, by the fact that we do not normally govern our critical practice by clear and distinct ideas of either presentational or representational elements. Yet the practices betray biases and assumptions that are often reductive in what they take as central and problematic in the links they draw between art and the world. I hope, then, to use my reading of force and exemplification in Malevich as a way of bringing to the surface confusions or limitations of the assumptions often underlying representational theories. As these become clear, we will see why deconstruction seems so appealing an alternative, but from a perspective that I think can lead us to concepts not so dependent upon the oppositions deconstruction feeds upon. My intention is not to refute deconstruction (one does not refute a practice) but to show how it is one limited way of serving the end I call representativeness.

We must ask first what views of representation are incompatible with Malevich's work and the modernist strategies it typifies. Clearly the work does not picture states of affairs—whether they be facts in the world, states of mind, or some version of universals or types. Yet although ideals of descriptive resemblance often creep into our critical practice and evaluations, they are not central to any sophisticated theory of representation in art. Gombrich's work is typical. Representation is not a matter of producing replica but of constructing salient resemblances that “suggest” or “evoke” a referent. Representation works when it “retains the efficacious nature of the prototype” because it preserves the relevant

"context for action." These contexts, I take it, can be either realistic (questions of how something appears) or symbolic (questions of what universal conditions are illustrated).⁸ From my point of view, this idea of contexts for action is an extremely promising one. But Gombrich's dislike of expressionism and of non-iconic art makes it appear that he confines the idea to contexts constructed as ideas or tonal qualities of depicted worlds that pre-exist and thus authenticate the representation. Thus while Gombrich denies a simple copy theory of representation, his values, his sense of what is salient in paintings and what authenticates them, suggest that he retains from that theory its hierarchy of fit: Representations are tested by their power to evoke some truth within a culture's beliefs about the "actual" world (which can be an abstract, mythic one).

Malevich's painting challenges these assumptions primarily by the emphasis it puts on representation as itself a condition of action in the process of interpreting itself and thus of making special demands on the ways an audience understands the directions of fit between the work, its activity, and the world. More important than any state of affairs evoked or suggested by the configurations of the image is the nature of the process displayed by the work. What links to the world is less some condition symbolized than the processes displayed in the art act, which evoke qualities of mind that can transcend art. As Maurice Denis put it in one of the texts most influential in modernism's challenge to older aesthetic: Our overwhelming impressions need not "emerge from the motif of the objects of nature represented, but from the representation itself, from forms and coloration."⁹ Malevich's painting, for example, uses its non-iconic properties to make the entire work a pure display of the very energies its shapes allow us to treat as significant. Picture and picturing are correlative. And because of this the specific portrayal seems inseparable from an abstract schema exemplifying the very ideas of creativity it elicits. The painting is simultaneously a display, a metacommentary and an invitation for us to take it as a pure schematic form applicable, as shape and as movement, to a wide variety of particulars. Moreover, the work's significance lies not only in this complex presentation but also in the ordered movement of reflective discovery it invites from its audience. The control of temporal movement is a feature of artistic experience that no spatial model of resemblance will capture, especially when the sense of unfolding in time reinforces and extends the state of being displayed in the work as its authorial act. Similarly, I can imagine no way to describe in traditional theories of representation the way Malevich's work insists on its own conditions as difference, at once within the physical world and negating it. Finally, theories that ignore such phenomena have great trouble explaining the way interpretation actually functions in art. If works represent states of affairs, then it makes sense to focus interpretation on the specific ways something is represented. The interpreter wants us to notice how the work treats some feature of the world and allows us to make predications about it. But, with works like Malevich's, and I think with most great works, interpretation is more Whiteheadian. Rather than emphasize the ideas we get about objects, we treat those ideas as lures for feeling that deepen our appreciation of the specific action

taking place in the entire structure of relations held in specific tensions by the work. It is the dynamics of interpretation that constitutes a complex condition of action in relation to display, and this conjunction produces or can produce genuine originality. Such works require a theory of representation that takes into account the conditions of possibility they display and evoke. This theory uses the display function as a way of preserving the realm of meaning in the text. The invitation is not to make just any response but to fill out the configuration the text offers and to attempt identifying with it. Then, because provisional identification is possible with what the text displays or schematizes as meaning, we have a way of moving from author's meaning to the use of such meaning in possible worlds. This is a plausible measure of significance.

IV

Expressionist or presentational theories will explain some of these phenomena. But such theories involve serious problems of locating the source of expression—in the work or in the maker—and they repeat the same problem on the level of response. What does one do with an expression—try to repeat the original experience or emphasize one's immediate reactions to the work's expressive properties. In either case Gombrich is right to insist that expressionist theory has difficulty coming to terms with the rhetorical features of expression that, as mediations, require interpretation of structures and meanings that cannot be reduced to responses to the work's manifest qualities. As evidence for Gombrich's views, we need only note how the brilliant observations of British art historians from Roger Fry to Harold Osborne rarely produce a full semantic account of a picture's import. Similar problems plague the expressionism that extends from Dewey and Collingwood to Guy Sircello: Emphasis on experience never quite coincides with a full discourse about meaning. Some Expressionist theories do isolate my central concerns—the quality of display in the art act, the power of movement in and through the work, and the understanding of interpretive fit as a relationship between examples and possible worlds. But so long as they must define their terms in sharp opposition to the reductionism that often accompanies resemblance views of representation, they are likely to lapse into psychologism or into formalism. When faced with Gerald Graff's using an ideal of representation¹⁰ to dismiss most literature in the Romantic tradition or with Gombrich's dislike of noniconic art, it is tempting to base one's counterarguments simply on the features of form or evocativeness they ignore. However, we then keep repeating the same oppositions.

For this I have a strong antidote. It may not cure, but it should help us to enjoy the disease while we come to see what elements must be integrated if there is comprehensive theory of representativeness adequate to what Malevich displays. I want to spend a few moments on Jacques Derrida's analysis of how the conventional poles of presentation and representation condemned to undermining one another's life while deferring one another's death. The following passage seems to me Derrida's most concise troping on the topic:

A entendre le mot de Cézanne, la verite (presentation *ou* representation, dévoilement *ou* adequation) doit être rendue “en peinture” soit par representation, soit par representation, selon les deux modes de la verite. La verite, le mode du peintre, doit être rendue en peinture selon les deux modes de la verite. Des lors, l’expression abyssale “verite de la verite,” celle qui aura fait dire que la verite est la non-verite, peut se croiser avec elle-même selon toutes sortes de chiasmes, selon qu’on déterminera le mode comme presentation ou comme representation. Presentation de la representation, presentation de la presentation, representation de la representation, representation de la presentation.¹¹

If we abstract from Derrida’s playful spirit, we can see him identifying four specific problems reinforcing and paralyzing the traditional oppositions I have been speaking of:

1. The force of signification seems always to evade representation and yet elicit it.
2. The artist’s model of truth conflicts with her model of art.
3. The power to claim “truth” confuses the adequacy of representations with the force of rhetoric.
4. The desire to represent that force creates an endless regress of signs in search of a source they endlessly supplement and displace.

The “ground” for such deconstruction appears in Wittgenstein. Where the *Tractatus* thought of representation in the pictorial form ArB, the *Philosophical Investigations* led us to view any description of such acts as entailing an agent S, a special sense of *r* in terms of the *as* or specific kind of equivalence established, and a sense of some conditions of uptake Q, which we can treat loosely here as symbolizing all the intended effects the work may have—on an audience and for the artist’s psyche and career. Thus we need to identify in our account of representation how S ArB Q can be accomplished. Derrida points the way by contrast, for he shows that each symbol identifies a point of slippage that renders representation a problematic, but probably inescapable concept.

Let me spell out only the problem of intentionality, the condition of agency S in representation, as an example of what Derrida recognizes and what artists like Malevich grapple with. Derrida tries to make us see that intentionality cannot be the purely transcendental openness Husserl dreamed of and analytic thought tried to secure by strategies modeled on Russell’s theory of types. As Sartre demonstrated, representation takes place from a position and from a desire always surpassing or placing elsewhere what it attends to. The *re-* in representation must be taken seriously because it calls our attention to an act of purposive presentation inseparable from the desired process of impersonal description. The S will prove never a neutral observer’s stance, but instead will combine roles of projection and depiction. And this means that the entire representational process will always be at once overdetermined (by the force of presentation) and undetermined (by carrying it sufficient evidence for deciding on the tasks the representation is actually intended to do). Understanding art as the imitation of models confuses ideals of description and of constructing works of art that satisfy aesthetic standards, and the pursuit of truth demands rhetorical efforts to displace other, dominant versions of the subject.

These problems are not merely epistemological delicacies teased out of the tantalizing ambiguity between subjective and objective genitive in the expression "sign of." Rather, they implicate many of the emotional issues of the relation between positions and descriptions that one might say has become the central topic of contemporary thought. Political cases of representation most clearly illustrate the complexity, for example, in what might be called the dilemma of a politician in a representative government.¹² We expect standing for and acting for to be congruent features of representation: The politician should manage in a disinterested way to act on behalf of interests that are in effect objectively determined by elections. Yet even deciding whom she represents involves two models—the empirical or actual interests of the constituents and the "real" or ideal interests that in her best judgment serve the "true" public interest. Yet the choice of whom to represent is very difficult to separate from how the representer's interests might at once be served and remain hidden. Whom she represents depends on what self she chooses or needs to present, and that need may in turn involve representations that mask it.

We might put the same case in more general terms by saying that treatments of representation by thinkers as Foucault, Derrida, and Goffman conceive descriptions as more "like" letters of recommendation than like accounts conventionally idealized as scientifically objective. They see idealization and description as interdependent, and thus as generating conflicting notions of truth. Consider as a philosophical parable the case of the student who asked a famous professor for a letter of recommendation but was told he could have only a letter of description. In this parable the object, the social practice, and the representing force are all at odds, and each has a different interest in the process of description. The professor wants his authority properly represented in his act, so he hopes that his picture will reflect his (idealized) character by showing how he refuses to idealize at least this student. (For many of us all our descriptions of our students have qualities of recommendation because they are our students and "must" represent something of us.) Yet the professor's "honesty" in one dimension becomes dishonesty in others—not simply because another fantasy shapes the presenting energy but also because the refusal to recommend can be more severely marked as negative by the institutional "model" (everybody writes "recommendations") than the agent intends in picturing his "model." Finally, consider the poor candidate for description, cast in his powerlessness as merely an object not worth the effort to falsify, which guarantees the "truth" of the message. He experiences the painful vulnerability of having to recognize that that description may not capture his "truth," but instead is, from his point of view, distorted by the very authorial act that should guarantee his distinctiveness.

V

Given the luscious ambiguities in concepts such as Representation and *mimesis*, it is not easy to say why we should not simply trace their various ways of folding into and displacing one another. Here, by what Geoffrey Hartman calls

reading against the text, we can even construct a benign deconstruction that preserves one form of the complexity of spirit. Yet such a choice would condemn us to leaving unexplored two significant alternatives. If we assume that artists honored by our traditions are generally wiser than most of their critics, of whatever persuasion, it is likely that we will see the problems, and perhaps even possible solutions, more fully if we read with or read through the text than if we read against it. Certainly Malevich's tilt reflects a profound meditation on precisely these problems of understanding how art can "represent" its own presentational force. Thus, second, it might be possible to construct from such art works, a view of the concept of representation capacious enough to preserve the vitality and complexity of fascinating fields of play like Derrida's without itself being so thoroughly subject to the endless play of vacillating oppositions. Perhaps one can see presentation and representation, or idealization and description, less as oppositions than as complementary ways of pursuing a single end. Such an account can also have an important historical dimension because it should be able to explain why presentational aesthetics developed precisely at the time when the tension between the idealizing and descriptive features of representation could no longer be concealed by symbolic and mythic strategies.

I wish to show that a rhetorical view of representation as representativeness can accomplish such a reconciliation. First, we must distinguish representation as a question of how the mind relates to the world from the specific conditions of art where signs stand in what can be a culturally grounded relationship to a sense of realities outside, beyond, or through the work.¹³ In this latter context, representation can be matter of representativeness—not a function of how signs project resemblance to states of affairs but a surrogate inviting an audience to take it as something to be identified with by projecting a possible world. The work uses aesthetic conventions to focus attention on the process of provisionally identifying with the stances, movements, or qualities of perception it constructs, so that one can reflect on how they might relate to a variety of existential conditions. The signs in art must still stand for some elements of ordinary experience, but the idea of invitation puts the emphasis on how they act for or act as what they elicit. Malevich's force depends on our accepting the work as potentially schematic, and hence as a set of conditions of action or relation we all share. When we ask "schematic of what," we begin to see that art works often reverse the normal standing-for-acting-for relationship we find in politics. To the extent that art works exemplify new configurations, we project what they stand for largely by construing how they act. And acting for is not a relation to an already existing community but a relation to a community one projects through the construction of a world one can identify with.¹⁴

Representativeness can be a property of any features of the work that allow projective identifications. Nonetheless, the fullest constructed world will obviously be created by our putting together the entire art symbol as a hierarchical organization of meanings. By identifying the authorial stance, we establish the richest parameters for identifications. Thus, a novel like *Anna Karenina* represents on one level the possible feelings of an adulteress, on another a complex

stance towards domesticity and self-discipline. If one follows upon my comments to ask what specific condition of acting for takes place in "Red Square and Black Square," one begins to get at the profound metaphysical shift Malevich inaugurated and the complexity of what I call critical situating required to get at this shift. As pure elemental relations, the painting acts for some transpersonal shapes and movements that in their materiality implicate and display conditions of creative intentionality set in the process of a self-contextualizing balance.

The most important achievement of this definition is that it avoids all temptations to collapse the epistemological force of art into any single relation of resemblance or standing for some existing state of affairs. And that means dispelling the myth of foundationalism for literature. I take as my motto for representativeness Wallace Stevens's dictum: "The measure of the poet is the measure of his sense of the world and of the extent to which it involves the sense of other people."¹⁵ From this we can see why various forms of realism and resemblance models of representation have strong appeal in art and in philosophy. If a description is true of a state of affairs, it is transpersonal and in effect compels us to acknowledge that it has representative force for all those who subscribe to the system of evaluation involved. Yet this view of description leaves unresolved the old bugaboo of empiricist theory: how to give a perspicuous account of questions of perspicacity and relevance or richness of fit. My view does, I think, account for this matter of the possible force of representations. We find them producing significant possibilities for reflecting on conditions of actions. And this view enables us to treat "realism" as having force less on descriptive than on loosely ethical or pragmatic grounds. Fidelity of resemblance matters to the extent that it can be shown to facilitate significant identifications. Graff and Lukacs are wrong in rooting a work's authority in the descriptive accuracy of its signs. Rather, the relevant question is Brecht's: What can this configuration of signs enables us to project in self-reflection about our lives, and how can it show that such identifications matter? Description is only one of many ways to connect signs and worlds, and empirical models of coherence control only some modes for appealing to representativeness.

By shifting to projective and pragmatic terms, we obviously run the danger of tempting critics to impose a single "authentic ethic," just as others try to impose a single "reality." But an emphasis on identifications also allows us to specify how criticism can serve ethical ends that do not collapse into any single dogma.¹⁶ By proposing as its basic value the possibility of significant identifications, my view at least implies a preference for preserving texts as different from one another and from us. Identifications grow feeble if they repeat themselves. So there are strong pragmatic grounds for insisting on principles like intentions in the text as our means of saving ourselves to some extent from projecting our own already constituted identities upon it. There are other available strategies, but, as I have suggested, the ideas of masterpieces and authority suggest that authors will do better for us the job of constructing possible worlds than we will do by critical deformations worked out according to our own powers and guidelines. Conversely, the possibility of rich identification serves as a useful, if not

very rigorous guideline for resolving critical knots or evaluating competing critical perspectives. The measure of a critical stance—in general and in relation to particulars—becomes how fully it allows us to recover whatever force led readers we respect (or wish to identify with) to value the work as they did. If this goal is acknowledged, the practice of criticism involves trying out various paths to this representativeness. Treating Malevich as a formalist, for example, simply blocks the possibility of understanding how he, and we, could conceive abstraction as a philosophical drama. Some critical paths lead to dead ends or to mere repetition, others allow us to see how the elements of a work establish rich possibilities of identification. “Rich” remains a contested term, but we at least know what kind of argument we must employ to justify its use.

VI

Once we adapt a rhetorical stance towards representativeness, we put ourselves in a position where many of the conventional oppositions lose their force, and it becomes possible to describe without endless vacillation some of the social roles art and criticism can play. We still need distinctions between representation and presentation, but because the aim is not description, the two need not be in pure conflict. Both are means for achieving the same end—possible self-conscious identifications in specific works as representative of human possibilities. Therefore, an aesthetic theory can try to combine elements of each in its overall design. Theory can hope to account for the force of expressive acts and authorial presence while also adapting itself to questions of structure and deliberate mediation hard to reconcile with presentational theories.

The process of untangling and retangling old oppositions is a complex one. Here I can only indicate some of the possibilities that I think follow from the overall shift I propose. Most important is the different attitude we are allowed to take towards the expressive or presentational force. Conventional models of representation as *mimesis* tend to share the distinction in analytic philosophy between propositional attitudes and the actual proposition. Only the latter easily lends itself to their principles of assessment. Similarly, mimetic theory concentrates on what the text’s argument or plot captures. It is paralyzed by authorial investments that change during the course of a work or, more generally, by the action of an authorial sensibility within the structure of resemblances to the world. These are too much like letters of recommendation. If, on the other hand, we emphasize the possible representativeness of a work, the attitude or stance displayed becomes a crucial factor. What links the work to the world is less what it says than what it demonstrates itself as doing in relationship to the world. The presenting activity has representative consequences. For movement, as in Malevich, is precisely what allows the work to have force as a possible display of conditions for acting and reflecting on actions. The work can interpret the very processes of its own rhetorical construction.

My move to rhetoric only holds off Derridean oppositions on one level, although quite a significant one. What can be presented without the displacing

energies of descriptive representation remains a matter of degree. Any discussion of intentions opens on to endless regress: We can ask about intending to intend or needing to represent what is presented. Nonetheless, it is precisely against the backdrop of this regress that we can see how much the rhetorical view gains for us. So long as we must represent the presentational act in another medium, we have translation problems and undetermination that invites deconstruction. But we can still distinguish from the translational aspect of interpretation the process by which interpretation serves simply as a means to fill out the lures for feeling engendered by the display function of the art object. As we saw in terms of the invitation in Malevich's painting, interpretation can be content with two senses of reading through a work. The interpreter brings dialectical pressure on the work so that its internal movements become purposive, and she tries to see through that movement what can be exemplified as a possible state of being in the world to be reflected upon. There is in principle, and as a possibility of critical practice, no need to translate the exemplified art into some overall meaning statable in other terms. It is sufficient to identify possible ramifications in what is displayed.¹⁷

Much depends here on the account of display one can produce for a theory of representativeness. I have discussed various features of the topic in my work on literature as performance, so I confine myself here to two features of display made basic and coherent within the view I have been arguing. First, display becomes a prominent distinguishing feature between epistemological and rhetorical or artistic concepts of representation. In epistemology, thinkers like Wittgenstein, Quine, and Rorty have argued that one can do without the concept of Representation entirely.¹⁸ What we need to test warrantable assertions is not some putative resemblance between pictures in the mind and facts in the world but simply some measure of how linguistic formulations effect practices. No discussion of mediation will have any authority or role to play independent of actual stimuli and results. Or to put the case the other way around, it is very difficult to imagine an account of mental representation because virtually any one will prove compatible with practical experience. So why bother with representation at all? SARB collapses into equivalence of Q. But such an account does not fit any view of art that emphasizes the specificity and ideality of the work, the state of difference it produces, or the practices of interpretation attentive to qualities not reducible to hypothetical-deductive reasoning. All these attributes depend on our concern for preserving the work as a particular idea or model to be reflected upon, and we want to locate its ideality in its capacity to exemplify as a specific configuration of experience general enough to apply to a variety of contexts. Wittgenstein elicited the distinctive sense of experience I am after in his remarks on "sameness" in art. For example, "You *could* select either of two poems to remind you of death, say. But supposing you had read a poem and admired it, could you say: Oh, read the other, it will do the same."¹⁹ If we are to have such specificity, we cannot collapse the object into a range of stimuli, equivalent for some relevant practice. This would collapse forms or ends into means and make irrelevant the artist's effort to create a type, or exemplification that is appreciated in part because it produces sharable identifications we can discuss as particu-

lar models. We need to preserve the specific shape of the mediation. What matters is not Q but the exemplification established by the SArB relation. We are concerned not with the motion Malevich's picture causes but with the distinctive qualities of the specific way the work presents relationships demonstrating and interpreting processes of balancing.

At this point it becomes necessary again to resist the temptation to treat what art pictures as a description. The representational structure need not refer to existing states of affairs precisely because we preserve all its configurational elements. The display is thus free to apply to possible situations: The work becomes an element of our grammar, not of our stock of truths. And as such an element, there is no problem with idealization or with closure. Idealization is simply built into art by virtue of the fact that it invites us to try on possible attitudes. We come to art knowing that it can project a variety of presentational modes—from pure fantasy to pure description—and a variety of ways of accounting for its own rhetoric as a means for developing the mode. Art works can be dialectical engagements with precisely the tensions Derrida articulates. But they neither need deconstruction nor deconstruct themselves because they offer themselves simply as conditions of possible identifications. Malevich, in fact, has his work exemplify precisely the condition of ideality that is the state of difference art produces in its refusal to be subsumed under any specific existential description. Yet even this has representative functions that lead beyond art, that suggest basic possible attributes in any condition of ecstasy or of intentionality.

Often the work will project both a condition of possibility and a plausible way of testing those possibilities. This I take to have been the project of many nineteenth-century novelists. *Middlemarch* projects a model of reading society and human actions that in turn is imaginatively tested by its events. The book's concern, then, is less with resembling states of affairs than with inviting us to try on what the text exemplifies as an ideal in order to explore a better way of reading than we ordinarily practice. The descriptive adequacy is rhetorical means, not a thematic end. Yet we ignore this point constantly in our fear of closure by acting as if the work wanted to impose its descriptive categories as exclusive interpretive ones. It is, of course, possible and sometimes necessary to idealize counterideals and to exemplify attitudes devoted to resisting the imposition of types. Yet it is equally possible and necessary to try out possible forms of totalizing interpretation. Closure, in other words, is a projected ideal to be tested as such. We can take the effort as a description and exalt it into a dogma. But we can carry anything to extremes. We come much closer to the way works project identifications if we take the effort to produce closure as simply a rhetorical, imaginative test of how far a given stance will take us. The end is not to close off other ways of reading but to project the possibilities inherent in one attitude or mode of integrative thought. To stress only resistance to closure is like reading Malevich's painting only for the tilt, without attention to its quest for a composing balance that idealizes a presentational force, capable of regathering what desire sunders.

I do not intend to suggest that because art is an invitation to provisional identifications it is culturally benign. Art has culturally constructive roles. Of this we

occasionally need reminding. But all invitations have their demonic features. Representativeness, like representating, involves wills to power. But by stressing representativeness, we can preserve the extensive and rich features of the work of art that function as display and allow us to judge in terms of our identifications the nature and value of the power projected. Artists can give audiences credit for recognizing and using in their own ways what gets exemplified as forms of power. There remain, of course, forms of power that are not exemplified, not self-consciously displayed by a work but hidden in it or hidden by it. Of these, I can only say that a rhetorical approach to representation puts suspicion back in the right place, or at least in the dramatically most interesting place. Stanley Cavell argues that philosophy's mistake is assuming that skepticism is only a philosophical problem rather than one deeply embedded in difficulties of establishing human trust and sharable projects.²⁰ Similarly, much of modern theory errs by treating the source of suspicion in art as an epistemological condition located in signs and a problematic of description. Art's danger is far more serious—we must suspect the very condition of agency that offers the work to us as a structure of possibilities. Only by such extreme measures can we at once defend ourselves against being taken in and recognize the full joy of finding a community based on invitations that resist our attempts to discredit them. The condition of resistance is precisely the condition that allows us to surpass tests of description and to explore what imaginative identifications with a range of works will produce as criteria of judgment.

VII

Because so much of this chapter is obviously addressed to problems most pressing upon literary critics, I want to conclude by stating why Malevich seems to me so useful a representative for my case. (I might add that if *The Truth in Painting* is a sign, art critics will soon face the same problems their literary brethren do.) The primary connections are historical. Noniconic painting has qualities of literalness and immediacy that allow it to exemplify better than any literary work the properties most important to the presentational aesthetics of modernism. It is fairly easy to show how these properties become important because of the painters' and poets' profound distrust of a representational heritage no longer able to hide problematic transitions between empirical descriptions, type universals, and idealizing recommendations of human powers. But my concern here is with the historical dialectic one can construct in relation to those presentational strategies. Malevich did not share my theory. There is no one less likely to have accepted a rhetorical view of art than Malevich. He saw art as compulsion, not as invitation. Indeed, he accepted the dominant ideal of empiricist representation—that a structure of signs, properly fitted to the world, should and could compel universal assent. He differed from that tradition in where he located the compulsion. Aware of the duplicities inherent in description, Malevich turned to a neo-Kantian strategy. He would impose compulsion not by the force of resemblance but by producing literal schema that in themselves captured the essential truths of our mental powers of construction. Abstraction, then,

seemed a form of compulsion deeper than any description because descriptions are only historical positivities whereas abstraction captures what remains constant for everyone's mind in a variety of descriptions.

In this light, modernism is reduced to abstraction because its skepticism about the duplicity inherent in traditions of representation that could combine realistic and idealistic (or religious) elements forced it to take mental structures as the only possible ways of compelling representativeness. All other art forms were masked letters of recommendation. Yet in that very act of abstraction, modernists like Malevich enable us to recover what is perhaps the most typical classical attitude towards representation. From Aristotle's probable impossibles to Reynold's universals, artists and theorists rarely had to grapple with the epistemological framework that equated representation with description.²¹ So they were free to understand representation as the production of possible schema for imaginative stances. But schema in a pre-Kantian universe are not candidates for expressing the essence of the mind so much as specific displays that can function to indicate typical possibilities of identification. The schema displayed in art works function simply as rhetorical invitations. At our culture's most self-critical and reductive moment, it may have rediscovered the ideas of art as projection that sustained its most generous and capacious spiritual ideals. And if this is even half true, there is a good deal not to despair about in the current emergence of a variety of philosophical perspectives that replace positivist ideals of compulsion by description with invitations to explore possible worlds.

NOTES

1. Malevich, *Essays on Art, 1915–1928*, vol. I, trans. Xenia Glowacki-Prus and Arnold McMillen (Copenhagen: Borgen, 1968), 123–25. For Mondria, see "Natural Reality and Abstract Reality," in *Theories of Modern Art*, ed. Herschel B. Chipps (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 322–23. The best work I know on how these "representations" have "content" is Leo Steinberg, *Other Criteria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 289–306, and Marcelin Pleynet, "Mondrian vingt-cinq ans apres," in his *Systeme de la Peinture* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977), 133–43. And for my understanding of specific concepts related to abstraction, I am indebted to Harold Osborne, *Abstraction and Artifice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979).

2. In using an idea of coherence, I refer simply to an attitude we take toward a text as we attempt to integrate its salient features. We may find them incoherent or a coherent analysis of incoherence, and so on. I also wish to acknowledge here that some of my terms and specific formulations derive from the following lecturers at an International Association for Philosophy and Literature Meeting on the subject of Representation: Geoffrey Hartman, Linda Dittmar, William Grimes, and Gerald Bruns.

3. For the best summary I know of versions of realism, which also reveal the quest for grounds of resemblance, see Marshall Brown, "The Logic of Realism: A Hegelian Approach," *PMLA* 96 (1981): 224–30.

4. I hope that this one quotation from Malevich (*Essays*, vol. 2, 138–39) suffices to indicate the general nature of his intentions:

"In the case of Suprematist contrast it is the different scales of the form, i.e., the sizes (dimensions) of Suprematist Elements in their mutual interrelations that have the

greatest significance. In this case color in no way corresponds to form like form to color, but it is only combined by means of the dimensions and scales of space. . . . The creation of these sensations may really be an expression of the essence of phenomena in the non-objective functions of the universe.

"This essence of phenomena is sensed non-objectively, since that is the nature of its reality. This reality will never be consciously realized, since the consciousness of form is contained in the object, in something concrete, and man strives to understand it. . . .

"The world, which is understood by sensation is a constant world. The world which consciousness understands as a form is not constant. Forms disappear and alter, whereas sensations neither disappear nor alter. A ball, motor, aeroplane or arrow are different forms, but the sensation of dynamism is the same. . . .

"Thus the investigation of phenomena by purely formal method brings us to forms . . . but after that we must rely on sensation which should complete that which cannot be shown by the formal method. . . .

"Only the formal approach to the universe still does allow complete fusion between man and the universe.

"The formal method discovers the forms of phenomena, but not their reality or spirit. . . . For form, color and spirit are phenomena with different states of energy. The total combination of their states in the universe in which my life is determined is a constant link with or in constant sensation of the spiritual aspect of the forces of the universe, both with and without image. This link in its turn calls for the activity from one which is expressed in the creation of a new phenomena; the creation of these phenomena will depend on the quality, or capacity to conceive the image, its stableness will depend on the power of the imagination. Thanks to this striving there arises a mass of things that ought to determine my ideas."

5. Malevich, *The World as Non-objectivity*. Unpublished writings, 1922–1925, trans. Xenia Glowacki-Prus and Edmund Little (Copenhagen: Borgen, 1976), 16.

6. Alexander Gelley uses the idea of schema to handle specific "mimetic" representations on a level more abstract than most commentators on realism do. See his "Metonymy, Schematism, and the Space of Literature," *NLH* 3 (1980): 469–88. Gelley provides a framework within which we can see noniconic artists taking a more radical Kantian step in an already established direction of inquiry.

7. I cite from Perry's "Perception, Action and the Structure of Believing," forthcoming in a *feitschrift* for Paul Grice edited by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner.

8. For Gombrich on representation, see especially "Meditation on a Hobby Horse," in *Meditation on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art* (New York: Phaidon, 1978), 1–11; and *Art and Illusion* (Princeton, NJ: Bollingen Press, 1960). I quote from *Art and Illusion*, 38, 111. I distinguish symbolic from realistic in accordance with Gombrich's discussion of Egyptians treating the "Pharoah's Size" as representing status while the Greeks read the painting as the actual story of a hero, larger than life (cf. 135–36). For Gombrich's dislike of expression theories and of abstract art, see *Meditation*, 56–69, 143–50.

9. Maurice Denis, "Definition of Neo-Traditionism," in Chipp, ed., 99.

10. Gerald Graff, *Literature against Itself* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), especially chapters 1, 2, 6, 8. I analyze specific problems in his arguments—for example, what can be said to represent what in a story—in my *Act and Quality* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), a work that also provides a general account of the rhetorical or "dramatistic" perspective I develop here and which clarifies how I use Goodman on exemplification. I should also note an increasingly popular contemporary

perspective on representation as resemblance that seems to combine expressivist and descriptive categories in a way absolutely opposed to my own. From Bakhtin on the one hand, Paul de Man on the other, we find emerging a realism based on negative rather than positive categories: A "true" representation is one that shows the failure of all our interpretive categories and leaves a residue we take as full or recognizable human reality. For this applied to the drama see Howard Felperin, *Shakespearean Representation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), and for an idealized application that makes the novel a privileged form (and reveals Felperin's bias) see Michael Holquist and Walter Reed, "Six Theses on the Novel—and Some Metaphors," *NLH* 3 (1980): 413–24. These seem to me profoundly pyrrhic arguments, like New Critical versions of the nondiscursive, because they give literature a content that transcends and cancels any predications the medium might allow us to make about nontextual experience.

11. Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. G. Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 10.

12. My use of ideas such as "standing for" and "acting for" are strongly influenced by Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

13. For my purposes it does not matter whether we ground the art function or purpose in illocutionary conventions, aesthetic attitudes, art worlds, or authorial intentions. And I claim adequacy only within traditions that grant some distinctive attitude to how we examine an aesthetic object as a significant particular. These are compatible with a wide variety of theories on how we use what is so constituted.

14. For an analytical account of art works as not bound by Kripke's causal view of names and hence as providing a range of imaginative identities, see Mary Bittner Wiseman, "Identifying Subjects," forthcoming in *American Philosophical Review*. And for a radical literary account of Romanticism as the projection of possibilities rather than description, see Donal Pease, "Blake, Crane, Whitman and Modernism: A Poetics of Pure Possibility," *PMLA* 96 (1981): 64–85.

15. Wallace Stevens, *The Necessary Angel* (New York: Vintage, 1965), 123–24.

16. My alternative is a pluralism of means that I do not think necessarily entails an individual supporting a pluralism of ends. On this subject see my essay, "Taking Ends Seriously: Criteria for Discussing the Purposes of Literary Criticism."

17. This, I realize now, is what Wittgenstein means by displaying one's critical grasp of a work by performing it or showing how to go on with it. See his *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). And for an attempt to generalize this criterion of going on, which I now see (from Henry Staten) misses the radical nature of Wittgenstein's questions but works for practical cases, see my "Going On and Going Nowhere: Wittgenstein and the Question of Criteria in Literary Criticism," in *Literature and Philosophy*, ed. William Cain.

18. For a good summary of the arguments against using ideas of mental representation in epistemology, see Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), chaps. 1–3.

19. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations*, 34.

20. Stanley Cavell, *The Claims of Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pts. 1, 4.

21. W. J. T. Mitchell makes a similar point about the change in the status of image, from being largely verbal to being largely pictorial, once empiricism takes hold. His essay "What Is an Image," in *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), overlaps with mine, I think, in several supportive ways.

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